


Peter W. Edbury

Kingdoms of the Crusaders

From Jerusalem to Cyprus



THE HISTORY OF THE

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
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PREFACE

The twenty-one studies that comprise this collection appeared between 1974 and 1997. All are concerned with the history and institutions of the kingdoms founded by the crusaders in the East: the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem and Lusignan kingdom of Cyprus. Some of the earliest (III, VI, XII, XIII, XXI) draw on work that formed part of my doctoral dissertation, 'The Feudal Nobility of Cyprus, 1192-1400' (St Andrews, 1975). 'William of Tyre and the Patriarchal Election of 1180' (II) was written jointly with Professor John Gordon Rowe of the University of Western Ontario, and I am very grateful to John for generously agreeing to allow me to include it here. This paper marked the start of a fruitful collaboration that culminated in the appearance of our *William of Tyre: Historian of the Latin East* (C.U.P., 1988). The first paper in this volume was originally conceived as a response to a reviewer who pointed out that we could have said more in our book about William of Tyre and the politics of the Baldwin IV's reign. The other major project which occupied me for much of the late 1970s and 1980s centred on the island of Cyprus and eventually saw light of day as *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades* (C.U.P., 1991). Most of the papers in the sections on Cyprus represent work done in connection with that book, either as pilot studies or by way of tying up loose ends after it was published. In recent years my interests have become increasingly concentrated on the legal texts from the Latin East. The papers in the section entitled 'Lawyers and Legal Texts' reflect this current concern and also serve to demonstrate that my investigations into this field in fact go back a long way.

Inevitably in a collection of studies spanning almost a quarter of a century, there are mistakes and places where I now no longer hold to the views I once had. Some of the more significant of these points are touched on in the *addenda et corrigenda* at the end of this volume.

For various reasons it has been necessary to reset no. XV, and I have taken the opportunity to make a number of minor corrections. This paper originally appeared in the publication of a conference held at Poitiers in 1993 to mark the 600th anniversary of the death of Leo of Lusignan, the last king of Cilician Armenia: *Les Lusignans et l'Outre Mer* (Poitiers: Conseil Regional Poitou-Charente/Université de Poitiers, 1995), pp.132-40. I thank the sponsors of this conference, the Association 'Les Lusignans et Mélusine' for agreeing to allow me to publish this revised version. Two other papers were first published in French and

appear here in English for the first time. They are no. XIX, originally 'La classe des propriétaires terriens franco-chypriotes et l'exploitation des ressources rurales de l'île de Chypre' in M. Balard (ed.), *État et colonisation au Moyen Age* (Lyon, 1989), pp.145-52, and no. XX, originally 'Le régime des Lusignan en Chypre et la population locale' in A. Ducellier and M. Balard (eds), *Coloniser au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1995), pp.354-8, 364-5. I am most grateful to Professor Michel Balard for consenting to their publication in this form.

I would also like to express my thanks to the copyright holders and publishers who have so generously given me permission to reproduce other studies here: E.J. Brill (I); The Oxford University Press (II, VI, VII); Professor P. Yannopoulos (III); The Royal Historical Society (V); Professor C. Yiangoullis, director of the Cyprus Research Centre (VIII, XVI, XXI); Frank Cass and Co. Ltd (IX); Professor M. Iacovou of the Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation (XI); Professor P. Holt (XII); Elsevier Science (XIII); George C. Ioannides, President of the Society of Cypriot Studies (XIV); R. Oldenbourg Verlag (XVII); Professor Laura Balletto (XVIII).

PETER EDBURY

Cardiff
December 1998

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The articles in this volume, as in all others in the Collected Studies Series, have not been given a new, continuous pagination. In order to avoid confusion, and to facilitate their use where these same studies have been referred to elsewhere, the original pagination has been maintained wherever possible.

Each article has been given a Roman numeral in order of appearance, as listed in the Contents. This number is repeated on each page and quoted in the index entries.

I

PROPAGANDA AND FACTION IN THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM: THE BACKGROUND TO HATTIN

One question a colloquium on the theme of Crusaders and Muslims in twelfth-century Syria might appropriately consider is why Guy of Lusignan and the army of the Latin East should have lost at Hattin. It is a question that can be answered on various levels, but historians are, I think, unanimous in believing that at least part of the blame for the Christians' defeat rests on the divisions among their leaders. The Muslims under Saladin had entered the Latin Kingdom and, probably with the deliberate intention of drawing the Christians into battle, laid siege to Tiberias. The king meanwhile had mobilized his entire strength at Saffūriyah. According to both Ernoul and Ibn al-Athīr, Raymond of Tripoli pointed out the unwisdom of trying to relieve Tiberias, but Reynald of Châtillon, supported by the Templar master, Gerard of Ridefort, accused him of duplicity. King Guy, who had been helped to the throne by Reynald and Gerard but who had encountered bitter opposition from Raymond, seems to have rejected his advice. The army set off; progress was slow, and it pitched camp for the night in an arid spot. Raymond's worst fears had come true: Saladin had succeeded in getting the Christian army into an exposed position, and the outcome was the catastrophic defeat of 4 July 1187.¹

An explanation of the background to the king's decision to disregard Raymond's counsel is readily available in some of the best known books on the crusades published in the last fifty years. Ever since the time of the leper king, Baldwin IV (1174–85), so the story goes, there had been a polarization between the established baronage of the kingdom and what is often termed the 'court party', many members of which were, like Guy of Lusignan himself, first generation settlers in the East. Count Raymond III of Tripoli, Baldwin of Ramla and his brother Balian of Ibelin, the second husband of King Amaury's widow Maria Comnena,

¹ For a reconstruction of these events, see M. C. Lyons and D. E. P. Jackson, *Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War* (Cambridge 1982) 256–61; cf. J. Præwer, *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford 1980) 484–500.

Reynald, lord of Sidon, and Archbishop William of Tyre, the celebrated historian, are regarded as the leading figures on the baronial side, while the 'court party' is identified as including Baldwin IV's mother, Agnes of Courtenay, her brother Joscelin, the seneschal of Jerusalem and titular count of Edessa, Reynald of Châtillon, a former prince of Antioch and now lord of Oultrejourdain, Guy of Lusignan and his brother Aimery, Patriarch Eraclius of Jerusalem and Gerard of Ridefort, who had become master of the Templars in 1185. The weakness inherent in having a king who was a chronic invalid, coupled with disputes over the regency and the succession to the throne, had brought the tensions between these two groups to the fore. What was more, there was a fundamental division between them as to how to deal with the growing Muslim threat: the baronial faction, made up as it was of men who were long familiar with the ways of the Near East, favoured a peace policy; by contrast, the court faction, which included newcomers to the East anxious to strike a blow for the Faith and ignorant of political realities, favoured aggression. Thus, in July 1187, Reynald and Gerard's desire to confront the enemy and Raymond's advice to temporize were in keeping with their known attitudes. In the event Raymond's policy was vindicated, or, to be more precise, that of his opponents was discredited, and historians, taking their cue from the principal narrative accounts of these years, have in consequence tended to give the baronial party a 'good press' and regard their rivals with disdain. The clearest expressions of this interpretation of politics in the years leading up to Hattin are to be found in the writings of Marshall W. Baldwin and Sir Steven Runciman. Baldwin's seminal study, *Raymond III of Tripolis and the Fall of Jerusalem*, appeared as long ago as 1936 and his chapters in the first volume of the Wisconsin (*née* Pennsylvania) *History of the Crusades* in 1955, while the relevant volume of Runciman's *History of the Crusades* was first published in 1952. Without doubt these scholars influenced a whole generation: for example, Hans Eberhard Mayer, whose highly successful one-volume history of the crusades first appeared in its English translation in 1972, was clearly in their debt when writing on this period.²

So there were factions or parties in which newcomers were

² See in particular, K. M. Setton, general ed., *A History of the Crusades* 1 (2nd ed. Madison 1969) 591–2; S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades* (Cambridge 1951–5) 2 405; H. E. Mayer, *The Crusades* (Oxford 1972) 128–9. In the second English edition of his book (Oxford 1988) at pages 127–31, Mayer has expanded and somewhat modified his remarks.

pitted against the old-established baronage; 'hawks' *versus* 'doves'. It has been an influential orthodoxy, but an orthodoxy that needs to be called in question. It is unsatisfactory on several counts. For a start, the categorization simply will not do. Agnes and Joscelin of Courtenay were the direct descendants of a participant in the First Crusade and had lived all their lives in the East. Reynald of Châtillon, generally regarded as the greatest exponent of an aggressive policy towards the Muslims, had been in the East since the time of the Second Crusade, forty years earlier. Both he and Joscelin had endured long periods of captivity and so would have been well aware of the military realities and the penalties for any error of judgement. To describe their party as a party of newcomers is therefore misleading, and it is quite unfair to insinuate that they were anxious to do battle with the Muslims because they were ignorant and inexperienced.³ Nor was the 'old baronage' uniformly arrayed against them. The 'court party' saw the young Humphrey of Toron, a member of a distinguished baronial family, as a suitable husband for King Amaury's daughter, Isabella, and in 1186 Humphrey showed where his own sympathies lay by refusing to allow himself to be used as a figurehead by Raymond of Tripoli in opposition to Guy of Lusignan. It might also be noted that Agnes of Courtenay remained married to the prominent baronial leader, Reynald of Sidon, until at least 1179 and probably until her death in about 1185.⁴

Similarly, to regard the 'court party' as a party of 'hawks' and the baronial party as 'doves' will not stand scrutiny. Our sources record two substantive truces between the kingdom of Jerusalem and Saladin in the years before Hattin. The first, agreed in 1180, lasted until early 1182. It is a moot point as to who had more to gain by a cessation of hostilities: Saladin wanted his hands free for a campaign in eastern Anatolia; the Christians needed a respite after their defeat the previous year. However, William of Tyre, who suggests that the initiative for the truce came from the Christian side, makes it clear that in 1180 Raymond of Tripoli

³ A point well made by J. Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem* (2nd ed. Paris 1975) 1 595–6. In the discussion following this paper, J. Riley-Smith pointed out that, in the case of the Lusignans, though they themselves were immigrants, members of their family had been coming to the East since the time of the First Crusade.

⁴ B. Hamilton, "Women in the Crusader States: the Queens of Jerusalem (1100–1190)," in D. Baker, ed., *Medieval Women* (Oxford 1978) 163–4. For Humphrey of Toron, idem, "The Elephant of Christ: Reynald of Châtillon," in *Monastic Reform, Catharism and the Crusades (900–1300)* (London 1979) 101–105.

was absent from the kingdom while the negotiations were taking place and that his opponents were in control. The truce was therefore the work of the 'court party'. Indeed, it is evident from William's narrative that it did not cover Raymond's own county of Tripoli.⁵ The second truce was agreed in 1185 and held until the early part of 1187. On this occasion, Raymond, who by now was regent in Jerusalem, was responsible. According to Ernoul, he had the full support of the barons and had consulted the masters of the Hospitallers and Templars; the truce had been prompted by a drought that had led to food shortages and, once it had been agreed, traders from the Muslim lands were able to bring in plenty of supplies. There is nothing to suggest that the truce was sought because Raymond was opposed to war with the Muslims *per se*, and, if Ernoul is to be believed, it had the support of all, including presumably Gerard of Ridefort and Reynald of Châtillon.⁶

More pertinent in a discussion of the background to Hattin is the question of the policy to be adopted in the event of a Muslim invasion. The Christians could either do battle with the enemy, or they could seek to contain the invading forces by shadowing the movements of the main Muslim army and trying to cut off its supplies and reinforcements in the knowledge that sooner or later it would disperse of its own accord. Both responses had their dangers. Pitched battles were risky, and it is clear that the rulers of Jerusalem had insufficient troops to put an army in the field and also garrison their strong-points. In 1182, 1183 and 1187 the mobilization of the kingdom's military resources to meet Saladin's invading army had denuded at least some of the fortresses of defenders. Contemporaries would have been well aware that if the field army were defeated, there was no second line of defence. On the other hand, by not engaging the invader, the Christian leaders would expose the countryside to pillage and invite the censure of arm-chair strategists who would accuse them cowardice and inaction.⁷

During the decade before Hattin both strategies were employed. Thus in 1177 the forces of the Latin Kingdom scored a notable

⁵ William of Tyre *Chronicon*, R. B. C. Huygens, ed. (Turnhout 1986) (henceforward WT) XXII 1; cf. XXII 2-3 for Tripoli. For a discussion of this truce from the Muslim perspective, see Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin* 144-7.

⁶ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)*, M. R. Morgan, ed. (Paris 1982) 23-4. For the Muslim side, see Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin* 221-2.

⁷ See R. C. Smail, *Crusading Warfare, 1097-1193* (Cambridge 1956) 135-7 149-56.

success in pitched battle against Saladin at Montgisard, although in 1179 at Marj 'Uyūn the Christians having sought battle, were caught off guard and defeated. In 1183, however, the Christians under Guy of Lusignan refused to give battle, and, despite the Muslim *razzias*, their policy of caution and containment can be said to have succeeded.⁸ Raymond of Tripoli's advice in 1187 to avoid engagement even although it meant risking the fall of his own city of Tiberias is famous; indeed, it is largely on the strength of this advice and the fact that he had negotiated the 1185 truce that his reputation as an advocate of peace and circumspection depends. Equally famous is the espousal by Reynald of Châtillon and Gerard of Ridefort of direct confrontation. What is less clear is whether it is right to assume that Raymond's advocacy of avoiding battle should be seen as the hallmark of baronial attitudes in contradistinction to those of his opponents.

In 1182 Baldwin IV led his forces into Oultrejourdain to confront Saladin who was intent on attacking Reynald's fortress of Kerak. According to William of Tyre, Raymond of Tripoli had advised against deploying the Christian forces there, since other parts of the kingdom would be left unprotected; and William, who evidently sympathized with Raymond's viewpoint, went on to record how the Muslims were able to enter Galilee from the direction of Damascus and cause considerable havoc. Raymond's attitude in 1182 would seem to have been consistent with his attitude in 1187: risk the fall of a particular fortified point (Kerak in 1182; Tiberias in 1187) rather than chance the outcome of a pitched battle, and at the same time keep the army in position for more general defensive duties. William's disgust at the strategy chosen in 1182 was heightened by the fact that Baldwin's army missed its opportunities to catch Saladin's forces at a disadvantage.⁹

But William's account of the 1183 campaign suggests a very different approach by Raymond and the barons.¹⁰ The Christians, commanded by Guy of Lusignan who was now regent for the largely incapacitated Baldwin IV, rightly anticipated that Saladin would invade Galilee and so mobilized their own forces in

⁸ R. C. Smail, "The Predicaments of Guy of Lusignan, 1183-87," in B. Z. Kedar, H. E. Mayer and R. C. Smail, eds., *Outremer: Studies in the History of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Jerusalem 1982) 169.

⁹ WT XXII 15-16. See Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin* 165-7.

¹⁰ For what follows, see Smail, "Predicaments," 164-71. William of Tyre's account of the campaign and its aftermath is at XXII 27-8 30. See also Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin* 204-8.

readiness. At the end of September Saladin led his army across the Jordan. Guy brought his into proximity to the Muslims but refused to do battle. Although Saladin sent out raiding parties, Guy's tactics in effect prevented him from achieving anything of significance, and after a few days he withdrew to Damascus. The presence of what was evidently a substantial Christian army would have stopped Saladin from undertaking any major siege, and at the same time the Christians could occupy the best water supplies and threaten the Muslims' lines of communication. All in all the campaign would appear as a text-book example of how to conduct a successful defensive strategy with minimum risk; in 1187 Raymond would presumably have expected events to have taken a not-too-dissimilar course had his advice been followed. However, according to William of Tyre, in 1183 Guy's position as commander was deeply resented, and at the critical stage in the campaign, when Saladin was trying to draw him into a military engagement, he was faced by a refusal to cooperate on the part of at least some of the barons who were with him;¹¹ then, when the campaign was over, these same barons—Raymond of Tripoli, Reynald of Sidon, Balian and Baldwin of Ibelin, together with Prince Bohemond III of Antioch—exploited the criticism he had incurred for his failure to join battle to have him removed from his regency. In other words, it has to be assumed that these men either believed, or affected to believe afterwards, that the Christian army should have accepted Saladin's challenge and risked a full-scale conflict.

In matters of diplomacy and military strategy there is therefore no clear pattern. At different times truces were agreed by both Raymond of Tripoli and his opponents, and, if Raymond was the exponent of cautious containment in 1182 and 1187, Guy of Lusignan adopted this line of policy in 1183 only to incur the strident criticism of the barons. So rather than behave consistently as 'hawks' or 'doves', it would seem that all concerned tended to adopt a pragmatic view of the best policy to be adopted.

There is, however, no denying the existence of personal animosities among the higher nobility during these years. What is less clear is how far it is correct to speak of coherent groupings with identifiable aims or policies—indeed, whether it is helpful to think in terms of 'factions' or 'parties' at all. William of Tyre's account of events is especially useful because he was not writing

¹¹ There is a lacuna in William's text at this point in his narrative. WT XXII, 28 line 55.

after Hattin and so did not have the benefit of hindsight or feel the urge to apportion blame. He was quite categorical: Raymond of Tripoli was the most capable figure in the kingdom.¹² Usually William's partiality for Raymond is linked with the idea that Raymond had given him both the chancellorship and his archbishopric during his regency at the start of Baldwin IV's reign. However, remarks made by Ibn Jubair, an Arab visitor to Palestine in 1184, would seem to confirm William's opinion,¹³ and so it could well be that William was voicing a commonly held view. It would certainly be wrong to question the sincerity of his judgement on the basis of the charges that were being levelled against Raymond in the aftermath of Hattin at a time when some people were trying to hold Raymond responsible for the defeat. But we must also consider William's wider purpose in writing. At the very end of the *Historia*, with Baldwin too ill to continue ruling, he was concerned to portray the kingdom as being safe in Raymond's hands; he wanted to believe, and he wanted his readers in the West to believe, that Jerusalem was being properly and ably governed. It has been argued elsewhere that his *Historia* is an *apologia* for the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and in particular for the kingship of Baldwin IV. William had emphasized Baldwin's abilities as a capable military leader (although other evidence suggests that in 1177 the Christian commander at the victory at Montgisard was Reynald of Châtillon and not the king as William indicated) and stressed his legitimacy (although this was explicitly contradicted by Ernoul, and a contemporary Arabic letter suggests that his accession in 1174 was not accepted as readily as William would have us believe). William would not have wanted his readers to think any less of Baldwin's effective successor.¹⁴

William furnishes no evidence to suggest that the political divisions which emerged in the 1180s were already in existence during the previous decade. In 1174 Raymond had come forward as a candidate for the regency in opposition to Miles of Plancy, a recent arrival in the East who had enjoyed the favour of his distant kinsman, King Amaury. William named Humphrey of Toron the constable, Baldwin and Balian of Ibelin, and Reynald

¹² WT XXII 30; cf. XXII 10 XXIII 1.

¹³ *Les voyages d'Ibn Jobair*, M. Gaudefroy-Demombynes, ed. and trans. (Paris 1949-65) 362.

¹⁴ P. W. Edbury and J. G. Rowe, *William of Tyre, Historian of the Latin East* (Cambridge 1988) 76-7 79. For Ernoul's denial of Baldwin's legitimacy, see *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 20.

of Sidon as being among Raymond's supporters. But bearing in mind that the other two major figures of the reign, Count Joscelin and Reynald of Châtillon, were still held captive and that Reynald of Sidon was Agnes of Courtenay's husband, this list would seem to confirm William's claim that there was a consensus calling for Raymond's elevation and that Miles was politically isolated, rather than indicate that Raymond's assumption of power rested on the support of a baronial clique.¹⁵ The men mentioned by William were indeed the leading figures of the time, as their position among the witnesses to Baldwin IV's charters confirms, and he gave almost identical lists, although now with the addition of Reynald of Châtillon and Joscelin, when enumerating the chief participants in the military operations of 1177 and 1183.¹⁶ William provides no other references to Raymond acting in collusion with the barons before 1180—indeed, but for his presence at the battle of Marj 'Uyūn in 1179, Raymond seems have remained in the county of Tripoli after 1175¹⁷—and William was sharply critical of two other 'baronial' figures: the constable, Humphrey of Toron, for his role in the campaign of 1175, and Reynald of Sidon for his role in 1179.¹⁸ William has two further scraps of evidence that would seem to cut across the usual interpretation of political divisions. In his account of the events of 1175, he recorded the election of Eraclius to the archbishopric of Caesarea. At the time Raymond may still have been regent, and so it is possible that, as Bernard Hamilton has suggested, Eraclius, like William himself, owed his promotion to Raymond's patronage or approval.¹⁹ Secondly, in 1177 he noted the marriage of Balian of Ibelin and King Amaury's widow, Maria Comnena, *with the king's consent*. In other words, at a time when it is assumed that the influence of

¹⁵ WT XXI 3.

¹⁶ WT XXI 21; XXII 28. For the royal charters, see e.g. R. Röhrich, ed., *R[egesta] R[egni] H[ierosolymitani (1097–1291)]* (Innsbruck 1893, 1904) nos. 537 562 593. All those mentioned in the text witness frequently, although not invariably.

¹⁷ WT XXI 28; cf. 10 18. Raymond does not appear as a witness to the royal charters in the late 1170s.

¹⁸ WT XXI 8 28. But compare William's obituary of Humphrey at XXI 26.

¹⁹ WT XXI 9; cf. XXI 8; B. Hamilton, *The Latin Church in the Crusader States: the Secular Church* (London 1980) 80. There are chronological uncertainties that may invalidate Hamilton's suggestion: the context of William's notice of his election is the death of the previous archbishop, and it is not known how long the vacancy lasted; nor is it clear when precisely Raymond relinquished his regency. Ernoul (*La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 49–50) claimed that he owed his archbishopric to Agnes of Courtenay. RRH no. 539, issued at some point during 1176, is the earliest document recording Eraclius as archbishop. If Eraclius's election took place in 1176 rather than directly after the death his predecessor in mid 1175, there is no reason why Agnes should not have had a hand in it.

the Courtenays was pre-eminent and with Raymond out of the way in Tripoli, the king allowed Balian to make an extremely advantageous union with a woman who was not only a close relative of the Byzantine emperor and mother of his own half-sister, but who also brought him her marriage portion, the valuable town of Nablus and its *banlieue*²⁰.

William rarely drew attention to political infighting in Baldwin's reign. One notable exception is his outburst directed at the king's mother, Agnes of Courtenay, a woman who was a 'utterly detestable to God and assiduous in her acquisitiveness', and her brother Joscelin. The context was an incident that took place in late 1181 or early 1182 in which Baldwin, supposedly at their instigation and that of other evil counsellors, refused Raymond of Tripoli entry into the kingdom on the grounds that he was out to supplant him.²¹ There is no doubting that both Agnes and her brother the seneschal were using their position to acquire landed property for themselves—Hans Mayer has spoken of Joscelin's 'sheer and unparalleled greed'²²—but precisely what was going on is not clear: maybe Raymond was making a bid to take control of the kingdom. William seems to indicate that it was the king's attitude, rather than that of his advisers, that was crucial. He described how 'the more important barons' then persuaded Baldwin, much against his will, to let Raymond return to the kingdom and be reconciled to him.²³ This episode was clearly connected in some way with the events of 1180 when, as William records, Baldwin was stampeded by fear that Raymond and Bohemond III of Antioch were out to dethrone him into marrying his sister and heiress, Sybilla, to Guy of Lusignan.²⁴

In late 1174 and 1175 Raymond had acted as regent; after 1175 he had spent his time in the north; when in 1180 and again in 1181 or 1182 he tried to make a comeback in the Latin kingdom he was rebuffed. As the closest adult potential heir to the throne and as count of Tripoli and, by marriage, lord of Tiberias, he could not but be a powerful figure in the kingdom should he choose to remain there. It therefore comes as no surprise that the king's mother and uncle, who as seneschal would have had

²⁰ WT XXI 17.

²¹ WT XXII 10.

²² *The Crusades* 2nd ed. 128. For Agnes's acquisition of Toron and Chastel Neuf, see Hamilton, "Women in the Crusader States," 167.

²³ A surviving royal charter shows that Raymond was back in the Latin Kingdom and attending the High Court by April 1182. RRH no. 615 cf. nos. 617 624.

²⁴ WT XXII 1.

a considerable degree of control over the day-to-day running of the king's government and household, opposed his return. There is no indication that in 1180 Raymond found any support within the kingdom, but in 1181 or 1182 it was a group of barons who persuaded the king to receive him back into favour. In the meantime Guy of Lusignan had married Sibylla, Baldwin's sister and heiress. Guy had thus come to stand between Raymond and the regency just as he had come to stand between Raymond and the succession. What was more, if later evidence is to be believed, in marrying Sibylla, Guy had thwarted the ambitions of Baldwin of Ramla who had hoped to marry her himself.²⁵

Guy is thus the pivotal figure in these events. The circumstances of his marriage at a time when Raymond and Bohemond were regarded as a threat to the political status quo in Jerusalem had the effect of tying the Courtenays to his own political fortunes; it also assured him of the hostility of Raymond and Ibelins. He was a newcomer whose meteoric rise caused resentment. William of Tyre was probably not alone in regarding him as unfitted by both birth and temperament for the responsibilities he now had to bear.²⁶ In 1183 Guy became regent, but his critics did not have long to wait before they had an opportunity to strike. As mentioned already, they seized on his conduct of the military operations of that year to discredit him, but in fact Guy played into their hands by allowing himself to be drawn into a quarrel with the king over a completely different issue, namely the king's personal income. Perhaps it was because of this quarrel that Agnes's voice was added to clamor calling for his removal from the regency. The upshot was a complete reversal of fortunes: Guy was dismissed and humiliated; the young Baldwin V was crowned in a move designed to pre-empt the possibility of Sibylla and her husband ascending the throne; Raymond was installed as regent.²⁷ The king's attitude was crucial: he may have been ill, but his wishes and opinions were nevertheless of the utmost significance. Just as in 1180–82 Baldwin had been determined to keep Raymond away from his kingdom, so at the end of 1183 he was determined to destroy Guy. Had Baldwin stood by Guy when he came under fire for his conduct of the 1183 campaign, it is unlikely he would have been toppled from power.

William's *Historia* ends with a description of events at the

²⁵ See Smail, "Predicaments," 161.

²⁶ WT XXII 1 lines 9–18; 26 lines 49–57.

²⁷ WT XXII 30.

beginning of 1184, and his final episode concerns Patriarch Eraclius. After the coronation of Baldwin V, relations between Baldwin IV and Guy continued to deteriorate to the extent that the king told the patriarch he wanted Guy's marriage to Sibylla annulled. Guy then had the gates of Ascalon shut in Baldwin's face. Eraclius, however, acting in concert with the masters of the military Orders, tried to intercede with the king on his behalf, and, when Baldwin remained obdurate, angrily stormed out of his presence.²⁸ In the past Eraclius has been subject to persistent calumny, but more recent research has done much to rehabilitate him and he has now emerged as an able and vigorous church leader.²⁹ His only other activities as patriarch that William recorded were his attempts in 1181 to reconcile Bohemond III and his opponents in Antioch—significantly he involved Raymond of Tripoli, at that time *persona non grata* in Jerusalem, which may suggest he was not too closely tied to Raymond's detractors.³⁰ Perhaps in speaking up for Guy the patriarch wanted to do a political ally a good turn, but it is equally likely that his efforts on Guy's behalf and his anger when thwarted came about because he was trying to do what he would have regarded as his duty as the senior churchman in the kingdom: act as peacemaker between the king and his brother-in-law, just as previously he had tried to act as peacemaker in Antioch. Exactly what happened next is not clear—William's history ends at this point—but the marriage was not annulled, and soon afterwards Eraclius and the masters of the Orders were sent on a major diplomatic mission to the West. Despite their support for Guy, they apparently continued to enjoy the confidence of the king and his regent, Raymond of Tripoli.³¹

The great problem in using William of Tyre's *Historia* for the period under discussion is that it is difficult to read it without preconceptions. We know, and William did not, that in 1187 the Kingdom of Jerusalem foundered; we also know that other, later evidence suggests that William himself suffered at the hands of the 'court party'; furthermore there is a strong tradition in modern historiography which believes that there were clearly drawn factions in the Latin East at this time and which tries to read

²⁸ WT XXIII 1.

²⁹ Hamilton, *Latin Church* 79–84; B. Z. Kedar, "The Patriarch Eraclius," in B. Z. Kedar *et al.*, eds., *Outremer* (as note 8) 177–204.

³⁰ WT XXII 7.

³¹ R. C. Smail, "Latin Syria and the West, 1149–1187," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 5th series 19 (1969) 18–19.

these factions into William's narrative. Elsewhere John Rowe and I have suggested that William's political role in the time of Baldwin IV may have been misunderstood: rather than being ousted from the forefront of the political life in the kingdom by his supposed enemies, he may have chosen to concentrate on his ecclesiastical duties and deliberately took only a limited part in secular affairs. As for the election of Eraclius as patriarch in preference to William, it may simply be that Eraclius was regarded at the time as the better candidate. Take away the polemic of later sources—Ernoul in particular—and the evidence for William as the victim of Agnes and her party is very thin indeed.³² This is not to say that William did not applaud Raymond, detest the Courtenays, and regret Guy's marriage to Sibylla. But you will look in vain in his *Historia* for evidence that the Courtenays plus Reynald of Châtillon plus the Lusignans and Eraclius had been running the kingdom for much of Baldwin IV's reign in the face of a party of opposition made up of the landed baronage led by Raymond and the Ibelin brothers and numbering William himself among their supporters. Of course, it may be that William, in producing an *apologia* for the crusading enterprise and the Latin settlements in the East that was itself designed as a work of edification, wanted to avoid washing dirty linen in public; that, while owning up to some of the conflicts, he managed to conceal much of the party strife. But a more dispassionate appraisal of his *Historia* demands that we jettison some of the assumptions which have led to too much subtlety being read into his narrative and to the identification of patterns of political alignment which are just not there.

I want to turn now to the other principal narrative for events in the East in the decade before 1187: the chronicle by Ernoul. Ernoul's original text is lost, but it was written after the Battle of Hattin and the Third Crusade. Accordingly it was influenced by what the author knew had happened later, in particular, by the internal struggles during the Crusade in which the party of Conrad of Montferrat, Balian of Ibelin and others sought to exclude Guy of Lusignan and his followers from power in what remained of the Latin Kingdom. Ernoul was also concerned to explain the disaster of 1187. That meant apportioning blame, and this he did, as a retainer of Balian of Ibelin, from the standpoint of the Ibelin family. The guilty men were Guy himself, his two principal military advisers, Reynald of Châtillon and Gerard

³² Edbury and Rowe, *William of Tyre* 19–22.

of Ridefort, his wife's uncle Joscelin of Courtenay, and Patriarch Eraclius who had assisted in the coup that brought Guy to power and had failed to give the moral leadership necessary to turn away God's disfavour. Ernoul's history has been transmitted to posterity in the various recensions of the Old French Continuation of William of Tyre, otherwise known as 'Eracles' and in the so-called 'Chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard the Treasurer'. In her study of these texts Ruth Morgan identified the version found in a Lyon manuscript of 'Eracles' as being the closest to Ernoul's original and demonstrated that the group of texts she dubbed the *abrégé* ('Ernoul and Bernard' and 'Eracles' variants C and G) was a much more distant derivative in which history was well on the way to being turned into romance and in which any additional detail was of doubtful historical value.³³ As it is, the Lyon 'Eracles' is interpolated with material which suggests that it acquired its present form around the middle of the thirteenth century,³⁴ and all the versions of the Continuation have lost the sections covering events before 1184, which were lopped off when they were stuck on to the end of the French translation of William of Tyre. The so-called 'Chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard the Treasurer' alone preserves a version of the earlier portions, but it is impossible to know how far they have been refashioned and how much credence the information contained within them deserves. If we are to treat with scepticism any additional material contained in the *abrégé* not found in the Lyons 'Eracles' for the period after 1184, we ought also to be cautious about the use we make of the earlier sections of 'Ernoul and Bernard the Treasurer' for which we have no parallel.

Ernoul's chronicle, as preserved in the Lyon manuscript, is strongly biased against Guy of Lusignan and his associates but not noticeably favourable to Raymond of Tripoli, and it gives scant support for the idea that he was the head of a baronial faction. Three episodes are relevant. First there is the assembly of barons Raymond called at Nablus in 1186 on the death of Baldwin V.³⁵ Previously they had sworn to recognize Raymond

³³ M. R. Morgan, *The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre* (Oxford 1973). The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre was published as "L'Estoire de Eracles empereur et la conquete de la terre d'Outremer," RHC Occ 2. For the Lyon version, see *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* (above note 6). For Ernoul and Bernard, see *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, L. de Mas Latrie, ed. (Paris 1871).

³⁴ P. W. Edbury and J. G. Rowe, "William of Tyre and the Patriarchal election of 1180," *English Historical Review* 93 (1978) 3 note 7.

³⁵ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 31-5.

as regent until the kings of the West should determine the rights of succession, but now Joscelin of Courtenay had engineered a *coup d'état* to put Guy and Sibylla on the throne. Various points may be suggested: the barons' presence does not necessarily mean they were Raymond's partisans—simply that they were still prepared to accept his summons as the duly appointed regent; the proposal to put forward Humphrey of Toron as an anti-king was never feasible—as Jonathan Riley-Smith has pointed out, even if the barons had supported the idea, their combined military resources would have been far from overwhelming;³⁶ once Humphrey had submitted to Guy, almost all the barons, including Balian of Ibelin, did homage to the new king; only Baldwin of Ramla preferred voluntary exile to reneging on his oath to uphold Raymond's rights. Raymond was isolated. Ernoul then described Raymond's behaviour at Tiberias.³⁷ Guy was threatening military action against him. Raymond was dependent on Saladin's support, and Saladin was able to exploit this dependence by insisting that he allow a raiding party to enter the kingdom through his territory. Ernoul made no attempt to conceal Raymond's treasonable behaviour in agreeing to this and he made little attempt to exculpate Raymond, since by the time of the raid Guy had changed tactics and decided to open negotiations with him. The upshot was the battle of Cresson on 1 May 1187 in which a hastily assembled Christian force under the masters of the military Orders was overwhelmed and the Hospitaller master killed.³⁸ A third episode also shows Raymond in a poor light: after the capture of Jerusalem he refused to allow the refugees to enter Tripoli and left them prey to the local brigands.³⁹ The Ibelins, however, emerge well from these episodes. At Nablus Baldwin remained steadfast to his oath, while it was in response to Balian's mediation that Guy was preparing negotiations at the time of Cresson; furthermore, the fact that refugees were allowed to leave Jerusalem at all was partly the result of Balian's efforts.

³⁶ J. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174–1277* (London 1973) 109–11.

³⁷ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 36–8.

³⁸ For Cresson, see besides *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* (38–41), the account in *De expugnatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum libellus* (J. Stevenson, ed., in Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon Anglicorum*; RS 66 209–217), and a contemporary papal letter preserved by Giraldus Cambrensis in his *De principis instructione liber* (*Opera*, G. F. Warner, ed.; RS 21 8, 201–2). The *De expugnatione* conceals Raymond's involvement with the Muslim raid, although Raymond's remark at p. 217 may suggest his complicity. The papal letter is useful as it provides corroboration of several elements in Ernoul's account.

³⁹ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 74. Raymond comes out badly from the story of the "marriage of Botron," 45–6.

Ernoul thus gives the impression that although Raymond and the Ibelins were united in their hatred of Guy, the bonds between them did not amount to anything more.

Ernoul gives the fullest version of the *coup d'état* that led to Guy's coronation.⁴⁰ But we should be wary of viewing the *coup* as the work of a closely knit 'court party'. Count Joscelin was the moving spirit behind it: his own interests would be far better served by the accession of his niece and her husband than by an interregnum presided over by Raymond. Ernoul explains Gerard of Ridefort's backing for Guy in terms of Gerard's private quarrel with Raymond. Indeed, it could well be that what united the perpetrators of the *coup* was a common hostility to Raymond as much as any positive support they may have had for Guy. Once Guy was crowned, they could be reasonably certain of success since most people would fall into line behind a duly consecrated monarch whose wife had a strong claim to the throne as the legitimate heiress.

More suggestive are the apparent attitudes of Reynald of Châtillon and Patriarch Eraclius. Reynald had nothing particular to gain from Guy's accession—indeed it has been pointed out that he might have had more advantage from the accession of his step-son, Humphrey of Toron⁴¹—nor was he conspicuous for his loyalty to other members of the so-called 'court party'. He has the reputation for being the most 'hawkish' of all the Latin Syrian leaders and in the past has been censured for breaking both the 1180 and the 1185 truces. Recently there has been some attempt to put his activities into a more explicable and hence less reprehensible context,⁴² but, however reasonable his behaviour may have seemed at the time, breaking truces was an act of insubordination towards the ruler of Jerusalem, and on each occasion—at the beginning of 1182 and the beginning of 1187—it was members of the 'court party' who were in control. According to the admittedly hostile Ernoul, in 1187 Reynald responded to King Guy's order to return what he had taken in his raid on a Muslim caravan with a powerful assertion of independence: he was lord of his own lands just as much as Guy was of his, and *he* had no truces with the Muslims.⁴³ Reynald was thus his own man. In 1186 he must have considered that allowing

⁴⁰ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 30–3. See Kedar, "Patriarch Eraclius," 195–8.

⁴¹ Hamilton, "Elephant of Christ," 106.

⁴² Hamilton, "Elephant of Christ," 102–3 106–7; Prawer, *Royaume latin* 1 594–5, 638; Prawer, *Crusader Institutions* 480–2; Lyons and Jackson, *Saladin* 157–8 248.

⁴³ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* 36.

the coronation of Guy to go ahead was the best of the various alternatives.

Eraclius' position was more complex. In 1184–5 he led a delegation to the West to find someone, preferably a member of one of the western royal families, to take charge in the East. Baldwin IV was now incapable of ruling, but it is not clear whether the patriarch was looking for a man who would himself become king and so supplant the royal dynasty, or whether he wanted someone to act as regent until there was a member of the royal house of Jerusalem able to take control for himself. Either way, the ambitions of both Raymond and Guy would be undercut. Eraclius' activities at this time suggest, in Professor Kedar's words, that he was 'neither a diehard supporter of Guy nor a subservient tool of the "court party"'.⁴⁴ But the mission failed, and in 1186 the patriarch anointed Guy and Sibylla king and queen of Jerusalem. By then he must have taken the view that there was nothing else he could do.

So the 'court party' and also Raymond and his supporters would appear to have been no more than groups of individuals whose interests and sense of duty coalesced on the key point of whether or not they wanted Guy to rule over them. It is probably a mistake to see the individuals pilloried by Ernoul for the defeat at Hattin as comprising a cohesive group in the preceding period; in his view they shared the blame, but that in itself does not make them a political party. Similarly, it is questionable how far the baronial supporters of Conrad of Montferrat after 1187 should be seen as a party before that date. Guy's brother Aimery had been married to Baldwin of Ramla's daughter since at least 1176,⁴⁵ and, as has been seen, there were a number of other features of the politics of the period that would seem to cut across the usual understanding of the situation.

In their different ways both Ernoul and William of Tyre were writing propaganda. An older generation of historians was largely taken in by it. More recently there has been a reaction, with the result that the standing of Eraclius and Reynald of Châtillon and indeed of Guy himself has risen, while that of Raymond has

⁴⁴ Kedar, "Patriarch Eraclius," 193. For a discussion of Eraclius' mission see, in addition to Kedar, H. E. Mayer, "Kaiserrecht und Heiliges Land," in his *Probleme des lateinischen Königreichs Jerusalem* (London 1983) 4; R. C. Smail, "The International Status of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem 1150–1192," in P. M. Holt, ed., *The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades* (Warminster 1977) 33 and note 38 (at 41–2).

⁴⁵ RRH no. 539.

fallen.⁴⁶ The problem in dealing with tendentious sources lies in knowing how much allowance needs to be made for their tendentiousness, and, in trying to ascertain what was happening, these narratives need to be considered carefully. It is my belief that notions of 'party' are misconceived and obscure the issues. Guy had good reasons in 1187 for wanting to win a resounding victory. Hans Mayer has pointed out that to meet the Muslim threat he had, with the connivance of Gerard of Ridefort, seized a large part of the treasure that King Henry II of England had been stock-piling in the East against the day when he himself should fulfil his crusading vows; only a major success would serve to offset the row that would be certain to follow when Henry discovered what he had done. The late R.C. Smail drew attention to the more general aspects of the predicament Guy was in: he knew he was unpopular in certain quarters; he knew what had happened in 1183 when he had avoided battle; the only way to prove himself and silence his critics once and for all was a military triumph.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ See Smail, "Predicaments," 174–6.

⁴⁷ H. E. Mayer, "Henry II of England and the Holy Land," *English Historical Review* 97 (1982) 735–7; Smail, "Predicaments," 173.

Additional note:

Since this paper was read the following articles which bear on the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the years before Hattin have come to my attention: J. Dunbabin, "William of Tyre and Philip of Alsace, count of Flanders' *Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België. Klasse der Letteren* 48 (1986) 111–17; B. Hamilton, "Manuel I Comnenus and Baldwin IV of Jerusalem," in J. Chrysostomides, ed., *Kathegetria. Essays presented to Joan Hussey* (London 1988) 353–75; H. E. Mayer, "Die Legitimität Balduins IV. von Jerusalem und das Testament der Agnes von Courtenay," *Historisches Jahrbuch* 108 (1988) 63–89; M. G. Pegg, "Le corps et l'autorité: la lèpre de Baudouin IV," *Annales ESC* 45 (1990) 265–87.



II

William of Tyre and the Patriarchal election of 1180

THANKS to the prestige of his *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum*,¹ the place of William of Tyre as one of the major historians of the Middle Ages has never been questioned. Its author first won distinction, however, as an eminent twelfth-century ecclesiastic and busy man of affairs. A native of Jerusalem, he had spent nearly twenty years in Europe studying arts, theology and civil law.² On his return to the East, his talents were quickly and favourably appraised by King Amaury whose patronage launched him on a career in which he served *regnum* and *ecclesia* as archdeacon of Tyre, tutor to the heir to the throne, the future Baldwin IV, ambassador to the Emperor Manuel I Comnenus, chancellor of the kingdom, archbishop of Tyre, delegate to the Third Lateran Council and 'official' historian of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.

In October 1180, the patriarch of Jerusalem, Amaury of Nesle, died after a long and, according to William, ineffectual pontificate. Among his possible successors, William was conspicuous, but, as we know from the *Historia*, within ten days of Amaury's death, it was Heraclius, the archbishop of Caesarea, who obtained the highest ecclesiastical position in the kingdom.³ William was reticent about the patriarchal election, making no mention of the fact that he himself had been a candidate. Furthermore, his treatment of his successful rival in the *Historia* was restrained and even-handed. While he criticized Heraclius for his intemperate behaviour in defending Guy of Lusignan in 1184, this was the only instance on which he recorded anything unfavourable about him, and he commented with approval on the attitudes shown by Heraclius, the king and others in their attempts to persuade Prince Bohemond III of Antioch to take back his wife.⁴ William's reticence is arresting. Encouraged by several attempts in recent years to examine the *Historia* more closely,⁵ we are tempted to probe further. The patri-

1. R[ecueil des] H[istoriens des] C[roisades. Historiens] Occ[identaux], i.

2. R. B. C. Huygens, 'Guillaume de Tyr étudiant. Un chapitre (xix, 12) de son "Histoire" retrouvé', *Latomus*, xxi (1962), 822-3.

3. W[illiam of] T[yre], p. 1068.

4. WT, pp. 1072-4, 1133; see also pp. 1021, 1049.

5. H. E. Mayer, 'Zum Tode Wilhelms von Tyrus', *Archiv für Diplomatik*, v-vi (1959-60), 182-201; H. E. Mayer, 'Studies in the History of Queen Melisende of Jerusalem', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, xxvi (1972), 95-182; R. B. C. Huygens, 'Guillaume

archal election of 1180 has yet to receive the scrutiny it deserves, and to fill this gap is the purpose of our paper. We hope to shed light not only on an important incident in the career of a great historian and ecclesiastic, but also, from an examination of the electoral procedures, to contribute something to a reassessment of the relationship between *regnum* and *sacerdotium* as it existed in the Latin East towards the close of the twelfth century.

William's laconic entry does not stand alone. Two further accounts of the election of 1180 are contained in the texts known to historians as the Continuations of William of Tyre, or *Eracles*,¹ and the *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*.² In her pioneering study, M. R. Morgan has taken an important step towards establishing the relationship between the various versions of these narratives.³ She has demonstrated that the accounts of the period before 1197 found in all extant versions stem from a common original and that the text closest to this original is one which she has called the Lyon *Eracles*.⁴ For the election of 1180, the Lyon *Eracles* provides an account almost identical to that preserved in the version to which Morgan, following Mas Latrie, refers as the Colbert-Fontainebleau *Eracles*.⁵ Standing over against these accounts must be placed that given by the texts which she has dubbed the *abrégé* (her term for the text edited and incorrectly attributed by Mas Latrie to Ernoul and Bernard the Treasurer) and the Noailles *Eracles*.⁶ Dr Morgan has shown that these two texts are further removed from the common original than the others and are derived from a western adaptation of a text more akin to the Colbert-Fontainebleau *Eracles* than to the Lyon *Eracles*.⁷

de Tyr étudiant', pp. 811-29; R. B. C. Huygens, 'La tradition manuscrite de Guillaume de Tyr', *Studi Medievali*, ser. 3, v (1964), 281-373; R. H. C. Davis, 'William of Tyre', in *Relations between East and West in the Middle Ages*, ed. D. Baker (Edinburgh, 1973), 64-76; D. W. T. C. Vessey, 'William of Tyre and the Art of Historiography', *Mediaeval Studies*, xxxv (1973), 433-55.

1. 'L'estoire de Eracles empereur et la conquete de la Terre d'Outremer', *RHC Occ.*, ii, 57-62.

2. Ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), 82-88.

3. M. R. Morgan, *The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre* (Oxford, 1973).

4. Lyon: Bibliothèque municipale, MS 828 ('Eracles' MS D). See Morgan, pp. 19, 59-116, 192-3 *passim*. Our thanks are due to the librarian for supplying us with a microfilm of this manuscript for comparison with the printed version. For the labelling of the different versions, see Morgan, p. 183.

5. 'Eracles' MSS A and B. See Morgan, pp. ix, 183.

6. 'Eracles' MS G. Also printed by E. Martène and U. Durand, *Veterum Scriptorum et Monumentorum Historicorum, Dogmaticorum, Moralium, Amplissima Collectio* (Paris, 1724-33), v, 604-6. See Morgan, p. 7.

7. See Morgan, pp. 11-13, 117-37 *passim*. One indication of their western provenance is their use of the term 'terre d'outremer' to denote the Latin East. See for example 'Eracles', p. 59 MS G; *Ernoul*, p. 84. The Lyon *Eracles* which was composed in the East used the same expression to denote western Europe. See Morgan, p. 98. Note how in the passage cited below (p. 4) the *abrégé*, clearly for the benefit of a public familiar with the Bible but unfamiliar with the geography of Syria-Palestine, explained the difference between the two Caesareas.

Because of the importance for this study of the accounts of the 1180 election to be found in these different recensions, it is necessary to consider their authorship and the circumstances of their composition. According to a tradition recorded by some manuscripts of the *abrégé*, the author of the original version was a certain 'Ernous' or Ernoul, a squire of Balian of Ibelin.¹ In view of the partiality for the Ibelin family shown by all the extant versions and particularly noticeable in the Lyon *Eracles*, there is no reason to doubt that the author was indeed an Ibelin retainer and that his work, in which he evidently drew on his own experiences and on those of Balian's circle, was intended as a sort of Ibelin family chronicle.² From the high degree of accuracy exhibited by the Lyon *Eracles* in those places where its chronology and factual detail can be checked, it is probable that Ernoul was writing in the 1190s, within a few years of the events he described, and that he completed his work shortly after 1197, the date at which it breaks off.³ The appearance of the French translation of William of Tyre's *Historia* in the early 1220s⁴ brought William's work before a wider public and doubtless led to the demand that the narrative be continued beyond 1184 and so brought up to date. This demand was satisfied by a compiler whose work, consisting for the period 1184-97 of an adaptation of Ernoul's chronicle, and datable from internal evidence to the mid-1220s, lies behind the extant versions of the Continuations of William of Tyre, especially the Lyon *Eracles*, and behind the *abrégé*.⁵ The compiler set aside the material in Ernoul's chronicle which belonged to the years before 1184, the period described by William, but kept a few episodes to include wherever convenient. One of these episodes was the account of the patriarchal election of 1180 which he inserted into the description of the events of 1187.⁶ Of the extant versions, it must be admitted that the Lyon *Eracles*, while being closest in substance to the compiler's work and hence closest to Ernoul's original, contains a number of late interpolations.⁷ Fortunately the

1. *Ernoul*, p. 149. See Morgan, pp. 41-44.

2. Morgan, pp. 112-14, 136, 188.

3. Morgan, pp. 115, 119.

4. Morgan, pp. 119, 172.

5. It is here that we venture to disagree with Dr Morgan. Whereas we accept her stemma (p. 96) in so far as it illustrates the relationship of the extant versions with one another, we regard X, the source from which all the extant versions are derived, not as Ernoul's 'Chronique primitive' (p. 114), but as the work of the compiler. As both the Lyon *Eracles* (d) and the Colbert-Fontainebleau *Eracles* (a-b) contain identical allusions to the Fifth Crusade and to Frederick II as emperor ('Eracles', p. 142), these allusions were evidently in their common original which must therefore be a product of the 1220s at the earliest. Thus, unless Ernoul was writing thirty or more years after the events he described, these versions must have been drawing on a re-working of his original. Since the *abrégé* pre-dates 1232, the compiler's work is to be dated to the mid or late 1220s. For other thirteenth-century allusions in both the Lyon *Eracles* and the Colbert-Fontainebleau *Eracles* and thus probably additions by the compiler, see 'Eracles', pp. 22, 136-7 (see pp. 317-18), 143.

6. See Morgan, pp. 129-30.

7. See Morgan, pp. 107-12. One interpolation in the Lyon *Eracles* certainly post-dates 1240 as it refers to the crusade of Thibault of Navarre. 'Eracles', p. 111 MS D.

fact that its account of the 1180 election is virtually identical with the parallel account in the Colbert-Fontainebleau *Eracles* shows that this passage at least has not been altered by a later hand but preserves the compiler's readings. The compiler's work was subjected in the West to a further re-working which gave rise to the Noailles *Eracles* and the *abrégé*. The *abrégé*, which had achieved its final form by 1232,¹ marks a departure from the precedent established by the compiler; for the period before 1184, the translation of the *Historia* was replaced by other material, probably drawn in part at least from Ernoul's original.²

Thus for the patriarchal election of 1180 we possess, apart from William of Tyre's brief statement, two distinct but related accounts, one given by the Lyon *Eracles* and the Colbert-Fontainebleau *Eracles*, the other by the *abrégé* and Noailles *Eracles*. Neither can be claimed as strictly contemporary; each represents a different stage in the development of a historical tradition. It is only by examining each in turn that we can determine the places they hold in that tradition and so, with the assistance of other relevant information, attempt a reconstruction of what happened on that occasion.

To begin with the election as recorded in Mas Latrie's edition of the *abrégé*:

But before I tell you about this (the rule of Andronicus Comnenus), I shall tell you about two clerks who were in the land of Jerusalem at that time, of whom one was archbishop of Tyre and the other archbishop of Caesarea. This is not that Caesarea which is called Caesarea Philippi but is Caesarea by the sea. The archbishop of Tyre was named William and was born in Jerusalem and there was not known in Christendom a better clerk than he in his time. The archbishop of Caesarea was called Heraclius and had been born in the Auvergne and as a poor clerk came to the land. And because of his beauty the mother of the king loved him and thus she made him archbishop of Caesarea. It happened at the time of these two clerks that the then patriarch of Jerusalem died. And so the king came and ordered the archbishops of the land to come to Jerusalem³ to the election of the patriarch and they came there. When they were all assembled there, there came the archbishop of Tyre to the canons of the Sepulchre, to whom it fell to make the election of the patriarch, and said to them in chapter and begged their attention: 'Sirs, I have found it written that Heraclius won the holy cross in Persia and carried it to Jerusalem and that Heraclius will take it out from Jerusalem and in his time it will be lost. Because of this I pray for God's sake that you do not name him in the election to be patriarch, for if you name him I know well that the king will accept him, and know well that the city is lost if he is patriarch and all the land. And do not think that I am saying this

For other thirteenth-century allusions unique to this recension, see 'Eracles', pp. 101, 111, 190, 205, 213, 214, 220 MS D.

1. Morgan, p. 46.

2. Morgan, pp. 117-35 *passim*.

3. The Noailles *Eracles* reads 'archbishops and bishops'. 'Eracles', p. 58 n. 19.

because of any ambition I might have to be patriarch, but because the land is lost if he is patriarch. But, for God's sake, name two others than us two; and if you do not find them in this land, we will help you well to give advice about seeking in France a good man to be patriarch.' The canons of the Sepulchre did not do anything of the sort, because the mother of the king had requested them to nominate Heraclius, the archbishop of Caesarea, and they nominated him and the archbishop of Tyre.¹ For this is the way of elections in the land beyond the sea of patriarch, archbishop, bishop and abbots that they nominate two and present them to the king and the king takes one. If they present them in the morning he should take him before vespers sounds and if they present at vespers, he takes him the next day after mass. The apostles made this election when Judas was dead and they chose two, Joseph the Just and Matthias. ('And they threw lots and the lot fell upon Matthias'.)² And they still do this in the land. And the king is the lots and takes which he wants. So the two archbishops were presented to the king and the king took Heraclius, the archbishop of Caesarea, because his mother had requested it; he had given him the gift that he should be patriarch. In this way was Heraclius patriarch of Jerusalem.³

The *abrégé* then continues with an account of Heraclius's demand that the hierarchy of the kingdom offer obedience to him as patriarch; William refused and, with the express purpose of impugning Heraclius's right to be patriarch, appealed to Rome where he was received with extraordinary honour by the pope and cardinals; Heraclius, fearing William's success at the curia, suborned a physician to follow him there and poison him; with William dead, Heraclius himself could go to Rome and then return to Jerusalem. The *abrégé* also tells us about Heraclius's scandalous private life, with particular reference to his mistress, Pasque de Riveri, who was the mother of his daughter and known to the inhabitants of Jerusalem as the 'patriarchess'. All this is to point the moral that because the clergy and people of Jerusalem, lacking the example of a righteous patriarch, fell into sin, the wrath of the Lord Jesus Christ was provoked so that He cleansed the city of its inhabitants save for two old men whom Saladin allowed to remain.⁴

William's address to the canons of the Holy Sepulchre cannot be accepted at face value. In the opening chapter of the *Historia* he had recorded the recovery of the cross by the Emperor Heraclius,⁵ but the idea that he could foresee that another Heraclius would take the cross out of Jerusalem and that it would be lost together with Jerusalem itself and the kingdom is clearly a literary device employed by someone writing after 1187. On the other hand, there are aspects of the account of the electoral procedure which ring true. Despite

1. The Noailles *Eracles* says that they nominated Heraclius first and the archbishop of Tyre afterwards. 'Eracles', pp. 58-59 MS G.

2. See Acts 1: 23-26.

3. *Ernoul*, pp. 82-84.

4. *Ernoul*, pp. 84-88.

5. WT, p. 10.

the reference to the archbishops being summoned to Jerusalem for the election – in the parallel passage, the Noailles *Eracles* mentions bishops as well¹ – it is explicitly stated that it was the canons who were the electors. The principle that the canons of a cathedral church constituted the electoral college was generally accepted in Latin Christendom at this period, but it is noteworthy that William of Tyre himself recorded an earlier instance of prelates being present at a patriarchal election.² William's speech provides an indication that the king had the right of confirmation, an aspect of episcopal elections which again accords with general practice in the western church and for which William again provides evidence in the *Historia*.³ The crucial point, however, is, given that the canons are the electors, how many names are they to submit to the king? The normal canonical procedure would have been one only, and at the beginning of his speech William seems to indicate that just one man (Heraclius, he fears) would be postulated for royal approval. Yet as the speech continues, he implies that the canons will postulate two, Heraclius and himself, and begs them to postulate two others. He concludes by referring to a search in France for a good man – singular – to be patriarch. Despite these inconsistencies put into William's mouth, the author of the *abrégé* explicitly states that dual postulation is normal in all elections to high ecclesiastical office and that the practice still continues.

The Lyon *Eracles* tells the same story as follows:

We shall tell you now about the election of the patriarch Heraclius who was archbishop of Caesarea. When the patriarch Amaury was dead, William, archbishop of Tyre, a very good man who both feared and loved God greatly, went to the canons of the Sepulchre and spoke to them and won over a party of them: 'Sirs, God has taken our father, the patriarch, to himself, and you are about to make the election. I advise you in good faith not to elect any prelate who is from this side of the sea. For you could elect such a man that you could be grieved and the kingdom would suffer, for it would be between me and Heraclius, archbishop of Caesarea. If you elect him and present him to the king, the king will accept him willingly, for his mother loves him greatly and you know how she had him made archbishop of Caesarea. You know what his character is like as well as I do. If you want to elect a wise man from

1. Above p. 4 n. 3.

2. WT, p. 854. See G. Le Bras, *Institutions ecclésiastiques de la Chrétienté médiévale (Histoire de l'Église, ed. A. Fliche, V. Martin et al., xii (Paris, 1959-64)), 372-3*. The suffragan bishops of a province continued occasionally to claim a part in the election of a metropolitan. This happened at the time of the election of Albert of Vercelli to the patriarchate of Jerusalem in 1204. *P[atrolologia] L[atina]*, ed. J. P. Migne (Paris, 1844-64), ccxv, 540.

3. WT, p. 1020. For clear evidence that kings of Jerusalem and princes of Antioch continued to enjoy the right of confirmation in the thirteenth century, see *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem (1100-1310)*, ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx (Paris, 1894-1906), no. 1432 (11 Jan. 1215). Our thanks are due to Dr J. S. C. Riley-Smith for drawing this document to our attention.

overseas, I and the other prelates in the kingdom will be willing to advise you, and if you are worried about the expenses, we will gladly pay them for you. This is why I am speaking these words to you and giving you this advice: I have found in a book that Heraclius brought the cross from Persia and placed it in Jerusalem and Heraclius will take it from Jerusalem and in his time it will be lost. Because of this I want you to take my advice.' The canons of the Sepulchre agreed with him. When the archbishop had left them they went to the chapter. The king's mother had already begged them to elect the said Heraclius. When they were in the chapter, they departed from the archbishop of Tyre's advice, and there were some of them there whom she had corrupted, with the result that they elected William, archbishop of Tyre, and Heraclius, archbishop of Caesarea, to be patriarch and presented them to the king. The king received them with favour and his mother begged him to accept Heraclius as patriarch. He granted his mother's wish and agreed to the election they had made. Some people say that the king of Jerusalem has this jurisdiction over the election of the patriarch, that when the canons of the Sepulchre have elected a patriarch they must present him to the king. If they have elected someone at vespers, they present him to the king and the king can delay replying until the next day at the hour of prime; if they elect at the hour of prime, they present him to the king and he should reply at vespers. This is the franchise which it is said the king should have in the election of the patriarch of Jerusalem, but I have never found or heard tell of it and because of this I do not want to say whether it is correct. If the king has this privilege, he should be well able to prove it when the need arises. It is said, and it is found in Holy Scripture, that when the apostles were staying on Mount Sion after (*recte* before) Pentecost and after the death of Judas they chose two good men; one was called Joseph the Just and the other Matthias, and they threw lots and the lot fell upon Matthias. Because of this some people would say that the canons of the Sepulchre represent the apostles and the king the lots; they elect and the king takes.¹

The Lyon *Eracles* goes on to comment on Heraclius's handsome appearance, little sense, little learning and debauched character; it was out of excessive love that the queen mother had made him archdeacon of Jerusalem (1168/9),² archbishop of Caesarea (1175),³ and then patriarch. Telling much the same story as the *abrégé*, the author next describes Heraclius's relationship with Pasque de Riveri. He then explains that despite William of Tyre's appeal to exclude Heraclius because of his morals, the canons had ignored his advice, the Lord Jesus Christ permitting him to be patriarch over the people of Jerusalem for their sin. When Heraclius was on Mount Sion on Maundy Thursday to make the chrism, he excommunicated William without right of appeal; William therefore appealed to Pope Alexander who was preparing to hold a council; as he was

1. 'Eracles', pp. 57-59 (following MS D).

2. See *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani (MXCVII-MCCXCI)*, ed. R. Röhricht (Innsbruck, 1893/1904), nos. 455-6, 469.

3. WT, p. 1021.

getting ready to go to Rome, Heraclius hired a physician to poison him, while he himself set out for his home in France; hearing that William was dead, he returned to Jerusalem where his conduct became worse than ever; the bad example of their patriarch encouraged the people of Jerusalem in their sin; the Lord Jesus was angry and cleansed His land of sin and of those who committed it; thus when Saladin captured Jerusalem, there were only two old men whom he permitted to end their days in the city supported by his generosity.¹

Compared with the *abrégé*, the account in the Lyon *Eracles* begins abruptly. The writer proceeds directly to William's speech which, in contrast to the account in the *abrégé*, is delivered before the canons go to chapter. While its themes parallel those in the other account, this version of the speech is more straightforward and more logical. Whereas the emphasis in the *abrégé* falls on William's prophecy of the disasters which will come as a result of Heraclius's election, in the Lyon *Eracles*, William is made to stress the need for the canons to look to the West for a new patriarch and to warn them against electing a local prelate. Apocalyptic utterances are less prominent in his warnings about Heraclius: he states that the kingdom will be damaged if Heraclius is elected, but there are no extravagant predictions about the loss of the city and the entire land. In the Lyon *Eracles* William is opposed to Heraclius because of his moral character; in the *abrégé*, William's opposition is explained by the prophecy concerning Heraclius and the cross. True, the Lyon *Eracles* records the prophecy, but it is given in a shortened form and no longer constitutes William's central theme. Instead it is out of keeping with the sober, rational tone of the rest of the speech, and, in the light of his views on Heraclius's morals, as an argument, it is redundant. The prophecy about the cross apart, the version of William's speech in the Lyon *Eracles* is far more convincing than that in the *abrégé*, and it may not be too much to suggest that the Lyon *Eracles* perhaps preserves the general drift of a speech made by William on this occasion. The orderly presentation, the combination of tact and apparent candour, the patriotism implied by the recognition of the need for an outsider to be the new ecclesiastical leader, are all characteristics of William's *Historia*, whereas apocalyptic prophecy is not. There is one other feature of William's speech as recorded by the Lyon *Eracles* which needs to be emphasized: it clearly assumes that the canons will postulate only one name for royal assent.

At the end of his account of the election, the author of the Lyon *Eracles* felt obliged to embark on some explanatory comments. As we have seen, the *abrégé* informed us at this point that dual postulation followed by a royal decision was still observed as the universal

1. 'Eracles', pp. 59-62 (following MS D).

rule in elections to high ecclesiastical offices in the Latin East, and it was in this context that it had introduced the passage dealing with the time allowed the king to respond to the postulation. In contrast, the Lyon *Eracles* has a different pre-occupation: the royal right of confirmation in the election of a patriarch. The author first expresses his doubt as to whether the king has this right, but then immediately introduces the passage – almost identical to that in the *abrégé* – on the time permitted for the royal decision. Although this passage unquestionably implies royal confirmation, he then repeats his uncertainties about the right the monarch is said to have on the grounds that personal knowledge and reliable information are lacking, adding that if the king has this right he should be able to prove it when necessary. But not content with leaving it at that, he now introduces the biblical story of the choice of Matthias. In the *abrégé* the insertion of the story made great sense. It was the scriptural justification for what to the *abrégé* was the usual procedure, the postulation of two names to the king. In the Lyon *Eracles* its insertion makes no sense at all. The author has told us how the canons, originally committed to electing one candidate, could not agree on this occasion and had therefore presented two names to the king so that he might resolve their dilemma. There has been no previous allusion to dual postulation and the narrative's underlying assumption has been that, under normal circumstances, when the canons make their election there will be only one nominee. As with the prophecy concerning Heraclius and the cross, the story of Matthias has no integral role in this account of the 1180 election. Why then did the author of the Lyon *Eracles* use the story at all? We can only assume that he believed that it was somehow connected with the part played by the king in this election. Perhaps it seemed to him to have some useful contribution to make to his reflections on the legitimacy of royal confirmation, since it gave support to the idea although in a form not at all consistent with his account of the election and his comments on it. He is in fact somewhat dubious about it as is shown by the phrases, 'It is said' and 'some people say'. As will be seen, his uncertainty is fortunate. Had he really accepted the validity of the Matthias story and all its implications, he might have altered his whole account of the election and in so doing deprived us of important evidence for our reconstruction of what we believe happened.

Finally in our analysis of these accounts of the election, an examination of what they tell of William's subsequent relationship with Heraclius and, in particular, the excommunication will be helpful. In contrast to the Lyon *Eracles*, the *abrégé* makes no mention of Heraclius excommunicating William. Instead it records how the patriarch demanded an oath of obedience from the hierarchy of the kingdom; William refused and appealed to Rome, stating that he

would go there to challenge Heraclius's right to be patriarch; once at the *curia*, William was well received but was poisoned before his case could be heard; Heraclius himself was then able to go to Rome. The story is coherent but nevertheless unconvincing. Corroborative evidence is altogether lacking and in view of the late date of the *abrégé's* recension,¹ unsupported assertions of this kind must be treated with caution. The Lyon *Eracles*, on the other hand, fails to provide a coherent account, making no attempt to explain why Heraclius should have excommunicated William and leaving the subject of whether William was poisoned before or after he left the East vague. Elsewhere it is clearly mistaken. It tells of William making ready to appeal to Pope Alexander who was preparing to hold a council. Alexander III died in August 1181 and, as we shall see, there is reason to suppose that the excommunication did not occur until after that date, and the council to which the writer referred was presumably the Third Lateran Council of 1179 which both William and Heraclius had attended.² Heraclius's visit to western Europe is depicted as a visit to his homeland, whereas in reality it was presumably his diplomatic mission to the West which lasted from mid-1184 to mid-1185.³ These considerations together with the fact that there is no supporting evidence for the excommunication have led some scholars to reject the whole story of Heraclius's relations with William as given by both sources.⁴ We however incline to a different view. The *abrégé's* account, we suggest, is no more than a rationalized and embroidered version of the account as transmitted to us by the Lyon *Eracles*, and what we find in the Lyon *Eracles*, for all its clumsiness and confusion, does contain important elements of truth. For example, it is not committed to the idea that William arrived in Rome, and so the absence of corroborative evidence for his breach with Heraclius in western sources is not a problem, and its indication that William died while Heraclius was in the West (mid-1184 to mid-1185), though open to

1. Above pp. 2-4.

2. WT, p. 1049.

3. See R. Röhricht, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem (1100-1291)* (Innsbruck, 1898), 412-15.

4. A. C. Krey, 'William of Tyre. The Making of an Historian in the Middle Ages', *Speculum*, xvi (1941), 160, ignores the excommunication and dismisses the entire account of William's relations with Heraclius as 'preposterous'. Mayer, 'Zum Tode', pp. 198-9, echoes Krey's opinion, rejecting the excommunication and the accompanying material on the grounds that they do not appear in the *Historia*. In contrast, H. Prutz, 'Studien über Wilhelm von Tyrus', *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde*, viii (1883), 106, accepts most of the *abrégé's* report. Röhricht, *Geschichte*, p. 391, dates the excommunication 2 Apr. 1181 and summarizes the *abrégé's* account while confessing his inability to bring it under critical control. In his dating and general approach he is followed by R. Grousset, *Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1934-6), ii, 745-8, W. Hotzelt, *Kirchengeschichte Palästinas im Zeitalter der Kreuzzüge, 1099-1291* (Cologne, 1940), 133, and S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades* (Cambridge, 1951-4), ii, 425. Other more recent works either accept the accounts uncritically or make no more than a passing reference to the question.

dispute, is plausible.¹ Above all, the circumstantial detail for the excommunication – Maundy Thursday, Mount Sion, the chrism, no right of appeal – argues for the belief that the excommunication did take place. Yet to accept the excommunication is not without difficulties. As it stands, the Lyon *Eracles* would lead us to assume that it occurred on the first Maundy Thursday after the election, in 1181,² but since we can observe William active as archbishop of Tyre and chancellor continuously from the time of the election until 19 March 1183,³ it would seem likely that the excommunication belongs to the period after this latter date. It cannot have been Maundy Thursday 1185, since the patriarch was then in Europe, and it would scarcely have been 1184 or 1186, dates at which William's friend, Raymond of Tripoli, was regent. By a process of elimination we suggest that the excommunication occurred in 1183, a year when Maundy Thursday fell on 14 April. If this date is correct, it may help explain the reason behind the excommunication. It is improbable that Heraclius would have excommunicated William for holding critical views of his morals or for speaking out against them in 1180, since they were public knowledge anyway. More likely William's excommunication should be seen as a political act. Easter 1183 coincided approximately with a major achievement by the queen mother, Heraclius and the other members of the 'Court Party', the appointment of Guy of Lusignan as regent.⁴ In their eyes, William, as an associate of their arch-enemy, Raymond of Tripoli, would have been potentially dangerous; excommunication would have had the effect of eliminating him from the governing circle and making it impossible for him to continue as chancellor. The phrase 'without appeal', may provide an indication of what Heraclius was after: for William to have the ban lifted, he would have had to go in person to Rome, and this would have removed him for an indefinite period from participation in the affairs of the Latin East.

Before we can attempt a reconstruction of the events of 1180 and trace the development of the traditions which came to surround it, it is necessary first to consider the *abrégé's* assertion that dual

1. The problem of William's death has been the subject of a study by H. E. Mayer who proposed as its date the late summer or early autumn of 1186. Mayer, 'Zum Tode', p. 201. It is beyond the limits of this article to give Mayer's conclusion the attention it merits, and so we limit ourselves to suggesting that he did not subject the evidence of Lyon *Eracles* to the scrutiny it deserves.

2. Hence the date, 2 Apr. 1181, urged by some scholars. See above p. 10, n. 4.

3. *Reg. Hier.*, nos. 601, 603-4, 606, 608, 613-15, 617-19, 624-5; WT, pp. 1075, 1109.

4. For Guy's appointment, see WT, pp. 1116-17. Its exact date is unknown; Guy, though prominent, seems not to have become regent earlier than 19 Mar. 1183, the date of the last extant charters of Baldwin IV. *Reg. Hier.*, nos. 624-5. From his references to hearsay in his description of the proceedings, William shows that he himself was absent; perhaps he was already excommunicate and so excluded from the High Court.

postulation was normal in the Latin East and continued until the time of its composition, and, second, to examine another election described by the Lyon *Eracles* which in certain respects is relevant to our understanding of its description of the election of Heraclius.

Of prime importance is the decretal *Cum terra, quae*, issued by Pope Celestine III between 15 April and 25 October 1191 and addressed *universo clero orientalis ecclesie*: from the verbal reports and letters of many, the pope has heard of a corrupt custom which has crept into the election of prelates in the Latin Orient; it would seem that electoral bodies have been postulating two persons secretly (*latenter*) to the patriarch or prince; this procedure has enabled the patriarch or prince to choose freely between the two candidates or to respond in such a way as to subvert the entire election; since this inflicts both oppression and injury on ecclesiastical liberty, the pope forbids the practice and commands that elections be held free of external interference. The procedure for a canonical election was then outlined with the insistence that one person be postulated and that the election be free of simony. Celestine concluded his decretal by stating that he was not prohibiting the right of a patriarch or prince to assent to the election, but that the election should not be impeded by their intervention.¹

The purpose of this decretal and the thinking behind it are unmistakable: the procedure of a secret dual postulation enabled the prince or patriarch to have an essential part in the electoral process; in order to prevent this interference and so preserve the *libertas ecclesie*, the pope was taking action to keep the election distinct from the confirmation. The word *latenter* may provide a clue to the details of the procedure the pope was condemning. As documents concerning an election of c. 1210 show,² two names would be presented secretly to the prince or patriarch who would then make his choice; when his wishes had been communicated to the electors, they in turn would formally elect the royal or patriarchal candidate; public confirmation by the prince or patriarch would then follow. The outward appearance of a canonical election was preserved, since the dual postulation was secret, but the fact that it was secret is an indication that even before 1191 the parties involved were aware that it was not canonically acceptable. The importance of *Cum terra, quae* lies in the fact that it clearly indicates that by 1191 the practice of dual postulation to either patriarch or king had gained currency in the Latin East. It is therefore particularly un-

1. The decretal is found in *Decretal. Gregor. IX*, lib. I, tit. vi, *De electione*, c. xiv, as printed in *Corpus iuris canonici*, ed. E. Friedberg (Leipzig, 1879-81), ii, 54, to which should be added the address, *arenga* and dating clause given by W. Holtzmann, 'La "Collectio Seguntina" et les décrétales de Clément III et de Célestine III', *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, I (1955), 430. See also *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, ed. P. Jaffé, W. Wattenbach *et al.* (2nd edn., Leipzig, 1885-8), no. 17656.

2. Below p. 13-14.

fortunate that the pope was not more explicit about the circumstances which led him to issue it, all the more so as independent evidence for the conduct of elections in the period immediately before 1191 is lacking. We do not know whether Celestine had been told simply that dual postulation was general or whether he had learnt of a specific instance or specific instances in which it had been applied. That he issued a general prohibition, not a specific rebuke, might argue for the former alternative, but it is possible that, in view of the precarious future of the Latin states in the East, he was refraining from singling out individuals for censure and so avoiding the risk of provoking further dissensions. It is, however, unlikely that if there had been a particular election which gave rise to the decretal, it was the patriarchal election of 1180. Although the king chose between two candidates on that occasion, anyone complaining to the pope of the procedures followed then would have elicited a response long before 1191.

There is no reason to assume that just because the pope had legislated on a particular issue, his decree was immediately and totally effective. In the West, thanks to the activities of the canonists, *Cum terra, quae* became well known, finding its way into the *Decretales* of Gregory IX.¹ But although there is no way of knowing how widely circulated it would have been in the East or for how long its contents would have been remembered, it seems clear from the surviving evidence for episcopal elections in the years following 1191 that the decretal, or at least the concept it embodied, gained general acceptance. Thus the patriarchal election of 1194 or 1195 led to a dispute over the right of confirmation, but there was only one postulate.² In a divided election tainted with simony to the see of Bethlehem which ended with a judgment of the papal *curia* in 1200, the king seems to have done no more than urge the candidature of one contestant while the patriarch championed his opponent.³ After the patriarchal election of 1204, the papal legates informed the pope of interference by the suffragan bishops who had claimed the right to share in the election and had held a *tractatio* at which the merits of two of the candidates had been discussed, but the king's behaviour seems to have been impeccable.⁴ At Valenia in 1214, where the Master of the Hospital was claiming the right of confirmation enjoyed elsewhere by the kings of Jerusalem and the princes of Antioch, the instrument recording the election leaves no doubt that only one candidate was postulated.⁵ The election to the archiepiscopal see of Nicosia in c. 1210, however, provides a clear

1. Above p. 12, n. 1.

2. 'Eracles', pp. 203-5 MS D.

3. PL, ccxvi, 1239-40. For the date see *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, ed. A. Potthast (Berlin, 1874-5), no. 1067.

4. PL, ccxv, 540-1; Potthast, no. 2418.

5. *Cartulaire général*, no. 1432. See J. S. C. Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c. 1050-1310* (London, 1967), 412-13.

instance of dual postulation.¹ The information for this episode is furnished principally by two letters of Pope Innocent III, one to King Hugh I of Cyprus dated 13 January 1213, the other, dated 15 January, to the chapter of Nicosia²: Albert, the patriarch of Jerusalem and papal legate in the East, had quashed the election of c. 1210 because King Hugh had brought pressure to bear on the chapter and had forced the canons to postulate two candidates that he might choose one; the chapter had then formally elected the royal choice; Hugh's reaction to Albert's decision had been to protest that the election had been *secundum antiquam consuetudinem celebrata* and that he had been following the practice of his predecessors; Innocent's response was to dilate on the evil potential of bad custom sanctified by time: *diuturnitas temporis non minuit peccatum, sed auget*³; the king's action in imposing his procedure on the canons thereby infringing the *libertas ecclesie* was irrational, irreligious and scandalous, all the more so since they had been committed *in terra . . . quae funiculus Domini haereditatis existit*.⁴ Despite Hugh's assertion that he was doing what was customary – an assertion to be discussed later – the Nicosia election appears to have been an isolated example of dual postulation. It seems that after 1191, rulers, with this one exception, made no attempt to impose it and that in terms of practical politics, Innocent's rebuke was the last word.

Of the principal chronicles dependent upon Ernoul, the Lyon *Eracles* alone preserves a version of his account of the patriarchal election of 1194 or 1195.⁵ Following the death of Patriarch Heraclius (November 1190/July 1191)⁶ there was a considerable delay before a replacement could be enthroned. A patriarch-elect, Ralph, who

1. For full accounts of this election, see L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852–61), i. 183–5; 'Histoire des archevêques latins de l'île de Chypre', *Archives de l'Orient latin*, ii (1884), part 1, pp. 211–13.

2. PL, ccxvi. 733–4, 734–5; Potthast, nos. 4646, 4649. See also PL, ccxvi. 494; Potthast, no. 4350.

3. PL, ccxvi. 733–4.

4. PL, ccxvi. 733. Despite the similarity of this phrase to the *incipit* of *Cum terra, quae* (*Cum terra, quae funiculus hereditatis Domini censebatur*), Innocent was not making a subtle allusion to his predecessor's ruling but was using canonical and theological principles to rebuke Hugh. The expression, which was evidently inspired by the Vulgate text of Deut. 32: 9 and Ps. 104: 11, seems to have been in use at the papal chancery to denote the East. For another example, see *Die Register Innocenz' III*, ed. O. Hageneder and A. Haidacher (Graz, 1964–), i. 596 lines 30–31.

5. 'Eracles', pp. 203–5 MS D. There is also an unpublished version which is clearly a précis of a text close to the Lyon *Eracles*. Florence. Bib. Medicea-Laurenziana. MS Plut. LXI, 10, fo. 299^v. Our thanks are due to the director for her kindness in supplying a microfilm of this manuscript.

6. During the siege of Acre (Aug. 1189–July 1191), but after Nov. 1190 when he was alive though ill. 'Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi', ed. W. Stubbs in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I* (Rolls Series 38, 1864), i. 121; *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi* (formerly attributed to Benedict of Peterborough), ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series 49, 1867), ii. 141, 147.

can be identified with some certainty as a former bishop of Bethlehem, appears at the time of the siege of Jaffa (July 1192), and then, if the identification is correct, died a prisoner of the Moslems.¹ The next known candidate, Michael, dean of Paris, rejected the offered patriarchate when elected to the archbishopric of Sens early in 1194.² It was therefore after this date but some time before February 1196, his earliest appearance in a surviving document in his new capacity,³ that Monachus, archbishop of Caesarea, was elected as Heraclius's successor.⁴ The Lyon *Eracles* begins by explaining that when the canons of the Holy Sepulchre had elected Monachus⁵ to be patriarch,

... since they had made their postulation without letting Count Henry [of Champagne, at that time ruler of the Latin Kingdom] know, when he found out about it he was extremely angry because he had been given to understand that when the patriarch was dead, just as we have already told you, the canons choose and present their choice to the king. If the choice was made at the hour of prime and they tell the king of it, he has respite until vespers to reply. And so it is said that the canons are the apostles and the king the lot...⁶

Henry of Champagne's reaction was to imprison the canons and to threaten to drown them since they had tried to deprive him of the power the kings of Jerusalem had in patriarchal elections. At this point his advisers, led by Archbishop Joscius of Tyre, persuaded him to back down, and so Henry released the canons and mollified Monachus by making a generous grant to his nephew. The canons then went to Rome for papal confirmation and the pallium, and there the pope came to hear of Henry's actions:

And so Pope Celestine reproved Count Henry and made a decretal which began thus: 'Since the land, which is raised up and called the heritage

1. 'Itinerarium', pp. 402-3; 'Eracles', pp. 194, 196 MS D; Salimbene de Adam, 'Cronica', *M[onumenta] G[ermaniae] H[istorica] Scr[iptores]*, xxxii. 18. See L. de Mas Latrie, 'Les patriarches latins de Jérusalem', *Revue de l'Orient latin*, i (1893), 18-19.

2. Rigord, 'Gesta Philippi Augusti', ed. H. F. Delaborde, *Oeuvres de Rigord et Guillaume le Breton* (Paris, 1882-5), i. 126; William of Amoria, 'Gesta Philippi Augusti', *ibid.* i. 195-6. See also S. Baluze, *Miscellanea* (Paris, 1678-1715), ii. 242-5.

3. *Cartulaire de l'église du Saint Sépulchre de Jérusalem*, ed. E. de Rozière (Paris, 1849), 233-8.

4. 'Eracles', p. 203 MS D; Alberic de Trois Fontaines, 'Chronicon', *MGH Scr.* xxiii. 842. A Florentine by origin, he had become chancellor of the patriarch of Jerusalem by 1171 (*Reg. Hier.* no. 490) and was made archbishop of Caesarea following Heraclius's promotion to the patriarchate. WT, p. 1073. See Haymarus Monachus, *De Expugnata Accone liber tetrastichus*, ed. P. E. D. Riant (Lyon, 1866), 98. The name 'Haymarus Monachus' given Monachus by Riant is to be rejected; it appears to have been based partly on a confusion with Monachus's predecessor as archbishop, Ernesius, and partly on a corrupt passage in the Lyon *Eracles*. See Haymarus Monachus, p. xxvii.

5. The Lyon *Eracles* speaks of the canons electing a monk who was archbishop of Caesarea - clearly a corrupt reading based on a confusion over his name. There is no other evidence that Monachus was a monk. The Plut. LXI, 10, fo. 299^v elaborates this, making him 'un moine noir'.

6. 'Eracles', p. 203 MS D.

and portion of God'. From then on the king of Jerusalem is not the lot, but nevertheless the canons are still the electors. No one should be surprised if the canons of the Sepulchre have this right in Jerusalem. For from the conquest of the land until now, there has been little time when a schism did not exist in the church of Rome. For when Godfrey and the other barons moved to come to conquer Jerusalem there was the schism of Pope Urban and King Henry. Then this was ended and afterwards there was Innocent II and then that of Pope Alexander and the Emperor Frederick, the grandfather of the present one, which lasted for eighteen years, and he made three popes who died bad deaths. Because of this there is no question at all of him holding it by custom. Because of this Pope Celestine forbade it as is said above.¹

Dr Morgan has suggested, rightly in our view, that part at least of this account is a later ecclesiastic's interpolation and was absent from Ernoul's original.² The last part, from the words, 'And so Pope Celestine reproved', is totally out of keeping with the essentially lay character of the chronicle as a whole, with its citation of an *incipit* of a papal decretal and its excursion into twelfth-century papal history, while the reference to Frederick Barbarossa as grandfather of the present emperor, Frederick II, supports our opinion that this section is not contemporary with the rest of the passage. The earlier portion of the account, however, is unquestionably derived from Ernoul. The phrase 'just as we have already told you', the truncated quotation of the passage dealing with the time allotted for royal confirmation and the shortened allusion to the Matthias story all suggest that the author of the Lyon *Eracles*'s version of the 1180 election was the author of this section as well. Further, in both style and presentation this passage is so similar to the bulk of the Lyon *Eracles* that it must be accepted as an integral part of the narrative,³ and details, such as the grant to Monachus's nephew which can be paralleled elsewhere,⁴ ring true and so add colour to this assertion.

1. 'Eracles', pp. 204-5 MS D. 'Dont le pape Celestin reprist le conte Henri, et fit une decretale; si comence enssi: "Com la terre, qui est commeue et apelée l'eritage et la partie de Deu". Des adonques en ca le rei de Jerusalem n'en est pas sort. Ne por quant les chanoines sont encore les eslectors. Nuls ne se doit merveillier se les chanoines dou Sepulcre faiseient iceste honor de Jerusalem. Car de la conqueste de la terre jusques a l'ores, poi de saison esteit que le cisme ne fust en l'Iglise de Rome. Car, quant Godefroi et les autres barons murent a venir conquerre Jerusalem, le cisme estoit dou pape Urbain et dou rei Henri. Puis fu de ce laissié, et apres Innocent le Segont, et puis fu del pape Alexandre et de l'emperere Fedric l'aiol de cestui, qui dura dix huit ans et fist trois papes, dont il furent mort de male mor. Por ce ne le deust il mie tenir par costume. Por ce le deffendi le pape Celestin, enssi come il est devant dit.'

2. Morgan, pp. 109-10.

3. Compare for example Henry's threat to drown the canons with his threat ('Eracles', p. 202 MS D) to hang the Pisans.

4. In 1197 Aimery of Lusignan gave an estate in Cyprus to Archbishop Joscius, heritable on Joscius's death by his nephew, probably in return for his help in arranging his marriage to Queen Isabella. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii. 606-7. See *Die Register Innocenz' III*, pp. 752-3; Potthast, no. 501.

It seems clear that the cause of the quarrel was the failure of the canons to present their postulate to Henry for confirmation. It may be assumed that they would have been familiar with *Cum terra, quae*, issued a few years earlier, in which the royal right of confirmation was specifically upheld. But Henry was not a crowned and anointed king, and it has been suggested that, since there was no king, the canons felt free to proceed without consulting him.¹ The narrative thus concerns an electoral procedure in which a single postulation was not submitted to the ruler for confirmation. The Lyon *Eracles* continues by giving two brief quotations from its account of the election of 1180: from the time allowed for royal confirmation and from the story of Matthias ('the canons are the apostles and the king the lot'). Within the narrative these quotations seem to function as a gloss, and, although the Matthias story was originally a justification for dual postulation, the fact that both quotations appear here together seems further evidence for our suggestion² that, to our author, they were associated with the problem of confirmation. In this context, the work of the interpolator should be seen as a kind of commentary. He evidently knew *Cum terra, quae*, and there is no doubt that the *incipit* he recorded is a rather loose translation of its opening clause: *Cum terra, quae funiculus hereditatis domini censebatur*. He was mistaken in ascribing the decretal, which was in fact issued in 1191, to the aftermath of this election, though his error is understandable if, as is likely, he knew it from one of the collections in which it lacked its dating clause. Moreover, he clearly thought that the decretal had put an end to the royal right of confirmation. Had he read *Cum terra, quae* carefully he would have seen that this right was in fact safeguarded. His overriding concern was to restrict royal interference in patriarchal elections, and to this end he inserted an *excursus* on papal history to show the unfortunate effects of imperial intervention in the affairs of the Church of Rome: what had happened to the papacy must not be allowed (by arguments from custom) to happen to the patriarchate of Jerusalem.³ Therefore, despite the reference to the Matthias story and the allusion to *Cum terra, quae*, dual postulation was not an issue on this occasion. The importance of this election lies rather in the way its account helps

1. H. E. Mayer, 'Das Pontifikale von Tyrus und die Krönung der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, xxi (1967), 192.

2. Above p. 9.

3. The sense of the interpolated passage remains obscure. An exact translation is extremely difficult. We have been assisted by many, notably Dr M. Grunmann of the University of Western Ontario. The circumstances of the interpolation are a matter for speculation. One hypothesis would be that its author was a cleric in the entourage of the patriarch of Jerusalem who, seeing at close hand in 1229 Frederick II's insistence on his prerogatives as regent of Jerusalem, acted to protect the patriarchate from undue interference. For a recent interpretation of Frederick's policies in the Latin East, see J. S. C. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (London, 1973), 160.

us interpret the Lyon *Eracles's* commentary on what happened in 1180.

On the basis of our discussion of the Lyon *Eracles*, we regard the 1180 election, not as an example of a recognized procedure of dual postulation, but, as has already been hinted, as a divided election. On the death of Patriarch Amaury, the canons of the Holy Sepulchre set about electing a successor. It was accepted that they would receive advice from the assembled prelates and from important laymen, and at least two people availed themselves of the opportunity: the queen mother, Agnes of Courtenay, and William, archbishop of Tyre. It is clear that the queen mother appealed to the canons to postulate Heraclius, partly, no doubt, because of her infatuation for him, but also, it is to be assumed, for sound political reasons. Heraclius had been drawn into the orbit of the royal family and the court, whereas William, although formerly the king's tutor and still chancellor of the kingdom, was associated with Raymond of Tripoli and his allies among the nobility. In his address to the canons, William denigrated Heraclius and implicitly disqualified himself as a candidate for election by suggesting that a search be made outside the Latin East for a suitable patriarch. The fact that he was able to offer advice and financial aid from the other higher clergy as well as from himself can be seen as an indication that he was acting as spokesman for the majority of those present. It requires little imagination to see why the notion of seeking a cleric from outside the Latin Orient was rejected. There would be a long delay; the search for a candidate in western Europe would be arduous, perhaps fruitless and, despite the offer to defray costs, expensive. Moreover, the suggestion was a departure from custom. The hierarchy of the Latin Orient, so far as we know, had been recruited from clergy present in the East, although on several occasions it had been recent arrivals or even visitors who had found themselves chosen to fill important ecclesiastical posts.¹ Also, the canons would have been well aware that in recent years there had not been much success in inducing important laymen to take up permanent residence in the East; there was no guarantee that they would be successful in persuading a western cleric of distinction to shoulder the onerous burden of patriarchal office.

If William's recommendation to seek a patriarch in the West was to be turned down, the only alternative was to elect someone already in the East. There were two obvious candidates: William of Tyre himself and Heraclius of Caesarea. The canons were divided, a situation not unusual in twelfth-century Latin Christendom. As

1. For example, Stephen of Chartres was a pilgrim in Jerusalem when elected patriarch (1128); Fulcher of Celles had been only a short time in the East before his election to the see of Tyre (1134/5). WT, pp. 594-5, 621-2.

the author of the Lyon *Eracles* tells us, William won over a party of them, and the queen mother had 'corrupted' some in favour of Heraclius. No solution to the deadlock could be reached by ordinary canonical methods. Our hypothesis is that an extraordinary procedure was hit upon: let the monarch, who had the right to confirm the election, decide between the two candidates. Perhaps as the king himself would have been an *ex officio* member of the chapter,¹ the canons had some defence against the charge that they had abandoned their responsibilities. Indeed, their action is understandable: a divided election would bring continuing disagreements which could only be resolved by an appeal to Rome; the patriarchal office would long be vacant at a time when the kingdom was weakened by the king's illness and by tensions between the 'Court Party' and the nobility. As William was fond of quoting: 'Omne regnum in se ipsum divisum desolabitur'.² The procedure was grossly irregular. Had the election been contested at Rome, undoubtedly the pope would have declared it invalid. So, to preserve the kingdom from division and avoid a deterioration in relations with the papacy, Heraclius's opponents remained silent. There survives no record of when or under what circumstances the pope confirmed the election, but we may assume that whoever were sent on Heraclius's behalf had instructions to prevent the full story of what had happened from becoming known.

The precise connection between this *ad hoc* arrangement, whereby the king arbitrated in a divided election, and the system of dual postulation, implied by *Cum terra, quae* and justified by the appeal to scripture in the story of Matthias and the lots as outlined by the *abrégé*, requires explanation. There is no doubt that the Matthias story was an *apologia* for canons, contestants and king alike so far as the 1180 election was concerned. As a piece of exegesis it may seem strained, and, in that it portrayed a divided election as an orderly process, it misrepresented the facts. But it was more than just a defence to silence critics of the events of 1180: it was a justification for the extension of the royal right of confirmation into a royal right to receive dual postulation. On the basis of *Cum terra, quae*, we have seen that dual postulation may have been general before 1191, even if it ceased after that date, and we suggest that the initial stimulus for its growth may have been the 1180 election. Certainly there is no indication that elections had been held in this manner before then. Dual postulation may have received theoretical support from an analogy with Byzantine practice. In Constantinople the patriarch was selected by the emperor from three candidates put forward by the Holy Synod.³ That Byzantine political ideas had

1. Mayer, 'Pontifikale', pp. 185-6.

2. Luke 11:17; see Matt. 12:25. WT, pp. 590, 630, 803, 1072, 1078.

3. See L. Bréhier, 'L'investiture des patriarches de Constantinople au Moyen Âge', *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* (Studi e Testi, 121-6, 1946), iii. 368-9.

support in the Latin East at precisely this period is shown by the evidence that there were some in Jerusalem who argued that the heir who was born after his or her father had become king, the *porphyrogenitus*, should inherit the throne in preference to other heirs, and it may be assumed that such concepts gained currency partly as a result of the presence of Maria Comnena in the Latin Kingdom.¹ If dual postulation were an idea introduced partly under Byzantine influence, the association of the patriarch with the prince in *Cum terra, quae* is perhaps explicable, for in Byzantium, just as the emperor chose the patriarch, so the patriarch chose the metropolitans.² The patriarch would have had the right to examine and confirm elections to offices within his direct jurisdiction,³ and this right would have afforded ample opportunity to introduce the practice Celestine was to condemn.⁴

Oral accounts of the 1180 election circulating in the East would inevitably have acquired elaboration. An early addition would have been the story of Matthias, which, as has been seen, could have served both as an *apologia* for 1180 and as a justification for the extension of dual postulation. To it was attached the tradition concerning the time allowed for royal confirmation. This may well be an authentic report concerning a practice which had grown up in Jerusalem during the twelfth century. Although this tradition underscores the right of confirmation, it is unlike the Matthias story in that it curtails the royal prerogative by its emphasis that there can be no delay in the exercise of this right. This restriction on royal authority is perhaps a testimony to its truth, and this in turn may have added plausibility to less convincing elements in circulation such as the Matthias story and the prophecy concerning Heraclius and the cross. The latter would have made its appearance after the defeat at Hattin and the collapse of the kingdom. In the aftermath of the disasters of 1187, parallels of several kinds were popularized: Jerusalem had been captured under a Pope Urban and lost under another Pope Urban; the cross recovered by one Heraclius, had been lost by another Heraclius.⁵ Thus three separate elements,

1. See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 104, 108.

2. See E. Herman in *Cambridge Medieval History*, iv (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1966-7), part 2, p. 110.

3. The right of the immediate ecclesiastical superior to scrutinize elections was general throughout Latin Christendom. For twelfth-century France, see M. Pacaut, *Louis VII et les Élections Épiscopales dans le Royaume de France* (Paris, 1957), 51-52.

4. An alternative explanation of the association of prince and patriarch could lie in the patriarch's role as royal deputy. For twelfth-century examples, see WT, pp. 550-3, 563, 617, 645.

5. The Lyon *Eracles* records the saying about the two Heracliuses and the cross on two other occasions, once ('Eracles', p. 46) putting it again into William's mouth, and once (p. 116 n. 1) linking it with the coincidence of the two Urbans. For other forms of these parallels, see Roger of Hovedon, *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series 51, 1868-71), ii. 323; Robert of Auxerre, 'Chronicon', *MGH Scr.* xxvi. 252; Salimbene de Adam, pp. 5-6.

all regarded as contributing to an explanation of the true meaning of the election of 1180, made an early appearance and may have been firmly linked to it by the time Ernoul committed them to writing.

Ernoul's original account of the 1180 election was probably written within a few years of the fall of Jerusalem. It was almost certainly little different from the version preserved by the Lyon *Eracles*, starting with William's appeal to the canons to elect an outsider and the Heraclius prophecy clumsily added as an afterthought. Sufficiently well informed on the actual events, he avoided the subject of dual postulation and described what happened in terms of a divided election settled by royal arbitration. Perhaps influenced by uncertainty as to whether Henry of Champagne had the right to confirm the patriarchal election of 1194/5, an event which may have been fresh in his mind at the time he was writing, he revealed his own uncertainties about the royal right of confirmation. In trying to resolve these uncertainties, he introduced the subject of the time allowed for royal confirmation and the story of Matthias whose applicability he clearly did not understand. In his treatment of the election of 1194/5, he was to use references to these two elements in his discussion, perhaps by way of reminding his readers that he had dealt with these issues already. At the end of his description of the 1180 election, he turned his attention to Heraclius whose private life and relations with William of Tyre provided ample opportunity for moralistic reflection. That he should have been biased in William's favour is easily explained: William was an associate of Raymond of Tripoli while Heraclius was an opponent; Ernoul himself was a retainer of Balian of Ibelin, one of Raymond's leading political allies. His partiality is thus in keeping with the rest of his work.

In the light of the oral traditions and Ernoul's written version of the 1180 election, it is now possible to offer an explanation of what happened at Nicosia in c. 1210 and of whom King Hugh was thinking when he asserted that he was following his predecessors' practices. There is no evidence that dual postulation had made an appearance between the promulgation in 1191 of *Cum terra, quae* and 1210, nor that in the fourteen years since the establishment of the Latin hierarchy in Cyprus any canonical irregularities in respect of episcopal elections had occurred. So unless the claim was entirely groundless or he was thinking back to the period of Byzantine rule in Cyprus, Hugh, by 'predecessors', must have meant the kings of Jerusalem, to whom he was related by marriage, and was referring to the years before the Latin conquest of Cyprus when dual postulation was being demanded in Jerusalem. He would have had two sources of information for the practice before 1191: Ernoul's account of the 1180 election and the collective memory of his entourage. Ernoul's

chronicle was doubtless known in Cyprus, thanks to the Ibelin connections there,¹ and we know of examples of familiars of the Cypriot court whose recollections would have gone back to the 1180s.² Possibly these recollections would have underlined the notion of dual postulation as a royal prerogative and they may even have produced other examples of its application in the period 1180-91. We can imagine the combined effect of both literary and oral accounts on the young, inexperienced and impetuous monarch, newly entered upon the exercise of his powers, especially as neither would have been likely to have referred to *Cum terra, quae*, which, had it been known, could have acted as a restraint.

If after 1210 dual postulation disappeared as a historical reality, it not only survived in historical literature, but its career there had only just begun. The years after 1220 witnessed the rapid proliferation of recensions of Ernoul's chronicle, some of which, most notably the Lyon *Eracles*, preserved his original with only comparatively minor alterations, while others, for example the *abrégé* and the Noailles *Eracles*, attained forms far removed from anything Ernoul wrote.³ At a fairly late stage in the transmission of these texts, a redactor, whose work became the basis of these two last-named versions, made a thorough and consistent revision of the material for the 1180 election to form the version hitherto most familiar to historians. He was perhaps influenced by the same oral traditions concerning dual postulation which may have influenced King Hugh. William's speech to the canons now began with the prophecy of Heraclius which served to justify all that followed. A few lapses apart, the narrative accorded with an electoral procedure of dual postulation interpreted in accordance with the story of Matthias and the lots. The redactor insisted that dual postulation was still applied in the Latin East, despite the fact that, as we have shown, this was simply not true. Like other thirteenth-century vernacular writers, he was evidently more concerned with literary effect than with strict adherence to his sources. But he was a writer of considerable ability who was at pains to provide his audience with a story that was entertaining and, at the same time, internally coherent. In this he succeeded far better than he could have imagined. Many scholars have relied to a greater or lesser extent on his account of the election and some have been prepared to accept his assertion that dual

1. For example, Hugh himself was the maternal grandson of Baldwin of Ibelin; Walter of Caesarea, the constable of Cyprus, was married to a daughter of Balian of Ibelin. C. du Cange, *Les familles d'Outre-Mer*, ed. E. G. Rey (Paris, 1869), 54-55, 280-1.

2. Among the Cypriot vassals who witnessed charters of Hugh I in 1210 were Raynald of Soissons and Walter Le Bel. *Reg. Hier.*, nos. 844, 846. Both are named in the list of vassals in the Kingdom of Jerusalem dating from the mid-1180s, Raynald at Nablus and Walter at Acre. John of Ibelin, 'Livre', *RHC Lois*, i. 424, 425. Raynald is first known from a document of 1183; Walter was viscount of Acre for a time after its recapture in 1191. *Reg. Hier.* nos. 627, 698, 701.

3. Above pp. 2-4.

postulation was still customary at face value.¹ It is only now, thanks to Dr Morgan's investigations, that we can begin to understand the tradition behind the *abrégé* and appreciate the clumsier but more reliable guide to what actually happened when Heraclius became patriarch of Jerusalem.

Our interpretation of the election of Heraclius is of significance both for the larger problem of the relations between Church and State in the Latin East in the late twelfth century, and also for our understanding of William of Tyre. There can be no question that the election of 1180 marked a victory for royal authority over the Church. Moreover, it seems to have paved the way for a remarkable extension of royal influence in ecclesiastical elections during the following decade, if indeed successive wielders of royal power were able to enhance monarchical authority by imposing the practice of dual postulation. An explanation of this policy would take us beyond the limits of this study into a consideration of royal authority generally during this period. Let it suffice to suggest that as the power of the crown diminished, the monarchy may have sought, by way of compensation, to increase its control of the Church. However, such aggrandizement was bound to provoke a reaction such as that embodied in *Cum terra, quae*, a decretal which for all its safeguarding of rights of confirmation firmly excluded the kings from interfering in the electoral process and so should be seen as a contributory cause of the subsequent decline of royal influence in Church affairs.

To come back to our starting point. On his return to the Latin East, William of Tyre appears as a superbly educated, highly gifted ecclesiastic pursuing an honourable career in which preferment would come as a matter of course. And so it did – thanks to the patronage of King Amaury and, after his death, of Baldwin IV and Raymond of Tripoli. Indeed, it was during Raymond's regency that he became chancellor (1174) and archbishop of Tyre (1175). But the death of King Amaury had left the future of the kingdom in jeopardy. The minority and subsequent incapacity of the leper king, Baldwin IV, gave rise to a struggle for power within the higher nobility in which Raymond of Tripoli and his followers were pitted against the 'Court Party', prominent in which were the queen mother, Agnes of Courtenay, and her brother, Joscelin. Contemporaneous with these divisions in the kingdom was the unification of the Moslem world under Saladin; William, as he shows clearly in

1. See Röhricht, *Geschichte*, pp. 390–1; Grousset, ii. 745–8; M. W. Baldwin, *Raymond III of Tripolis and the Fall of Jerusalem (1140–1187)* (Princeton, 1936), 40; Hotzelt, pp. 131–3. Among those accepting dual postulation as customary are A. C. Krey (William of Tyre, *A History of Deeds done beyond the Sea*, trans. and annotated by A. C. Krey and E. A. Babcock (New York, 1943), ii. 451 n. 7), J. Praver (*The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (London, 1972), 106), and H. E. Mayer (*The Crusades* (London, 1972), 155).

the *Historia*, was under no illusions as to the threat this posed.¹ Naturally enough, he was anxious that Jerusalem should weather the coming storm. In the closing years of his life, his contribution to the defence of Jerusalem was the *Historia*; he could see that Jerusalem needed help from the West and in his account of the vicissitudes of the previous eighty years he sought to show that help was both needed and merited. To this end he consciously played down the divisions at court, rarely allowing his true sentiments to get the better of him,² so that it has been left to the ingenuity of modern scholars to point out his partiality for Raymond and his opposition to those figures whom Raymond opposed such as Miles of Plancy, Philip of Flanders and Guy of Lusignan.³ It was ironical that the faction to which he himself belonged should have been the one which failed to come to terms with those westerners who had come East.

The early 1180s were difficult years for William. The election of 1180 signified a major reverse. There can be little doubt that he felt chagrin and disappointment over Heraclius's election: he had been outmanoeuvred by the detested queen mother; the patriarchal chair would have been the logical culmination of his career. Thereafter his fortunes continued to decline so that by 1183 he was totally excluded from the intricate scheming by the 'Court Party' which resulted in the appointment of Guy of Lusignan as regent, and the final blow, we suggest, would have been the excommunication of 14 April in the same year.⁴ But even if the excommunication was lifted following Raymond's return to power in November 1183, William must have been tempted to take his revenge in the pages of the *Historia*. Yet to do so meant revealing all the facts of the election: his speech to the canons; his appeal for an outsider; his denigration of Heraclius; in particular, the irregular procedure. He probably realized that no one would think any the better of him for exposing the kingdom's political and ecclesiastical wrangles for posterity in what would seem to all as a piece of personal vindictiveness. Furthermore, an exposure of the 'Court Party' would damage the monarchy and bring discredit on the kingdom as a whole, thus undermining one of his own aims in writing the *Historia*, that of portraying Jerusalem as a kingdom which deserved western aid. The alternative was to remain silent about the election and also about the excommunication. However great his sense of

1. WT, p. 1114.

2. For instances of William's hostility to the 'Court Party', see WT, pp. 1078, 1133-4. Vessey (p. 451) has suggested on the basis of WT, p. 1116 that William suppressed favourable material about Guy of Lusignan included in an earlier draft. To the contrary, we suggest that the effect of such a suppression could have been to remove derogatory remarks about Guy.

3. For example, see Vessey, pp. 445-53.

4. Above p. 11.

injustice, to record either would have required an explanation which would have damaged both *ecclesia* and *regnum*.

Taking revenge would also have damaged Heraclius. We do not know William's precise attitude towards his rival, but it seems that Heraclius was not stupid and ignorant as the Lyon *Eracles* would have us believe.¹ He had been a student at Bologna,² perhaps in William's day, and there was probably more to him than just a handsome appearance and dissolute morals. Nothing suggests that he had proved inadequate as archdeacon of Jerusalem or archbishop of Caesarea, and in many ways his career had paralleled William's. They had both been educated in the West; they had both attained metropolitan rank at about the same time; they had both attended the Third Lateran Council. We can therefore suggest that even William could appreciate Heraclius's strengths and recognize that in certain respects he would make an adequate patriarch. This interpretation, if correct, goes far towards explaining why in the *Historia* Heraclius is treated with studied neutrality.³ No comment is made on his private life, and, correspondingly, silence is William's tribute to whatever virtues he may have possessed. There was of course more to this than the historian's objectivity; there was his determination to present the Latin East in as favourable a light as possible: hence the bare factual report of the election of 1180, the suppression of the excommunication and the even-handed treatment of Heraclius. For the sake of the Latin Orient, the whole truth could not be told.

P. W. EDBURY

J. G. ROWE

1. Above p. 7.

2. His time at Bologna is alluded to in a letter of Stephen of Tournai. *PL*, ccxi. 355.

3. Above p. 1.

III

FEUDAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATIN EAST

The contributions of the last thirty years to the institutional and social history of the Latin states in Syria and Palestine have done much to revolutionize our understanding of their development in the two centuries of their existence⁽¹⁾, yet many questions remain unasked. Although considerable advances have been made in the study of the organisation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the history of the pre-fourteenth-century institutions of its sister-state, the kingdom of Cyprus, has received little attention⁽²⁾. In both Latin Syria and Lusignan Cyprus, the Frankish ruling class constituted only a tiny minority of the population, but in both only western Christians, men *de la lei de Rome*, could hold fiefs burdened with military service⁽³⁾. The social and legal position of the fief-holder is therefore of con-

(1) In particular by J. Prawer, J. Richard, C. Cahen, H. E. Mayer and J. S. C. Riley-Smith. For bibliography see J. PRAWER, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1969-1970), i, 52-3; J. S. C. RILEY-SMITH, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (London, 1973), p. 232, n. 4.

(2) J. Richard has published a number of studies on Cyprus in the fourteenth century, in particular: *Le casal de Psimoloso et la vie rurale en Chypre au XIV^e siècle*, in *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'École française de Rome*, lix (1947); *Un évêque d'Orient latin au XIV^e siècle. Guy d'Ibelin, O.P., évêque de Limmasol, et l'inventaire de ses biens (1367)*, in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, lxxiv (1950); *La révolution de 1369 dans le royaume de Chypre*, in *B[ibliothèque de l']E[cole des] C[hartes]*, cx (1952); *Chypre sous les Lusignans. Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIV^e et XV^e siècles)* (Paris, 1962); *Le royaume de Chypre et le grand schisme à propos d'un document récemment découvert*, in *Comptes-rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* (1965); *La situation juridique de Famagouste dans le royaume des Lusignans*, in *Πρακτικά τοῦ πρώτου διεθνoῦς κυπρολογικοῦ συνεδρίου* (Nicosia, 1972), ii; and with M. H. Laurent, *La bibliothèque d'un évêque dominicain de Chypre en 1367*, in *Archivum fratrum Praedicatorum*, xxi (1951).

(3) RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 10-11.

siderable importance, and the following article sets out to provide some insight into his role in society by examining the legal history of the twin institutions of military service and feudal tenure.

Two points must be made at once: there is good evidence that although the structure of feudal society was not identical in the two kingdoms, the feudal custom of Jerusalem also applied in Cyprus (4). This meant that Jerusalemite precedents could be cited in Cypriot courts (5) and *vice versa* (6), and also that treatises on feudal law written in either kingdom were of use in both; thus John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa, apparently revised his work which was written primarily for use in Jerusalem by inserting chapters culled from Philip of Novara who was writing in Cyprus (7); in the fourteenth century a version of John of Jaffa's treatise was given official status as a recognized work of reference in the Cypriot High Court (8), and in the sixteenth the Venetian authorities in Cyprus ordered it to be translated into Italian (9). On the other hand, institutions in the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli developed separately (10).

(4) Geoffrey LE TOR, *Livre*, in *R[ecueil des] H[istoriens des] C[roisades]. Lois*, i, 444; Philip OF NOVARA, *Livre*, in *RHC Lois*, i, 478, 523; *Documents relatifs à la successibilité au trône et à la régence*, in *RHC Lois*, ii, 404, 406; *Document relatif au service militaire*, in *RHC Lois*, ii, 428.

(5) But only with the court's express permission in the absence of a Cypriot precedent. Philip OF NOVARA, p. 524.

(6) For an example see *Documents relatifs à la successibilité*, pp. 404, 406, 408.

(7) Two principal groups of manuscripts originating from before 1369 survive of John of Ibelin's work. See M. GRANDCLAUDE, *Classement sommaire des manuscrits des principaux livres des Assises de Jérusalem*, in *R[evue] H[istorique de] D[roit] F[rançais et] E[tranger]*, ser. 4, v (1926), 442. The chief distinction between them is that the later group contains a number of interpolated chapters copied or adapted from Philip of Novara's treatise. That these interpolations were the work of John himself is indicated by the designation in one of them of John of Ibelin, the 'Old Lord' of Beirut, as 'mon oncle'. Philip OF NOVARA, p. 515; John OF IBELIN, *Livre*, in *RHC Lois*, i, 383, cf. 103, 112.

(8) John OF IBELIN, pp. 5-6: *Bans et Ordonnances des rois de Chypre, 1286-1362*, in *RHC Lois*, ii, 379.

(9) See M. GRANDCLAUDE, *Etude critique sur les livres des Assises de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1923), pp. 173-4.

(10) This article is only concerned with institutions found in Jerusalem and Cyprus. For Antioch see C. CAHEN, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche* (Paris, 1940), pp. 436-52, 528-34. For Tripoli see

Secondly, though any study of feudal institutions in the Latin East must rely heavily on the treatises on feudal law written for the most part in the second half of the thirteenth century, it must be stressed that these treatises need to be used with care. Medieval lawyers were prone to write not what the law was but what they felt the law ought to be, and from the Latin East almost nothing survives of the legal or administrative archives against which historians of medieval England can check the statements of 'Glanvill' or Bracton. More specifically, the legal treatises have in recent years come under a close critical scrutiny from which they have not emerged unscathed. We have now to reject John of Jaffa's version of the founding of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the origin of its laws⁽¹¹⁾; the jurists' treatment of the *Assise sur la ligece* 'had little correspondence to reality'⁽¹²⁾; John of Jaffa's ideas about a restricted baronial peerage were 'unhistorical and never, it seems, entirely accepted'⁽¹³⁾, and his account of the day-to-day duties of the seneschal should perhaps be regarded with suspicion as well: certainly the seneschals of Cyprus are unlikely to have exercised the functions he described⁽¹⁴⁾. Significantly, all the topics discussed in the legal treatises which have been called in question concern either constitutional law or the law as it affected the status of the greatest magnates; the jurists' descriptions of the more routine business of the courts and the law as it affected the less exalted feudatories have yet to be challenged. But it was precisely in their descriptions of the regular business of the courts that the jurists had least scope to indulge in flights of fancy, for herein lay the chief usefulness of their work. Probably they were sometimes anachronistic, but the standing of the authors and the extent to which later generations copied their works is a pointer to the validity of their ideas and to the accuracy of their accounts of legal institutions⁽¹⁵⁾.

J. RICHARD, *Le comté de Tripoli sous la dynastie toulousaine (1102-1187)* (Paris, 1945), pp. 44-57.

(11) See J. PRAWER, *Les premiers temps de la féodalité du royaume latin de Jérusalem*, in *Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis*, xxii (1954), 409-24.

(12) J. S. C. RILEY-SMITH, *The Assise sur La Ligece and the Commune of Acre*, in *Traditio*, xxvii (1971), 204.

(13) RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 20.

(14) See P. W. EDBURY, *The Feudal Nobility of Cyprus, 1192-1400* (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, St. Andrews, 1974), pp. 307-10.

(15) See RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, chap. 6. For fourteenth-century manuscripts of these treatises see GRANDCLAUDE, *Classement sommaire*.

I

With the difficulties of using the legal treatises in mind, we turn to the question of the performance of military services in the late thirteenth century. John of Jaffa placed military service at the head of his list of duties owed by those who held fiefs burdened with *servise de cors* :

They (*les homes*) should go to serve *à cheval* and armed at (the lord's) summons in any of the places of the kingdom to which he may summon them or have them summoned with whatever service they owe, and (they should) remain there for as long as he shall have summoned them or shall have had them summoned — up to a year ; for one ought not to be summoned for longer than a year by the *assise* or *usage* of the kingdom of Jerusalem. And he who owes service of his body (*servise de cors*) and that of a knight or sergeant should perform his service anywhere in the kingdom, either with him or without him if he has been summoned as he should⁽¹⁶⁾.

John then described the various forms that the service of counsel, *consilium* as opposed to *auxilium* or military service, could take, and concluded by mentioning three circumstances in which service was owed outside the kingdom : on the occasion of the king's marriage or that of any of his children, for the defence of the king's honour or faith, and for the evident need of the kingdom or the common profit of the land⁽¹⁷⁾. Several points are noteworthy : military service could take the form of service as a knight or as a sergeant ; it could last up to a whole year⁽¹⁸⁾ ; as men holding fiefs owing the service of more than one knight did not necessarily serve with the other members of their contingent, it would appear that a lord did not always serve in the host as commander of his own feudal retinue ; although service outside the kingdom had to be justifiable, the circumstances under which it could be owed were evidently open to wide interpretation. Behind all these aspects of service lay the assumption that military service would be performed, and performed in person.

(16) JOHN OF IBELIN, pp. 345-7 (following variant Ms. C).

(17) *Ibid.*, pp. 347-8.

(18) See also *La Clef des Assises de la Haute Cour du royaume de Jérusalem et de Chypre*, in *RHC Lois*, i, 598.

In view of the fact that by the second half of the thirteenth century there were numerous fiefs in England held by military tenure for which the holder would not ever have performed personal service, this assumption needs to be examined. The Latin Syrian legal writers of the period show clearly that in theory holders of fiefs burdened with *servise de cors* did perform their military services⁽¹⁹⁾; indeed they even made withdrawal of personal service a sanction against a lord under the *Assise sur la ligece*⁽²⁰⁾. The most important piece of evidence for contemporary attitudes to military service is to be found in the depositions of 1271 in the dispute over whether the Cypriot knights owed service outside Cyprus⁽²¹⁾. The dispute had arisen against the background of renewed Muslim advances at the expense of the Christian states on the mainland of Palestine and Syria. In the face of Baibar's major successes, King Hugh III had brought forces to Acre from Cyprus in 1265, 1266⁽²²⁾, and probably in 1268⁽²³⁾ and 1269, the year of his coronation as king of Jerusalem⁽²⁴⁾. In 1271 Hugh III again summoned his men, this time to join the Lord Edward who was then in the East on crusade, but, frightened perhaps by an abortive Mamluk raid on Limassol earlier that year⁽²⁵⁾ and concerned at the repeated summonses of the past few years to defend what by

(19) Besides the extract cited from John of Ibelin, see Geoffrey LE TOR, p. 436; Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 510, 519, 520, 526, 531, 538-43, 552-3; JOHN OF IBELIN, pp. 24, 203, 211-12, 306, 356-9; James OF IBELIN, *Livre*, in *RHC Lois*, i, 454-5, 457.

(20) RILEY-SMITH, *The Assise sur La Ligece*, p. 183.

(21) *Document relatif au service militaire*, pp. 427-34. For confirmation of the date of the dispute, see Walter OF GUISBOROUGH, *Chronica*, ed. H. Rothwell (London, 1957), p. 208. *L'estoire d'Eracles empereur et la conquete de la Terre d'Outremer* in *RHC H[istoriens] Oc[cidentaux]*, ii, 462 wrongly gives the date as 1272.

(22) *Eracles*, ii, 450, 455; *Annales de Terre Sainte*, ed. R. Röhricht and G. Raynaud, *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, ii (1884), 452; *Les Gestes des Chiprois*, in *RHC Documents Armeniens*, ii, 759, 766.

(23) *Annales de Terre Sainte*, p. 453; IBN AL-FURĀT, *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders: Selections from the Tārīkh al-Duwal wa'l Mulūk*, ed. and trans. U. and M. C. Lyons, with historical introduction and notes by J. S. C. Riley-Smith (Cambridge, 1971), ii, 129-30, 232; *Chronique d'Amadi*, ed. R. de Mas Latrie in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi* (Paris, 1891-3), i, 210.

(24) *Eracles*, ii, 457; *Annales de Terre Sainte*, p. 454; *Gestes*, pp. 772-3.

(25) *Gestes*, pp. 777-8; IBN AL-FURĀT, ii, 152-3.

then may have already seemed a lost cause, they objected. The Lord Edward agreed to arbitrate, and depositions were laid before him on the one hand, by King Hugh, and, on the other, by James of Ibelin, a son of John of Jaffa⁽²⁶⁾. Hugh asserted that the vassals owed service outside Cyprus by the terms of their enfeoffment and then listed a number of precedents on which such services had been enacted. James answered him point by point, denying that service could be owed outside the kingdom and alleging that when Cypriots had served abroad it was either as volunteers or because they were ignorant of their rights. At no point in his speech did James suggest that services were not owed within Cyprus, or that the system of feudal service was anachronistic and had ceased to function.

If Hugh could get his vassals to perform services outside Cyprus, there can be no doubt that services were owed and in fact performed in the island: though John of Jaffa's list of occasions on which they could be demanded abroad allowed a wide interpretation, he clearly implied that services at home were subject to even fewer restrictions. The question now arises as to whether the 1271 dispute shows that overseas military services were actually performed. Though some of the arguments which James of Ibelin used to challenge Hugh's use of historical precedents may well have been valid⁽²⁷⁾, his case was not convincing. His assertion that Cypriot feudatories could not be summoned to serve outside the island because the king had no right to demand 'service de mer' is unsupported⁽²⁸⁾, and the idea that service abroad must be illegal because Jerusalemite usage was derived from that of the West — from that of France in particular — and in the West service outside the borders of one's kingdom was unknown was

(26) For their relationship, see P. W. EDBURY, *The Ibelin counts of Jaffa: a previously unknown passage from the "Lignages d'Outremer"*, in *English Historical Review*, lxxxix (1974), 606.

(27) James's version of the circumstances of the Cypriot expeditions to Palestine in 1228 and 1231-2 (pp. 431-2 paras. 8-9, see p. 428 paras. 13-14) agrees with the account of these events as recorded by Philip of Novara. *Gestes*, pp. 681-2, 701-2.

(28) The *Assise de Belbeis*, an *assise* of King Amaury of Jerusalem, had laid down that a knight was not obliged to serve in a siege anywhere his horse could not carry him (*Gestes*, p. 721), but Hugh was not calling on his men to engage in naval battles, only to travel by ship to the scene of the campaign.

doubly erroneous : service abroad was claimed in the West ⁽²⁹⁾, and in a recent judgement in Jerusalem which James would unquestionably have known about, a man whose case had rested partly on the contention that Latin Syrian law should follow French law had been overruled ⁽³⁰⁾. As for the discussion of the precedents cited by Hugh, it is not easy to disentangle the conflicting statements of the two protagonists. But James was unable to conceal the fact that Hugh had succeeded in bringing his vassals to Acre following feudal summonses. James tried to cover himself by suggesting that they were ignorant of their rights, but this is unconvincing in view of his statement that the issue of feudal service abroad had been the subject of long debate ⁽³¹⁾. James's answer to Hugh's point that he confiscated the fief of a knight for failing to accompany the army to Syria following a summons is also inadequate : Hugh implied that the court had given judgement that the man was in default, thereby giving tacit acknowledgement of his right to summon abroad ⁽³²⁾ ; James asserted that the man had commended his fief because he was too poor to perform the services demanded, and implied that because a lord held a man's fief for a year and a day following either commendation or default of service some confusion had arisen ⁽³³⁾. But even if this were true, James did not explain why the knight found it preferable to surrender his fief for a year and a day rather than assert that the king had no right to summon him abroad and try to get his peers to support him in court.

Not only did Hugh bring feudal armies to Syria in the 1260s, but the compromise agreed in 1273 vindicated his right to continue to do so. By this agreement the Cypriots undertook to serve outside Cyprus, either in the Kingdom of Jerusalem or elsewhere in the East, for four months provided that the king or his son should lead them ⁽³⁴⁾. This

(29) Bishop Subbs pointed out (*The Medieval Kingdoms of Cyprus and Armenia*, in *Seventeen Lectures on the Study of Medieval and Modern History* (Oxford, 1886), p. 179) that by summoning his knights abroad, Hugh III was only doing what the Lord Edward was himself to do in 1297.

(30) See *Documents relatifs à la successibilité*, pp. 404, 408, 411, 414-15, cf. pp. 406, 409-10, 413.

(31) *Document relatif au service militaire*, pp. 432-3 (para. 13, see para. 12).

(32) *Ibid.*, p. 429 (para. 20).

(33) *Ibid.*, p. 433 (paras. 16-18). See Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 520, 555, 556-7.

(34) *Eracles*, ii, 463-4 ; Marino SANUDO, *Liber secretorum fidelium crucis*, ed.

compromise appears to have settled what was almost certainly the real point at issue: not whether services abroad were owed, but whether the king could insist on his full theoretical rights, thereby placing a greater burden on his vassals than they could reasonably be expected to bear. John of Jaffa, as has been seen, indicated that service could be exacted for as much as a year at a time. Unquestionably this was a far heavier burden than was normal in the West⁽³⁵⁾, and, although the practical impossibility of continuous mobilization had been recognized in the East since the first decades of the twelfth century⁽³⁶⁾, the agreement of 1273 is the earliest evidence for any formal reduction of this liability⁽³⁷⁾. It is to be assumed that lords did not normally exact anything approaching their theoretical rights, and that the dispute of 1271 followed a period in which demands for services had been heavier than usual. Marino Sanudo recorded a curious post-script: in 1279 Hugh III attempted to re-occupy Acre, then held by the Angevins, but his Cypriot vassals frustrated the expedition by leaving after four months⁽³⁸⁾; military service was being exacted, but under the terms of the compromise of 1273.

The amount of direct evidence for the continuing exaction of military services in Cyprus in the fourteenth century is slender. For example, it is known that in the early part of the century at least, grants of fiefs owing services were still being made⁽³⁹⁾, but, on the

J. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos* (Hanover, 1611), ii, 225. See *Annales Ecclesiastici*, ed. C. Baronius and O. Raynaldus, new ed. by A. Theiner (Bar-le-Duc/Paris, 1864-83), 1273 para. 36.

(35) See J. L. LA MONTE, *Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100 to 1291* (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), pp. 141-4; CAHEN, p. 529; R. C. SMAIL, *Crusading Warfare (1097-1193)* (Cambridge, 1956), p. 98.

(36) See FULCHER OF CHARTRES, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, ed. H. Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg, 1913), p. 763 (s.a. 1125).

(37) By the second quarter of the fourteenth century the obligation to serve abroad seems to have been further reduced to three months in the year. *Formules*, in *RHC Lois*, ii, 385.

(38) Marino SANUDO, p. 228. See L. DE MAS LATRIE, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852-61), ii, 131. It should be noted that the other sources for Hugh's attempt on Acre make no mention of the departure of the knights after four months. *Annales de Terre Sainte*, p. 457; *Gestes*, p. 784; *Amadi*, p. 214.

(39) *Texte officiel de l'allocution adressée par les barons de Chypre au roi Henri*

other hand, there is no information as to the terms under which Cypriot vassals served in the campaigns of Peter I in the 1360s. The grounds for believing that feudal *servise de cors* continued as an effective institution into the fourteenth century are based on the account of just one incident: in 1373 the Genoese invaded Cyprus, captured Famagusta and with it the young king, Peter II; Leontios Makhairas, the principal narrator of these events, recorded how that in November,

The king sent, and the knights and many more of the vassals were summoned to come from Nicosia to Famagusta, with their horses and their weapons and the men to do the service which was owed for their fief: and at the king's command they started off and came to him⁽⁴⁰⁾.

If Leontios is to be believed, then surely we have here the description of a feudal summons. Many of the men who responded were promptly arrested by the Genoese, while others who set out in answer to it realized what was happening and turned back⁽⁴¹⁾. A list of some sixty men who were held in prison in Famagusta in 1374 has been preserved, and it is likely that many of them were the same who had fallen into the hands of the Genoese when they answered the summons of the previous year⁽⁴²⁾. Although there is no way of knowing which of the men whose names appear in the document were arrested then, and which were seized at other stages in the invasion, it is perhaps significant that the list contains a number of the most prominent Cypriot vassals and many members of families long established in the Latin East.

The evidence adduced so far indicates that the military service which was owed for fiefs was not merely a part of a tidy, theoretical system of feudal relationships which existed only in the writings of the feudal jurists of the late thirteenth century, but was a contemporary

Il de Lusignan pour lui notifier sa déchéance, ed. L. de Mas Latrie, *Revue des questions historiques*, xliii (1888), 538.

(40) LEONTIOS MAKHAIRAS, *Recital concerning the Sweet land of Cyprus entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed. and trans. R. M. Dawkins (Oxford, 1932), i, para. 418.

(41) *Ibid.*, paras. 418, 420, 422.

(42) *Nouvelles preuves de l'histoire de Chypre*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie, *BEC*, xxxiv (1873), 80-84. The list has clearly been altered to include others who were later taken to Genoa as exiles or hostages. For a comparable list see Leontios MAKHAIRAS, i, para. 542.

reality. Not only did Cypriot vassals, and it may be assumed those of Jerusalem as well, perform services in the 1260s and 1270s, but the institution of the feudal *auxilium* appears to have survived in Cyprus until at least the latter part of the fourteenth century.

II

In the passages quoted above, both John of Jaffa and Leontios Makhairas indicated that military services were to be performed by knights and by other categories of fighting men as well. But there is no question that the most important form of service was knight service. What distinguished 'service de ... cors come chevalier' (43), from other types of service was the knight's arms and equipment. John of Jaffa gave a detailed description of the knight's armour in the mid-thirteenth century (44): he wore a hauberk, a helmet with a vizor (45), and iron leg pieces; he carried a lance, sword and shield; the horse was protected by an iron head piece and mail to guard its legs and flanks. The number of mounts that a knight had to provide himself with seems to have varied but could be as many as four (46). From the 'Livre au Roi' it would seem that a vassal who failed to equip himself properly was liable to have his fief confiscated (47). Other fief-holders owed service as sergeants or turcoples. A sergeant was either a foot soldier, or, from the late twelfth century, a mounted warrior; with the development of heavier armour and notions of a noble caste, the term 'knight' became restricted to the wealthier, better-armed cavalry, and contemporaries found it necessary to distinguish the latter from the more lightly-armed mounted men, the *sergens à cheval* (48). It is likely

(43) *Document relatif au service militaire*, p. 430.

(44) JOHN OF IBELIN, pp. 170-71. The description is *à propos* the armour for appeal of battle in cases other than homicide, but it is clear from this passage and from the remarks of other writers (Philip of NOVARA, p. 485; *Clef*, p. 589) that this was the normal equipment at this period. From fourteenth-century tomb stones it would appear that by then plate armour was in use in Cyprus. T. J. CHAMBERLAYNE, *Lacrimae Nicossienses. Recueil d'inscriptions funéraires, la plupart françaises existant encore dans l'île de Chypre* (Paris, 1894), plates xviii, xxviii.

(45) For a knight with a vizer-less helmet (1229), see *Gestes*, p. 689.

(46) See RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 8, n. 43 (p. 236).

(47) *Livre au Roi*, p. 613.

(48) See SMAIL, pp. 107, 110-11.

that the class of vassals who owed *servise de cors* as sergeants served mounted. In what is one of the earliest references to them in the East, it was recorded that at the time of the Latin settlement of Cyprus Guy of Lusignan enfeoffed two hundred *sergens à cheval* (49). At about the same period mounted sergeants who were liege men were known to the author of the 'Livre au Roi' (50), and in the thirteenth century mounted sergeants constituted an important section of the feudal military resources of the lordship of Arsur (51). But, as Philip of Novara made clear, it was the terms of service that distinguished feudal knights and sergeants; the rules governing the succession to their fiefs and the other conditions of their tenure were the same (52). Like the *sergens à cheval*, turcoples were *equites levis armaturae* (53), and it is possible that the terms *sergens à cheval* and 'turcopole' came to be used interchangeably. One version of the account of the Latin settlement of Cyprus described turcoples being enfeoffed where the other versions mentioned sergeants (54), and, indeed, what appears to be a fief-holding turcopole is found in a Cypriot charter of 1197 (55). On the other hand, there is a reference in 1306 to turcoples who are differentiated from 'homini ligii fanti ha cavallo' (56), an expression which presumably is to be understood as meaning liege *sergens à cheval*. The turcoples enfeoffed in the 1190s were to serve protected by a hauberk and with two mounts (57), and as a class of feudatories they continued to exist in the early fourteenth century (58).

(49) *Eracles*, ii, 188-9 (variant mss.); *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), p. 287.

(50) *Livre au Roi*, p. 613.

(51) *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem (1100-1310)*, ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx (Paris, 1894-1906), no. 2985.

(52) Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 542-3, and see pp. 515, 519.

(53) William OF TYRE, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum*, in *RHC HOc*, i, 925, 1097. See SMAIL, pp. 111-12.

(54) *Eracles*, ii, 192, cf. 188-9 (variant mss.). Describing events of 1231, Philip de Novara mentioned turcoples and *valès à cheval* (*Gestes*, p. 700) whereas in the corresponding passage the author of *Eracles* (ii, 386) spoke of *sergens à cheval*.

(55) MAS LATRIE, *Histoire*, III, 607.

(56) *Amadi*, p. 252. For another possible example of a passage in which they are differentiated, see *Eracles*, ii, 322. The historians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries never otherwise mention more than one type of lightly-armed mounted men below the rank of knight on any one occasion.

(57) *Eracles*, ii, 192.

(58) See *Amadi*, p. 264.

Many fief-holders held fiefs owing the service of just one knight, sergeant or turcopole, and under normal circumstances would have been expected to perform that service in person. A list of the *servitia debita* of the Kingdom of Jerusalem dating from the eve of the battle of Hattin shows that in the 1180s the occupants of the greatest lordships could owe as many as a hundred knights, while on the royal domain there were several examples of vassals owing between two and ten knights⁽⁵⁹⁾. From other evidence it is known that some vassals had to provide both knights and sergeants or turcoples⁽⁶⁰⁾. For those feudatories with fiefs burdened with the service of more than one fighting man, the solution to the problem of how to make up the *servitium debitum* was either subinfeudation or the use of mercenaries. There were limits placed upon the proportion of a fief which could be subinfeudated⁽⁶¹⁾, and partly for that reason, and partly, no doubt, for more general considerations of convenience, the practice of employing mercenaries, *compaignons*, was common⁽⁶²⁾. Some mercenary knights were evidently immigrants from the West who hoped to receive the grant of a fief or the opportunity to marry an heiress. In 1153 both Raynald of Châtillon and Walter of St. Omer were said to have served as mercenaries on Baldwin III's expedition to Ascalon⁽⁶³⁾. That same year Raynald, described by William of Tyre on this occasion as 'quidam stipendarius miles', married Constance of Antioch⁽⁶⁴⁾, and by 1159 Walter was lord of Tiberias⁽⁶⁵⁾. Gerard of

(59) JOHN OF IBELIN, pp. 422-6. See SMAIL, pp. 89-90 ; J. PRAWER, *La noblesse et le régime féodal du royaume latin de Jérusalem*, in *Le moyen âge*, lxxv (1959), 58-9. The list clearly pre-dates 1187, and could post-date May 1185. See J. RICHARD, *Les listes des seigneuries dans 'Le livre de Jean d'Ibelin'*. *Recherches sur l'Assebebe et Mimars*, in *RHDFE*, sér. 4, xxxii (1954), 570, n. 15. For fluctuations in the *servitia debita* with a possible example of a substantial reduction in the thirteenth century, see RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 9.

(60) JOHN OF IBELIN, p. 346. For an example of a fief in Antioch burdened with the service of one knight and one turcopole, see *Inventaire des pièces de Terre Sainte de l'ordre de l'Hôpital*, ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx, in *Revue de l'Orient latin*, iii (1895), no. 167.

(61) See below, p. 342

(62) See RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 9.

(63) WILLIAM OF TYRE, p. 796.

(64) *Ibid.*, p. 802.

(65) *Regsta Regni Hierosolymitani*, compiled R. Röhricht (Innsbruck, 1893-1904), no. 336. See WILLIAM OF TYRE, p. 790. Walter's rights to Tiberias were

Ridefort, later master of the Temple, came East and served both King Amaury and Raymond III of Tripoli as a mercenary; allegedly Raymond held out the prospect of marrying him to an heiress in Tripoli and when the marriage failed to materialise, Gerard and he quarrelled⁽⁶⁶⁾. Named mercenaries are comparatively rare in our sources, but it seems that another important group were those drawn from the ranks of noble families already established in the East. Writing of events in Cyprus in 1306-1310, the author of the so-called 'Chronique d'Amadi', a history now only known in an Italian translation, mentioned some thirty-five mercenary knights by name of whom about two thirds were evidently related to Cypriot feudatories⁽⁶⁷⁾. Presumably these men were either the sons of fief-holders or members of cadet branches of feudal families. In many cases they were probably employed by the crown, but some would have served as *compaignons* to relatives or other associates who held fiefs owing more than one knight.

Not all fiefs were burdened with *servise de cors*. Some were held in sergeantry, this is for a menial, non-military service⁽⁶⁸⁾, while others were free of service altogether. It is likely that in some instances a *fié franc* dated from the time of the Latin conquest⁽⁶⁹⁾, but John of Jaffa admitted the possibility that a lord might deliberately make a grant of a fief with no services attached⁽⁷⁰⁾. Thus in 1310 it was agreed that Hugh, son of Amaury of Tyre, 'should be free, quit and immune from performing personal service on account of the aforesaid fiefs (those inherited from his father and Khrysokhou which was then being gran-

evidently acquired by his marriage to the heiress, Eschiva of Bures, who continued to hold the lordship after his death.

(66) *Eracles*, ii, 50-52. The ambition of mercenaries to receive fiefs is alluded to by Leontios Makhairas (i, para. 79) in his description of events in Cyprus in the 1340s.

(67) *Amadi*, pp. 259, 264, 266, 269, 275, 294, 337, see p. 386. See also *Gestes*, p. 871. Among the families represented were Antioch, La Baume, Brie, Costa, Floury, Gibelet, Mainbœuf, Mimars, Montgisard, Montolif.

(68) See RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 4-5.

(69) For a use of this term by a thirteenth-century jurist, see JOHN OF IBELIN, p. 399. See PRAWER, *Les premiers temps*, pp. 413-14, 417-18; RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 7.

(70) JOHN OF IBELIN, pp. 215-16.

ted him) for as long as he shall live' (71). In a narrative account of the events of the same year we are told that Philip of Ibelin, count of Jaffa and one of the wealthiest Cypriot vassals, held his fiefs free (72). It is almost certain that such exemptions were rare; exactly how commonly lesser nobles would have held their fiefs free from service is unknown, but there is no doubt that two other leading Cypriot vassals of the early fourteenth century, Hugh of Lusignan, later Hugh IV, and Balian of Ibelin, prince of Galilee, did owe feudal services (73).

Not every fief-holder owed service as a knight; not every man who fought equipped as a knight held a fief. Use was made of both feudal and mercenary knights, and also of both feudal and mercenary sergeants. It is likely that sometimes knights would have served not for pay, nor in response to a feudal summons, but as volunteers, perhaps as crusaders or simply in the hope of winning booty on campaign and obtaining favours subsequently from their lords (74). Those feudatories who owed more than the service of one man could have made up their *servitium debitum* either with rear vassals or with mercenaries hired at their expense, but their retinues may well have included relatives and household retainers. Writing of events in Cyprus in 1232, Philip of Novara gave a portrait of the composition of a lord's military following. At the time of the battle of Aghirda, Balian of Ibelin was excommunicate, and his father, as overall commander of the royalist forces, removed him from his usual command for that reason. Despite his excommunication and his father's action, Balian was accompanied into battle by five knights:

Of these five, one was Philip of Novara and another Raymond of Flace; these two were his vassals and held from him; Peter of Montolif was a third, a mercenary high in his favour, and the other two were Robert of Maumeni and Odo of La Fierté whom he had brought up and made a knight (75).

(71) C. PERRAT, *Un diplomate gascon au XIV^e siècle: Raymond de Piis, nonce de Clément V en Orient*, in *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'École française de Rome*, xliv (1927), 80. See *Amadi*, p. 373.

(72) *Amadi*, p. 385. For the family's wealth, see MAS LATRIE, *Histoire*, ii, 215; EDBURY, *Ibelin counts*, p. 606.

(73) *Texte officiel*, p. 538; *Amadi*, p. 385.

(74) See *Document relatif au service militaire*, pp. 430-34.

(75) *Gestes*, p. 715.

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In trying to obtain a picture of the mounted section of the field army of the thirteenth century, we have also to remember the frequent participation of contingents from the Military Orders and, especially after the middle of the century, from the foreign forces in the East such as the French garrison at Acre⁽⁷⁶⁾. Rulers had no part in the recruitment of the armies of the Military Orders or the foreign garrisons; as for their own armies, while it is clear that *servise de cors* remained important, other forms of recruitment existed along side the feudal summons.

III

We have seen that feudal *servise de cors* still flourished in the 1260s and apparently survived in Cyprus until the latter part of the fourteenth century. If the thirteenth-century jurists are to be believed, the reasons for this survival lay partly in the terms under which fiefs were held. A fief would have had to be valuable enough to provide a livelihood for the holder and his family and to equip him to perform the amount of service due. Naturally a lord would not want to find that his vassal had alienated so much of his fief that what was left could no longer support his military obligations, and so alienation in *mortmain* was forbidden⁽⁷⁷⁾, and division or subinfeudation had to be accompanied by a corresponding division of services. The proportion of a fief that could be subinfeudated was limited, although the jurists were uncertain as to the extent of this limitation: a man had either to keep more than half his fief in his own hands, or at least retain a larger portion than that held by any one of his feoffees⁽⁷⁸⁾. As a rule fiefs could not be divided so that a new division owed only a fraction of the service of a knight or sergeant, although when a fief owing several knights was divided among heiresses fractionalisation was

(76) For the French garrison, see J. RICHARD, *Le royaume latin de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1953), pp. 297-9. For an example of its participation on campaign (1266), *Eracles*, ii, 455.

(77) Except with the lord's permission. See Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 530-31. See also John OF IBELIN, pp. 215-16.

(78) Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 553-4; John OF IBELIN, pp. 284-5. See RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 12-13.

allowed if the services could not otherwise be apportioned equally⁽⁷⁹⁾. Normally a fief owing the service of only one knight could not be divided at all⁽⁸⁰⁾, the only exception being for purposes of dower when the division would not be permanent. Furthermore, fiefs or parts of fiefs could not be sold except in cases of insolvency, and only then to someone of knightly status approved by the lord⁽⁸¹⁾. In practice it may be assumed that fief-holders tried to circumvent these provisions: Julian of Sidon leased his lordship to the Templars, but King Hugh III later insisted that he perform services supported out of his income from the Order⁽⁸²⁾; fief-holders evidently tried to alienate feudal properties in towns by claiming that they were non-feudal *bourgeries*, a category of property which could be bought and sold freely⁽⁸³⁾. That fractionalized fiefs existed is plain from Philip of Novarra, but his only mention of them was in his discussion of the partition of fiefs among heiresses⁽⁸⁴⁾.

In addition to the rules which were designed to preserve the fief in its entirety and so guarantee the ability of the feudatory to perform services, there were others which ensured that the service would be performed even if the holder of the fief was unable to do it in person. A fief-holder who was an unmarried woman had to employ a mercenary⁽⁸⁵⁾; in a minority the services were the responsibility of the *bailli*⁽⁸⁶⁾; a man who inherited two separate fiefs each owing *servise de cors* had to provide a *compaignon* to make up the total *servitium debitum*, and on his death the fiefs would pass to two of his heirs instead of both going to his eldest heir⁽⁸⁷⁾; a man who was over sixty

(79) Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 542-3. See John OF IBELIN, p. 224.

(80) Philip OF NOVARA, p. 554; John OF IBELIN, p. 284.

(81) *Livre au Roi*, pp. 638-9; Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 500-501; John OF IBELIN, pp. 288-94.

(82) Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 530-31.

(83) See J. PRAWER, *The 'Assise de Teneure' and the 'Assise de Vente': A Study of Landed Property in the Latin Kingdom*, in *Economic History Review*, ser. 2, iv (1951), 81-7. Praver probably overestimated the effectiveness of Henry II of Cyprus's ordinance of 1297 to curb this abuse.

(84) Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 542-3.

(85) *Ibid.*, p. 559.

(86) John OF IBELIN, p. 281.

(87) Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 538-41; John OF IBELIN, pp. 223-4. See E. MEYNIAL, *De quelques particularités des successions féodales dans les Assises de Jérusalem*, in *RHDFE*, xvi (1892), 409-20.

or disabled had to place his horse and arms at his lord's disposal⁽⁸⁸⁾.

These rules for the preservation of fiefs and the *servitium debitum*, which are known principally from the writings of the feudal jurists, underline the point that in theory military service was expected. The fact that they existed, however, does not in itself prove that services were exacted, any more than it proves that the rules themselves were adhered to. But it may be surmised that they were reasonably effective, if only because the performance of military services survived comparatively late in the Latin East. Two other factors help explain this survival: the absence of commutation of services and the level of feudal incidents.

There is no evidence that kings of Jerusalem or of Cyprus ever allowed their vassals to commute their military services to a money payment. As has recently been pointed out, this is particularly striking when it is remembered that the commutation of agricultural rents in kind was common in the East⁽⁸⁹⁾. In England the proliferation of fractionalized knight's fees was unquestionably stimulated by commutation in the form of the institution known as *scutage*. In the East fractionalization of fiefs was severely restricted; in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it seems that this restriction was effective, and perhaps the comparative absence of fractional fiefs should be seen as a symptom of the absence of commutation. A man who wished to avoid performing *servise de cors* and could not arrange for a substitute to serve in his place had one of two courses open to him: he could commend his fief to his lord — and the lord could refuse to accept a fief in commendation if military needs were pressing — or he could simply fail to answer summons. In either case the vassal lost his fief, probably his only source of income, for a year and a day, and so neither alternative was attractive⁽⁹⁰⁾. If then there was no established method of commuting military service, a lord either exacted the service on pain of temporary confiscation, or received nothing from his

(88) JOHN OF IBELIN, pp. 358-9, see p. 362. See *Livre au Roi*, p. 641.

(89) RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 38-9.

(90) PHILIP OF NOVARA, pp. 520, 556-7; JOHN OF IBELIN, pp. 282-3, 306, 392-3. If a man refused to answer summons when his lord's lands were under attack or if he insisted on commending his fief by abandoning it to his lord under similar circumstances, the lands were forfeit for life.

vassal for the fiefs he held from him. Consequently it was all the more important for the lord to be able to get his men to perform their services.

In feudal societies in the West, the lord was entitled not only to the services owed by the vassals for their fiefs but to certain other rights over the fiefs themselves. These rights, usually described collectively as feudal incidents, gave the lord a share in the financial returns of the lands or rents held by feudal tenure, and could be valuable. But although John of Jaffa wrote of the homage, services and 'totes les autres redevances que le fié deit' (91), it is clear from the thirteenth-century jurists that feudal incidents in Cyprus and Jerusalem were limited. There is no evidence for relief, the payment levied when an heir entered his feudal inheritance (92); similarly, as the son or daughter of a fief-holder who had died could, if he or she were of age, enter their father's fief without reference to the lord (93), it would appear that, in those circumstances at least, the lord had no right of *primer seisin*. Neither was wardship, or, to use the term current in the East, *bailliage*, of heirs under age the prerogative of the lord. The surviving parent brought up the heir and held his fiefs; if there was no surviving parent, the fiefs were administered by the closest adult heir, while the person of the minor was entrusted to a relative on the other side of the family. Only in the absence of a surviving parent or an adult heir did the lord have the right to take the wardship for himself (94).

In sharp contrast, a lord had the right to control the marriages of all women between the ages of twelve and sixty (95) who held fiefs or the *bailliage* of fiefs owing *servise de cors* (96). The justification for this institution, known as *servise de mariage*, was primarily that a

(91) John OF IBELIN, p. 222.

(92) See RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 38 and n. 116 (p. 247). For relief in Antioch, see CAHEN, p. 532.

(93) Philip OF NOVARA, p. 494.

(94) *Ibid.*, pp. 494-5; John OF IBELIN, pp. 261-7; James OF IBELIN, p. 461. See RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 38.

(95) For the age limits, see Philip OF NOVARA, p. 559; John OF IBELIN, p. 362.

(96) John OF IBELIN, pp. 267, 279-82; James OF IBELIN, p. 467. A widow was not required to perform *servise de mariage* for her dower portion.

suitable man could be found to perform services for a fief held by an heiress or a widow⁽⁹⁷⁾. *Servise de mariage* was, as the terminology suggests, regarded as a type of service: the procedures for summons and the showing of essoins were similar to those for military service⁽⁹⁸⁾; failure to perform *servise de mariage* was punishable, as was failure to perform *servise de cors*, by loss of fief for a year and a day, and failure to answer summons was also punishable by loss of fief for a year and a day⁽⁹⁹⁾. According to John, the 'Old Lord' of Beirut, John of Jaffa and Philip of Novara, marriage without permission was punishable by loss of fief for the duration of the marriage, but according to the author of the 'Livre au Roi' and Balian of Sidon, for life⁽¹⁰⁰⁾. The procedure for *servise de mariage* was straightforward: the woman was summoned to appear in the High Court where she was given a choice of three potential husbands; a widow could not be summoned within a year and a day of her previous husband's death; the prospective husbands had to be peers of the woman, or, in the case of a widow, of her former husband⁽¹⁰¹⁾. The most celebrated example of the disparagement of a widow was the attempt of Peter I of Cyprus to marry Maria of Gibelet to an artisan⁽¹⁰²⁾. The ill-feeling caused by this incident led directly to Peter's murder in 1369, and in the *remède* enacted immediately after the murder it was ordained that the lord needed the approval of the woman's next of kin for the candidates for her hand; this would appear to mark a reduction in his

(97) John OF IBELIN, p. 348.

(98) Philip OF NOVARA, p. 559; John OF IBELIN, pp. 359-61; *Formules*, p. 389. See LEONTIOS MAKHAIRAS, i, para. 277.

(99) Thus John OF IBELIN, p. 361. Philip of Novara (p. 559) stated that in the event of failure to answer summons, the lord held the fief until the woman performed *servise*. Failure by a widow to do *servise de mariage* for the *bailliage* of her child's fief resulted in the loss of her dower as well as the fiefs held in *bailliage*. John OF IBELIN, p. 282.

(100) *Livre au Roi*, p. 627; Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 559-60; John OF IBELIN, p. 365. Ralph of Tiberias argued that the penalty should be loss of fief for a year and a day. If the husband was a vassal of the same lord and had entered his wife's fief, he could be appealed for breach of faith. John OF IBELIN, pp. 366-9. See *Livre au Roi*, p. 627.

(101) *Livre au Roi*, pp. 626-7, 628; Philip OF NOVARA, p. 559; John OF IBELIN, p. 359. See *Bans et Ordonnances*, p. 379.

(102) See G. HILL, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1940-52), ii, 364.

rights⁽¹⁰³⁾. The relatives had always been able to demand that the lord should summon an heiress to marry, a provision which seems to have been intended to prevent a lord who held the *bailliage* of the heiress's fief keeping her unmarried and thereby prolonging his enjoyment of her income⁽¹⁰⁴⁾. The careers of Beatrice of Courtenay and Isabella of Ibelin, lady of Beirut, show that on occasion heiresses did avoid *servise de mariage*⁽¹⁰⁵⁾, but it can be assumed that normally a king or lord could control marriages, and this gave both political and financial advantages. John of Jaffa mentioned financial incentives offered the lord by the relatives of an heiress to induce him to allow her to marry the man of their choice⁽¹⁰⁶⁾, and the way in which Henry II of Cyprus reserved his rights over a limited number of marriages in 1306 and 1310 at the same time as his income was agreed suggests that the profits were considerable⁽¹⁰⁷⁾.

There remain the incidents known as feudal aids. The jurists mention only one circumstance in which a lord could impose an aid on his vassals' fiefs: a one per cent levy to pay his ransom should he be captured, and this could only be applied if the sum required could not be raised from the lord's property or by loans⁽¹⁰⁸⁾. The insignificance of this obligation is placed in perspective when it is remembered that there is no evidence for tenants-in-chief in Cyprus or Jerusalem ever being called upon to tax themselves in this way to ransom their king. On the other hand, there is evidence for taxation in the form of aids taken from fiefs both in Jerusalem in 1183 when the rate was two per cent and in Cyprus from 1289⁽¹⁰⁹⁾.

If the level of feudal incidents was limited, and, with the exception of the returns from *servise de mariage*, the profits accruing small, the value to the lord of lands and fief-rents held from him in feudal tenure would have lain predominantly in the services owed. Furthermore, if services were not commuted to money payments, the im-

(103) *Bans et Ordonnances*, p. 379. See RICHARD, *La révolution de 1369*, pp. 110-11.

(104) JOHN OF IBELIN, pp. 264-6.

(105) See RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 28, 147, 224.

(106) JOHN OF IBELIN, p. 264.

(107) *Texte officiel*, p. 539; *Amadi*, p. 329 see p. 302.

(108) JOHN OF IBELIN, p. 397.

(109) WILLIAM OF TYRE, p. 1111; *Texte officiel*, p. 535.

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plication would be that the performance of the *servitium debitum* was normally all a lord exacted. Thus rulers would have had a strong incentive to preserve the system of feudal services, and this partly explains the regulations designed to keep fiefs and therefore services intact. Similarly, if the burden of incidents on the vassals was light, there would have been less incentive for them to devise methods of avoiding them along the lines of the English system of feoffment to use. It can therefore be suggested that the level of feudal incidents in the East was a factor which helped preserve feudal tenure and services.

IV

There can be no disguising the fact that for our knowledge of the rules for preserving fiefs in their entirety, our knowledge of the provisions for ensuring that services would be performed, and our knowledge of the extent to which a lord could profit from feudal incidents, we are dependent almost exclusively on the writings of the feudal jurists of the second half of the thirteenth century. These writers rarely disagreed with each other on these issues, although frequently one might give details on a particular point which were ignored by the others. They were also broadly in agreement with the much earlier 'Livre au Roi' (c. 1197-1205) ⁽¹¹⁰⁾, a work which unfortunately left many aspects of feudal law unmentioned. The measure of unanimity among the later thirteenth-century jurists is a pointer both to the accuracy of their descriptions of legal conventions and to the fact that individual conventions were well established at the time their treatises were written. The jurists, however, only tell us what the law was in theory, or what, in their view, the law should have been, and there is every reason to assume that in practice evasion of particular rules or exemptions from certain obligations were not unusual: as has already been mentioned, Julian of Sidon alienated his lordships to a Military Order and there are two known examples of heiresses

(110) For example, the regulations governing *servise de mariage*, the position of a man who inherited two fiefs, and the sale of feudal property (pp. 626-8, 633-4, 638-40) were similar. On the other hand, the obligations of a knight over sixty or disabled (p. 641) were not the same as those described by John of Ibelin (pp. 358-9).

avoiding *servise de mariage* ⁽¹¹¹⁾. How vigorously the law as described by the jurists was applied is impossible to assess, but we can assume that their account of it provides at least the theoretical basis from which practice deviated.

The picture that emerges of feudal institutions in the thirteenth century is one in which the military services owed for fiefs were performed — this is independently attested — while the fiscal potentialities of the fief — commutation of services, feudal incidents — were not much exploited; the tenurial system was geared to perpetuating this arrangement. The question that must now be asked is what of the period between the foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the time the jurists were writing? how did these feudal institutions develop and what can be said of their origins?

In certain instances it is known that individual aspects of feudal convention were modified during the century and a half following the capture of Jerusalem. In particular, there seem to have been important changes in the regulations governing *servise de mariage* and in those concerned with the succession to fiefs. Philip of Novara stated that originally there had been no seigneurial right to control the marriage of heiresses who could thus marry whom and when they chose; the lord subsequently took full control of marriages, and the system described by Philip and the others emerged as a compromise designed to allow some influence to the woman's relatives ⁽¹¹²⁾. If this account of the development of the institution is true, then what was to become the only appreciable incident of feudal tenure did not exist for some time after the conquest. The position of heiresses was further changed in the twelfth century by the introduction of the rule that, in default of a male heir, a fief would be divided among sisters with the services shared proportionately; previously the eldest heiress had inherited the entire fief. According to the thirteenth-century sources, this change was made on the advice of Count Stephen of Sancerre who is known

(111) See above p. 347. Another probable example of an unsanctioned alienation to a Military Order was Balian of Arsuf's transfer of Arsuf to the Hospitallers. See RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 224. For the enforcement of *servise de mariage*, see the remarks of Balian of Sidon. PHILIP OF NOVARA, p. 560. See also CAHEN, pp. 608-9. For an exemption from *servise de mariage*, see MAS LATRIE, *Histoire*, ii, 148.

(112) PHILIP OF NOVARA, pp. 558-9. See PRAWER, *La noblesse*, pp. 51, 56.

to have been in the East in 1171 (113). There were at least two other changes in the laws of succession in the twelfth century: whereas in the thirteenth a man who inherited two separate fiefs each burdened with *servise de cors* could enjoy both of them but had to provide *compaignons* to make up the requisite *servitium debitum* and on his death the fiefs passed to two of his heirs instead of being both inherited by his eldest son, previously the lord could take one of the fiefs into his own hands and after his vassal's death bestow it upon a younger child or any of his other descendants (114). The date of this change is unknown, but it evidently occurred in the twelfth century as the thirteenth-century arrangement was known to the author of the 'Livre au Roi' (115). The other change concerned a more basic principle of inheritance. In Jerusalem fiefs were granted either to the first holder and all his heirs, or to the first holder and the heirs descended from himself and his espoused wife only. The latter condition restricted the number of possible heirs by excluding collaterals, and by limiting the possible heirs a lord would have had a far greater expectation of recovering the fief, either permanently through the failure of heirs, or temporarily due to the minority of the heir and the absence of a parent or another potential heir who could hold the *bailliage*. It is clear that the practice of granting fiefs to a man and all his heirs was superseded in Jerusalem during the twelfth century by the more restrictive form of enfeoffment: grants to a man and his heirs by his espoused wife only are first found in 1152, and as all enfeoffments in Cyprus were on this basis it appears that the older practice had completely died out by the 1190s (116). But the continuing development of feudal law was not a feature solely of the twelfth century. Philip of

(113) Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 542-3. For Stephen see *Documents relatifs à la successibilité*, pp. 408, 409; Robert OF TORIGNY, *Chronica*, ed. R. HOWLETT, *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I* (RS 82), iv, 249; William OF TYRE, p. 988. Henry Le Buffle, after whose death the first division among heiresses was said to have been made, is last known in 1165. *Reg. Hier.*, no. 412. See also *Les Lignages d'Outremer*, in *RHC Lois*, ii, 454.

(114) Philip OF NOVARA, p. 538.

(115) *Livre au Roi*, pp. 633-4.

(116) *Ibid.*, p. 643; Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 504, 537; John OF IBELIN, p. 235. For the earliest examples of grants to the first holder and his espoused wife, see PRAWER, *La noblesse*, pp. 62-3.

Novara noted that it was not until after the Ibelin-Longobard war (1229-1233) that children of traitors born before their fathers' treachery lost their rights to their ancestral fiefs; previously only children born after the offence were disinherited in consequence of their father's guilt⁽¹¹⁷⁾.

In the light of our knowledge of feudal military services and the associated aspects of tenurial law in the thirteenth century and also of these examples of changes in feudal institutions, it is now possible to put forward a hypothesis about the period in which these institutions first took shape and the circumstances which influenced their development. There can be no doubt that notions of feudal dependence and the idea of the feudal contract involving the holding of a fief in return for service were introduced to the East with the conquest, and were strengthened by waves of immigration from the West in the years immediately following it. The critical period for the establishment of the framework of feudal law was thus the opening decades of the twelfth century, and two features of this period, both abundantly illustrated by the narrative sources, should be regarded as having had a profound influence: the shortage of man-power and the continuous state of warfare⁽¹¹⁸⁾.

The shortage of troops and their almost constant deployment dictated that a knight who came to the East could expect to receive a heritable fief for his service, and that a ruler would be willing and able to pay that price in order to acquire permanent military settlers to defend his expanding frontiers. Rulers were dependent partly on the feudal host, partly on mercenaries and partly on pilgrim armies, and of these it was the feudal troops who formed 'the backbone of the army of the Latin kingdom'⁽¹¹⁹⁾. Pilgrim armies, however valuable on a particular campaign, were transitory and not always amenable to royal control⁽¹²⁰⁾; mercenaries are known from this period, but seem

(117) Philip OF NOVARA, p. 498.

(118) See for example, Fulcher OF CHARTRES, pp. 388, 563. See also PRAWER, *La noblesse*, pp. 42-4. For the wider effects of the continuous warfare on Frankish society, see C. CAHEN, *La féodalité et les institutions politiques de l'Orient latin*, in *Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei fondazione Alessandro Volta. Atti dei convegni*, xii (1957), 173-4.

(119) LA MONTE, p. 158; SMAIL, pp. 23, 88.

(120) See SMAIL, pp. 94-5.

to have been less common than later ; they required ready cash, a commodity which was not always available, and yet lacked a stake in the well-being of the Kingdom (121). Perhaps mercenary knights were few for the simple reason that any knight worth employing and who intended to stay in the East could obtain a fief. If mercenary knights were hard to find, this could explain why an ordinary knight who inherited two fiefs was not thought capable at first of serving with a *compaignon* and so was relieved of the military responsibilities (and income) of one of them (122). Kings and lords were not only prepared to enfeoff knights, but were prepared to do so on generous terms both to induce knights to settle and to outbid other lords who also needed to attract followers. Provided that the all-important military service was forthcoming, they were prepared to surrender much that was becoming customary in various places in the West. If a vassal left a son to carry on his father's service, the last thing the lord would want to do would be to discourage him from remaining in the East by making him buy back his patrimony : therefore, no relief and no *primer seisin*. Similarly, who looked after a minor heir and his fief or who decided who an heiress should marry was irrelevant as long as the *servitium debitum* was performed. Service, not financial profit, was what was wanted from fiefs, and it is scarcely surprising that no tradition of commutation of services developed. The rules governing the succession to fiefs were designed to attract settlers and were biased towards the provision of able-bodied knights. Grants to a man and all his heirs could, it has been argued, serve to encourage collaterals still in the West to come East (123). The fact that fiefs passed to the closest heir of the last in seisin and not to the representative heir would have tended to produce heirs who were more likely to be already of age (124). That women could inherit feudal property may have been intended as an incentive to settle, as the idea that a hard-won fief would continue to be held by one's descendants even if

(121) *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 32, 94, 102.

(122) For an alternative explanation, see PRAWER, *La Noblesse*, p. 49.

(123) *Ibid.*, pp. 48-9.

(124) Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 503-4. See *Livre au Roi*, p. 630. A representative heir would most commonly have been the grandson of the fief-holder, the son of his deceased eldest son ; a second son would be the closer heir, and in these circumstances far more likely than the grandson to have reached his majority.

there were no male heir would have been attractive⁽¹²⁵⁾. A further incentive may have been provided by the rule known to Philip of Novara but apparently not exercised in the thirteenth century which allowed the first holder of a fief to divide it among his sons as he pleased⁽¹²⁶⁾. But these incentives to settle do not always seem to have been sufficient, for there is evidence that the early kings of Jerusalem had to take steps to discourage fief-holders, and also owners of non-feudal tenements, from abandoning their property by promulgating an *assise* that all claim to title lapsed after the absence of a year and a day⁽¹²⁷⁾.

In the early years of the twelfth century, not all knights were occupying their lands by virtue of enfeoffment; some held their lands by right of conquest. As William of Tyre explained: when a town was taken by assault whatever a man seized for himself, he and his heirs would lawfully possess⁽¹²⁸⁾. Such lawful seizures of property were evidently common at the time of the conquests following the First Crusade, and the result was that although a knight could be a personal dependant of a lord, he would own property from which no service was due. Examples survived into the thirteenth century, but it is assumed that in many instances such allodial holdings were turned into fiefs, perhaps on the insistence of a lord as the price of confirmation of title⁽¹²⁹⁾. Nothing concrete is known about this process, but just as generous terms of feudal tenure were offered to attract military settlers to accept fiefs, so it is likely that the same generous terms, with the condition that services were owed, would have made the change from allodial holdings easier.

Later in the twelfth century the military resources of the Latin Kingdom were still not adequate to guarantee its security. The feudal host, however, thanks partly to the advent of the Military Orders, no

(125) PRAWER, *La noblesse*, p. 48. See M. GRANDCLAUDE, *Liste d'Assises remontant au premier royaume de Jérusalem (1099-1187)*, in *Mélanges Paul Fournier* (Paris, 1929), p. 335.

(126) Philip OF NOVARA, pp. 545-6.

(127) PRAWER, *The 'Assise of Tenure'*, pp. 79-82. This *assise* later came to be applied only to non-feudal property. See pp. 83-4.

(128) William OF TYRE, p. 805.

(129) See PRAWER, *The 'Assise de Tenure'*, pp. 82-3; PRAWER, *Les premiers temps*, pp. 413-14, 417-18.

longer bore the full responsibility for defence, and it seems also that the acute shortage of Frankish knights had abated. In consequence, we may suggest, the kings could afford to be more restrictive in their grants of fiefs and in the terms under which fiefs were held, while at the same time, presumably because of pressure from the feudatories, at least one of the rules designed to protect services slackened somewhat. It has been observed that it was more difficult for a newcomer to get into the feudal hierarchy at this period and also that the use of mercenaries was becoming commoner⁽¹³⁰⁾. Possibly these features were related: a greater supply of men could have meant that the kings no longer needed to offer heritable fiefs to recruit their armies; a salary for as long as a man's services were required was sufficient, and so money which might earlier have gone to provide fief-rents could be diverted to hire troops on a more temporary basis. Similarly, if there were more men available as mercenaries, the individual feudatory who found himself bound to find a *compaignon* would be in less difficulty, and so the rules concerning the inheritance of two separate fiefs were relaxed in the vassal's favour⁽¹³¹⁾. Another possible effect of the reduced pressure to recruit knights through infeudation was the growth of the practice of granting fiefs to the first holder and his heirs by his espoused wife only; as has been mentioned, these terms were less attractive, since the possibility of the lord recovering the fief by escheat was enhanced, while the first holder could not expect his lands to pass to a brother or nephew if he himself died without children⁽¹³²⁾. The kings also extended their rights over existing fief-holders: there is the example of the aid levied in 1183, and at an unknown date the crown assumed control of the marriages of heiresses and widows; the subsequent arrangement whereby heiresses were to have the choice of three candidates was clearly a concession to

(130) PRAWER, *La noblesse*, p. 53; SMAIL, p. 94.

(131) See above, pp. 343, 350. Philip OF NOVARA (p. 538) explained the change in the law as the consequence of the fear that the fief taken by the lord would be permanently lost if the ancestor's *seisin* and the rights to succession passed beyond the memory of the court. Praver (*La noblesse*, pp. 55-6) has argued that the change was to allow the nobility the chance of concentrating fiefs in their hands and so build up their power.

(132) Praver's suggestion (*La noblesse*, p. 63) that this change would have benefitted the barons rather than the crown, though ingenious, is unconvincing.

the nobility, although neither can this change be dated⁽¹³³⁾. Another concession which could ultimately have led to the loss of military service as it allowed for the fractionalization of fiefs was the decision in 1171 to allow their division among heiresses.

Much work has been done since Bishop Stubbs pronounced his verdict that 'The Assizes of Jerusalem' — and by these he meant the feudal law as described by the thirteenth-century jurists — 'lay like a crystal block, a model of usages, incapable of enforcement and incapable of growth'⁽¹³⁴⁾. Enforced and developed they most certainly were, but at the back of Stubb's statement stands one important truth: in the absence of legislation, feudal law tended to fossilize. The jurists have much to say about the legislation of the twelfth-century kingdom which was enshrined in the *Letres dou Sepulcre* and lost for ever at the time of the fall of Jerusalem; to them feudal law was customary law, and it was not always known whether a particular element had its origin in usage or in a conscious legislative enactment⁽¹³⁵⁾. What the jurists do not say is that there had been no legislation to change the rulers for military service or feudal tenure in the period between the fall of Jerusalem and the time they were writing. Without legislation, though usage may gradually and imperceptibly have changed, the law was in theory immutable. The consequence of this conservatism, it is suggested, was that despite major changes in conditions in the Latin East, for example, the loss of territory and the long periods of peace in the thirteenth century⁽¹³⁶⁾, many of the features of feudal law such as the insistence on the performance of military service, the rules of inheritance and the comparative absence of incidents, which can perhaps be seen as the product of the chronic warfare and shortage of man-power a century earlier, survived. In the early twelfth century Frankish society had to

(133) See PRAWER, *La noblesse*, p. 56. GRANDCLAUDE, (*Liste d'Assises*, pp. 340-41) suggested that it was not yet operating in 1177, but the example he cited in support of his suggestion, the marriage of William of Montferrat to Sibylla, the heiress-apparent to Jerusalem, would scarcely have been typical of feudal practice at that time.

(134) STUBBS, *Medieval Kingdoms*, p. 168. He was referring specifically to fourteenth-century Cyprus.

(135) See RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 133, 134-5.

(136) See RICHARD, *Le royaume latin*, p. 161.

be geared to warfare to preserve its existence : in this it succeeded and many of the institutions apparently created at that time proved to be so durable that they continued to the end of the Latin Kingdom and for long afterwards in Cyprus ⁽¹³⁷⁾.

(137) I am indebted to Dr. J. S. C. Riley-Smith and Dr. R. C. Smail for reading and commenting on a draft of this article.

IV

THE BARONIAL COINAGE OF THE LATIN KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM

The subject of the baronage of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and its relationship with the crown has received considerable attention during the past half century. In 1932 the American scholar, John La Monte, published his Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem which was essentially a restatement of the older view that from the outset in the early twelfth century the kings were weak constitutionally: the king was primus inter pares with his vassals; he was obliged to rule with their consent, and his rule was hedged about by an array of feudal conventions which allowed little scope for the exercise of royal authority. Since the Second World War a number of specialists in the history of the crusades, most notably Jean Richard, Claude Cahen, Joshua Prawer, Hans Eberhard Mayer and Jonathan Riley-Smith have presented us with a fresh view, or rather, a fresh series of views.¹ La Monte is shown to have mistaken thirteenth-century legal theory for twelfth-century historical reality, and, though areas of disagreement remain, a consensus has emerged which would see the twelfth-century kings of Jerusalem as powerful men who kept the upper hand in their dealings with their nobles. As time wore on the prerogatives of the dynasty were undermined: the accession in 1174 of a king who was a leper; the accession in 1185 of a king who was a young child; the disastrous defeat for the Christians at Hattin in 1187; the consequent loss of territory and prestige and the resultant recrimination; the succession to the throne of no less than four heiresses in turn so that for the period 1186-1228 the kingdom was ruled by their consorts—all had a debilitating effect on royal authority even although some of the rulers concerned were able and vigorous. From 1228-1268 the titular kings of Jerusalem were absentees—members of the German imperial house of Hohenstaufen—and for much of the remaining period until the extinction of the Latin Kingdom in 1291 the throne was disputed by the Cypriot Lusignans and the Sicilian Angevins. No wonder that legal theorists writing in the second half of the thirteenth century could present a view of the constitution which left the impression that monarchical power was severely circumscribed and that baronial rights were extensive.

This paper sets out to consider the coinage issued by the barons of the Latin Kingdom, delving into the problems of who were involved, when were the mints in operation and under what circumstances were coins produced. But first, as frequent reference is made to Schlumberger's Numismatique, still after a century of use an invaluable work of reference, a possible source of confusion needs to be dispelled. Schlumberger shared the belief that the droit de coins possessed by many of the lords in the East comprised the right to strike money. In fact, as Chandon de Briailles showed nearly forty years ago, this privilege had nothing to do with coinage and concerned the right to use a lead seal to authenticate formal documents.² Schlumberger's erroneous

belief led him to assume that many more lords could have issued coins than in fact did so. It is now clear that the lords of only three lordships, Sidon, Beirut and Tyre, definitely issued their own coins—western-style billon or copper deniers and oboles.³ In addition, there is an extremely rare anonymous denier of Jaffa (Fig. 1) which is at present undated and so which may or may not have been minted during one of the periods at which Jaffa was held as a fief of the crown.⁴ Attention is drawn elsewhere in this volume (pp. 94-6).




FIG. 1. Anonymous denier of Jaffa. Obv. Cross pattée. +·DENARIVS·
Rev. Stylized gateway. +·IOPPENSIS·

to supposed references in Muslim sources to Jaffan and Beirut dirhems—evidently imitative Arabic coins—but it is far from clear precisely what coins were intended by these ascriptions, and there is no way at present of knowing whether they were in reality minted by the lords of Beirut and counts of Jaffa.

To turn first to the coins issued by the lords of Sidon. We are at once confronted by a problem. In the supplement to his Numismatique de l'Orient latin, Schlumberger described a copper coin which purports to have been issued by Gerard lord of Sidon who flourished in the years 1147-65 and who died c. 1170 (Fig. 2).⁵ Gerard is chiefly famous as the nobleman whose disseisin of one of his own vassals provoked the then king, Amaury, to intervene on that vassal's behalf and to promulgate the celebrated law, the Assise sur la ligece. In addition there survive self-evidently garbled reports of what appears to have been an earlier brush with the crown which may have led to Gerard being expelled from the kingdom by Amaury's predecessor, Baldwin III.⁶ The difficulties surrounding the coin includes the fact that the unique example known to Schlumberger is now unlocated⁷ and, although style is difficult to judge from a nineteenth-century line-drawing, Schlumberger's engraving makes the coin look more like a product of the thirteenth century than anything produced in the third quarter of the twelfth. Were it acceptable as a coin minted by Gerard, it would be of key interest as the earliest identified




FIG. 2. Copper coin supposedly of Gerard lord of Sidon. Obv. Arrow.
GIRARDVS. Rev. Chrismon. S·I·D·O·N·I·A (retrograde).

baronial issue. But unless other examples are brought to light, it must be treated with all possible reserve.⁸

With Gerard's son and successor, Raynald of Sidon (1170-c. 1204), we are on safer ground. Several deniers are known bearing his name⁹ and the problem here lies in trying to establish the period at which these coins were minted (Fig. 3). Raynald first appears as lord of Sidon in a document of 1171;




FIG. 3. Billon denier of Raynald of Sidon. Obv. Fortified tower. RENALDVS. Rev. Arrow. SYDONIA.

in 1187 Sidon, along with most of the Latin Kingdom, was captured by Saladin, and although Raynald retrieved part of his lordship by the truce agreed in 1192, it was not until 1229, long after his death, that the town of Sidon was once again fully in Christian control. Until the late 1220s it would appear that the revenues from Sidon were shared by the Muslims and the Christian lords in a condominium and that Sidon itself was in Muslim hands.¹⁰ In the light of these developments it is more natural to assume that the minting of these coins dates from the period when Raynald had sole rule in Sidon—before 1187—and this early date may find some support in the absence of coins of Sidon from two large hoards concealed in the mid-1220s, the Tripoli and Kessab hoards, perhaps an indication that by then they had ceased to circulate.

If Raynald's coinage belongs to the period before the battle of Hattin, it needs to be considered in conjunction with the copper coins bearing the legend T.V.R.R.I.S. +.D.A.V.I.T. . It has recently been proposed that the Turris Davit coinage was issued by Raymond of Tripoli at Beirut during his custody of that lordship in the years 1184-6 while regent for Baldwin IV and Baldwin V.¹¹ His acquisition of the regency had meant the victory for the political faction in the Latin East which he himself led and of which Raynald was a member, and Beirut was assigned to him temporarily in order to compensate him for personal expenses incurred during his period of office. Beirut was the most northerly of the cities of the Kingdom of Jerusalem; beyond it lay Raymond's own county of Tripoli; immediately to the south stood the lordship of Sidon. Raymond and Raynald were thus political allies and near neighbours. Both employed appropriate devices on their coins: Raymond's Turris Davit coinage bore on the reverse the eight-pointed star characteristic of Tripolitan deniers; Raynald's coinage shows on the reverse the arrow, the punning device derived from the fact that the contemporary vernacular form of the name for "Sidon" had the medieval French word for "arrow" as its homonym (saiette from the Latin sagitta). Indeed, it is possible that Raynald issued his coins in the mid-1180s, influenced perhaps by the example of his political patron some twenty-odd miles up the coast.

Raynald's coinage appears to have been followed by a series of degenerate imitative forms with totally blundered legends (Fig. 4).¹² These are only identifiable as originating from Sidon by the arrow device common to them all. The arrow, however, seems to have been misunderstood: it is placed vertically instead of horizontally and has the appearance of a stylized plant with dots




FIG. 4. Degenerate forms in billon or copper of the Sidon coinage. In no case can an intelligible reading of the legend be offered.

added to the design perhaps intended as flowers or leaves. The best specimens have the Holy Sepulchre on the other side—the design being copied from the AMALRICVS deniers (still current in the 1220s) while others have the simpler six-limbed chrismon. It is likely that they all date from the period of the condominium (1192-1229), and they could be of Arab workmanship. It may further be proposed that the GIRARDVS coin already discussed (Fig. 2) is an associated type, presumably of the same period: the form of the arrow, which shows the vertically aligned plant-like features, and the six-rayed chrismon are closely paralleled.

In striking contrast to these degenerate issues is the well-executed anonymous billon coin illustrated in Fig. 5.¹³ This coin, with its French legend




FIG. 5. Anonymous billon denier of Sidon. Obv. Cross pattée +D·E·N·I·E·R·. Rev. Building with arcading and cupola. +D·E·S·E·E·T·E·.

and the absence of the arrow motif, clearly signifies a new departure, and the fact that the earliest datable contexts in which it has been found are hoards apparently concealed in the 1230s¹⁴ strongly suggests that the issue began shortly after Sidon returned to undisputed Christian control in 1229. If so, the coinage would have been first minted on the authority of Raynald's son, Balian of Sidon. Balian was a distinguished lawyer who for much of the time from 1228 until his death in 1240 acted as regent in Acre, steering a difficult course in the conflict between the Emperor Frederick II, the father of the rightful but absentee heir to the throne, and the Latin Syrian barons led by Balian's own maternal uncle, John of Ibelin lord of Beirut, who were opposed to him.¹⁵ Writing of the events of 1251, Joinville has a story of King Louis IX of France and his knights giving deniers issued by Balian's widow, Margaret of Risnel, as an offering at the funeral of Count Walter of Brienne.¹⁶ Unless of course the coins in question were of some unknown type specifically minted for this occasion, it is probable that Joinville was referring to coins of the type here discussed—the implication being that they were still available at that time. Whether they were still in production in 1251 is another question. The style of the surviving specimens is so uniform that the idea that their issue spanned a period of over twenty years is open to doubt.

Mention of John of Ibelin lord of Beirut leads us to the coins that he himself issued in his lordship. Beirut, lost by the Christians in 1187, was regained in 1197 and was given to John, a half-brother of Queen Isabella, at an unknown date between 1200 and 1205.¹⁷ John thereafter held Beirut until his death in 1236; from 1205 until 1210 he was regent of Jerusalem, but he is best remembered as the leader of the Cypriot and Latin Syrian nobility who resisted the attempts by the Emperor Frederick to bring the Christian-held territories in the East under his direct control. John was a wealthy lord and Beirut seems to have enjoyed considerable commercial prosperity during his time. The famous description of his palace at Beirut by Wilbrand of Oldenburg who was a visitor in 1212 speaks of his conspicuous consumption,¹⁸ and from the 1220s there is evidence for John developing Beirut's commercial potential by issuing privileges to encourage western merchants to come there to trade.¹⁹ It may be surmised that it was as a direct result of this commercial activity that sufficient silver accumulated for John to mint his own deniers.

The surviving coins from Beirut are of two denominations: billon deniers bearing John's name (Fig. 6) and copper coins, some of which are anonymous while others are again in the name of John (Fig. 7). Most of the principal varieties of the deniers occurred in two hoards, the Tripoli and Kessab hoards, both of which were concealed in the mid-1220s, and this enables us to date them to the period c. 1200-c. 1225.²⁰




FIG. 6. Billon denier of John of Ibelin, lord of Beirut. Obv. Cross pattée; crescents in 2nd and 3rd quarters. +IOhANNES. Rev. Fortified tower. +DE BERITI.

Schlumberger suggested that the copper coinage dated from the time of John's grandson and namesake, John II, who was lord of Beirut 1247-68, but the existence of at least three examples overstruck on the Turris Davit coinage of the mid-1180s suggests that they too were minted by John I. It is true that the copper coins do not appear in either of the hoards just mentioned, but this absence would be explained simply in terms of their low value making their concealment not worth while. Probably the copper coins were issued more or less simultaneously with the billon deniers as a fractional denomination of lower intrinsic value.²¹ There are three varieties of the coppers, and the sequence in which they were issued is problematic. The quality of the dies is variable, and declines in the course of the issue inscribed DE BERITO IOhE. This might be taken as a reason for placing the variety last. It is by far the most plentiful. The other two varieties are anonymous. The fortified gateway on that inscribed DE BERITENSIS is distinct, being eccentric with an entrance to one side, curved arches at the top of the central tower and single turrets on the side-works. It is scarce and could be an experimental issue standing at the head of the series. The coin with DE BARVTh resembles the more common variety in the details of its gateway and the fact that in this case the legend is in French might be an indication that this variety is late in the sequence.




FIG. 7. Copper coins of John of Ibelin, lord of Beirut. Obv. Fortified gateway. The legends are a) DE BERITENSIS, b) DE BARVTh or c) DE BERITO IOhE. Rev. Geometric, fretted design.

Schlumberger drew attention to "la ressemblance frappante" between the coins bearing John's name and the issues of Tripoli and Sidon and of the Turris Davit type.²² Now that it has been proposed that the Turris Davit coinage originated from Beirut, the link between it and John's coinage is all the more significant. John of Ibelin would presumably have known Raymond of Tripoli's mint, and, as the existence of the overstrikes proves, the Turris Davit issue was still in circulation there at the time John's moneymen were at work. There were also close personal links between John of Ibelin, Raynald of Sidon and Raymond of Tripoli: John's father, Balian of Ibelin, was another of Raymond's partisans in the years before 1187 and Balian and Raynald both supported Conrad of Montferrat in the struggle to oust Guy of Lusignan from power at the time of the Third Crusade. Besides this, Raynald married John's sister, Helvis of Ibelin, a woman at least twenty years his junior.²³ The date of Raynald of Sidon's death is unknown—it occurred at some point between 1200 and 1210²⁴—but it seems highly probable that he survived long enough to suggest to his brother-in-law that he might follow his own example and mint his own coins in his lordship.

The third lordship from which coins are known is Tyre. They were issued by Philip of Montfort, lord of Tyre 1246-70, and his son, John lord of Tyre and Toron 1270-83.²⁵ Philip of Montfort was the son of Raynald of Sidon's widow, Helvis of Ibelin, and her second husband, Guy of Montfort; he was thus the nephew of John of Ibelin, lord of Beirut. Philip is normally referred to as "Lord of Tyre", but his title to Tyre was somewhat dubious. In 1246 the regent of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, King Henry I of Cyprus, entrusted Philip with custody of Tyre. Tyre was a part of the royal domain and Henry, as regent, in theory could not make permanent alienations from it. Legally Philip had only temporary control and his right to administer Tyre could last only until the regent either dismissed him or died. But despite the insecurity of his title, Philip held on to Tyre, treating it as if it were his own feudal barony. On the accession of King Hugh III of Cyprus as king of Jerusalem in 1269, the legal situation was regularized by an agreement which confirmed Philip in possession. At the same time provision was made for the marriage

of Philip's son, John, to Hugh's sister. In reality, even if he had wanted to, King Hugh was too weak to take Tyre back from Philip who by then had been entrenched there for over twenty years.²⁶ Throughout the 1260s Philip had been at loggerheads with the Latin Syrian barons based in Acre since he supported the Genoese and they the Venetians in the wars that the two mercantile republics were fighting in the East. At one point, in 1263, he made an alliance with the Muslims against the authorities in Acre, and in 1267 he had his own truce with Baybars, the Mamlūk sultan.²⁷ Hugh III of Cyprus' marriage alliance with the Montforts paid off: when in 1277 his control of Acre and the other vestiges of the royal domain on the coast of Syria was allowed to slip out of his hands and pass to the officers of his rival, Charles of Anjou, John of Montfort remained loyal and allowed Hugh to use Tyre as a bridge-head for his attempt at recovery.²⁸



FIG. 8. Copper coins of Philip and John of Montfort. a) Obv. Cross pattée. +PhELIP. Rev. Classical portico and pediment. DE SVR. b) Obv. Cross pattée. +IOhSTRO (recte +IOhSIRE—see Seltman op. cit. (n. 25)). Rev. Similar to a). DE SVR.

Philip and John's coins (Fig. 8) are of a similar design and it may be that they form a continuous series and were minted during a relatively short space of time around the year 1270, the date of Philip's death. The coins appear to be of copper, with little or no silver content, and so cannot have had much commercial appeal or have been of much value to the lords who issued them.

It is one thing to describe and try to date a series of coin issues, quite another to interpret their significance. The various issues span the best part of a century, and it is likely that the circumstances which prompted their appearance were far from uniform. But an adequate investigation of the coins themselves remains to be undertaken. With the exception of the Turrus Davit coinage, which in any case stands apart since it appears to have been issued by the regent and not by a vassal in his lordship, no corpus of the surviving coins of any of the issues has been compiled. No analysis of provenance has been attempted, and it is not possible to assess how widely the coinage circulated. Nor have the dies and die-duplicates been counted, and until this is done the total coins minted in any one variety cannot be estimated. The metal-content of the issues similarly awaits analysis, and so no conclusions as to the intrinsic value of the coins relative to other coinages in circulation is available. (Quite likely the deniers will prove to be in the same range of fineness as the royal coins, i.e. roughly a quarter silver to three-quarters copper.) In very general terms it can be said that the baronial coins were never an important part of the economy at large. For example, in the Tripoli and Kessab hoards which were concealed in the 1220s, they accounted for less than 1% of the total in each case, and other evidence seems to point in the same direction. Nevertheless, much work is still to be done.

The historian when faced with these baronial coins is also confronted by a completely different problem. A twelfth-century law threatened vassals of the crown who minted their own coins or who fabricated imitations with the confiscation of their fiefs. Issuing coins in one's own name and the forgery of coins were just two offences in a list of twelve for which this penalty was prescribed. Others included such things as rebellion, deserting one's lord in battle and apostasy.²⁹ It looks as if the purpose of the law, or établissement, was to assert a royal monopoly over the minting of coins. But herein lies the difficulty. For whereas the établissement purports to have been promulgated by King Baldwin II (1118-31), recent numismatic opinion inclines to the view that the earliest royal coinage belongs to a later period, to the reign of King Baldwin III (1143-63).³⁰ There are three possible ways around the dilemma thus posed: first, the law was dealing with what at the time was a purely hypothetical situation; secondly, pace recent opinion, coins were being issued as early as the time of Baldwin II, and, thirdly, the law should be redated to a later period. None of these solutions is altogether satisfactory. Medieval kings did not as a rule legislate for hypothetical contingencies, and there is no definite indication from the wording of this law that this is what was happening here. But Professor Joshua Prawer has rightly drawn attention to the influence of Roman Law present in the établissement, and it may be that the two clauses concerning coinage indicate no more than an awareness of the Roman principle that the falsification of money was a crimen laese maiestatis and do not reflect contemporary circumstances.³¹ Were royal mints functioning before the 1140s? After the fall of Tyre in 1124 the Christians are said to have used captured dies to strike Fatimid dinars,³² but when royal mints properly-speaking began is another question. Precise dating of Jerusalemite coins is difficult, and although various possibilities for pre-Baldwin III issues have been mooted, none has yet been proved.³³ The simplest solution to the problem of the établissement is to redate it and ascribe it to the reign of Baldwin III. This redating has been proposed by Professor Prawer for completely different reasons. There is no need here to re-examine his arguments except to note that though he clearly prefers to date the établissement to the reign of Baldwin III, he admits to entertaining a certain measure of doubt.³⁴ Of course, if Baldwin III was responsible for issuing the établissement, the difficulty is neatly resolved since there is no question that a royal mint or mints were in action during his reign, and conversely, as M. Yvon has observed, the numismatic evidence supports Prawer's hypothesis.³⁵ Prawer may well be correct, but final and satisfactory answers to the question of the date of the établissement and the question of the date of the earliest regular coinage struck by the crown are still awaited.

If Baldwin II or Baldwin III thought it necessary to forbid vassals to mint their own coins, it is worth considering whether any had in fact been doing just that. At first sight, unless against our better judgement we accept that Baldwin III's contemporary, Gerard of Sidon, was responsible for the coin which bears his name, vassals only began to mint their coins some twenty years after Baldwin III's death. But two further possibilities remain open.

It could be that at some period during the reign of one of the two Baldwins, vassals had issued their own Saracen Bezants. Such issues might have been far more significant economically than the scarce copper and billon coins we

know were issued later and so would have posed more of a threat to the royal currency and the royal control of commerce: hence the severe penalty of confiscation. It may well be that the imitative Arab coinage struck by the kings of Jerusalem was designed in the first instance as a trade-currency for use in commercial dealings with the neighbouring Muslim powers. In this connection it could be significant that the établissement links the prohibition on the minting of one's own coins with a prohibition on the development of the trading potential of one's lordship by building up port facilities and improving roads into the Muslim lands.³⁶ That minting coins and developing commerce with Muslims are associated here could indicate that the king regarded the minting of coins as one aspect of a threat to his control of commerce, in which case the likelihood that it was imitative Arabic coins that had been issued by the nobles is enhanced. But speculation along these lines is almost certainly doomed to remain unresolved even if a gold hoard of early date were to turn up: if barons did issue imitations of Muslim coins, it would be exceedingly difficult to identify them as such.

A second possibility concerns the county of Tripoli. At the time the town of Tripoli was captured from the Muslims in 1109, Count Bertrand did homage to King Baldwin I. In 1122, however, his son and successor, Pons; refused Baldwin II homage and declined to perform services. Baldwin II led a military demonstration to the county and mediators arranged what William of Tyre called "a suitable peace". But William gives no direct indication that Pons did homage on that occasion and he makes no further reference to counts of Tripoli doing homage to kings of Jerusalem. In 1132 Pons again came into conflict with a king of Jerusalem, this time Baldwin II's successor, Fulk of Anjou.³⁷ It is noticeable that after the 1120s there are far fewer instances recorded by William of Tyre of counts of Tripoli assisting the kings on their campaigns, while on the other hand there are a number of places in William's narrative from the 1130s onwards which make it plain that Tripoli was regarded as being independent of Jerusalem.³⁸ It is clear that in the 1120s and '30s Count Pons was making a successful bid to throw off the royal suzerainty which stretched back to 1109, and that Baldwin II and Fulk were fighting a losing battle to prevent him. There exists a unique anonymous coin from Tripoli which is tentatively attributed to Pons.³⁹ Assuming that this attribution is correct, it might be possible to construct the hypothesis that Baldwin II (if it was Baldwin II) included the clause forbidding vassals to issue coins in the établissement as part of an attempt on his side to counter Pons' assertions of independence. Further clauses in the établissement could relate to other aspects of Pons' resistance to Baldwin's authority, in which case it would seem reasonable to connect the promulgation of this document with the events of 1122.

After this inconclusive and speculative discussion of the circumstances and purpose of the établissement, we come now to consider its bearing on the baronial coin issues described above. A number of distinguished scholars have drawn the conclusion that Raynald of Sidon and the other lords who minted coins were usurping the royal prerogative and flouting the law as laid down by Baldwin II or Baldwin III.⁴⁰ Certainly there is other evidence that Raynald, John of Ibelin lord of Beirut and Philip and John of Montfort were all self-assertive men who took steps to safeguard their interests, and the fact that they issued their own coins is seen as a part of a wider pattern of independently-

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mindful behaviour. The very existence of baronial coins is therefore viewed as a pointer to the rise of aristocratic autonomy and the decay of royal power. Such an interpretation has much to recommend it, but is not without difficulties.

Simply to say that baronial power was growing and royal power declining is not in itself an adequate explanation of why barons should have chosen to issue small denomination coins of billon or copper. Praver would see the striking of these coins as a political rather than as an economic act: it was, to use his own words, "a declaration of independence by the baron and his lordship".⁴¹ But if the coins were primarily issued as a form of propaganda, proclaiming the power of the baron concerned, it may be wondered why some of these issues were anonymous, giving only the provenance of the mint and not the name of the man on whose authority they were minted and put into circulation. On the other hand, Praver is probably correct in saying that the coins can have brought the lords comparatively little financial reward, since they have a low face-value and their scarcity suggests that relatively few can have been minted. But if it is admitted that the coins themselves do not always have the appearance of being propagandist issues and that they may have been of little economic value to their lord, the question of why the lords should have bothered to strike them at all arises.

In the middle ages any owner of a mint would expect to make a profit out of striking coins, and the Jerusalemite barons would have been no exception, even if it is assumed that the actual return would have been modest. But it could well be that over and above the profitability of minting coins there was a further economic incentive—that the lords struck coins to make good a shortage of small change in their lordships. As in present-day Italy, there may have been simply not enough loose change in the market—traders' tills. The Tripoli and Kessab hoards both contained large numbers of small coins from western Europe and the incidence of stray finds seems to confirm the impression that in the thirteenth century western coins circulated, supplementing the royal issues.⁴² Whatever the official view may have been of barons minting coins, in the early thirteenth century the royal authorities certainly allowed non-royal coins to pass from hand to hand. The conclusion here must be that the royal mints were unequal to the demand, and so it is proposed that some of the baronial issues signify efforts to alleviate the shortage, thereby protecting the normal exchange of goods and services within the respective lordships. Of course, this explanation will not serve for every instance: for example, John of Beirut's overstrikes must obviously have been issued for reasons other than increasing the volume of coin in circulation.

The accepted interpretation, that baronial coins signify a usurpation of the royal monopoly, and the hypothesis that baronial coins were minted as a means of making a profit for the lords concerned with the possible added incentive of alleviating a shortage of small change are not in themselves mutually exclusive. But the baronial issues may not have been a usurpation at all. The barons, or some of them, may have acted with the express permission of the king. Praver is of the opinion that, as there is no evidence for the king abolishing his monopoly, the barons must have usurped it, but lack of evidence is not conclusive on its own, especially as formal privileges from the Latin East granting rights of any sort to lay vassals are extremely rare. A more radical

approach, and one which seems to tilt the balance of probability more firmly against the usurpation theory is that by the early thirteenth century the établissement of King Baldwin and with it the assertion of the royal monopoly of mints may have been only dimly remembered by king and barons alike. Its text survives in the legal treatise known as the "Livre au roi" of c. 1200, but various features of it accord ill with other aspects of the treatise and Riley-Smith has tentatively suggested that its inclusion there represents a piece of legal antiquarianism brought in to answer the circumstances of a particular political crisis. As he puts it, "it was an archaic, half-forgotten piece of legislation...".⁴³

What then does all this have to tell us about the nobility and its changing relations with the crown? After 1174 baronial power waxed and monarchical power waned. This much is incontrovertable. But there has been a tendency to assume that baronial power was advanced by conflict and confrontation. To take the case in point: the assumption has been that the barons "usurped" the royal monopoly, flaunting their coinage in the face of an enfeebled monarchy in an assertion of newly won power. Maybe. But there is something unreal about this picture. We are all too easily trapped into a habit of mind which imagines that there was a sort of baronial instinct which demanded that the barons "do down" the king. But why "do down" one's lord, one's military commander, the fount of patronage, the guarantor of noble privilege? After all, more often than not baronial and royal interests coincided. One view could be that normally the barons were not out to curtail royal power so much as to fill the vacuum when for other reasons royal power failed. Clearly this is a much larger subject than a paper on baronial coin issues can encompass, but the hypothesis that baronial coins represented little more than an attempt to alleviate a shortage of small change which the royal mints were incapable of remedying might be one step in the argument towards such an interpretation.⁴⁴

NOTES

1. For bibliography, see J. Prætor, Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem, 1969/70, i, 51ff; J. S. C. Riley-Smith, The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277, 1973, p. 232 n. 4.
2. F. Chandon de Briailles, 'Le droit de "coins" dans le royaume de Jérusalem', Syria XXIII (1942/3), 244-57. See now H. E. Mayer, Das Siegelwesen in den Kreuzfahrerstaaten (Bayerische Akad. der Wissenschaften: Philosophisch-Historische Klasse Abhandlungen. Neue Folge 83 (1978)).
3. J. Yvon, 'Les monnaies "féodales" du royaume latin de Jérusalem', BSFN XXV (1970), 550-2.
4. Schl., p. 110 and plate IV, 29.
5. Schl. supplement, p. 7 and plate XX, 6. For Gerard's career see J. L. La Monte, 'The lords of Sidon in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries', Byzantion XVII (1944/5), 183-211, at pp. 190-3, 199.

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6. La Monte, 'Lords of Sidon', pp. 192-3; J. Richard, 'Pairie d'Orient latin: les quatre baronnies des royaumes de Jérusalem et de Chypre', RHDFÉ⁴ XXVII (1950), 67-88 at p. 76.
7. Yvon, 'Les monnaies "féodales"', p. 551.
8. In the discussion at the symposium following this paper, Mr. Porteous drew attention to a somewhat similar coin, albeit with a French legend instead of a Latin one, in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. At first sight this coin would also appear to show Gerard's name, but, as Mr. Sabine then suggested, this might be a faulty rendering of SIRE DE (Seete).
9. Schl., p. 114 and plate V, 3; supplement p. 7.
10. La Monte, 'Lords of Sidon', pp. 193-200; Praver, Histoire du royaume latin, ii, 179-80, 199.
11. C. Sabine, 'The Turris Davit coinage and the regency of Raymond III of Tripoli (1184-6)', 'NC⁷ XVIII (1978), 85-92.
12. Schl., pp. 114-15 and plate V, 4-7; supplement p. 7 and plate XX, 5; A. J. Seltman, 'Some Crusader Coins', NCirc LXXIV (1966), 61-3 at p. 62.
13. Schl., p. 115 and plate V, 8.
14. D. M. Metcalf, 'Some hoards and stray finds from the Latin East', ANSMN XX (1975), 139-52 at p. 143 n. 16.
15. For his career, see La Monte, 'Lords of Sidon', pp. 200-5; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp. 123, 137-40, 160, 166-86 passim, 199-207 passim.
16. Jean de Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, ed. and trans. into modern French by N. de Wailly, 1874, p. 466.
17. J. L. La Monte, 'Jean d'İbelin: the Old Lord of Beirut, 1177-1236', Byzantion XII (1937), 417-48 at p. 424.
18. The passage is quoted in an English translation by J. Praver, The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: European Colonialism in the Middle Ages, 1972, pp. 451-2.
19. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp. 66, 76-8.
20. D. H. Cox, The Tripolis Hoard of French Seignorial and Crusader's Coins, NNM LIX (1933), 1-61 at pp. 53-4; H. Longuet, 'La trouvaille de Kessab en Orient latin', RN⁴ XXXVIII (1935), 163-83 at p. 175; J. Yvon, 'Monnaies et sceaux de l'Orient latin', RN⁶ VIII (1966), 89-107 at pp. 97-9.
21. Schl. pp. 118-19 and plate V, 11, 12; supplement, p. 8 and plate XX, 8, 9, 11; Sabine, loc. cit., pp. 89-90, 92. The coin illustrated by Schlumberger and thought by him to be from Toron (pp. 124-5 and plate V, 13) has now been re-attributed to Beirut. Seltman, op. cit., p. 63.
22. Schl. p. 118.
23. Whereas Raynald was apparently of full age by 1171 (La Monte, 'Lords of Sidon', p. 194), his wife's parents did not marry until about 1176 (La Monte, 'John d'İbelin', p. 419).

24. La Monte, 'Lords of Sidon', pp. 199, 200. It is usually said that Raynald had died before 1204 when his widow married Guy of Montfort. The chronicler mentions the marriage in the course of his description of the events of that year, but it is not altogether clear whether it took place then or later. Guy was again in the East in 1210-11 and it was in 1210 that Raynald's son Balian first appears as lord of Sidon. RRH no. 853; 'L'estoire de Eracles empereur et la conqueste de la Terre d'Outremer', RHC Occ., ii, 263, 311.
25. Schl., pp. 128-9 and plate V, 14-15. Seltman, loc. cit., pp. 61-2. John of Montfort inherited a claim to the lordship of Toron, lost to the Muslims in 1266, through his mother. Seltman (loc. cit. and above n. 21) has corrected Schlumberger's belief that coins were issued at Toron.
26. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp. 215, 224-5; H. E. Mayer, 'Ibelin versus Ibelin: the struggle for the regency of Jerusalem 1253-1258', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society CXXII (1978), 25-57 at p. 29; J. Richard, The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, trans. J. Shirley (Amsterdam, 1979), p. 408.
27. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp. 27-8; Richard, Latin Kingdom, pp. 366-70, 395.
28. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p. 227; Richard, Latin Kingdom, p. 417.
29. 'Le Livre au Roi', RHC Lois, i, 616-17. Note however that the reference to the forgery of the 'coins' of the kings or barons of the realm in the 'Livre des assises de la cour des bourgeois' (RHC Lois, ii, 220) relates to seals and not coinage.
30. The belief that the regular royal silver coinage began in the middle years of the twelfth century depends on the attribution of the Baldvinvs coinage, now generally thought to have begun with Baldwin III. See J. Duplessy and D. M. Metcalf, 'Le trésor de Samos et la circulation monétaire en Orient Latin au XII^e et XIII^e siècles', RBN CVIII (1962), 173-207, esp. pp. 178-9; Yvon, 'Monnaies et sceaux', pp. 92-7; D. M. Metcalf, 'Coinage of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem in the name of Baudouin', NC⁷ XVIII (1978), 71-84.
31. J. Prawer, 'Etude sur le droit des Assises de Jérusalem: droit de confiscation et droit d'exhérédation', RHDFÉ⁴ XXXIX (1961), 520-51 continued in XL (1962), 29-42 at p. 527.
32. P. Balog and J. Yvon, 'Monnaies à légendes arabes de l'Orient latin', RN⁶ I (1958), 133-68 at pp. 141-2.
33. Three possibilities are known to the present author and there are doubtless others. (i) Dr. Metcalf kindly informs me that he has isolated a group of gold bezants some of which could belong to the period before Baldwin III's accession. (ii) The Baldvinvs coinage could go back to one of the first Baldwins. This possibility is not ruled out by Yvon ('Monnaies et sceaux', pp. 96-7). (iii) It is possible that the rare anonymous denier discussed by A. Spaer ('Two rare crusader coins of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem', NC⁷ XVII (1977), 184-6 at pp. 184-5) is early.

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34. Prawer, 'Étude' (1962), pp. 38-42; idem, Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, p. 137. Cf. his Histoire du royaume latin, i, 470 and n. 7 where he is more confident in his ascription to Baldwin III.
35. Yvon, 'Les monnaies "féodales"', p. 551 n. 1.
36. 'Livre au roi', p. 617.
37. William of Tyre, 'Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum', RHC Occ., i, 466, 469, 536, 611-13. Cf. Fulcher of Chartres, 'Historia Hierosolymitana', RHC Occ., iii, 420, 447. See J. Richard, Le comté de Tripoli sous la dynastie toulousaine (1102-1187), 1945, pp. 30-2.
38. For counts of Tripoli assisting the kings before 1130, see William of Tyre, pp. 474, 481, 485, 519, 523, 565, 579, 596. For assistance after 1130, see pp. 672, 784, 845, 1013, 1115. For Tripoli as an independant entity, see pp. 626, 754-5, 1006, 1065-6, 1077-8, 1122. See further Richard, Comté, pp. 32-8.
39. See above p. 45.
40. Prawer, Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, pp. 137, 384, 391; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p. 27; Richard, Latin Kingdom, pp. 89, 332.
41. Prawer, Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, p. 137; see also p. 384.
42. Cox, op. cit.; Longuet, op. cit.; Metcalf, 'Some hoards and stray finds', pp. 141-9.
43. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p. 156.
44. I should like to thank all those who attended the symposium and were kind enough to comment on this paper; the final form owes much to their suggestions. A special word of thanks to Michael Metcalf whose vigilance has prevented countless howlers.

**THE DISPUTED REGENCY OF
THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM
1264/6 AND 1268**

Of the surviving sources for the internal history of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem in the 1260s, the collection of materials on the regency (*bailliage*) disputes of 1264 (or 1265 or 1266) and 1268 is among the most important. It helps explain the rise to power of Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan (King Hugh III of Cyprus) and also sheds much light on contemporary legal concepts and procedures.

This collection has been printed three times before: by Labbe in 1651,¹ by La Thaumassière in 1690,² and, from La Thaumassière's edition, by Comte Beugnot in 1843.³ The present edition is based on the text in Codex Vaticanus latinus 4789, an early fifteenth-century manuscript which is the ancestor of all other surviving copies of the collection.⁴ This manuscript belonged to James of Flourey, count of Jaffa in the second quarter of the fifteenth century,⁵ and contains a version of the legal treatise by the thirteenth-century count of Jaffa,

¹ P. Labbe, *L'Abregé royal de l'alliance chronologique de l'histoire sacrée et profane, . . . avec le Lignage d'outre-mer, les assises de Jérusalem et un recueil historique de pièces ancienne* (Paris, 1651), i, pp. 514-41.

² G. Thaumassière de La Thaumassière, *Coustumes de Beauvoisis, par Messire Philippe de Beaumanoir Bailly de Clermont en Beauvoisis. Assises et bons usages du royaume de Jerusalem, par Messire Jean d'Idelin Comte de Japhe & d'Ascalon, S. de Rames & de Baruth. Et autres anciennes coutumes Le tout tiré des Manuscrits* (Bourges, 1690), pt 1, pp. 195-208.

³ 'Documents relatifs à la successibilité au trône et à la régence', *R[ecueil des] H[istoriens des] C[roisades.] Lois*, ii, pp. 401-19.

⁴ See M. Grandclaude, 'Classement sommaire des manuscrits des principaux livres des Assises de Jérusalem', *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, sér. 4, v (1926), 450, 462-3, 475; E. Brayer, P. Lemerle, V. Laurent, 'Le Vaticanus latinus 4789: histoire et alliances des Cantacuzènes aux XIV^e-XV^e siècles', *Revue des études byzantines*, ix (1951), 47-50.

⁵ See J. Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans. Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIV^e et XV^e siècles)* (Paris, 1962), pp. 123-32. Someone, presumably a member of his family or household, has marked all the references to members of the Flourey family in the manuscript. See below, p. 28, n. *d* and p. 30, n. *e*, and also fos. cclxxxv^r, cclxxxvij^r, ccxc^r, ccxcj^r.

John of Ibelin, and a fourteenth-century recension of the 'Lignages d'Outremer'. The version of John of Ibelin's treatise is thought to be that commissioned in Cyprus in 1369 to be an official work of reference in the High Court.⁶ We are told that various additions were inserted into the treatise at that time,⁷ and it would seem that the collection relating to the 1260s was among them. Beugnot appears to have been the first to realize that the materials for the regency disputes were not part of John of Ibelin's original treatise, and he published them separately with three other texts under the title of 'Documents relatifs à la successibilité au trône et à la régence'.⁸ It is on his edition that all subsequent scholars have hitherto relied.⁹

The need for a new edition arises from the fact that Labbe and La Thaumassière based theirs on seventeenth-century manuscripts which were markedly inferior to their fifteenth-century prototype. Interest in the work of John of Ibelin had been awakened in France in the early part of the seventeenth century largely through the activities of the distinguished antiquarian and virtuoso, Nicolas-Claude Fabri de Peiresc (1580–1637). In 1627 Peiresc arranged for a copy of Vaticanus latinus 4789 to be made, and this copy is now to be found in the collection of his manuscripts in the Bibliothèque Inguimbertaine at Carpentras (MS. Carpentras 1786). Labbe used a copy made from Peiresc's manuscript and La Thaumassière a manuscript at two removes from Labbe's.¹⁰ Grandclaude pointed out that Peiresc's manuscript shows signs of having been executed carelessly,¹¹ but no one seems to have realized the full extent of its

⁶ See Grandclaude, 'Classement sommaire', 450, 453, 462.

⁷ John of Ibelin, 'Livre', *RHC. Lois*, i, p. 6.

⁸ The 'Documents relatifs' consists of (a) part of the first chapter of the legal treatise by James of Ibelin (*RHC. Lois*, i, pp. 453–4) which had also been inserted into the 1369 version of John of Ibelin's treatise (Cod. Vat. lat. 4789, fo. ccxxxv^{r-v}); (b) a treatise on the *bailliage* by John of Ibelin (see Grandclaude, 'Classement sommaire', 460 ('un fragment d'une consultation donnée par Jean d'Ibelin')); (c) the materials for the regency disputes of the 1260s (Cod. Vat. lat. 4789, fo. ccxliij^r–fo. cclxij^v); (d) an account of the accession of King Hugh IV of Cyprus, also from the 1369 version of John of Ibelin's treatise (Cod. Vat. lat. 4789, fo. cclxij^v–fo. cclxvi^v).

⁹ In particular: L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852–61), i, pp. 339–408, 424–8; J. L. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100 to 1291* (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), pp. 51, 75–9; G. F. Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1940–52), ii, pp. 152–4, 161–3; J. S. C. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174–1277* (London, 1973), pp. 218–22 and *passim*.

¹⁰ See Grandclaude, 'Classement sommaire', 450–2, 471–4.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 451.

defects. It is clear from a comparison of Vaticanus latinus 4789 and Carpentras 1786 that the copyist of the latter deliberately omitted passages from some of the longer chapters, sometimes concealing his omissions with a *précis* so that the passage still made sense. Beugnot was able to supply the passages omitted from John of Ibelin's treatise from manuscripts of other recensions of that work, but as he had made no use of Vaticanus latinus 4789 he was unaware of the missing passages from the materials for the regency dispute.¹² The value of Beugnot's edition of this collection is further reduced by errors in the transmission of the text between Peiresc's manuscript and La Thaumassière's edition and in Beugnot's own transcription from La Thaumassière.

The materials for the disputes of the 1260s comprise fifteen chapters of which the first nine relate to 1264/6 and the remaining six to 1268. At the end of the last chapter there is a reference to a *vidimus* of documents concerned with the pleading in both disputes, together with some account of what action had been taken. This instrument had been drawn up at the instance of King Hugh III and sealed by the papal legate and other church dignitaries. Probably the contents of the *vidimus* were substantially the same as the collection of materials preserved in our manuscript. If so, the collection dates from Hugh's lifetime, and, as the last chapter describes him as having been crowned king of Jerusalem and enjoying his kingdom in peace, it presumably belongs to the period between his coronation in 1269 and his departure from Acre in 1276. Possibly the account of the proceedings in these disputes was compiled for Hugh's procurators to lay before Pope Gregory X who, in 1272, had cited Hugh to defend himself at the Curia against the claims of Maria of Antioch, the unsuccessful contestant of 1268.¹³

Whether or not the collection of materials was identical with the contents of the *vidimus*, there is no reason to doubt that these documents were assembled as justification for Hugh III's title to the crown of Jerusalem: in both 1264/6 and 1268 he had been recognized by the feudatories, the Military Orders and other important elements in society as the rightful regent; his rule was therefore both legal and popular. But if the collection was intended as propaganda

¹² For important instances, see below, pp. 33-4, 36. Beugnot was similarly ignorant of a section from the 'Lignages d'Outremer' also omitted by the copyist of Carpentras 1786. See P. W. Edbury, 'The Ibelin counts of Jaffa: a previously unknown passage from the "Lignages d'Outremer"', *English Historical Review*, lxxxix (1974), 604-9.

¹³ See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 222.

for Hugh III, the question arises of how far it gives a distorted account of what happened. It is necessary to distinguish two types of material in the collection: what purports to be the verbatim record of the pleading (chapters 1–8 and most of chapters 11, 12, 13 and 14), and the narrative description of the decisions of the court and the political developments (chapters 9, 10, 15 and the rest of 11, 12, 13, 14). There is no evidence whatever that the transcriptions of the pleadings have been tampered with to bolster Hugh's case: in both disputes Hugh used arguments which may not have withstood careful scrutiny, and Hugh of Brienne, his opponent in the earlier dispute, and Maria of Antioch each made points which could well have told against him. Anyone who looked to the speeches made before the High Court rather than to the court's decisions for a justification of Hugh's rights to the throne might not have been convinced. On the other hand, owing to the paucity of independent evidence for these disputes, it is difficult to evaluate the degree to which the narrative parts of the collection give an accurate and unbiased account.

1264/6: Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan (Hugh III) versus Hugh of Brienne

The dispute between Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan and Hugh of Brienne was over who should be regent of Jerusalem on behalf of the young Hugh II of Cyprus who in turn was regent for the titular king, Conradin of Hohenstaufen. Since 1243 legal opinion in Jerusalem had maintained that the regent should be the titular king's nearest heir in the East to claim the regency, the *plus droit heir aparant*. In that year the Hohenstaufen lieutenant had been ejected and Alice of Champagne declared regent. The regency passed to her son, King Henry I of Cyprus, and eventually to his son, Hugh II. Hugh was a minor and so needed a regent to exercise his authority in both Cyprus and Jerusalem. Between 1253, the date of Henry's death, and her own death in 1261, the regent of Cyprus was Hugh's mother, Plaisance of Antioch, and it was Plaisance who in 1258 successfully claimed the regency of Jerusalem on Hugh's behalf. In 1263 Isabella of Lusignan, Hugh's aunt and heir presumptive, acquired the regency of Jerusalem, but in Cyprus, where she had waived her claim, the regent was her son, Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan. In the intervening periods, 1253–58 and 1261–63, the vassals in Jerusalem had chosen one of their own number to act as regent.¹⁴

¹⁴ For a full discussion, see Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 185–98, 209–17, 318–20.

On Isabella's death in 1264¹⁵ Hugh II's next of kin were his two cousins, the sons of his father's sisters. Hugh of Brienne, the son of Maria, the elder sister, was younger than Isabella's son, Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan, and the central issue in their dispute was which of the two was to be regarded as the senior and thus as the *plus droit heir* of Hugh II.

Hugh II would have come of age at about the beginning of 1268.¹⁶ So ostensibly all that was at stake in this dispute was the right to administer the kingdom of Jerusalem for a few years. But what is not known is whether the young king was thought likely to live long enough to be succeeded by children of his own. Had his death been anticipated at the time of the dispute, the outcome would have been all the more important, since whoever was declared to be his closest heir could expect to succeed to the kingdom of Cyprus and be regent of Jerusalem for the absentee Hohenstaufen for an indefinite period. There is no direct evidence, other than the fact of his premature death, to suggest that Hugh was delicate; indeed, despite his youth—he can only have been thirteen at the time—plans for him to marry a daughter of the lord of Beirut were in progress by May 1265,¹⁷ and so presumably his death was not then regarded as imminent. On the other hand, his family seems to have had a record of ill health: both his mother and his grandfather, Hugh I, had died young, and his father had been afflicted with obesity.¹⁸

Historians have assumed that the dispute between the two cousins followed close on Isabella's death, and so have dated it to 1264. It is possible, however, that this assumption is unfounded. There had been a considerable delay before either Plaisance or Isabella had

¹⁵ 'L'estoire de Eracles empereur et la conquete de la Terre d'Outremer', *RHC. Historiens Occidentaux*, ii, p. 448.

¹⁶ Hugh would have reached his majority on his fifteenth birthday. Both Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan and Maria of Antioch (see below, chaps. 11, 12) stated that he was not of age at the time of his death in November or December 1267. (See below, note 19; also 'Les Lignages d'Outremer', *RHC. Lois*, ii, p. 444.) His birth cannot therefore have been before November/December 1252, but, as his father died on 18 January 1253, it cannot have been later than mid-1253, even allowing for the unsupported possibility that it was posthumous.

¹⁷ Clement IV, *Registre*, ed. E. Jordan (Paris, 1893-1945), no. 882. For the only near-contemporary statement that the marriage actually took place, see 'Lignages', p. 444.

¹⁸ Plaisance of Antioch's parents were married in 1234 ('Annales de Terre Sainte', ed. R. Röhrich and G. Raynaud, *Archives de l'Orient latin*, ii (1884), pt 2, p. 439), and so presumably she cannot have been aged more than about twenty-five at the time of her death in 1261. Hugh I died aged twenty-three. See Hill, *History of Cyprus*, ii, p. 82. For Henry I as Henry 'Gras', see 'Documents relatifs à la successibilité', p. 420; 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', *RHC. Documents Arméniens*, ii, pp. 670, 741, 756, 769.

claimed the regency, and there may have been a similar delay after the death of Isabella. The earliest, and indeed the only, reference before Hugh II's death late in 1267¹⁹ to Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan as regent of both Cyprus and Jerusalem is in a letter of May 1267,²⁰ but in a papal letter of February 1266 and in the narrative accounts of the events of 1265 and 1266 he is described solely as regent of Cyprus.²¹ The letter of May 1267 mentioned the dispute in a manner which suggests that it had not arisen recently and, in fact, could be construed as meaning that the dispute had taken place three years earlier, but in the absence of more conclusive evidence the possibility that the dispute belongs to 1265 or 1266 must remain.

Whatever the merits of Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan's legal claim to be regent, there can be little doubt that from a purely political point of view he was the more attractive candidate. At the time of the dispute he was already regent of Cyprus and he proved himself ready to use Cypriot military resources in the defence of Latin Syria: in 1265 he brought 130 knights as well as mounted sergeants and squires to Acre, and in the following year he was accompanied by a 'mout belle compaignie de gens d'armes, chevaliers et autres'.²² Furthermore, he was closely allied by ties of blood to influential figures. His father, Henry of Antioch, was uncle of the then prince of Antioch and in 1263-4 had been associated with his wife in the regency of Jerusalem;²³ Hugh's own wife, to whom he had been married or at least betrothed since 1255,²⁴ was a member of the Ibelin family and so was closely related to several of the leading nobles in the Latin Kingdom. Hugh of Brienne, on the other hand, had no near relatives in the East to whom he might look for support,²⁵ and although he is said to have given what military help he

¹⁹ The sources vary as to the exact date: November 1267 ('Eracles', p. 456; 'Gestes', p. 769; Marino Sanudo, 'Liber secretorum fidelium crucis', ed. J. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos* (Hanover, 1611), ii, p. 223) and 5 December 1267 ('Annales', p. 453 (wrongly naming him Henry); 'Chronique d'Amadi', ed. R. de Mas Latrie, *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi* (Paris, 1891-3), i, p. 209).

²⁰ *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, ed. E. Martène and U. Durand (Paris, 1717), i, cols. 1013-14.

²¹ Clement IV, no. 838; 'Annales', p. 452; 'Eracles', pp. 450, 455; 'Gestes', pp. 759, 766; Marino Sanudo, p. 222; 'Amadi', p. 207. See Hill, *History of Cyprus*, ii, p. 154.


²² 'Gestes', pp. 759, 766. See also 'Eracles', pp. 450, 455.

²³ See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 217.

²⁴ Alexander IV, *Registre*, ed. C. Bourel de la Roncière *et al.* (Paris, 1895-1959), no. 71.

²⁵ His mother's relations were all equally closely related to Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan. On his father's side his nearest relative in the East seems to have been his second cousin, Julian of Sidon. See W. H. Rüdts-Collenberg, *The Rupenides*,

The royal house of Jerusalem to illustrate the disputes of the 1260s



Note: names in capitals—kings and queens of Jerusalem.
names in italics—regents of Jerusalem.

could,²⁶ he clearly had nothing approaching the forces at the disposal of his opponent.

The outcome of the dispute was that the High Court recognized Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan as regent of Jerusalem. These matters rested until the death of King Hugh II late in 1267 left both the throne of Cyprus and the post of regent of Jerusalem for Conradin of Hohenstaufen vacant. In Cyprus Hugh of Brienne seems to have contested Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan's right to the throne, but to no avail. On Christmas Day 1267 Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan's coronation took place, and apparently at about this time Hugh of Brienne departed to the West.²⁷ He seems never to have given up his claim to be rightful king of Cyprus; in 1275 he was trying to organize an army to win the island by force, and in 1289 he was attempting to sell his rights to King Alphonso III of Aragon.²⁸ In the early fourteenth century, Pierre Dubois was suggesting that the French monarchy should purchase the Brienne claim to Cyprus from Hugh's heir as a prelude to endowing a younger son of Philip IV with the island.²⁹

1268: Hugh III versus Maria of Antioch

1268 began disastrously for the Christians in the Latin East: in early March Baibars captured Jaffa and on 15 April the castle of Beaufort fell to him as well.³⁰ At this point Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan (now King Hugh III of Cyprus) crossed from Cyprus to Acre³¹ to claim the regency of Jerusalem. His rights were accepted by the High Court, but, before the feudatories had done homage, they were challenged by Maria of Antioch on the grounds that she rather than Hugh was the closest heir of Conradin of Hohenstaufen.

Hethumides and Lusignans. The Structure of the Armeno-Cilician Dynasties (Paris, 1963), table IX(B).

²⁶ *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, i, col. 1014.

²⁷ 'Gestes', p. 769. Ibn al-Furāt (*Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders: Selections from the Tārīkh al-Duwal wa'l Mulūk*, ed. and trans. U. and M. C. Lyons, with historical introduction and notes by J. S. C. Riley-Smith (Cambridge, 1971), ii, p. 129) stated that Hugh of Brienne was in Armenia on Hugh II's death and implied that his claim passed by default.

²⁸ Hill, *History of Cyprus*, ii, p. 171; E. Lourie, 'An offer of the suzerainty and escheat of Cyprus to Alphonso III of Aragon by Hugh de Brienne in 1289', *English Historical Review*, lxxxiv (1969), 101-8.

²⁹ 'Opinio cujusdam suadentis regi Francie ut regnum Jerosolimitanum et Cipri acquireret pro altero filiorum suorum, ac de invasione regni Egipti', ed. C.-V. Langlois in Pierre Dubois, *De recuperatione Terre Sancte*, (Paris, 1891), p. 140.

³⁰ 'Annales', p. 453; 'Eracles', p. 456; 'Gestes', p. 771.

³¹ 'Annales', p. 453.

Most historians have ascribed the pleading as recorded in our documents to the period following Conradin's death in October 1268 and have assumed that it concerned not the regency of Jerusalem but the throne.³² The internal evidence of the pleading, however, proves that this view is erroneous: at the end of chapter nine it is stated that Maria of Antioch was claiming the regency (*bailliage*) in her subsequent speech (chapter twelve); in his reply to Maria (chapter thirteen) Hugh also referred to the *bailliage* and spoke of Conradin as if he were still alive, while in chapter eleven he had made it clear that it was the death of Hugh II that had precipitated the claim. Furthermore, Hugh's remarks at the beginning of chapter eleven concerning his arrival in Acre in response to messages about the perilous state of the kingdom would belong more naturally to 1268 than to 1269, an uneventful year, and the fact that Geoffrey of Sergines was still prominent may also suggest that our account of the dispute pre-dated the arrival of the news of Conradin's execution. Geoffrey died on 11 April 1269; if the pleading had been for the throne, the problem then arises as to why, if Hugh were accepted as king before that date, his coronation should have been delayed until 24 September.³³ It is not hard to see why historians have been misled: we know from other sources that following Conradin's death Maria claimed the throne,³⁴ and the recorded pleading has been seen as a transcript of the proceedings at that time. In fact it is now clear that Maria claimed first the regency and then the throne. Our documents themselves are misleading in places. The rubric to chapter ten speaks of Hugh's coronation as king of Jerusalem, but it is clear from the context of the chapter that it ought properly to refer to his coronation as king of Cyprus. The only other place where Hugh's coronation is referred to is in the last chapter, and there the context does not necessarily indicate that it followed directly on the pleading. It is true that both Hugh and Maria spoke of claiming the kingdom, but both were concerned with lordship over Jerusalem rather than with the crown. Thus Hugh asked to be received as the 'seignor de ce royaume' (chapter eleven) while

³² See La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy*, p. 77. Mas Latrie (*Histoire de Chypre*, i, p. 424 and n. 4) thought that the pleading pre-dated Conradin's death but was for the throne of Jerusalem. Riley-Smith (pp. 220-1 and nn. 173, 177-8) has interpreted chapter 11 as relating to the regency of Jerusalem and belonging to the period before Conradin's death and chapters 12-15 as relating to the throne and belonging to the period after Conradin's death.

³³ 'Annales', p. 454; 'Eracles', p. 457. Hugh III may have been crowned king of Cyprus as little as three weeks after the death of Hugh II.

³⁴ See below, p. 11 and n. 41.

Maria asked for the 'seignorie de Jerusalem' (chapter twelve). As has recently been demonstrated, this terminology was characteristic of regency for an absentee and uncrowned king who had reached his majority,³⁵ and so, far from indicating that the parties were disputing the accession to the throne, it is perhaps further evidence that they were claiming the regency.

As in his dispute with Hugh of Brienne, there is little doubt that in 1268 Hugh III was regarded as being the more suitable candidate. We have seen that he could provide military assistance from Cyprus, and this consideration alone would have weighed heavily in a year which had already seen the loss of Jaffa and Beaufort and which was to see the collapse of the principality of Antioch. Hugh was already experienced in government and capable of providing what had been lacking for so long: strong rule and, in all likelihood, a stable dynasty. Maria on the other hand was over forty and unmarried.³⁶ It is not known whether she already intended to sell her rights to Charles of Anjou,³⁷ but the prospect of her rule cannot have been attractive. There can be no questioning Hugh's popularity in 1268. Even the two main groups which were later to give their backing to Charles, the Templars and the French garrison at Acre, were behind him at this stage. The Templars do not seem to have broken with him decisively until after William of Beaujeu, a relative of the French royal house and former Templar commander of Sicily, had been elected master of the Order in 1273.³⁸ The commander of the French garrison in 1268 was Geoffrey of Sergines, who, as seneschal of Jerusalem, apparently presided over the hearing and was the first to do homage. After Geoffrey's death Hugh evidently remained on good terms with the French, appointing as seneschal Robert of Crésèques and as marshal William of Canet, the nephew of Geoffrey's successor as commander of the garrison.³⁹

³⁵ See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 188.

³⁶ 'Gestes', p. 773.

³⁷ Hugh was said to be in fear of Charles as early as 1268 (Ibn al-Furāt, ii, p. 130).

³⁸ See J. Richard, *Le royaume latin de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1953), p. 327; M. L. Bulst-Thiele, *Sacrae Domus Militiae Templi Hierosolymitani Magistri: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Templerordens 1118/19-1314* (Göttingen, 1974), pp. 259-60, 263-5. See also 'Gestes', p. 779. There is some evidence that the Templars gave Maria support earlier ('Gestes', p. 773), but as late as June 1271, Thomas Berard, master of the Temple, witnessed a document in which Hugh III was described as king of both Jerusalem and Cyprus (*Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem (1100-1310)*, ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx (Paris, 1894-1906), no. 3422).

³⁹ For Geoffrey of Sergines and the French garrison, see Richard, *Le royaume latin*, pp. 297-8. For Robert of Crésèques and William of Canet, see *Cartulaire général*, nos. 3323, 3326; 'Eracles', pp. 458, 463; 'Gestes', p. 767.

With the execution of Conradin of Hohenstaufen by Charles of Anjou on 29 October 1268, the legitimate descent from Frederick II and Queen Isabella II of Jerusalem came to an end. Hugh was accepted as the rightful king of Jerusalem and was crowned in Tyre on 24 September 1269.⁴⁰ Whether Maria challenged his rights to the throne in the High Court is unclear, but she certainly asked the patriarch of Jerusalem for coronation, had a clerk interrupt Hugh's coronation with a protest on her behalf, and appealed to Rome.⁴¹ Although the accounts of the regency disputes may have been assembled by Hugh III in combating her case at the papal curia and the subsequent sale of her rights to Charles of Anjou,⁴² these later developments fall outside their scope.

Pleading and legality

However much Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan may have struck his contemporaries as the more suitable candidate for the regency and ultimately the throne of Jerusalem than either Hugh of Brienne or Maria of Antioch, it was important that his rule should be seen to be legitimate. In both 1264/6 and 1268 due legal process was followed. The High Court was convened and on each occasion the vassals were joined by representatives of the clergy, military orders, Italian communes and burgess confraternities. Although in 1264/6 and perhaps in 1268 the other groups were allowed some part in the discussion, the operative decision was made by the vassals in private. In 1268 and presumably in 1264/6 Hugh then swore the customary oath for a regent on taking up his appointment⁴³ and the vassals did homage. Before any decision could be reached there had to be the formal pleading in which the claims and counter-claims were stated. In 1264/6 the protagonists each spoke four times and their speeches are, so far as the Latin East is concerned, a unique example of legal dialectic. In 1268 the pleading was less formalized, with Maria's speech apparently following Hugh's initial claim after some delay and Hugh's second speech terminating the public debate. Just as the procedures for recognizing the regent had to be correct for the regent's power to be regarded as legitimate, so what was said in the pleading mattered since it was on that that legally the decision recognizing his rights to the regency rested. Much of the interest of

⁴⁰ 'Annales', p. 454; 'Eracles', p. 457.

⁴¹ Gregory X, *Registre*, ed. J. Guiraud and L. Cadier (Paris, 1892-1960), no. 103; 'Gestes', p. 773; 'Amadi', p. 211. See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 222.

⁴² See above, p. 4. See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 222-8.

⁴³ For a description of this oath, see John of Ibelin, p. 312.

these materials for the disputes of the 1260s lies in the way in which they reveal the grounds on which the claimants based their cases and, following from this, the extent to which the pleas and the eventual outcome on each occasion conformed with existing precedents and legal theory.

In 1264/6 three contradictory legal principles, backed up by subsidiary arguments based on precedents, were adduced by the contenders. Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan argued that he was the *plus droit heir* because he was the elder of the two claimants in the same degree of relationship to Hugh II; he also argued that he should be regent because he was descended from the previous regent. Hugh of Brienne's case was based on the assertion that he was Hugh II's *plus droit heir* because his branch of the family was senior to that of his opponent. Only the first of these arguments was upheld by the court, but all three deserve examination, if only to draw attention to the extent to which the two cousins were confused in their own thinking and in their use of precedents.

In the thirteenth century the feudal jurists of the Latin East were agreed that fiefs were to be inherited by the closest heir of the last in seisin and the *bailliage* of fiefs of a minor heir was to be held, if both parents were dead, by the closest adult heir.⁴⁴ Despite precedents which pointed to the contrary,⁴⁵ both Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan, in his principal argument, and Hugh of Brienne accepted the premiss that the regency was to be settled in accordance with these rules. The difference of opinion arose over the question of how who was the closest heir should be determined. Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan argued that for male heirs in the same relationship to the last in seisin the eldest inherited; just as an elder brother would inherit in preference to a younger brother, so he, as the elder cousin, should inherit in preference to the younger cousin.⁴⁶ In support of this contention he asserted that there were numerous precedents, but he only referred to three specifically: two, a case involving a certain Hugh of Masaire at Sidon and another in which Walter of Floury was given the hereditary marshalcy of Tiberias in preference to Elias Charles, were not discussed in detail,⁴⁷ but the third, the

⁴⁴ See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 14-16, 38.

⁴⁵ See below, pp. 16-17.

⁴⁶ These views were repeated by John of Ibelin (pp. 224-5) and Geoffrey Le Tor ('Livre', *RHC. Lois*, i, pp. 435-6). See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 219.

⁴⁷ A Hugh of 'Mazelria' witnessed a charter issued by Balian of Sidon in 1228 (*Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani (MXCVII-MCCXCI)*, compiled by R. Röhrich (Innsbruck, 1893, 1904), no. 986). He was probably the Hugh of 'Mazarea' who was a vassal of the lord of Beirut in 1223 (*ibid.*, no. 963). Walter of Floury is known

succession to the lordship of Tiberias, seems to have been of considerable importance for him. In 1241 Richard of Cornwall had secured the return of Tiberias which had been held by the Muslims since 1187.⁴⁸ In keeping with the normal rules of inheritance in such cases,⁴⁹ the heir was the closest relative of the last in seisin, Eschiva of Bures. She and her four sons, Hugh, William, Otto and Ralph of Tiberias, had all died before 1241, and so the question was which of Eschiva's grandchildren should inherit. Two contenders emerged: Eschiva, the daughter of Otto of Tiberias, and her cousin, also named Eschiva, the daughter of Ralph. Ralph had been younger than Otto, but his daughter was the elder of the two women,⁵⁰ and, largely on the advice of Philip of Montfort, it was to Ralph's daughter that Tiberias passed. Thus Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan could argue that the principle had been established that an elder cousin should inherit even when a member of a more junior branch of the family. Hugh of Brienne could only reply that this case did not constitute a true judicial precedent, since the point at issue had not been settled by *esgart* of court; apparently Eschiva, daughter of Otto, had withdrawn her claim on learning of the body of opinion against her.

Hugh of Brienne claimed that he should hold the regency because his mother was older than his opponent's. In effect he was claiming that when there were two contenders for an inheritance or *bailliage* who were in the same degree of relationship to the last in seisin, the principle of successoral representation should be applied. Had she lived, his mother, Maria, would have been Hugh II's heir; as all members of that generation of the family were now dead, he was the next heir as the representative of the senior line in the female descent. In principle, successoral representation as a custom governing the inheritance to fiefs was rejected in the Latin East, being denied by men as diverse as the author of the 'Livre au Roi' writing *c.* 1200 and the Cypriot ambassadors to the papal court in 1360.⁵¹ Hugh of

from a document of 1233, though without the title of Marshal (*ibid.*, no. 1046). A John of Floury, marshal of Tiberias, is known from documents of 1261, 1262 and 1269 (*ibid.*, nos. 1297a, 1322, 1370; and see no. 1259). Elias Charles, a vassal of the lord of Caesarea, is known from documents of 1253 and 1255 (*ibid.*, nos. 1210, 1233, 1238).

⁴⁸ See Richard, *Le royaume latin*, p. 253.

⁴⁹ For the custom when seisin had been interrupted by Moslem occupation, see Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 15-16.

⁵⁰ For the family's genealogy, see 'Lignages', p. 455.

⁵¹ 'Le Livre au Roi', *RHC. Lois*, i, p. 630; Leontios Makhairas, *Recital concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed. and trans. R. M. Dawkins (Oxford, 1932), i, para. 106.

Brienne's strongest supporting argument was from a Cypriot precedent involving members of the Beduin family. On this occasion a younger cousin in the senior line had inherited in preference to an elder cousin in the junior line and the validity of the case as a precedent was emphasized by the fact that the defeated party had lost even though his counsel had been the distinguished jurist, Philip of Novara. Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan's riposte was that there had been a miscarriage of justice, and he tried to argue that a more telling precedent from Cyprus was the *conoissance* by which he had been made regent in 1261 and so accepted as Hugh II's heir. In turn, Hugh of Brienne stated that he had deliberately allowed his rights to pass by default in 1261 and so the *conoissance* was irrelevant to the present debate. Of perhaps greater interest is another supporting argument employed by Hugh of Brienne, this time from French customary law: the Kingdom of Jerusalem had been conquered by Frenchmen who had brought with them their own institutions; Jerusalemite institutions should therefore accord with those in France; in France the dispute would be settled by the principles described by Hugh, and in consequence he should have the regency. Specious though this argument may seem, a similar interpretation of the origins and nature of Jerusalemite law seems to have been shared by at least one contemporary, James of Ibelin, and so perhaps it was widely held at that time.⁵² In support of his contention, Hugh of Brienne had cited the twelfth-century example of the count of Sancerre's advice being accepted in a case involving the division of a fief among heiresses. The case may have been a *cause célèbre*—it was also referred to by Philip of Novara⁵³—but, as Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan pointed out, it did not prove the superiority of French law over that of Jerusalem, only that in the absence of a suitable precedent the High Court could seek advice from elsewhere—advice which anyway would not be binding.

Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan's other argument, that he should have the regency because his immediate ancestor, his mother, had held it, is of interest because, as will be seen, it raised problems concerning the precedents for the succession to the regency during the previous quarter of a century, and was to reappear in a slightly different form in his dispute with Maria of Antioch. Hugh of Brienne pointed out that this argument was incorrect as *bailliage* was not

⁵² 'Document relatif au service militaire', *RHC. Lois*, ii, p. 431. See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 140.

⁵³ Philip of Novara, 'Livre', *RHC. Lois*, i, p. 542.

heritable, and, given the premiss that the rules for determining who should hold the *bailliage* of fiefs and who should have the regency of the kingdom were identical, he was right.⁵⁴ Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan seems to have conceded this point, since he did not use the argument in his later speeches, but he then appears to have assumed that Hugh of Brienne based his claim upon it. Instead of recognizing that he was thinking in terms of successoral representation, he evidently thought that Hugh of Brienne was arguing that as his mother would have had the regency had she lived, he should have it by inheritance from her. Because of this confusion, Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan's counter-arguments lacked the force they might otherwise have had.

Turning now to the 1268 dispute, we find that Maria of Antioch too based her arguments on the premiss that right to the regency should be determined on the same principles as right to the *bailliage* of the fiefs of a minor heir. Her claim rested squarely on the fact that she was Conradin's *plus droit heir*: her relationship to him was one degree closer than Hugh's, and, indeed, she was the only surviving descendant of Queen Isabella I of Jerusalem of her generation. Quite rightly she also pointed out that she was the closest relative in the East of Isabella II, the wife of Frederick II, who was the last queen of Jerusalem to have had seisin of the kingdom. The genealogical information on which her case rested was stated accurately, and her speech, which had evidently been carefully prepared, is a model of lucidity. By contrast, Hugh III's two speeches were loosely worded and obscure in their argumentation. His first speech is that of a man who was not anticipating any contradiction, and his second is clearly a spontaneous reply delivered immediately after Maria's speech had been read. In both it is clear that he based his claim on his relationship to Hugh II; he had been recognized as Hugh's heir, had held the regency for him in his minority, and now that he had died should have it in his own right. This argument explains both the relevance of the earlier dispute to that of 1268, for it was then that Hugh III was accepted as his cousin's heir, and why the account of the earlier dispute should later have been used together with the account of the 1268 dispute in justification of Hugh's position as king of Jerusalem. As for Maria's claim, it was brushed aside as misconceived; either Hugh had not understood it, or, more likely, he deliberately distorted it; he wrongly asserted that Maria was claiming that Conradin was the last in seisin of the kingdom and

⁵⁴ See Geoffrey Le Tor, p. 436.

then poured scorn on the whole idea of claiming by inheritance from the Hohenstaufen.

It is at once clear that the legal arguments which determined the outcome of these two disputes were incompatible. In 1264/6 the High Court accepted Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan as regent 'pource quil estoit ainsnes dou conte de Braine'.⁵⁵ In other words it had upheld the plea that he, the elder of the cousins of Hugh II, was the young king's *plus droit heir* and so should be regent; the ideas that he should be regent as his mother's heir, or that Hugh of Brienne should be regent as the representative heir, through his mother, of Hugh II were rejected; the premiss that the right to be regent was determined in the same way as the right to hold the *bailliage* of fiefs had been vindicated. In 1268, however, the court passed over a plea argued on the basis of the successful premiss of a few years earlier: instead of allowing a claim on the grounds of closeness of relationship to the person for whom the regency was to be held, it appears to have allowed a claim on the basis of relationship to the previous regent. Exactly what happened at the hearing in 1268 is not clear. After Maria had had her deposition read for her and had heard Hugh's reply, she withdrew. When the vassals came to announce their decision, she would not return to the court, and, in delivering their verdict, their spokesman, James Vidal, perhaps implied that the vassals were awarding the regency to Hugh because Maria had thereby not presented her case properly. This could indicate that the vassals recognized the justice of Maria's claim but had seized on this as a legal loophole to circumvent it.⁵⁶

Before we jump to the conclusion that whereas the 1264/6 dispute was resolved by a fair decision, the 1268 dispute ended in a travesty of justice, it is necessary to examine the precedents. There had been two occasions before 1264, in 1246 and in 1253, when a regent other than a parent had died while exercising the office. In 1243 when Conrad of Hohenstaufen came of age and the vassals decided to use his majority as an excuse for setting aside the regency of his father, Frederick II, Conrad's closest relative in the East was his great-aunt, Alice of Champagne, the eldest surviving half-sister of his grandmother, Maria of Montferrat. Alice was declared regent, and she held the regency until her death three years later.⁵⁷ At the time of her death Conrad's closest relative in the East was her half-sister, Melissende of Lusignan, the widow of Bohemond IV, but, although

⁵⁵ See below, p. 41.

⁵⁶ See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 222.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 210-12.

Melissende tried to put in a claim,⁵⁸ the regency passed to Alice's son, King Henry I of Cyprus. Henry died in 1253, but the regency was not awarded to any member of the Jerusalemite royal family until 1258 when it was given to Henry's son, the infant Hugh II. We do not know the date of Melissende's death, but even assuming she were already dead there were several people in the East in 1258 who, though they may not have appeared in the High Court to claim the regency, were more closely related to the Hohenstaufen. Henry I's surviving sister, Isabella, and his cousin, Maria of Antioch, the daughter of Melissende, were one degree closer than Hugh II, and if the principle expressed by Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan in 1264/6 that the eldest cousin in the same degree of relationship should be recognized as the closer relative had been followed, then both he and the sons of his aunt Maria would have taken precedence over the young king.⁵⁹ Thus in 1246 and 1258 the new regent was not the closest relative of the titular king, but, so it would seem, the closest relative of the previous regent. And so when in 1264/6 Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan asserted that he should have the regency from his mother, the previous regent, and when in 1268 he claimed the regency as the heir of Hugh II, his thinking could well have been influenced by these earlier cases. Although theory and precedent may have pointed in different directions, precedent, it might be argued, was on his side.

The most telling objection to this hypothesis is the fact that at no point did Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan make any explicit reference to the precedents of 1246 or 1258. His reasons can only be surmised. In 1264/6 he probably realized that, irrespective of precedents, the doctrine that the regency was to be settled by the *bailliage* rules, including the provision that the *bailliage* was not heritable, was strongly held, and he was content to accept this principle since its logical outcome was that he would win. On the other hand, there may have been good reasons for not arguing from these precedents if in fact the thinking behind the 1246 and 1258 decisions was more sophisticated than I have hitherto suggested. Unfortunately we have no direct evidence for the arguments actually used on these occasions, and political considerations may have been more persuasive than legal principles: Henry's acceptance in 1246 seems to have been

⁵⁸ Innocent IV, *Registre*, ed. E. Berger (Paris, 1881-1919), no. 4427. See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 212.

⁵⁹ Maria's elder son, John, was evidently in the West at this period ('Catalogue d'actes des comtes de Brienne, 950-1356', compiled by H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, xxxiii (1872), nos. 174-82).

accompanied by lavish bribes, and Hugh's can be seen as the result of a political manoeuvre inspired by his mother, Plaisance of Antioch, and her lover, John count of Jaffa, and should be understood in the context of the war of St Sabas.⁶⁰ Instead of making what at first sight seems to be the simplest assumption, that Henry I and Hugh II, like Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan in 1268, claimed the regency as the heirs of the previous regents, let us suppose that the principle of successoral representation was applied on these occasions: the descendants of Alice of Champagne would thus have taken precedence over the more junior line of Melissende and her daughter, and the son of Henry I, the descendant in the male line, would have taken precedence over Henry's sisters and their children. By applying this principle, Henry I would rightly have become regent in 1246 and Hugh II would have been next in line. Had these arguments been used in 1246 or 1258, Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan would have hesitated to refer to these earlier events in 1264/6 since his opponent, Hugh of Brienne, was the representative heir of Hugh II at that time. As has been seen, Hugh of Brienne did argue with reference to successoral representation. Admittedly he made no use of these instances as precedents, but the fact that he thought that representation could be applied to the succession to the regency suggests that the principle may have had some currency. Whatever the truth, the decision of 1264/6 ruled out any further appeal to this principle, and so when in 1268 Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan found the arguments which had turned to his advantage in the previous dispute used against him, there was no possibility of his posing as Conradin's representative heir in the East. Instead he resorted to the crude and distinctly dubious claim that he should be regent because he was the heir of the previous regent; presumably he was relying on his political backing to overcome the legal obstacles.


The problem of trying to reconstruct the arguments which may have been considered or rejected by the protagonists and their advisers is that we can never be sure how widely a particular legal principle was accepted or how heavily an individual precedent may have weighed. Close examination increases the apparent complexity of these disputes and we do not know how much contemporaries were aware of some of the finer points. If we accept the validity of the arguments upheld in 1264/6, 1268 saw the triumph of expediency over legality. But how far the outcome of the 1264/6 dispute ac-

⁶⁰ See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 214-17.

corded with the earlier precedents and the arguments which may have determined their consequences is another matter. While an outward semblance of legal propriety was maintained, constitutional considerations could be manipulated to ensure that on each occasion the more suitable candidate emerged victorious.

The text of the account of the regency disputes of 1264/6 and 1268 occupies fos. ccxliij^r–cclxij^v of Vaticanus latinus 4789. It has not been thought necessary to collate this manuscript with any of the seventeenth-century copies since, as has already been remarked, they are all derived from it. But because so many historians have discussed these disputes using Beugnot's edition, the 'Documents relatifs', his page and chapter numbers and the more important of the missing phrases and longer passages have been noted. Editorial emendations to the text have been kept to a minimum, but capitalization and punctuation have been modernized.

I am most grateful to Mgr Charles Burns, *archivista* at the Archivio Segreto Vaticano, for his kindness in obtaining microfilm of Vaticanus latinus 4789 and for securing permission to print this section from it. Thanks are also due to Dr L. H. Butler, Dr R. C. Smail, and Mr A. B. Hunt for their advice and assistance, and, above all, to Professor J. S. C. Riley-Smith. It was he who first introduced me to the disputes of the 1260s and his help and encouragement have been of enormous value in undertaking this publication.



[I]* Ces sont les erremens dou roi Huge¹ et dou conte de Braine² sur le fait dou bailliage dou royaume de Jerusalem, et tout premier ce est le dit dou roy Hugue.^a

‘Seignors, il est chose certaine que la royne Aalis,³ mayole, fu dame de ce royaume, et lot et tint et en usa come dame, et morut saisie et tenant come de son droit. Et quant Dieu ot fait son comandement de li, ce royaume eschei a mon oncle, le roy Henri,⁴ qui fu son fis, si lot et tint et usa come seignor, et morut saisi et tenant come de son droit. Et quant Dieu ot fait son comandement de lui, ce royaume eschei a mon seignor Hugue,⁵ son fis, nostre petit seignor, que Dieu creisse en bien, et ce mon dit oncle neust heu heir de sa feme espouse lors qui[l] morut, fust escheu ce royaume a madame ma mere⁶ com a son droit heir. Mais pource que il eschei au dit Hugue, la royne Plaisance,⁷ sa mere, pour ce quil estoit merme daage, ot le bailliage de ce royaume par lusage doudit royame pour le droit de son dit fis. Et quant Dieu fist son comandement de la dite royne Plaisance, le dit bailliage vint a ma dame ma mere, qui fu fille de la royne Aalis et seur dou roy Henri et ante doudit Hugue, ^bcome a celle a qui ce royaume fust escheu com a plus droit heir doudit Hugue cil^b fust mesavenu de lui. Et la raison en est clere, car il est us ou costume ou assise en ce royaume, (fo. ccxliij^v) quant heir merme daage na pere ou mere qui puisse tenir son bailliage, que le plus droit heir et le plus prochain de ces parens, qui sont en vie, a qui cescheete doie escheir, a la garde et le bailliage de ces biens devant tous autres gens quant il les requiert, et avoir les doit, car il auroit leritage ce il escheoit. Et pource madame ma mere, qui estoit le plus droit heir

^a *MS. chap. ccxcij* (Beugnot, chap. iii, pp. 401–2).

^b *The words come a celle . . . doudit Huce c[il] omitted by Beugnot.*

* Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Codex Vaticanus latinus 4789, fo. ccxliij^r.

¹ Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan, regent of Cyprus (1261–7), regent of Jerusalem (1264/6–9), king of Cyprus (as Hugh III, 1267–84), king of Jerusalem (1269–84).

² Hugh, count of Brienne (1261–96), count of Lecce (1271–96).

³ Alice of Champagne, wife of King Hugh I of Cyprus, regent of Jerusalem (1243–6).

⁴ Henry I, king of Cyprus (1218–53), regent of Jerusalem (1246–53).

⁵ Hugh II, king of Cyprus (1253–67), titular regent of Jerusalem (1258–67).

⁶ Isabella of Lusignan, daughter of Hugh I of Cyprus and Alice of Champagne, regent of Jerusalem (1263–4).

⁷ Plaisance, daughter of Bohemond V of Antioch, third wife of Henry I, regent of Cyprus (1253–61), regent of Jerusalem (on behalf of her son, 1258–61); died 1261.

et la plus prochaine de parente doudit Hugue a avoir [le]scheete de ce royaume, requist li et monseignor mon pere⁸ le bailliage de ce royaume, et lorent et tindrent et en userent tant come elle vesqui com de leur droit. Et puis que Dieu ot fait son comandement de li, je, qui sui son fis et son droit heir et cousin germain doudit Hugue, sui venus en ce royame com en mon droit. Et vous fais assavoir que je sui le plus droit heir et le plus prochain parent dou monseignor Hüge, mon cousin, a avoir et tenir le bailliage de ce royaume, qui est sien, jusques a son parfait aage, et di coment: car je entens que il est us ou coustume ou raison en ce royaume que, quant aucune escheete deritage ou de bailliage [eschiet]^a a plusors parens, qui sont en un degre de parente a celui ou a celle de par cui lescheete leur vient, de celle part dont elle muet, que lainsne de ceaus qui sont en vie la pardevant les mainsnes, ce il la requiert. Et ce est clere chose, que enci doie estre, car par lassise ne lusage de ce royaume fie ne seignorie qui eschee ne se part entre freres ne entre autres parens masles ains le doit tout avoir lun deaus, cest assavoir, lainsne de ceaus qui sont en vie devant tous les autres parens, se il le requiert; que trop seroit fort chose et estrange, que de ceaus qui sont en un degre de parente le mainsne heritast devant lainsne (fo. ccxlv^r) la ou lainsne le requeist, ne onques navint en ce royaume, ne i avendra, se Dieu plaist, que seroit contre lassise et lusage de ce royaume et tort apert. Et je di que je sui lainsne de tous les parens qui sont en vie de monseignor Hugue, mondit cousin, a qui lescheete de ce royaume peut escheir, qui soient desendus a nostre dite ayole, et pource est il clere chose selonc raison ou lusage de ce royaume, que je sui son plus prochain parent et son plus droit heir, si com je ai devant dit, a avoir son bailliage de ce royaume. Que fis ou fille demore en saisine ou en teneure de ce dont son pere ou sa mere meurt saisi et tenant com de son droit. Et puis que enci est, dont est il clere chose a conoistre a chascun, que ce bailliage est mon droit par les raisons que je ai dites: que aces est clere chose et seue que ma dame mamere morut saisie et tenant de ce bailliage com de son droit, et que je sui lainsne des parents dou mon cousin si com je ai dit. Pour quoi je doi avoir le bailliage de ce royaume devant tous autres, com celui qui sui le plus droit heir dou dit Hugue a avoir cescheete, si le veulle avoir, et pour toutes les raisons

^a Suggested by Beugnot.

⁸ Henry of Antioch, a younger son of Bohemond IV, died 1276.

que je ais dites, ou pour aucunes delles, ^ase vous conoisses que je avoir le doie; et^a ce vous conoisses que je le doie avoir, je en euffre a faire ce que je doi com baill, faisant lon a moi ce que lon doit com a baill.'

[2] Ce est le dit dou conte de Braine apres ce que le baill⁹ a fait sa requeste.^b

'A ce que vous dites que la royne Aalis fu vostre ayole et le roy Henri vostre oncle et monseignor Hugue son fis, que Dieu face preudome, vostre cousin germain, et que vous estes le plus droit heir doudit Hugue a avoir le bailliage de ce royaume par les (fo. ccxlvv) raisons que vous aves dites, je di que non estes ains le sui je; quausi fu la royne Aalis mayole et le dit roi mon oncle, com il furent vos, et le dit Hugue mon cousin come vostre. Et quant la royne Aalis, nostre dite ayole, morut et la seignorie de ce royaume eschei a ces enfans, ma mere¹⁰ et la vostre et le roy Henri, nostre oncle, mamere,^c qui estoit ainsnee de ces enfans, eust heu lescheete devant ces autres enfans, pource quelle estoit lainsnee, ce ne fust quen cest royaume heritent les fis devant les filles; et pource ot le dit roi, nostre oncle, leritage par devant ma mere. Et il est usage en ce royaume que le fis et la fille demore el point de son pere et de sa mere, quant il meurt, a avoir leur drois et leur escheetes mais que de bailliage. Et puis que enci est, je, qui sui fis de la contesse Marie qui fu ainsnee de vostre mere, doi avoir le baillage de ce royaume devant vous aici com mamere leust devant la vostre, ce elles vesquissent, come celui qui sui demores el point de ma mere avoir ces drois et ces escheetes si come je ai devant dit. Et quil soit voir, que fis ne fille ne demore en tel saisine ne en tel teneure come vous dites dou bailliage, il est chose seue que bailliage ne[s]chiet, ne ne peut escheir, au fis ne a la fille de celui qui a tenu le bailliage, sil y a plus prochain parens ou plus droit heir de lui a leir de par qui lon tient le bailliage de celle part dont leritage meut; que ce le roi, nostre oncle, et nos meres eussent eu une seur mainsnee de vostre mere, il nest pas

^a *The words* se vous conoisses . . . le doie; et omitted by *Beugnot*.

^b *MS. chap. ccxcij* (*Beugnot*, chap. iv, pp. 403-4).

^c *MS. et mamere*.

⁹ i.e. Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan, so-called because he was already regent (*bailli*) of Cyprus.

¹⁰ Maria of Lusignan, wife of Walter of Brienne.

doute que elle neust eu le bailliage de nostre dit cousin devant nous come selle qui seroit plus prochain de lui que vous estes. Dont je di que vous ne deves pas avoir (fo. ccxlvj^r) ce bailliage par ce que vous dites que vous demores en tel saisine et en tel teneure come vostre mere avoit doudit bailliage. Et a ce que vous dites que il est us ou costume ou assise en ce royaume, que, quant il y a plusors parens qui apartiennent a home ne a feme en un degre et il meurt, que cescheete eschiet et vient a lainsnee de ces plus prochains parens^a qui sont en vie qui li apartiennent en un degre de celle part dont leritage meut, et que vous estes lainsne des plus prochains parens^a dou monseignor Hugue, qui fu fis dou roy Henri, qui soient desendus de nostre dite ayole, et que, par lassise ou lusage de ce royaume ou par raison, vendroit a vous lescheete de ce royaume, se Dieu faisoit son comandement doudit Hugue sans heir que il eust de sa feme espouse, et que vous, par les raisons que vous aves dites, deves avoir le dit bailliage, je di que non deves et di coment: car vostre ainsneesce en ce cas ne vous doit valoir contre moi, pource que^b il est chose seue que madame mamere fu ainsnee de la vostre, et fu heir de la royne Aalis a avoir lescheete de ce royaume devant vostre mere, et la premiere ainsneesce doit avant aler et doit estre premiere contee, et a celle se doit on prendre et tenir. Et puis que enci est, je di que je doi avoir le bailliage des biens de nostre dit cousin par ainsneesce de madame mamere com celui qui sui son heir et demores en son point a avoir ces raisons et ces escheetes. Et a ce que vous voles que lassise ou lusage de ce royaume vous vaille a avoir le bailliage pour ce que vous estes ainsne de moi, je di que ce ne vous ne doit valoir que assise ou usage y a de ce peut estre que ce est des freres et des seurs, ne, je nentens, (fo. ccxlvj^v) que, par us ou costume ou assise^c de ce royaume, gens qui sont en tel cas com nous soumes, que lainsne le puisse ne doie avoir devant le mainsne, ne que esgart ne conoissance de court en fu onques fait en ce royaume que il leust ou deust avoir^d par lassise ou lusage de ce royaume;^d mais el royaume de Chipre, ou lon a jure a tenir les us et les costumes et les assises de ce royaume, avint le contraire de ce que vous dites. Que par celle haute court fu esgarde que sire Oste Beduin, qui estoit mainsne de sire Thomas de Malandre qui estoit son cousin germain si com nous soumes, eust le fie de sire Thomas Beduin, leur ayol, devant le dit Thomas de Malandre qui estoit

^a *The words qui sont en vie . . . plus prochains parens repeated by Beugnot.*

^b *MS. que repeated.*

^c *MS. assisise.*

^d *The words par lassise . . . ce royaume omitted by Beugnot.*

ainsne de lui, pour ce que le dit Oste fu fis de lainsne des enfans de sire Thomas Beduin, ne ne demora quil ne leust, pource que le dit Thomas de Malandre estoit ainsne de lui.¹¹ Ne nul ne doit entendre que la dite court, ou il a tant de preudes homes et de sages, eust ce esgarde quelle esgarda, cel[l]e entendist que lesgart quelle fist fust contre lassise ou lusage dou ce royaume; ne par defaute de bieu plaidoier ne doit nul entendre que le dit Thomas de Malandre le perdist, puis que il lot a son conseil sire Phelipe de Nevaire,¹² que lon tient au meillour plaideour de sa mer. Et fort chose est a croire, que il ait usage en ce royaume qui soit contraire a lusage de France; que ceaus qui les y establirent ou conquest de la tere furent franceis, et au royame de France est usage que le fis de lainsne ou de lainsnee a leritage devant le fis dou mainsne ou de la mainsnee soit ainsne dou fis dou lainsne ou de lainsnee. Et a ce que vous dites que fie ne seignorie ne separt en ce (fo. ccxlvij^r) royaume entre freres ne entre autres parens masles, et que lainsne le doit avoir devant le mainsne, par celle raison ne debes vous avoir le bailliage de ce royaume devant moy, ains le doi je avoir devant vous, que il est chose certaine que mamere fu ainsnee de la vostre et plus droit heir de la royne Aalis sa mere que la vostre. Et puis que elle fu ainsnee, et puis que a la premiere ainsneece se doit on prendre, si come je ai devant dit, il est bien clere chose que je sui plus prochain parent de vostre dit cousin et le plus droit heir de vous a avoir le bailliage de ces biens, et que la raison est moie et non vostre. Et pour toutes les raisons que je ai dites, ou pour aucunes delles, di je que le bailliage de ce royaume et que la raison en est moie et non vostre, et que cest mon droit, et le doi avoir devant vous; ^asi le veull avoir, se les homes de la haute court de ce royaume conoissent que je avoir le doie, et se il conoissent que je avoir le doie, je euffre a faire ce que je doi com baill, faisant lon a moi ce que lon doit com a baill.^a

^a *Beugnot concludes* se la court de ce royaume conoist que avoir le doie.

¹¹ The Beduins were a Cypriot feudal family which attained some prominence in the fourteenth century. The earliest known members of the family are Arnulf and Thomas Beduin (presumably the man of that name mentioned here) who both witnessed the treaty between the Cypriots and Genoese of 1232 (*Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani*, no. 1049 (wrongly dated 1233)). Neither Otto Beduin nor Thomas of Malandre are otherwise known.

¹² Philip of Novara, the Cypriot jurist and politician. The fact that the present tense (*tient*) is used of him here has been understood to mean that he was still alive at the time this speech was made. If so, this is the last known reference to him and establishes the date of his death as falling during or after 1264. See G. Paris, 'Les Mémoires de Philippe de Novaire', *Revue de l'Orient latin*, ix (1902), 166-7.

[3] Ce est le segont dit dou baill a premiere dit dou conte.^a

'A ce que vos dites que le bailliage de ce royaume est vostre droit et non le mien, pource que quant la royne Aalis, nostre ayole, morut ce royaume eschei a ces enfans, vostre mere et la moie et le roy Henri nostre oncle, et que vostre mere, qui estoit lainsne de la dite royne, eust eu cescheete devant ces autres enfans pour ce que elle estoit lainsnee, se ne fust ce que en ce royaume heritent les fis devant les fille, voirs est que^b ce royaume eschei au roy Henri, nostre oncle, par la mort de nostre dite ayole com a celui qui son droit heir estoit, et il (fo. ccxlviij^v) vint en ce royaume, et lot et tint et usa come seignor jusques a sa mort com de son drot. Mais a vostre mere neschei riens qui valoir vous doie de chose qui escheir li peust de par sa mere, com celle qui not onques saisine ne teneure ne avoir ne la peust davant le dit roy, et cest aparant. Car puis que le dit roy, nostre oncle, en fu saisi et tenant, si com est desus dit, se vostre mere peust demander aucune raison en ce royaume par lescheete que vous dites qui li eschei de par sa mere, elle le perdi par la teneure doudit roi, et que ce soit voirs, il est cler a conoistre que ce elle le hust survescu, ce que elle ne fist mie, et il fust mort sans heirs de sa feme espouse, et elle vosist requere la seignorie de ce royaume et avoir, il convenist que elle la requeist de par le dit roi, son frere, et non pas par la dite royne, sa mere, pour ce que il en morut derainement saisi et tenant come de son droit. Car il est us ou coustume ou assise en ce royaume que lon doit requere escheete de par le derain saisi et tenant, et non de par autre qui valoir li doie; que ce il la requiert de par autre lon ne li est tenu de respondre. Ne a vostre mere neschei riens, ne ne peut escheir, de ce royaume de par le roy, nostre oncle, pour ce quelle morut avant de lui; qua mort na morte ne peut riens escheir, pour quoi vostre mere not, ne ne pot avoir droit en lescheete dou roi, nostre oncle. Et puis que elle ne ot ne ne pot avoir droit, vous ne le poes ne le deves avoir de par lui, et puis que vous ne laves ne poies avoir de par lui, donc di je que ainsneesce ne vous peut ne ne doit riens valoir a avoir le bailliage ne lescheete de ce (fo. ccxlviiij^r) royaume devant moi, qui sui devant vous. Et a ce que vous dites que vous voles que lassise ne lusage de ce royaume [ne] me doie valoir a avoir le dit bailliage, pour ce que je sui ainsnes de vous, je di que si doie et veull que lassise ou lusage de ce royaume ou raison me vaille et doie valoir a avoir le dit bailliage.

^a *MS. chap. ccxciiij* (Beugnot, chap. v, pp. 405-6).

^b *This word is followed by en, struck out.*

Car il est clere chose et aperte que ce royaume est escheu par la mort de nostre dit oncle a son dit fis, Hugue nostre dit cousin, et que aucun doit avor par assise ou par usage de ce royaume ou par raison le bailliage de ces biens, donc le doit avoir celui qui plus grant raison y a devant les autres, se il le requiert. Et je ai plus grant raison et plus grant droit que les autres qui aucune maniere de droit et de raison y pevent demander, come celui qui sui lainsne de tous les parens de nostre dit oncle qui derainement morut saisi et tenant et de nostre dit cousin a qui ce royaume est escheu, si com je ai dit, que de nostre dit ayole sont desendus. Car par lassise ou lusage de ce royaume, fie ne signorie ne separt ne ne doit partir entre heirs masles, ains le doit avoir lun deaus, donc est il cler a conoistre que ensi doie estre com je ai dit; que trop seroit fort chose et estrange et tort apert, que de ceaus qui sont en un degre de parente le mainsne heritast devant lainsne la ou lainsne le requist, ne onques navint ne ya ne vendra, ce Dieu plaist, que ce seroit contre lusage et lassise de ce royaume ^aet tort apert. Car en ce royaume ne fit onques use,^a ne raison ne le done, que le mainsne des parens qui sont en un degre eust heritage ne le bailliage devant lainsne, quant il le requiert, auci des autres parens com des freres, (fo. ccxlvij^v) ne il ne se trovera ja que le mainsne heritast devant lainsne la ou lainsne le requeist, donc est il clere chose que je [qui] sui ainsne de vous doi avoir le bailliage de ce royaume devant vous. Et a ce que vous dites que esgart ne conoissance de court ne fu onques fait en ce royaume, que lainsne de ceaus qui sont en tel cas come nous soumes eust heritage ne le bailliage devant les mainsne, se enci est com vous dites, il nest demore que porce que debat de tel cas ne vint onques en court; et de choses si cleres et si usees com cest est, nest mestier de metre sen sur court a faire ent esgart ne conoissance, que ce seroit uiseuce et tenu abusion auci com se lon le faisoit des freres. Et a se que vous dites que le contraire de ce fu fait en Chipre, ou lon a jure de tenir les us et coustumes et les assises dou royaume de Jerusalem, et esgarde par la haute court dou fait de sire Oste Beduin et de sire Thomas de Malandre, esgart nest pas assise ne ne doit estre tenu com assise; que court ne peut faire esgart que de paroles de quoi lon se met en esgart, et plaideer peut faillir et faut souvent, que mout meillour plaideour de sire Phelippe de Nevaire a lon veu souvent faillir a dire ce que mestier li estoit en plait, et il est chose certaine que mesire Phelipe de Nevaire failli lors a bien plaideer, et que ce qui lors en fu fait par esgart fu par la defaute de

^a *The words et tort apert . . . onques use omitted by Beugnot.*

ce que lon ne dist pas tout ce que mestier y fu si com il a este aparant. Que la ou les homes de la haute court de Chipre furent assemblez plus esforceement que^a lon ne lesvit piesa et messire Phelippe avec eaus, jos le bailliage dou royaume de Chipre par leur conoissance, com le plus droit heir dou fis dou roi, nostre dit oncle, a avoir son bail(fo. ccxlix^r)liage sauve madame mamere se elle le requeist; et ce fu fait vostre oyant et vostre veyant, qui esties en vostre parfait aage, sans droit que vous y demandicies ne sans chalonge ne debat que nous y meyssiens. Pour quoi je dis que ledit esgart ne vous doit valoir, mais a moi doit valoir la dite conoissance quelle fu fait par toute la coumunauté des houmes de la dite court de Chipre, vostre oyant^b et vostre veyant; ne le fait de sire Oste Beduin ne de sire Thomas de Malandre ne fu pas en tel cas com le nostre, ne le dit esgart qui en fu fait ne vous doit valoir. Et a ce que vous dites que les usages de ce pais furent pris et estrais des usages dou royaume de France, et que par lusage de France le fis de lainsne encor soit il mainsne emporte lheritage quant il eschiet devant lainsne quant il sont en tel cas com nos soumus, je ne sai que il soit ensi com vous dites, et tout le fust il, ne requier je riens par lusage dou France, mais par lusage de ce royaume le requier je, ^cles quels doivent estre tenus et maintenus en ce royaume; ^cne en ce royaume nest pas lusage tel com vous dites quil est en France, ains est tout le contraire. Et bien est aparant par les raisons que je ais dit, et pour ce que la dame de Thabarie et de madame Eschive de Thabarie, qui sont en tel degre de parente come nos soumes et leur fait semblant au nostre, fu que la dame de Thabarie ot la seignorie de Thabarie devant madame Eschive, pource que elle estoit ainsnee de li, ne ne demora que elle ne leust, pource que elle fu fille dou mainsne, et ce fu pource quelles ne puissent riens requerre ne avoir de par leur peres, qui onques ne furent saisis ne tenans, ains (fo. ccxlix^v) lot de par madame Eschive, leur ayole, qui derainement fu saisie et tenant.¹³ De par celle meysme maniere ot sire Gautier de Flouri^d la mareschaucie de Thabarie devant sire Helies Charles, et a Sayete avint il auci dou fait qui fu de sire Hugue de Masaire.¹⁴ Ne onques le contraire de

^a *This word is followed by que, struck out.*

^b *MS. voyant.*

^c *The words les quels doivent . . . en ce royaume omitted by Beugnot.*

^d *In margin ci dit de le marschal de Flury in a fifteenth-century hand.*

¹³ For the succession to Tiberias, see above, p. 13.

¹⁴ For Walter of Floury, Elias Charles and Hugh of Masaire, see above, p. 12 note 47.

ce navint en ce royaume pour quoi il est clere chose que lusage de ce royaume nest pas tel com vos dites que celui de France est. Et pour toutes les raisons que je ai ore et autre fois dit, ou por aucune delles, di je que le bailliage de ce royaume est mon droit et non le vostre, si le veull avoir, se les homes de la haute court de ce royaume conoissent que je avoir le doie, et ^ase il conoissent que je avoir le doie,^a je euffre a faire ce que je doie come baill, faisant lon a moi ce que lon doit com a baill.'

[4] Ce est le segont dit dou conte au segont dit dou baill.^b

'Vous aves entendu coment jai dit que mamere fu ainsnee de la vostre et coment elle fu droit heir de nostre dit ayole, la royne Aalis, et de nostre dit oncle, le roy Henri, devant vostre mere come celle qui estoit ainsnee de vostre mere, et par quel raison ^cvostre ainsneesce ne doit valoir contre moi, et coment lainsneesce [de] mamere doit valoir contre vos, et coment la premiere^c ainsneesce doit avant^d aler, et que celle ce doit on prendre et tenir, et coment je sui demoures el point de mamere a avoir ces raisons et ces escheetes, et par quel raison la teneur de vostre mere dou bailliage, que elle tient, de ce royaume ne vos doit valoir, et par quel raison je sui plus droit heir de vous a avoir le bailliage de ce royaume par devant vous. Et a ce que vous dites que il ne me (fo. ccl^r) doit valoir, ce que ma mere fu droit heir devant la vostre de la royne Aalis, nostre ayole, et de nostre oncle, le roy Henri, ne que lainsneesce de mamere ne me doit valoir, ne qua celle ne se doit lon tenir, je dis que si fait par les raisons que jais autre fois dites. Et se il estoit enci com vous dites ce ne me doit pas ennuire par raison, car la en vie de vostre mere ne li eschei riens de madite ayole ne par mon dit oncle qui valoir vos doie, com celle qui riens ne tint ne ot en ce royaume de heiritage qui escheu li fust de par eaus, si com il est aparant que mon seignor Hugue, qui est desendus de nostre ayole, est en vie, a qui ce royaume eschei par la mort de nostre dit oncle; et puis que enci est que [a] vostre mere, tant come elle vesqui, neschei riens deritage de par nostre dite ayole ne de nostre oncle quelle tenist ne heust come le sien, donc di je que tout aici com mamere heust eu la seignorie de ce royaume devant la vostre, se il fust mesavenu de nostre dit oncle

^a *The words se il conoissent . . . le doie omitted by Beugnot.*

^b *MS. chap. ccxcv (Beugnot, chap. vi, pp. 407-9).*

^c *The words vostre ainsneesce . . . la premiere omitted by Beugnot.*

^d *MS. avoir.*

sans heir de cespouse, la doi je avoir, se il mesavenoit de nostre dit cousin sans heir que il eust de sa feme espouse; et puis que enci est, il est cler a conoistre que je doi avoir le bailliage de ce royaume devant vous. Et a ce que vous dites que bailliage de ce royaume est esc[h]eu, et que aucun le doit avoir, et que celui qui plus grant raison y a ^ale doit avoir, ce est voirs, et je, qui plus grant raison y a^a de vous par les raisons que je ai dites ores et autrefois, le doi avoir devant vous, ne vostre ainsneesce ne vos doit valoir en ce cas; mais celle de mamere me doit valoir ^bpar les raisons que je ai avant dites, ne^b ne doit demourer que elle ne me vaille (fo. ccl^v) pour chose que vous aies dite, ^cqui soit assise ou usage en ce royaume ou raison que fie ne seignorie ne se part.^c Et a ce que vous dites ^dquil ne fu onques use en ce royaume, ne raison ne le done, que le mainsne heritast devant lainsne qui sont en un degre auci bien dautres com de freres, se il estoit si com vous dites, ce que je nentens pas, ne fu il onques use en ce royaume que lainsne des parens qui sont en un degre, autres que freres ou seurs, eust heritage ne bailliage devant le mainsne de lainsne par esgart ne par conoissance de court. Et^d se la dame de Thabarie ou sire Gautir de Flouri^e ou autres lont eu, si com vous dites, ce ne este par droit ne par esgart ne par conoissance de court, ains a este parce que ceaus qui raison y avoient se sont soufeis de venir en court et de demander leur raison; pour quoi di je que ce ne vous vaut, ne valoir ne vous doit, ^fna moi ennuire, que je naie par devant vous le bailliage de ce royaume com celui qui suis plus droit heir de vous a avoir le par devant vous par les raisons que je ai dit.^f Et a ce que vous dites que esgart, qui fu fait en Chipre de sire Oste Beduin et de sire Thomas de Malandre, [ne] me vaille, et que vous voles que la conoissance qui fu faite en Chipre dou bailliage, que vous eustes, vous vaille a avoir cestui bailliage, je di que le dit esgart me doit valoir, mais a vous ne doit valoir la dite conoissance, et di raison pour quoi; car le fait de sire Oste Beduin et de sire Thomas de Malandre, qui requeroient lescheete de leur ayole, fu debatue en court par les parties longuement, et apres fu esgarde que la raison estoit de sire Oste Bed(fo. cclj^r)uin, et encor fust il mainsne doudit Thomas, pource que il estoit fis de lainsne des enfans de son ayol. Et quant vous requeistes le bailliage de Chipre,

^a *The words le doit avoir . . . raison y a omitted by Beugnot.*

^b *The words par les raisons . . . avant dites, ne omitted by Beugnot.*

^c *The words qui soit assise . . . ne se part omitted by Beugnot.*

^d *The words quil ne fu . . . conoissance de court. Et omitted by Beugnot.*

^e *Cross in margin.*

^f *The words na moi ennuire . . . je ai dit omitted by Beugnot.*

il est chose seue que je ne le debati ne en court, ne mits pour debatre, le que je men souffri que lonour de madame mante, vostre mere, qui nourri mavoit, que je doutai quelle ne me seust maugre; ne celle conoissance, qui adonc fu faite, ne vous doit valoir ^ane a moi ennuire, et ce la court connut ce que vous dites, celle conoissance ne vos doit valoir contre moi^a a avoir le bailliage de ce royaume par les raisons que je ai dites; ains doit valoir a moi lesgart qui fu de sire Oste Beduin et de sire Thomas de Malandre, si come je ai devant dit. Et a ce que vous dites que vous voles requere le bailliage par lusage de ce royaume et non pas par celui de France, vous aves entendu que je ai dit autrefois, quil ne fu onques esgarde ne coneu en ce royaume que lainsne de ceaus qui sont en un degre autres que freres, fis de la mainsnee,^b heust heritage ou bailliage devant le mainsne fis de lainsnee, et que les usages de ce pais furent pris et etrais de ceaus de France au conquest de ce royaume. Et puis que vous dites que dou mainsne fis de lainsne ne fu onques fait esgart ne conoissance en court, et je di que lainsne fis de la mainsnee^c ne fu onques fait esgart ne conoissance de court en ce royaume, dont je di com se doit prendre as usages de France; et je ai dit autre fois que lusage de France est, et encor je di; et que il soit voirs, ce que je di autrefois est venu en ce royaume, qui navoit este debatu ne coneu par esgart ne par conoissance de court, (fo. cclj^v) de quoi lon estoit ensere que lon se travailloit de savoir la verite de lusage de France et^d par sel usage lon deliveroit le fait en ce royaume, et se est chose aperte et seue. Car quant messire Henri le Bufle fu mort et ces filles furent en debat de lescheete de leur pere, lon sen acerteni par lusage de France et atendi lon plus dun an le conte de Sansuerre pour savoir quel usage estoit en France de tel cas, ^eet par lusage qui fu delivree celle quarele si com est aparant que encor court en ce royaume.¹⁵ ^e Pour quoi par ceste raison, et por toutes les autres que je ai dites ores et autres fois ou par aucune delles, je veull avoir le bailliage de ce royaume par devant vous, com celui qui sui le plus

^a *The words ne a moi ennuire . . . contre moi omitted by Beugnot.*

^b *MS. mainsneece.*

^c *MS. lainsnee.*

^d *MS. et repeated.*

^e *The syntax of these lines is obscure as some words are evidently missing. The meaning, however, seems clear enough.*

¹⁵ Henry Le Bufle (fl. 1155–65) is last known from a document of March 1165 (*Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani*, no. 412). Stephen, count of Sancerre (1152–91) was in the East in 1171 (William of Tyre, 'Historia Rerum in Partibus Transmarinis Gestarum', *RHC. Historiens Occidentaux*, i, p. 988; see Robert of Torigny, 'Chronica', ed. R. Howlett, *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I* (Rolls Series, 4 vols, 1884–9), iv, p. 249).

droit heir de nostre dit cousin a avoir cescheete, se les homes de la haute court, 'qui si sont assemblez, connoissent que je le doi avoir. Et ce il^a connoissent que je avoir le doie, je euffre a faire ce que je doie com baill, faisant lon a moi ce que lon doit com a baill.'

[5] Ce est le tiers dit dou baill au segont [dit]^b dou cont.^c

'Vous avez entendu coument jais autrefois dit, et encor di, que riens neschei a vostre mere de par nostre dite ayole, la royne Aalis, qui valoir vous doie, ne ne par nostre dit oncle, le roi Henri, neschei riens a vostre mere nescheu ne pot que elle morut avant de lui, na mort na morte ne peut riens escheir, et par quel raison lainsneesce de vostre mere ne vous doit valoir a avoir le bailliage de ce royaume pour nostre dit cousin. Et a ce que vous dites que vous nentendes que ce que je ais dit fust onques use en ce royaume, ne raison ne done, que le fis dou mainsne, quant il est ainsne, heritast devant (fo. cclij^r) le fis de lainsne ce il est mainsne de lui, ausi bien des parens qui sont en un degre taignans a celui de qui lescheete leur est venue de la ou elle meut com des freres, se vous ne le[n]tendes, pour ce ne remaint il mie quil ne soit et doie estre si com je ais dit, et di pourquoi. Car il est chose manifeste, que quant on meurt et il y a ij fis que autant li ataint lun de parente com lautre, et que aici devoit avoir part el fie et en la seignorie le mainsne com lainsne, se lusage de ce royaume ne li toloit, qui est tel^d que lainsne la tout. Et par celle meisme maniere et par tel raison il est clere chose et aperte, que se un home a deus fis et il meurent ains de lui sans avoir aucune teneur des biens de lor pere et chascun de ceaus ait fis, que son fie et sa seignorie eschiet as fis des fis, et puis que il eschiet a ceaus, donc le doit avoir lainsne devant le mainsne; car aici bien sont il en un cas lun devers lautre a avoir leritage de leur ayol com leur peres, cil eussent survescu leur pere, car lusage de ce royaume est que lon doit requerre sescheete de par le derain saisi et tenant, dou di je que les dis cousins de par leur pere ne pevent riens requerre, qui onques nen orent teneur ne raison quil avoir puissent, ce il eussent survescu leur pere, [et] a leur enfans ne leur doit riens valoir. Pour quoi je di que lainsneesce de vostre mere ne vous doit valoir, con celle qui morut ains nostre dit oncle, son frere; et puis com ne doit requerre escheete

^a The words qui si sont . . . Et ce il omitted by Beugnot.

^b Supplied from table of rubrics, fo. 16v.

^c MS. chap. ccxcvj (Beugnot, chap. vii, pp. 409-10).

^d This word is followed by que lains, struck out.

fors de par le derain saisi, et que fie ne seignorie ne se doit partir, si com jais autrefois dit, il convient que lun des ij qui sont en un degre lait, et puis quil convient que lun lait, il est bien droit et raison que lainsne lait devant (fo. cclij^v) le mainsne; et enci a tous jours este use ne onques en ce royaume navint le contraire, pourquoi je di qui est clere chose, que je qui sui ainsnes de vous doi avoir ce bailliage devant vous, qui estes le mainsne. ^aEt a ce que vous dites que il ne fu onques use par esgart ne par conoissance de court, qui lainsne fis dou mainsne ou de la mainsnee heritast devant le mainsne fis de lainsne ou de lainsnee,^b je di que ce il na este fait par esgart ne par conoissance de court ce ne me doit nuire, qui nest demoure que parce que tel cas ne vint onques en court. Que quant tel cas sont venus, ceaus qui estoient certains que il ni avoient droit, et que ce il venoient en court quil le perderoient par esgart de court, si nauroient honour ne profit et venir ysi sen soit soufers. Que fort chose est a croire, que, ce il cuidassent desrainier par court, que ces que je ais nommes se fussent soufert devenir en court requere leur raison et de si grans fais come ceaus estoient, ce le contraire de ce que je ais dit ne fu onques en ce royaume esgarde ne coneu ne fait en court ne dehors court. Ne le fait de la dame de Thabarie et de madame Eschive, sa cousine, ne fu pas par souffrance ains fu acertaine par les plus sages homes qui de sa mere fussent au jour, et il en y avoit plus lors quil na ore que ceaus qui ores sont y estoient et plusors autres qui sont puis mors, et par tous fu dit et conseille au seignor de Sur, leur oncle,¹⁶ sur qui elles cestoient mises que droit et la raison en estoit de la dame de Thabarie, pour ce que elle estoit ainsnee de madame Eschive qui estoit fille de lainsne. Et par les raisons que je ai dites di je que raison et ce, qui a este fait et use en ce royaume (fo. cclij^r) de tel cas com le nostre est, me doit valoir a avoir le bailliage de ce royaume devant vous, car chose acertenee par tant de gens doit porter plus grant force et estre meaus tenue que esgart et conoissance que lon pert souvent par ce que le plait est mal plaidee. Et encor di je que la conoissance, qui fu faite en Chipre de mon bailliage, me doit meaus valoir qua vous lesgart qui fu faite

^a *The passage beginning at this point and ending with the words je ais dites (p. 34, n. a) omitted by Beugnot.*

^b *MS. de la mainsne ou de la mainsnee.*

¹⁶ Philip of Montfort, lord of Tyre (Sur) (c. 1246–70). The two Eschivas were the children of two brothers (Otto and Ralph of Tiberias) married to two sisters, the daughters of Helvis of Ibelin and Raynald of Sidon. Philip was the son of Helvis by her later marriage to Guy of Montfort. See 'Lignages', pp. 455, 461.

de sire Oste Beduin et de sire Thomas de Malandre, par les raisons que je ais dites.^a Et a ce que vous dites que vous voles come se preigne a lusage de France pour aucunes raisons que vous aves dites, et pource meismes que vous dites que lon atendi le conte de Sansseure un an et plus pour acertener le fait de messire Henri le Bufle, de quoi lon se trovoit ensere, et quencor court en ce royaume ce que adonc fu establi tout fust il ensi com vous dites, di je que ce cas nest pas semblant a celui, car tel cas com celui des seurs fu adonc nestoit onques avenu en ce royaume, ne de cestui cas en quoi vous et moi soumes ne peut lon dire quil ne soit avenu en ce royaume plusors fois ne que lon se soit onques trove ensere. Quant il avint que lon a veu tousjours user en ce royaume que lainsne fis dou mainsne ou de la mainsnee a leritage devant le mainsne fis de lainsne ou de lainsnee, se il le requiert, quant il sont en un degre de parente de celle part dont lescheete meut, ^bsi com il a este aparant de plusors si com je^c lai autre fois dit.^b Et aucune fois est avenu que court estoit enseree daucunes choses, et que lune court mandoit demander conseil a lautre ^dcourt, ne celle qui demandoit conseil^d nestoit pas pource tenue de tenir le conseil ne lusage des autres cours a qui elle demandoit conseil, se il ne li sembloit bon; et (fo. cclij^v) mout de fois est avenu que la court de ce royaume a mande requere conseil en Chipre, en Antioche, a Triple et en autres leucs de quels le plus nont pas tel usage com il y a en ce royaume, que lon fust tenu de tenir les usages de celui pais de toutes les autres choses qui en ce royaume avendroient, et tout soit ce com ait aucune fois demande conseil as autres cours nest lon pas tenu de croire leur conseil ne^e tenir leur usage se il ne leur semble bon. Et pour toutes les raisons, que je ai dites ore et autre fois, ou par aucunes delles, di je que je doi avoir le bailliage de ce royaume et avoir le veull devant vous com le plus droit heir de nostre cousin a avoir cescheete, ^fne pour chose que vous aies dite ore et autre fois, je ne veull quil demeure que je naie le dit bailliage, se les homes de ceste court conoissent que je avoir le doie, et se il conoissent que je le doi avoir, je en euffre a faire ce que jen doi com baill, faisant lon a moi ce que lon doit com a baill.^f

^a *End of passage omitted by Beugnot.*

^b *The words si com il . . . autre fois dit omitted by Beugnot.*

^c *MS. le.*

^d *The words court, ne celle qui demandoit conseil omitted by Beugnot.*

^e *MS. de.*

^f *Beugnot concludes se la court conoist que je avoir le doie.*

[6] Ce est le tiers dit dou conte au tiers dit dou baill.^a

‘Vous aves entendu coment jai plusors fois dit, et encor di que [de par] la royne Aalis, nostre dite ayole, eschei ce royaume a ces enfans, et que mamere fu lainsnee de ces enfans et fu plus droit heir de lui, que vostre mere ne fu, a avoir lescheete de ce royaume, et coment je sui par les raisons que je ais dites demores el point de ma mere a avoir ces drois et ces escheetes, et coment et pour quel raison je sui plus droit heir de vous a avoir le bailliage de ce royaume. Et a ce que vous dites que quant un home meurt qui a ij fis, que autant li taint de parente lun com lautre, et que auci devroit part avoir el fie, (fo. ccliiij^r) et en la seignorie le mainsne ne con lainsne, se lusage de ce royaume ne li tolloit, qui est tel que lainsne la tout; et que, par celle meisme raison, se un hom a ij fis et il meurt sans avoir aucune teneur de ces biens, et chascun deaus a fis, que lescheete dou pere des ij freres eschiet as fis des fis; et que puis qui leur eschei lainsne le doit avoir devant le mainsne, je di que ce est voirs ce il est fis de lainsne, mais ce il est fis dou mainsne, je di que il ne le doit pas avoir. Et a ce que vous dites que il est husage en ce royaume con doit requere cescheete de par le derain saisi et tenant, je nentens que lusage de ce soit tel com vos dites, que la court de ce royaume en fist onques esgart ne conoissance que lusage fust tel com vous aves dit, ne en tel cas com nos somes ce ne vous doit valoir; car trop est clere chose et manifeste, que mamere fu plus droit heir que la vostre de nostre dite ayole et de nostre dit oncle, et ce vostre mere survesqui la moie et ot le bailliage de ce royaume, ce ne me doit nuire, que jai autre fois dit et encor di, que bailliage neschiet pas de baill a baill quant il y a plus prochein parent ou plus droit heir de celui ou de celle por cui lon tient le bailliage; ne vostre [mere] en sa vie naquist riens des biens de nostre dite ayole ne de nostre dit oncle a heritage qui valoir vous doie. Et bien est clere chose, que puis que ensi fu que vostre mere morut sans avoir teneur daucune chose qui escheir li peust a heritage de nostre dite ayole ne de nostre dit oncle, que tout auci com ma mere fu leur droit heir devant la vostre, que je le doi estre et sui devant vous, pour ce que je sui son fis, quelle estoit ainsnee de vostre mere, et que je sui demores par lusage de ce royaume el point ou ma mere estoit (fo. ccliiij^v) quant elle morut a avoir ces raison et ces escheetes; pour quoi je di que encor fust ce que gent, qui fussent en tel cas com nos somes, covenist a requerre de par le derain saisi et tenant, ce que je nentent pas, suis je et doi

^a *MS. chap. ccxcvij* (Beugnot, chap. viii, pp. 410–12).

estre droit heir de nostre dit oncle et de son dit fis par devant vous, pour ce que ma mere fu droit heir devant la vostre de nostre dit oncle, qui estoit ainsnee de la vostre. Et trop seroit estrange chose et contre toutes manieres des drois et des raisons, que vous, qui estes fis de celle de la quel mamere estoit plus droit heir dou dit roy, nostre oncle, par devant vostre mere, deucies avoir le bailliage ne le heritage de chose, qui fust escheue de nostre dit oncle ^aet qui est de nostre dit cousin, par devant moi, qui suis fis de celle qui de nostre dit oncle estoit plus droit heir par devant la vostre, et le fust de nostre dit cousin celles vesquissent.^a Et a ce que plusors gens en ce royaume, qui estoient ainsnes et fis de mainsnes, ont herite et [eu] leur escheetes devant les mainsnes fis des ainsnes qui estoient en tel cas com nous somes, vous aves entendu, coment jai dit autre fois, par quels ce ne me doit nuire na vous valoir, car se aucune personne se veaut souffrir de requerre et d'avoir sa raison, celle soffrance ne doit pas tolir la raison de celui ou de celle qui la veaut avoir et la requiert. ^bEt de ce que vous dites que le fait de la dame de Thabarie et de madame Eschive, sa cousine, fu mis sur le seignor de Sur a acertenir de cui la raison estoit et quil fu acertene par les plus sages gens de ce pais, ce nen sais je, et tout fust il enci ce ne me doit mie ennuire ne a vous ayder. Car mout de fois avient que lon quiert aucune chose a aucune gens, que ceaus a qui lon le re(fo. cclv^r)quiert ne sont mie bien voyans cler de la raison, et mout de fois semble as gens cune chose soit raison que a ceaus meismes semble puis le contraire quant il oient la raison dune part et dautre; ne tel maniere denqueste nest pas esgart ne conoissance ne ne la doit on tenir a usage ne a assise; et parmi tout ce est il chose seue et certaine, que ce que le seignor de Sur fist de celui fait, quil le fist par lassent des parties, ne null peut meaus laisser sa raison, que celui de qui elle est. Ne se que madame Eschive, ne les autres que vous dites qui en tel cas furent, se laisserent de requere et d'avoir leur raison, me doie tourner a damage, ains vell avoir le bailliage de ce royaume par devant vous, com selui qui sui le plus droit heir de nostre dit cousin, que vous nestes, a avoir cescheete par devant vous, selle escheoit par les raisons que je ai dite.^c Et a ce que vous maves porte une maniere dexemple, que sune court demande^d conseil a autre des choses dont elle se treut enserree, et que porce nest mie celle court qui demande conseil

^a *The words et qui est . . . celles vesquissent omitted by Beugnot.*

^b *The passage beginning at this point and ending with the words je ai dite (below, n. c) omitted by Beugnot.*

^c *End of passage omitted by Beugnot.*

^d *MS. devant.*

tenue de croire le conseil ne tenir l'usage de l'autre, cil ne li semble bon, et que la court de ce royaume a plusors fois requis conseil a plusors cours, ne que porce nest elle pas tenue de tenir les usages de celles cours, je di que ceste comparison nest pas conminan et di coment: que chose est seue, quant Anthioche fu conquise par crestiens, que Boemont¹⁷ en fu seignor que jentens qui fu de Puille, et peut estre quant il en fu seignor quil y mist les usages tels com il vost, et aici le conte de Toulouse, qui fu seignor de Triple,¹⁸ et aici firent les autres qui furent seignors^a des autres [seignories] quant elles furent conquises; et le royaume de Jerusalem soit lon bien que fran(fo. cclv^v)sois conquisterent, et quil pristerent et traisterent les usages de ce royaume de ceaus de France, pour quoi je di que de cestui cas se doit lon prendre a l'usage de France, ne quil doit demourer por chose que vous aies dite, com ne si preigne. Et por toutes les raisons, que je ai dites ore et autre fois, ou pour aucunes delles, veull je avoir li dit bailliage, se les homes de la haute court de ce royaume conoissent que je avoir le doie; et cil conoissent que je le doi avoir, je en euffre a faire ce que je doi come baill, faisant lon a moi ce que lon doit come a baill.'

[7] Ce est le quart dit dou bail au tiers dit dou conte.^b

'Jais mout de paroles dites et plusors raisons monstrees les quelles vous et les homes de la court aves entendues quil nest mestier que je redie, et pour le fait abergier je mostre brefement par vive raison, coment je sui plus droit heir de vous a avoir ce bailliage et leritage de ce royaume, cil mesavenoit de nostre dit cousin a qui Dieu doint bone vie. Il est certaine chose quil nos convient a requerre ce bailliage, se nous le volons avoir, de par celui a qui leritage de ce royaume est escheu com a droit heir, ce est mon seignor Hugue, le fis de nostre dit oncle, ^ca qui ce royaume eschei de par nostre dit oncle^c qui derainement morut saisi et tenant com de son droit. Et pour ce devons nous requerre cest bailliage de par nostre dit cousin, quil est assise ou l'usage en ce royaume, que, quant fie ou seignorie eschiet a enfant merme daage et il na pere ne mere, que celui ou

^a MS. seignorns.

^b MS. chap. ccxcviii (Beugnot, chap. ix, pp. 412-13).

^c The words a qui ce royaume . . . dit oncle omitted by Beugnot.

¹⁷ Bohemond of Taranto, prince of Antioch (1098-1104); died 1111.

¹⁸ Raymond of St Gilles, count (as Raymond IV) of Toulouse (1088-1105), first count of Tripoli.

celle qui est son plus drot heir a avoir celle escheete devant tous (fo. cclvj^r) autres se lenfant merme daage moroit doit avoir le bailliage doudit fie ou de la devant dit seignorie devant tous ces autres parens, et la si la requiert; et il est voirs que la seignorie de ce royaume eschei a nostre dit cousin par la mort de nostre dit oncle, et que madame mamere ot et tint le bailliage de ce^a royaume et en morut saisie et tenant com le plus droit heir de nostre dit cousin a avoir cescheete. Et il est certaine chose et veraie, qua vostre mere neschei heritage ne bailliage de ce royaume ne aucun autre chose de par nostre dit oncle nescheir ne li pot, pour ce que elle morut lonc tens avant de lui, qua mort na morte ne peut riens escheir, si com jais autre fois dit; ne de par nostre dit cousin ne li poroit riens escheir, com a celle qui ne fu onques heir doudit Hige nestre ne le pot, pource quelle morut lonc tens ains quil fust nes ne engendres, ne que son pere eust espousee la royne Plaisance, sa mere. Et puis que de par nostre dit oncle ne li eschei aucune chose ne escheir ne li pot, pour les raisons que je ai dites, ne quelle ne fu onques heir de nostre dit cousin si com jais avant dit, donc est il clere chose quelle not ne pot avoir aucun droit en ce royaume, et puis quelle ne lot ne avoir ne le post, vous de par lui ne laves ne avoir ne poes. Et puis que de par li ne laves ne ne poes avoir, sa[i]nsneesce ne vous vaut ne ne peut valoir a avoir lescheete ne le bailliage de ce royaume devant moi; et ce je, de par ma mere, qui survesqui la vostre et nostre dit oncle et qui ot le bailliage de ce royaume si com jais autre fois dit, ne puis requerre ne avoir droit el dit bailliage par les raisons que vous dites, donc est il certaine chose que vous ne le (fo. cclvj^v) poies requerre ne avoir de par vostre mere par les raisons que je ai dites; et ce nous de par nos meres ne le poons requerre navoir, donc covient il, se nos le volons avoir, que nous le requerons de par nostre dit cousin si com jai autre fois dit. Et puis que de par lui le nous covient a requerre, je die que je le doi meaus avoir de vous que je suis ainsnes de vous; que par raison que vous dites que vostre mere heust eu leritage et le bailliage de ce royaume devant la moie, se elles vesquissent et il leur fust escheu por ce que vostre mere fu ainsnee de la moie, di je que par celle meisme raison le doi je avoir devant vous, puis que il nos est escheu, que je sui ainsne de vous. Et je vous ais autre fois dit et di encor, que je ne sai que les usages de France sont, et tout fust lusage de France tel com vous aves dit, ce que je nentens mie, je ne requier ne ne doi requere le bailliage de ce royaume par autre usage que par celui de ce royaume; par les quels

^a MS. ce repeated.

usages je le doi avoir pour toutes les raisons que je ais dites, ne ne veull quil demore pour chose que vous aies dit ne dies, que je ne laie devant vous. ^aPour toutes les [raisons] que jai dites ores et autre fois, ou par aucun delles,^a ce les homes de la haute court de ce royaume, qui si sont, conoissent que je le doi avoir, et de ce me met je en leur cunnoissances, et cil conoissent que je le doi avoir, je en euffre a faire ce que je doi com baill, faisant lon a moi ce que lon doit com a baill.'

[8] Ce est le quart dit dou conte au quart dit dou baill.^b

'Ja soit ce que je aie plusors fois dit et mostre clerement par quels raisons je sui le (fo. cclvij^r) plus droit heir de vous a avoir le bailliage de ce royaume, com celui qui sui le plus droit heir de vous de nostre dit oncle, a qui ce royaume est escheu par la mort de nostre dit oncle, qui derainement en morut saisi et tenant, por aberger le fait [et] eschiver riote, je dirai as plus courtes paroles que je porai ce que besoign mest a avoir ce bailliage par devant vous qui est mon droit. Il est chose certaine que ce royaume eschei de par la royne Aalis, nostre ayole, a ces enfans, et que ma mere fu lainsne de ces enfans et son plus droit heir devant la vostre, et puis que ce royaume eschei de par nostre dite ayole a ces enfans et que mamere fu son plus droit heir devant la vostre, je sui plus droit heir de vous a avoir ce bailliage. Car par forme de droit et de raison nous nous devons prendre a nostre dite ayole, dont leritage nous est escheu, par droit ligne desendant; et ce nos devons requerre ne avoir le bailliage de ce royaume par la droite ligne desendant de nostre dite ayole par les raisons que je ai dites, et il le nous convient a requere de par nostre dit cousin, a qui ce royaume est escheu par la mort de nostre dit oncle qui derainement morut saisi et tenant, je di que je sui plus droit heir de nostre dit cousin, que vous nestes, a avoir cescheete de ce royaume, cil estoit mesavenu de lui, dont Dieu len gart, pour quoi je doi avoir le bailliage de ce royaume par devant vous. Et clere chose est et certaine, que nous ne poons avoir raison que par nos meres, qui furent seurs germanes de nostre dit oncle et antes de nostre dit cousin, et puis que nous ni avons raison ne ne poons a (fo. cclvij^v) avoir que par nos meres, et ma mere fu ainsne de la vostre et plus droit heir de nostre dit oncle et de nostre dit cousin que la vostre, se elles vesquissent, dont sui je plus droit heir de vous a avoir ce

^a *The words* Pour toutes les . . . par aucun delles *omitted by Beugnot.*

^b *MS. chap. ccxcix (Beugnot, chap. x, pp. 413-14).*

bailliage, com celui qui sui fis de celle qui leust eu devant la vostre. Et a ce que vous aves dit et dites que mamere morut ains la vostre, et que pource a vostre mere vint ou pot venir la raison d'avoit lescheete de nostre dit oncle a heritage, cil fust mesavenu de lui sans heir de cespouse, ce ne vous vaut ne ne doit valoir ne a moi ennuire, que a vostre mere en sa vie neschei riens de nostre dit oncle a heritage. Et puis quelle en sa vie naquist la raison qui li vint ou pot venir, pource quelle survesqui mamere com celle a qui neschei riens de nostre dit oncle a heritage, si com jais dit, ne riens nen ot ne tint qui valoir vous doie, di je que par celle meisme raison lescheete de nostre dit oncle est revenue a moi par devant vous tout aici com elle estoit de mamere par devant la vostre. Car nos soumes demoures el point de nos meres a avoir tel raison chascun lun devant lautre, com nos meres eussent, celle^a vesquissent, lune devant lautre, ne il nest pas doute que ma mere ne leust devant la vostre, dont la doi je avoir devant vous; que estrange chose seroit et tort manifest ce vous, qui estes fis de celle de la quel mamere estoit plus droit heir a avoir lescheete de nostre dit ayole et de nostre dit oncle et de nostre cousin, si com jai dit, [deucies l'avoit par devant moi];^b ne je nentens que de gens, qui soient en tel cas com nos somes, il avenist onques par esgart ne par conoissances de court ne par raison ce que (fo. cclviij^r) vous aves dit qui est plusors fois avenu et fait en ce royaume, ne il navendra ja, se Dieu plaist, car se seroit contre toutes manieres de drois et de raisons et tort manifest et apert. Et pour ces raisons et pour toutes les autres que je ai dites ores et autre fois, je di que vous ne devez avoir le bailliage de ce royaume par devant moy, ains le doi avoir par devant vous come celui qui sui plus droit heir de vous dou fis dou roy nostre dit oncle a avoir cescheete, cil mesavenoit de lui sans heir de cespouse dont Dieu len gart, ne ne veull^c pour chose que vous aies dites ore et autre fois, quil demeure que je naie^d le dit bailliage par devant vous, si le veull^c avoir se les homes de la haute court conoissent que je avoir le doie. Ne pource que vous dites que vous nentendes que l'usage de Franche est tel com jais dit, et que tout fust il tel que vous ne requeres que par l'usage de ce royaume, je ai dit et encor di, que il est chose certaine que l'usage de France est tel com jai dit, et que il fu mis et establi au conquest de la terre en ce royaume; et je nentens que puis que cest usage fu establi, quil

^a MS. de celle.

^b There is clearly a phrase missing here. The reconstruction is based on the wording of the parallel passage, above p. 36.

^c The words pour chose que . . . si le veull omitted by Beugnot.

^d MS. nage.

eust autre establi ^aau conquest de la terre en ce royaume, et je ne croi que il eust autre establi^a par le seignor ne par les homes, quil le cassast ne qui contraire li fust; por qui je veull que cel usage me vaille et doit valoir pour les raisons que jai dites ores et autre fois, se la court conoist que valoir me doie. Si vell avoir le bailliage de ce royaume par devant vous pour toutes les raisons que je ai dite ores et autre fois ou par aucunes delles, se les homes de la haute court de ce royaume conoissent que je avoir le doie, si me met (fo. cclviij^v) je en leur conoissance; et cil conoissent que je le doi avoir, je en euffre a faire ce que je doi com a baill, faisant lon a moi se que lon doit com a bail.’

- [9] Ce est la maniere coment la haute cour dou royaume de Jerusalem connut par lassise dou dit royaume que le bailliage de Jerusalem montoit au baill, por ce queil estoit ainsne dou son cousin, le conte dou Braine, et^b coument li firent les homages.^c

Après cest aleguacion la court dou royaume et messire Joffre de Sargines¹⁹ et le legat²⁰ et les maistres²¹ et les comunes²² et les frairies²³ sacorderent que le baill eust le bailliage dou royaume avant que le conte de Braine, et tous les chevaliers homes liges furent dune part et conurent par lassise dou royame de Jerusalem que le bailliage montoit au dit baill pource quil estoit ainsnes dou conte de Braine. Et lors messire Goffroi de Sargines se despoula et ala premiers et fist homage au baill, et puis tous les homes et bourgeois et fraires. Et ensi ot le roy Hugue le baillage dou royaume de Chipre et puis^d celui de Jerusalem, et tint le bailliage tant que le petit roy trespassa de ce ciecle, et puis se fist coroner dou royaume de Chipre. Mais

^a *The words au conquest . . . eust autre establi omitted by Beugnot.*

^b *MS. et repeated.*

^c *MS. chap. ccc (Beugnot, chap. xi, pp. 414-15).*

^d *This word followed by de struck out.*

¹⁹ Geoffrey of Sergines had accompanied St Louis to the East in 1248. He was regent of Jerusalem from 1259 until 1263, and seneschal of Jerusalem and commander of the French garrison at Acre from 1254. He died 11 April 1269.

²⁰ William, former bishop of Agen (1247-62), papal legate, patriarch of Jerusalem and bishop of Acre (1262/3-70).

²¹ The masters of the Military Orders.

²² The Italian mercantile communes.

²³ The burgess confraternities.

entre ces faites vint damoisele Marie,²⁴ et requist le bailliage dou royaume de Jerusalem, et dist aucunes choses que vous ores ci apres.

[10] Ce est la maniere coment les homes de la haute court de Jerusalem²⁵ resurent au seignor le sus dit baill, et fu corone doudit royaume apres la mort dou roy Hüge, qui estoit mermeaus, qui tenoit son bailliage.^a

Quant Dieu fist son comandement de Hugue, le petit roy qui fu fis dou roy Henri et de royne Plaisance, le roy (fo. cclix^r) Hugue, qui tenoit son bailliage adonc pource que elle estoit mermeaus, ala avant et requist as houmes de la seignorie, et les homes le resurent a seignor et fu coronés. Et apres avint en Acre a requere le royaume de Jerusalem as homes et a la gent Dacre, le legat et les gens de religion et le maistre dou temple²⁶ et de l'ospital²⁷ et des alemans²⁸ et le consle de Pise²⁹ et le baill de Veneise³⁰ et les frairies et tous les homes Dacre que la se troverent, et [le] desus nome roy dist as homes de la haute court de Jerusalem qui la estoient assemblees en la presence des dessus només :

[11] Ce est la maniere coment le sus dit baill asemla la haute court dou royaume de Jerusalem et leur requist le dit royame com droit heir, et coument la dite court conut que il estoit le droit heir, et li offrirent leur homages.^b

'Seignors, vous saves bien si com nos vous le deymes autre fois en la presence dou patriarche, qui adonc estoit, si a le plus de vous autres qui si estes assemblees, que, quant vous nos feistes assavoir le pereillous estat ou le royame estoit, nous en alames a plus tost que nos poemes. Et nostre venue fu pour ij choses: lune pour le grant besoign de ce royaume, et lautre pour entrer raison de ce royaume qui escheu

^a *MS. chap. cccj* (Beugnot, chap. xii, p. 415).

^b *MS. chap. cccij* (Beugnot, chap. xiii, pp. 415-16).

²⁴ Maria of Antioch, daughter of Melissende of Lusignan and Bohemond IV of Antioch, died 1307.

²⁵ *lege* Chipre.

²⁶ Thomas Berard (1256-73).

²⁷ Hugh Revel (1258-77).

²⁸ Anno of Sangerhausen (1257-74).

²⁹ Unknown.

³⁰ Michele Doro.

nous estoit. Et nous deymes adonc que nos aviens aucunes autres choses a dire et requerre, ^aque nous ne voliens lors dire ne requerre,^a jusques atant que le leuc et point fust. Et or nous semble quel soit leuc et tens de dire. Car le seignor de Sur et dou Thouron³¹ sont ores ci, qui nestoient adonc, pour qui nous vous faisons assavoir quil ne nous convient pas ores a retraire, que nous soumes (fo. cclix^v) ne dou soumes venus ne de quel gens estrais, car nos entendons bien que asses est seu et coneu a entre vous. Et si saves coment ce royaume, dou quel nous tenons le bailliage, nous est [es]cheus a heritage par la mort dou monseignor Huguet, mon cousin, que Dieus pardoint, qui merme daage estoit. Et quel royaume, puis que nous venimes, nous soumes entres et avons use et usons com de nostre droit, pourqui vous nous faites le homages et les redevances et les servises si com lon doit a faire a seignor de ce royaume, et nous somes prest de faire vers vous se que nous devons.' Et quant le roy ot ce retrait, les devant dis homes de royaume alerent dune part et au chief dune piessse se retournerent et firent dire par la coumunauté et par lotroi deaus tous par un deaus, cest assavoir par sire Jaque Vidan,³² que selon clere requeste, que le roy lor avoit fait, il estoient tout aparailles de faire li leur homages et leur redevances et servises, si com lon estoit use de faire au seignors dou dit royaume.

[12] Ce est coment damoisele Marie, fille de messire Beamont,³³ fist lire une charte par un clerc en la presence de la haute court de Jerusalem, faissant lor assavoir que elle estoit plus droit heir [a]^b avoir le dit royaume que le baill nestoit, pour ce que elle estoit desendue de lainsne[e]^c seur de la mere de sus dit baill.^{34 d}

'Par devant vous, monseignor Hugue de Leisegniau par la grace de Dieu roy de Chipre, je, damoisele Marie, sui venue par devant

^a *The words que nous ne . . . dire ne requerre omitted by Beugnot.*

^b *Supplied from table of rubrics, fo. 17^r.*

^c *Supplied from table of rubrics, fo. 17^r.*

^d *MS. chap. ccclij (Beugnot, chap. xiv, pp. 416-17).*

³¹ John of Montfort, son of Philip, lord of Tyre (1270-83). He had inherited the lordship of Toron from his mother.

³² James Vidal (fl. 1249-77). For his career, see Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 37.

³³ Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch (1201-33).

³⁴ The final statement in the rubric is erroneous; the genealogical details given in the body of this chapter, however, are correct.

vous, seignors, par les religions et homes liges de la haute court dou royaume de Jerusalem, et vous fais assavoir com de fu chose que la (fo. cclx^r) royne Yzabeau³⁵ fu dame et droit heir dou royaume de Jerusalem; si ot plusors filles: lune des filles fu la royne Marie,³⁶ qui fu filles dou marques,³⁷ et espouse le roy Johan;³⁸ de ceste Marie fu nee Yzabel,³⁹ espouse de lempereor Fedric;⁴⁰ de ceste Yzabel fu nes le roy Conras,⁴¹ pere de Conradin;⁴² lautre de[s] avant dites filles fu la royne Aalis, que la devant dite Yzabeau ot dou conte Henri de Champagne;⁴³ de la devant dite Aalis fu nes ly rois Henri de Chipre, et dou roy Henri de Chipre fu nes Huguet qui morut avant son aage; lautre fille de la royne fu madame Melissent,⁴⁴ princesse Dantioche, fille dou roy Heimeri de Lesignau,⁴⁵ qui fu mamere, si com chascun set. Por la quel chose je vous pri et requier et conjuir, si com vos estes tenus de garder et sauver et maintenir chascun en son drot, par les us ou coustume dou royaume de Jerusalem, com cele qui sui le plus prochain heir dou royaume et le plus aparant et fille de la fille de la royne Yzabel ^aet la plus prochaine de la royne Yzabel,^a mere dou roy Conras, la deraine saisie dou royaume de Jerusalem, a qui vous estes tenus de sauver ces heirs par vous fois, et com celle, que madame mamere survesqui toutes ces seurs, que vous en saisine et en teneure me metes de la seignorie de Jerusalem, et me faites homage et redevance come a dame et a plus aparant heir qui soit ores en ce royaume de Jerusalem. Et je sui aparaille et bien le vous euffre tout se que les seignors et les dames doivent faire a leur homes, selonc se que les autres seignors dou dit royaume ont fait et use de faire.' Quant le clerc ot leu la charte, le desus nome roy demanda a la damoysele ce que le clerc ot leu et dit lavoit dit pour elle, et elle respondi que oil. Tantost le desus nome (fo. cclx^v) roy dist:

^a *The words et la plus . . . la royne Yzabel omitted by Beugnot.*

³⁵ Isabella I, queen of Jerusalem (1190–1205).

³⁶ Maria of Montferrat, queen of Jerusalem (1205–12).

³⁷ Conrad of Montferrat, king-elect of Jerusalem, died 1192.

³⁸ John of Brienne, king of Jerusalem (1210–25), co-ruler of the Latin Empire of Constantinople (1231–7).

³⁹ Isabella II, queen of Jerusalem (1212–28).

⁴⁰ Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, died 1250.

⁴¹ Conrad IV of Hohenstaufen, king of the Romans, died 1254.

⁴² Conradin (Conrad V) of Hohenstaufen, executed 1268.

⁴³ Henry, count of Champagne (1181–97), ruler of Jerusalem (1192–7).

⁴⁴ Melissende of Lusignan, wife of Bohemond IV.

⁴⁵ Aimery of Lusignan, king of Cyprus (1196–1205), king of Jerusalem (1197–1205).

[13] Ce est le respons que le sus dit baill fist contre la request[e]^a de la sus dite damoisele Marie.^b

'Dame, nos vous responderons, pour ce que aucunes choses atouchent a nous de ce que vous aves fait dire, et les homes vous feront tel respons, com il lor semblera que a eaus appartient. Saches, dame, que nous vodriens que vous eussies bien et honor, pource que vous mapartenes de si pres com chascun seit, et se qui seroit de vostre raison, Dieus le seit, que vodriens que vous leussies, et quil vous fust garde par tens. Et pour ce que nous vodriens que chascun seust coment lon vous forsconseille, nos esclersirons devant toute ceste gent aucune chose que vous nous deymes arseres devant le maistre dou temple et le sire de Sur [et] devant plusors autres gens. Tout, soit ce que nos avons, yroient a plaidoyer a vous, ne vous nestes en point que vous le puissies faire par plusors raisons. Et ce nous ne fuissies au pais, et il ne eust nul autre heir, et vous feyssies as homes tel requeste com vous leur faites, si sen passeroient il legierement; toutes voies se que nos dirons sera pour esclersir les gens se que vos nous deymes.'

'Saches,^c dame, que nos volons que chascun sache que, selonc lusage de ce royaume, qui veaut requerre escheete ou heritage, il convient quil le requiert de par celui ou de par celle qui en a eu la deraine saisine, cil est de celui lignage, et asses est seu et debatue qui est ensi, et si autrement seroit grant tort seroit et grant perill en par (fo. cclxj^r) plusors manieres, car nulle saisine ne teneure ne vaudroit riens, et les heirs costiers deseriteroient souvent les drois heirs desendans de la souche, et autres maus a ces se poroient faire; et puis que requerre convient, par raison et par usage, de par ceaus qui ont este derainement saisi. Car si fu mon oncle, le roy Henri, et son fis de tel maniere de teneure et de saisine come heir merme peut estre saisi, et que je ne soie lor plus prochain et lor plus droit heir nul ne le peut contredire ne debatre; et se vos voles requerre de par le roy Conrat, nos vous disons que le roy Conrat est en son aage,⁴⁶ et lon seit bien que le bailliage ne se peut requerre que par soi meymes de par le derain saisi. Et vous entendes a requerre de par le roy Conrat, que on seit bien, que onques ne fu saisi, et que se il fust present il li vendroit requerre de par le derain saisi et non mie de par lui.

^a Supplied from table of rubrics, fo. 17^r.

^b MS. chap. ccclij (Beugnot, chap. xv, pp. 417-18).

^c MS. initial S decorated.

⁴⁶ i.e., Conradin. Maria was in fact claiming from Isabella II.

Et celui meismes li covendroit requerre de par autrui, cest assavoir de par le derain saisi, donc est il bien clere chose que vous, ne autre, ne poies requerre de par lui, et ne pour quant ces choses ne disons nous mie pour fourme de plait, car elles ne nous ont besoign. Et saches, nos volons bien que chascun sache, que, se les homes de ce royaume entendent que vous naves nulle raison, que il la vous sauvent se vous laves, et tenes en sont par droit et selonc lusage de ce royaume, et bien lont fait tout jours des heirs que il entendent que avoient raison, tout sans ce que il fussent present, ne que nul ne requist de par eaus, si com est aparant de Conrat et de ces heirs; et ce il entendissent que vous ou vostre mere ou autre eusies (fo. cclxj^v) droit, il leussent sauve com il firent a eaus.' Et quant le desus nome roy ot ce dit, les homes liges dou royaume alerent ensemble pour faire respons a la desus nommee damoisele des choses que elle avoit dites, et sur ce la dite damoysele sen parti sans oyr respons.

[14] Ce est la maniere coment les homes de la haute court vindrent en presence dou dit roy, et li firent savoir coment il estoient venus faire respons a la sus dite damoysele Marie sur la requeste que elle lor fist, et troverent que elle estoit partie de la, et li manderent par iij homes que ce elle voloit atendre li feroient respons de ce que elle a requis.^a

Adonc les homes liges revindrent devant le roy, et parla par la comunate de tous sire Jaque Vidan, et dist au desus dit roy en tel maniere: 'Sire, les houmes liges de ce royaume qui si sont estoient a unø part pour faire respons a damoysele Marie daucunes paroles que elle avoit dites et fait dire na pas granment en la presence de vous [et] de ces seignors qui si sont; de qui il voloient faire respons de ce que a ceaus montoit, et sur ce il entendirent quelle sen aloit hors de se gens; si^b manderent par iij homes se elle voloit atendre qui li feroient respons a ce que elle avoit requis et dit, et elle ne vost riens atendre, ains sen ala; dont les homes de la seignorie qui si sont vous dient, que pour chose que il aient oye jusques, il ne se beent riens a retraire de ce faire quil vous ont offert a faire, faisant vous a eaus de quil vos ont requis, se vous de vostre volente ne vous en voles arester.'

[15] Ce est le repons que le sus (fo. cclxij^r) dit roy fist as homes de la sus dite court, que nulle chose nestoit dite ou faite que il

^a MS. chap. cccv (Beugnot, chap. xvi, p. 418).

^b MS. si repeated.

deust arester de non faire en vers eaus ce que il doit, et que il feissent vers lui se que eaus faire devoient.^a

Si que le desus nome roy lor respondi et dist que chose nestoit dite ne faite dont il deust arester, et quil estoit prest et aparaille de faire ce que il lor avoit autre fois dit a faire vers eaus se que il devroit, ^bet que il feissent vers lui se que il faire devoient, ^b si com il avoient dit; si que le desus nome Jaque Vidan li paroffri un escrit en qui se contenoit la tenour dou serement que il disoient que les seignors doudit royaume estoient use de faire et devreent faire. Et il tout ensi le jura, com il contenoit en celle escrit, et tantost com il ot se fait les homes liges, qui la estoient dou dit royaume de Jerusalem, li firent homage et tout premierement messire Goffrei et le sire de Sur et le sire dou Thouron et tout le remenant de homes qui la se troverent; et puis apres resut les homages des autres qui li estoient tenus a faire; et apres ressut le serement des frairies et de tous les autres que serement li devoient; et tint le royaume de Jerusalem quites et en^c pais, et fu coronés a Sur, la ou les roys de royaumes se coronent; et fist tant par son sens que temple et ospitau et sire Goffrey de Sargines et toutes manieres des gens lobeysoient et servoient come au seignor. Et tant pourchassa et fist vers le legat et vers tote la gent de religion, qui[1] li firent une lettre ouverte, seelees de leurs seaus, de trestous leur eremens qui sont desus escrits, et coment le royaume li eschut par lusage, et coment il le requist as homes come son droit, et il li firent homage com a droit heir, et que plus (fo. cclxij^v) droit heir ne avoit, ne le conte de Braine ne damoisele Marie, et en tel maniere ot et tint le dit roy les ij royaumes quites et en pais, com de son droit et sa raison, par lassise et lusage dou royaume de Jerusalem et de Chipre.

^a *MS. chap. cccvj* (Beugnot, chap. xvii, pp. 418-19).

^b *The words* et que il . . . il faire devoient *omitted by Beugnot.*

^c *MS. em.*

VI

*The Ibelin counts of Jaffa: a previously unknown passage from the 'Lignages d'Outremer'*¹

As a source for the history of the Latin East in the twelfth century, the genealogies known as the 'Lignages d'Outremer'² are of little value; indeed, it has even been said that they 'ne peuvent en aucun cas servir de preuve avant 1250'.³ Nevertheless, the discovery of a hitherto unknown passage relating to the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth deserves notice, especially as it outlines the genealogy of one of the most important branches of 'la plus grande famille du Proche Orient Latin au temps des croisades . . .'.⁴

The 'Lignages' survive in two recensions. The earlier is included in two fourteenth-century manuscripts containing Latin Syrian and Cypriot legal texts, the Bibliothèque Nationale MS. fr. 19,026 and the Biblioteca Nazionale de S. Marco, MS. fr., appendice, 20.⁵ From the references to individuals who were apparently alive at the time it was made, it seems to belong to the 1270s: for example, Hugh III was king of Jerusalem (1269–84), Julian Grenier was lord of Sidon (1247–75), and Guy II was evidently lord of Gibelet (before 1271–82).⁶ The later recension survives in only one manuscript older than the seventeenth century, the Codex Vaticanus latinus 4789. This is an early fifteenth-century copy of the augmented version of John of Ibelin's treatise on feudal law which was made following the assassination of Peter I of Cyprus in 1369 and the 'Lignages' are included at the end.⁷ Henry II (1285–1324) was king of Cyprus at the time this recension took shape,⁸ but, as there is no reference to

1. I am grateful to Principal L. H. Butler, Dr. J. S. C. Riley-Smith, and Miss A. J. Kettle for reading and criticizing this Note.

2. 'Les Lignages d'Outremer', ed. Comte Beugnot in *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Lois*, ii, 435–74.

3. W. H. Rüdts de Collenberg, 'Les premiers Ibelins', *Le moyen âge*, lxxi (1965), 434.

4. Rüdts de Collenberg, *ubi supra*.

5. See M. Grandclaude, 'Classement sommaire des manuscrits des principaux livres des Assises de Jérusalem', *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, sér. 4, v (1926), 459–62. Beugnot, in his edition, used the former manuscript as his MS. B and a copy of the latter as his MS. A.

6. 'Lignages', pp. 450, 454. For Julian of Sidon, see J. L. La Monte, 'The Lords of Sidon in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries', *Byzantion*, xvii (1944–5), 206–9; for Guy of Gibelet, see E. G. Rey, 'Les seigneurs de Gibelet', *Revue de l'Orient latin*, iii (1895), 404–7.

7. Grandclaude, pp. 462–3; E. Brayer, P. Lemerle and V. Laurent, 'Le Vaticanus latinus 4789: histoire et alliances des Cantacuzènes aux xiv^e–xv^e siècles', *Revue des études byzantines*, ix (1951), 47. See J. Richard, 'La révolution de 1369 dans le royaume de Chypre', *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, cx (1952), 115–17. With minor alterations, Beugnot reprinted the recension as it appeared in la Thaumassière's edition of 1690.

8. 'Lignages', p. 444.

his marriage to Constance of Aragon (1317) or to those of Maria of Lusignan to James II of Aragon (1315) and Isabella of Ibelin to Ferrand of Majorca (1316),¹ it had presumably been composed before the middle of the second decade of the fourteenth century. The last event which can be dated is the marriage of Guy, son of Balian of Ibelin, to Isabella, daughter of Baldwin of Ibelin, for which a papal dispensation was granted in December 1303; the 'Lignages' note a daughter named Alice from this union.² The evidence therefore indicates a date for this recension of c. 1305-15,³ or, in other words, about forty years after the date of the earlier version.

In the seventeenth century the corpus of feudal jurisprudence from the Latin East became the object of antiquarian interest. The Vatican manuscript was copied and then several further copies were made from this initial copy.⁴ Comte Beugnot was content to use inferior versions and the edition made from them by la Thaumassière, and so overlooked several important passages which were omitted by the first copyist. Among these passages is a section from the chapter in the 'Lignages d'Outremer' which deals with the Ibelin family; it describes the descendants of Philip of Ibelin, the *bailli* of Cyprus (1218-27/28) and brother of John the 'Old Lord' of Beirut, who, from the time of Philip's son, John, held the title of count of Jaffa and Ascalon.⁵

The earlier recension of the 'Lignages' only traced the family to John's son, *cestui Guiotin*.⁶ The later recension can now be seen to have contained the genealogy to the next generation, providing a more detailed picture of the family as a whole. It settles conclusively the line of inheritance of the titular county after John of Jaffa's death, furnishing evidence for the next four holders of this title. It also gives fresh information about the family's marriages into the Armenian nobility, and for the attitude of the Cypriot nobility to Latin monastic foundations.

John of Ibelin was count of Jaffa from before June 1247⁷ until his death in December 1266.⁸ He was a remarkable man, a jurist, politician and soldier, and a prime example of a noble with fiefs in

1. G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1940-52), ii, 282-3.

2. 'Lignages', p. 449; *Le Registre de Benoît XI*, ed. C. Grandjean (Paris, 1905), no. 161.

3. Leo III (1301-7) is the last named king of Armenia ('Lignages', p. 445). I am reluctant to draw conclusions from materials concerning families outside Cyprus, but this indication would seem to point to a date nearer 1305 than 1315.

4. Grandclaudé, pp. 450-3, 471-5.

5. Codex Vaticanus latinus 4789, fo. cclxxxii^v col. 2 - fo. cclxxxiii^r col. 1; printed *infra*, pp. 609-10; for the rest of the chapter, see 'Lignages', pp. 448-9

6. 'Lignages', p. 452.

7. L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre* (Paris, 1852-61), iii, 647.

8. 'L'Estoire d'Eracles empereur et la conquête de la Terre d'Outremer', in *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Historiens occidentaux*, ii, 455; 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', in *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Documents arméniens*, ii, 766; Marino Sanuto, 'Liber secretorum fidelium crucis', ed. J. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos* (Hanover, 1611), ii, 222.

both Jerusalem and Cyprus. His Cypriot estates are known to have included the important villages of Peristerona of Morphou and Episkopi.¹ Probably after the fall of Jaffa in 1268² and certainly after the fall of Acre and the other Syrian ports remaining in Christian hands until 1291, his descendants would have come to rely on their island fiefs.

On the basis of the earlier recension of the 'Lignages' it has generally been assumed that John was succeeded by his son Guy.³ It is now clear that Guy had an elder brother, James, and, though the new passage from the 'Lignages' does not say so, there is evidence that James was count of Jaffa before him. One manuscript of the 'Annales de Terre Sainte' records the death of '... le conte de Jaffe, Jaques d'Ybelin...' in 1276,⁴ and the contemporary Arab historian, Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir, states that John of Ibelin was succeeded by his son *Jāk* (*i.e.* Jacques).⁵ James was almost certainly the author of the treatise on feudal law, and the knight who in 1271 represented the Cypriot feudatories in their dispute with King Hugh III over their obligations to perform military services on the Syrian mainland.⁶ Apart from his legal activities, not much is known about him; he witnessed charters of John II of Beirut in 1256 and of Hugh III

1. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii, 648-9. Of the several villages in Cyprus called Peristerona, that 'of the count of Jaffa' was stated by Leontios Makhairas to have been the centre of the cult of St. Barnabas and St. Hilarion. *Recital concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed. and trans. by R. M. Dawkins (Oxford, 1932), para. 32. The identification of this place with Peristerona of Morphou is suggested by the fact that the splendid Byzantine church there is dedicated to these saints. See A. and J. Stylianou, *Peristerona (Morphou)* (Nicosia, 1964), pp. 3-4.

2. S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades* (Cambridge, 1951-4), iii, 324.

3. C. du Fresne Du Cange, *Les familles d'Outremer*, ed. E. G. Rey (Paris, 1869), pp. 351-2; L. de Mas Latrie, 'Les comtes de Jaffa et d'Ascalon du xii^e aux xix^e siècle', *Revue des questions historiques*, xxvi (1879), 196-7; Runciman, iii, 324; Ibn al-Furāt, *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders: Selections from the Tārīkh al-Duwal wa'l-Mulūk*, ed. and trans. by U. and M. C. Lyons, with historical introduction and notes by J. S. C. Riley-Smith (Cambridge, 1971), ii, 220, n. 10.

4. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', ed. R. Röhrich and G. Raynaud, *Archives de l'Orient latin*, ii (1884), *Documents*, p. 456.

5. The extant manuscripts of Ibn al-Furāt (writing in the early fifteenth century) as well as those of al-Nūwayrī (writing in the fourteenth century) read *Hāl* which Ibn al-Furāt's editors have emended to *Jāy* (*i.e.* Guy) even though an emendation to *Jāk* would have been simpler. Both authors depend directly or indirectly for their account on Ibn 'Abd al-Zāhir whose version of this incident has not been published; see Ibn al-Furāt, i, 135 and note. I thank Mr. R. G. Irwin for drawing this to my attention.

6. James of Ibelin, 'Livre', ed. Comte Beugnot in *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Lois*, i, 451-68; 'Document relatif au service militaire', ed. Comte Beugnot, *ibid.* ii, 430-4. Beugnot (James of Ibelin, p. 453 n. a) thought that James was the son of Balian of Ibelin, prince of Galilee, the only member of the Ibelin family hitherto known from the 'Lignages' with that name. Rey (Du Cange, *Les familles d'Outremer*, p. 369) saw that as James son of Balian was a minor in 1310s, the lawyer was someone else. The new passage from the 'Lignages' provides the essential clue to his identity, and confirms the supposition made by W. H. Rüdts de Collenberg (*The Rupenides, Hetbunides and Lusignans: the Structure of the Armeno-Cilician Dynasties* (Paris, 1963), table IIIa(H3)) and more recently by J. S. C. Riley-Smith (*The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem 1174-1277* (London, 1973), pp. 127, 284).

in 1269.¹ Neither in the 1269 charter, nor in the account of his pleading in 1271 is he described as count of Jaffa, but perhaps this can be explained by the recent loss of the county to the Mamlukes.

It is possible that Guy of Ibelin was still young at the time of his brother's death, since in the recension of the 'Lignages' dating to the 1270s his name is given in the diminutive form, and his recorded activities do not begin until 1299. From that date he was prominent in the moves by the Cypriots to join the Mongols in an attempt to defeat the Mamlukes.² He was clearly held in high esteem, for the chronicler wrote that his death in February 1304 was

di gran danno a l'isola de Cypro, imperochè molti scandali, travagli et inconvenienti acorseno, che se fosse stato lui vivo non sariano stati come ho ditto.³

Guy was succeeded by his son Philip⁴ who appears not to have reached his majority until about 1309.⁵ In 1310 he emerged as a supporter of Amaury of Tyre, and after his murder was a member of the party which joined Aimery of Lusignan and Balian, prince of Galilee, at Kormakiti⁶; because of this he was imprisoned in Kyrenia castle where he died in 1316.⁷ The family remained out of favour for the rest of Henry II's reign; Guy's widow Maria of Ibelin, a sister of Balian of Galilee, was imprisoned in 1318 with her two sisters, but was released by Hugh IV on his accession.⁸

The last titular count of Jaffa who appears in the 'Lignages' is Hugh, Philip's brother. He evidently restored his family to favour, marrying Isabella, the widow of Ferrand of Majorca and daughter of Philip of Ibelin, Henry II's principal counsellor.⁹ He rose to prominence, becoming seneschal of Jerusalem by 1338,¹⁰ and his extravagant spending on the chase was remarked on by Ludolf of Sudheim, a German pilgrim who was in Cyprus in the late 1330s.¹¹ In the early years of the following decade he sided with his step-son,

1. *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani (MXCVII-MCCXCI)*, compiled by R. Röhrich (Innsbruck, 1893, 1904), nos. 1250, 1368.

2. 'Gestes', pp. 848, 850; Marino Sanuto, pp. 241-2; 'Chronique d'Amadi', ed. R. de Mas Latrie in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi* (Paris, 1891, 1893), I, 237, see also p. 238. In addition, see John of St. Victor, 'Memoriale historiarum', in *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, xxi, 640.

3. 'Chronique d'Amadi', p. 240.

4. For confirmation that Philip was Guy's son, see *Regestum Clementis papae V*, ed. cura et studio monachorum ordinis s. Benedicti (Rome, 1885-92), no. 2143.

5. Philip was knighted early in 1309; how long this would have been after his majority at the age of fifteen is not known. 'Chronique d'Amadi', p. 385.

6. 'Chronique d'Amadi', pp. 320, 348, 362, 365, 371, 384-5; for these events, see Hill, II, 245-64 *passim*.

7. 'Chronique d'Amadi', p. 398. The John of Ibelin who died at about the same time as a brother of Philip of Ibelin 'the Younger' and not a brother of the count as stated here.

8. 'Chronique d'Amadi', pp. 399-400, 401-2.

9. Papal dispensation dated March 1320 in John XXII, *Lettres communes*, ed. G. Mollat (Paris, 1904-47), no. 11145.

10. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 178.

11. *Ibid.*, II, 215.

Ferrand of Majorca the younger, against King Hugh IV. According to Ferrand, the king seized Hugh of Jaffa's beasts of burden, his falcons, leopards and dogs, and all his other goods and sold them, reducing him to poverty.¹ Hugh is not heard of again.²

It has long been known that John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa, married Maria, sister of King Hethum I of Armenia and was thereby brother-in-law of Henry I of Cyprus's second wife, Stephanie.³ But until now the fact that two of John's daughters also married into Armenian families has passed unnoticed.⁴ Their husbands were both holders of lordships in the Amanus mountains, Sarvantikar (la Roche)⁵ and Hamous, and with Isabella of Ibelin's marriage to the lord of Sarvantikar, the link with the Armenian royal family was renewed.⁶ In the thirteenth century, intermarriage between Armenian and Jerusalemite noble houses was not common, and three unions in two generations are exceptional.⁷

The history of Latin monasticism in Cyprus during the Lusignan period has yet to be fully investigated.⁸ That female members of the family should have entered religion need not surprise us, but the fact that one was an abbess and the other had a convent founded specifically for her sheds new light on the extent to which church patronage was exercised by the nobility. St. Theodore, a house previously not known by name before the mid-fifteenth century,⁹ has been identified with the Cistercian nunnery founded by Alice of Montbéliard, Philip of Ibelin's widow, in 1244.¹⁰ The statement in the 'Lignages' that it was founded for her daughter's benefit adds

1. *Ibid.* ii, 201-2, and see pp. 182-203 *passim*.

2. For other references to Hugh, see John XXII, *Lettres communes*, no. 54162; *I libri commemoriali della Repubblica di Venezia regesti*, ed. R. Predelli and P. Bosmin (Venice, 1876-1914), ii, 69, no. 393.

3. Du Cange, *Les familles d'Outremer*, p. 351.

4. See Rüd't de Collenberg, *Rupenides*, table IIIa(H3); this family tree of the Ibelin counts of Jaffa needs considerable revision in the light of the new passage from the 'Lignages'.

5. *Ibid.* p. 48.

6. See *ibid.* table II(H1). Isabella's husband was probably a son of Djoffry, Lord of Sarvantikar (70), first cousin of King Hethum I (1226-69). Of Djoffry's three sons, the most likely candidate is Sempad, for in Oct. 1298 the pope issued a dispensation, legitimizing the marriage and grown-up sons of 'Sembat de Botha' and Isabella, daughter 'quondam nobilis viri G. comitis Joppensis' of the diocese of Mamistra. *Les Registres de Boniface VIII*, ed. G. Digard *et al.* (Paris, 1907-39), no. 2660. In 1298 Guy of Jaffa was still alive and it is unlikely, though not impossible that he would have had mature grandsons when his own eldest son was still young; probably 'G.' is a mistake for 'J[ohn]' and Sempad of 'Botha' the unnamed 'sire de la Roche'. Sempad and Isabella had a common great-grandfather in Vacaghk, Lord of Barba'ron (Rüd't de Collenberg, *Rupenides*, table II(H1), 44) and so would have needed a dispensation.

7. For other examples of intermarriage between Armenian and non-princely crusading families, see Rüd't de Collenberg, *Rupenides*, tables IIIa(H3), VIII(BK)(ME), X(G).

8. The account by J. Hackett (*A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus* (London, 1901), pp. 589-650) is unsatisfactory.

9. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii, 293-4.

10. *Ibid.* 644-5. See Hackett, pp. 592, 605; J. Richard, 'L'abbaye cistercienne de Jubin et le prieuré Saint-Blaise de Nicossie', *Epeteris tou Kentrou Epistemonikon Erevnon*, iii (1969-70), 71.

credence to this suggestion. The convent of Our Lady of Tyre at Nicossia was the exiled Benedictine house of St. Mary the Great, founded in Jerusalem in the twelfth century.¹ It was patronized by leading Cypriot families² and there was doubtless considerable prestige attached to the post of abbess. Margaret of Ibelin occupied that position in the early fourteenth century and played a minor, but not insignificant, role in the political events of 1309 and 1310.³

The new passage from the 'Lignages' is useful in that it provides information on various questions concerning the nobility of Cyprus and Jerusalem, most notably on the problem of the identity of James of Ibelin, but as it only takes the family history as far as the early years of the fourteenth century, the obscurity which surrounds the demise of the Ibelin counts of Jaffa is in no way dispelled. Balian, the third son of Guy, count of Jaffa, was twice married⁴ and died before 1363.⁵ A John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa, presumably a son of Hugh of Jaffa or Balian and grandson of Guy, participated in Peter I's campaigns of the 1360s, but is not known after 1367.⁶ By 1375 Renier Le Petit was count of Jaffa.⁷ Whether he had inherited this title through an heiress, or received it by royal grant following the extinction of the Jaffa branch of the Ibelin family remains uncertain.

'Les Lignages d'Outremer'. Passage relating to the descendants of Philip of Ibelin, *bailli* of Cyprus. (Vatican Library. Codex Vaticanus latinus 4789, fo. cclxxxii^v col. 2-fo. cclxxxiii^r col. 1. Manuscript copied in the early fifteenth century.)

Phelippe, l'autre fis de Balian de Ybelin et la royne Marie fu baill de Chipre de par la royne Aalis, et espousa Aalis de Monbeliart qui fu feme de conte Bertot d'Alemaigne, & orent .j. fis et une fille: Johan et Marie qui fu nonain et fu pour lui estoree l'abeie de Saint Theodre a Nicossie. Johan fu conte de Iaphe, et espousa Marie la fille Constans, le baill de Ermenie et seur dou roy Heiton, et orent .iiij. fis et .iiij. filles: Jaques,

1. 'Chronique d'Amadi', pp. 271, 276-7. See Hackett, pp. 608-10.

2. Margaret of Lusignan, sister of King Hugh III, entered it just before her death. Other nuns included Euphemia of Armenia, the widow of Julian of Sidon, and Beatrice of Piquigny ('Chronique d'Amadi', pp. 271, 276, 349).

3. 'Chronique d'Amadi', pp. 296, 349-51, 387.

4. Dispensation dated Aug. 1329 for him to marry Margaret of For (John XXII, *Lettres communes*, no. 46004), and Nov. 1352 for him to marry Margaret of Ibelin, dowager lady of Arsur (Clement VI, *Lettres se rapportant à la France*, ed. E. Déprez et al. (Paris, 1901-61), no. 5452). The last dispensation was repeated in Oct. 1353 (Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes et curiales*, ed. P. Gasnault and M.-H. Laurent (Paris, 1959), no. 575). Possibly he is the Balian of Ibelin for whom a dispensation was issued in July 1322 to marry Joanna of Montfort (John XXII, *Lettres communes*, no. 15870).

5. See Urban V, *Lettres communes*, ed. M.-H. Laurent (Paris, 1954), no. 645.

6. Leontios Makhairas, paras. 163, 190, 200.

7. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 373, n. 3.

Johan¹ et Gui, Marguerite, Ysabeau et Marie. Marguerite fu nonain et abaiesce de Nostre Dame de Sur a Nicossie. Ysabeau espousa le sire de la Roche en Ermenie et [fo. cclxxxiii^r] orent .ij. fis: Joffre et Costans. Marie espousa Baron Vahram, le sire dou Hamous, et orent .ij. filles: Ysabeau et Marie. Ysabeau espousa Livon des Mons. Marie fu feme de Phelippe de Ybelin come vous aves oy.² Jaques et Johan morurent. Gui fu conte de Iaphe, et espousa Marie, la fille de Phelippe de Ybelin conestable de Chipre, come vous aves oy,³ et orent .iiij. fis et une fille: Phelippe, Hue, Balian & Marie.⁴

1. John, son of John Count of Jaffa, is not otherwise known.

2. See 'Lignages', p. 449. Rüd̄t de Collenberg (*Rupenides*, table XI(1)) ignores the statement of the 'Lignages', and gives as Philip's first wife Zabel, daughter of Oshin IV of Lampron.

3. See 'Lignages', p. 449. Our manuscript (fo. cclxxxix^v col. 2 - fo. cclxxxii^r col. 1) makes it clear that Philip and not Balian of Ibelin was the father of Maria.

4. See *Regestum Clementis papae V*, no. 2143.

VII

John of Ibelin's title to the county of Jaffa and Ascalon

IN March 1253 Pope Innocent IV issued a bull confirming the grant made by King Henry I of Cyprus of the county of Jaffa and Ascalon to John of Ibelin. As Innocent made clear in the bull, it was unusual for a pope to confirm the grant of a lay fief, and this particular confirmation appears to be the only one of its kind destined for the Latin East.¹ The grant itself had evidently been made before June 1247, when for the first time in a surviving document John styled himself 'count of Jaffa and lord of Ramla'.² Jonathan Riley-Smith has put forward a cogent suggestion concerning the circumstances in which the grant may have been made. In 1246 Henry had become regent of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem on behalf of the absentee king, Conrad IV of Hohenstaufen. He had obtained this office, not as Conrad's nominee, but by claiming it in the East as Conrad's nearest relative there. The grant to John was apparently one of a series made by Henry to prominent barons to secure their support for his acquisition of the regency; there is some evidence that another of Conrad's relatives in the East had disputed his right to it, and the barons themselves may have been reluctant to recognize him as regent.³ That Henry should look to John for support and should make this grant, the effect of which was to build him up into one of the most powerful men in the East, is readily explicable: John's kinsmen were already extremely influential both in the kingdom of Jerusalem and in Cyprus; his uncle and namesake, 'the Old Lord of Beirut', had led the opposition in the East to the Emperor Frederick II in the late 1220s and 1230s; John himself, the son of the man who had been regent of Cyprus for most of Henry's minority, already had interests in both kingdoms and was a prominent member of the Cypriot High Court;⁴ an accomplished lawyer, his chief claim to fame in the eyes of posterity is as the author of the most comprehensive of the legal treatises to survive from Latin Syria; moreover John, whose family was already linked by marriage to the royal house of Cyprus, was married to Henry's wife's sister.

1. L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852-61), iii. 649-50; Pope Innocent IV, *Registre*, ed. E. Berger (Paris, 1881-1921), no. 6465.

2. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii. 647-8; *R[egesta] R[egni] H[ierosolymitani] (MXCVII-MCCXCI)*, compiled by R. Röhrich (Innsbruck, 1893, 1904), no. 1149.

3. J. S. C. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (London, 1973), 214-15; cf. pp. 125, 212.

4. RRH, nos. 1037, 1049, 1054, 1055, 1071, 1078; J. L. La Monte, 'A register of the cartulary of the cathedral of Santa Sophia of Nicosia', *Byzantion*, v (1930), nos. 38, 39, 42, 45. In many of these documents he is designated 'John of Ibelin Junior'.

Recently the subject of John's political activities in the middle years of the thirteenth century has been re-examined and elaborated at length by Hans Eberhard Mayer. Mayer, following Riley-Smith, states that Henry gave John the county of Jaffa and Ascalon in his capacity as regent and goes on from there to argue that the grant was of questionable legality. The previous count of Jaffa, Walter of Brienne, had been captured in 1244 at the battle of Gaza and died a prisoner in Egypt at an unknown date – a document of July 1247 indicates that at that time certain knowledge of his death had not reached France. On the basis of this evidence Mayer believes that the grant to John was made 'somewhat hastily', and that even assuming Walter were dead by the time it was made his heirs would have had a claim.¹ There is another problem. In law, grants made by regents who were near relatives were only valid for the duration of their regency, a point which was clearly admitted during Henry's period of office as contemporary sources attest. Indeed, when in 1269 or 1270 Philip of Montfort was confronted by a king of Jerusalem resident in the East, he conceded that his title to Tyre, given him by Henry in 1246, was inadequate, and he was obliged to accept what was in effect a new grant of the lordship on a fresh basis.² And so, besides envisaging a challenge from Walter of Brienne's heir, Mayer also imagines the possibility of the new regent who took office in 1253 following Henry's death in January of that year revoking his predecessor's grant. The new regent was John of Jaffa's cousin, another John of Ibelin, the lord of Arsur. Mayer is of the opinion that the cousins were already political opponents: the possibility that John of Arsur might deprive John of Jaffa of his county would have heightened the tension between them. So, claims Mayer, on Henry's death in January 1253, John of Jaffa sent an envoy, who, braving the perils of the Mediterranean in the depths of winter, obtained from the pope the bull, issued on 26 March, which confirmed him in his possession of the county of Jaffa and Ascalon.³

A few years later, in 1256–8, John of Jaffa and John of Arsur found themselves supporting opposing sides in the war fought in the East by the Venetians and Genoese known as the War of St Sabas; their partisanship was important in helping shape the attitude and response of the Latins in Syria to its outcome. The Ibelin family was easily the most powerful in the East, and in the 1250s the count of Jaffa and the

1. H. E. Mayer, 'Ibelin *versus* Ibelin: the struggle for the regency of Jerusalem, 1253–1258', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, cxx (1978), 30–31, 41. For the document of 1247, see 'Catalogue d'actes des comtes de Brienne, 950–1356', compiled by H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, xxxiii (1872), no. 174. It should be noted however that as early as February 1245 Frederick II believed Walter to be dead. Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, ed. H. R. Luard (Rolls Series, 57) (London, 1872–83), iv. 301.

2. Riley-Smith, *Nobility*, pp. 188, 190, 215, 224–5.

3. Mayer, 'Ibelin *versus* Ibelin', pp. 31, 38, 41.

lord of Arsur were its two most influential members. The theme of Mayer's article is that there had been a rift between John of Arsur and the other members of the family ever since the late 1220s, and so when this rift acquired an international significance in the late 1250s it was no new thing.

In investigating the question of John of Jaffa's legal rights, we are confronted by a series of problems. From 1247 he used the style 'count of Jaffa and lord of Ramla' in formal documents, and it was this form of address that was used by Pope Innocent in the confirmation of 1253. But Innocent clearly stated that John had been given the county of Jaffa *and Ascalon*. It is only later in the 1250s that we find John using the full form: 'count of Jaffa and Ascalon and lord of Ramla.' But by what right was John lord of Ramla? Certainly he had no inherited right to it. And was John's title to Jaffa really as vulnerable as Mayer seems to think? Why this apparent reluctance to include Ascalon in his full form of address? What exactly did John think he was doing when he persuaded the pope to confirm the gift of Jaffa and Ascalon, and why should the pope have complied with his request?

The twenty or so years before John emerges as count of Jaffa witnessed two major developments in the Latin East: the rejection of royal control and the recovery of substantial areas of territory which had been lost following the battle of Hattin in 1187. In 1225 the heiress to the throne of Jerusalem, Queen Isabella II, had married the Western Emperor, Frederick II of Hohenstaufen. In 1228 she died leaving an infant son, Conrad. Frederick, who claimed the right to be regent for his son, only visited the East once, during his crusade of 1228-9. Conrad, who came of age in 1243 and who died in 1254, never came to the East. Preoccupied by their affairs in Europe, the Hohenstaufen attempted to rule in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem through lieutenants to whom they delegated vice-regal powers. The story of Frederick's crusade and the opposition it provoked in the East has often been told. Civil war in the early 1230s in which Frederick's opponents, led by the Ibelins, were victorious in Cyprus and gained effective control of Acre and much of the rest of the kingdom of Jerusalem (though not Tyre and Jerusalem itself) gave way in the mid-1230s to a lengthy period of stalemate. Ranged against Frederick were the Ibelins and most of the other important Jerusalemite nobles, the royal house of Cyprus, the Templars and the Genoese; on the other hand, Frederick could count on the support of the prince of Antioch, the Teutonic Knights, the Hospitallers, the Pisans and some members of the nobility. The Ibelins and their supporters in Acre confronted the pro-Hohenstaufen forces in Tyre. In 1243, using as their pretext the fact that Conrad was now of age and so the officers appointed by Frederick had ceased to have any legal authority, the Ibelins ousted their opponents from Tyre by force, and,

ignoring the rulers appointed by Frederick or Conrad, declared Conrad's closest relative in the East, Alice of Champagne, to be regent. When Alice died in 1246, her son, King Henry I of Cyprus, replaced her.¹ In effect the Latins in the East had rejected the rule of their hereditary dynasty, and they then adopted a series of expedients in an attempt to give their opposition the semblance of legality. But even after the capture of Tyre and despite the fact that in 1245 the pope had excommunicated Frederick and deposed him as emperor, there were still those in the East who continued to favour the Hohenstaufen.

It may seem paradoxical that in spite of these divisions among the Christians in the East, the Muslims were prepared to return by treaty substantial tracts of territory. These concessions were prompted by rivalries within the Muslim world and fears that crusading expeditions, even if they did not inflict major defeats, could upset the balance of power there. In 1229 Frederick had negotiated the return of Jerusalem, a 'corridor' linking it to the coast, part of Galilee and the hinterland of the lordship of Sidon. In 1241 Richard, earl of Cornwall, had secured further territorial concessions in the north of the kingdom, the rest of Galilee, Ascalon and an appreciable area of land between Ascalon and Jerusalem. For a few years after 1241 the Latin Kingdom was larger in size than at any time since 1187. The recovery of territory led inevitably to the question of who was to have it. The Latin Syrian feudatories were deeply committed to the principle that land recovered from Muslim occupation should pass either to its former owner or to the closest heir of the former owner. The customs followed for determining who was the closest heir were based on the closeness of blood-relationship to the last in seisin and not on the principle of successoral representation applied in England and some other places in the West. In his legal treatise, John of Jaffa gave examples of how the succession to fiefs newly restored to Christian control might work out in practice: Ibelin, the town and lordship from which his own family took their name, was among the places recovered in 1241; the last Christian lord to have had seisin was Balian of Ibelin in 1187, and in 1241 the lordship passed to his one surviving daughter, Margaret, the dowager lady of Caesarea, in preference to Balian's namesake and grandson, the son of his own elder son. Rights of succession could be disputed: thus Tiberias, also recovered in 1241, was claimed by two cousins, the granddaughters of the last person to have been seised; the elder cousin was the daughter of a younger son, but despite the fact that she was in a more junior line, it was she who obtained the lordship.²

1. Riley-Smith, *Nobility*, pp. 159-84, 198-212 *passim*.

2. For Ibelin, see John of Ibelin, 'Livre', *R[ecueil des] H[istoriens des] C[roisades]*, *Lois*, i. 107-9; Riley-Smith, *Nobility*, pp. 15-16. For Tiberias, see P. W. Edbury, 'The Disputed Regency of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1264/6 and 1268', *Camden*

With these considerations in mind, we turn to examine John of Jaffa's titles. His rights to the lordship of Ramla well illustrate some of the difficulties facing anyone who attempts to disentangle the question of feudal descent in the first half of the thirteenth century. When in June 1247 John is found styling himself 'lord of Ramla', he was the first Christian lord to do so since before 1187. This in itself is rather puzzling since notionally at least the town of Ramla had been in Christian possession for much of the intervening period. By the truce agreed in 1192, revenues from Ramla were to be shared in a condominium with the Muslims, and by the truce of 1204 the Christians were to have the revenues of Ramla in their entirety. Quite likely the cession by the Muslims was purely nominal – a traveller in the 1210s spoke of the town being in ruins – and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is possible that there was no effective attempt by the Christians to reassert control until 1229 when, by the treaty of that year, Ramla was one of the places in the 'corridor' linking Jerusalem to the coast. It was probably not until the treaty of 1241 made by Richard of Cornwall that the Christians could re-occupy the whole lordship.¹

Not only is it unclear when a descendant of the last Christian lord before 1187 would have been able to take seisin, it is also open to debate who had had seisin at the time that Ramla was lost. Until 1186 the lord of Ramla had been Baldwin of Ibelin, one of the most intransigent opponents of Guy of Lusignan. On Guy's accession to the throne in that year, he refused to perform homage and, despite Guy's threat to confiscate his lands, commended his lordship to him to hold until his son Thomas should come of age. Thomas in the meantime was given into the care of Baldwin's brother, Balian. So who had seisin in 1187: Baldwin or his son, or the king or Balian, to whom, according to an inferior version of the story, Baldwin had also entrusted his lands?² Mayer opts for Balian, but this can hardly be correct since even if, in the face of the more authoritative version of the incident, Balian had the lordship as well as the heir, he would have been no more than its guardian with no permanent rights of his own.³ If Guy had confiscated Ramla in 1186 or 1187, then it would have

Miscellany, xxvii (1979) (= Camden Fourth Series, xxii), 13, 28, 33. John of Ibelin also describes the disputed succession to Daron, but the historical context of this dispute is obscure.

1. J. Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem* (2nd edn., Paris, 1975), ii. 99, 123, 200, 259, 287. See Wilbrand of Oldenburg, 'Peregrinatio', ed. J. C. M. Laurent, *Peregrinatores medii aevi quatuor* (Leipzig, 1864), 184.

2. 'L'estoire de Eracles empereur et la conquete de la Terre d'Outremer', *RHC Historiens occidentaux*, ii. 32–34; see variant at p. 33.

3. Mayer, 'Ibelin *versus* Ibelin', p. 30. Mayer draws attention to a weakness in his own interpretation; had Balian been seised, the lordship would have passed not to John of Jaffa but to the senior branch of his descendants, the sons of the 'Old Lord' of Beirut.

been a crown possession in which case John of Jaffa would have received it as a gift from a subsequent king or regent – the most obvious candidates being Henry of Cyprus or his mother, Alice of Champagne. But there is no positive evidence for Guy seizing Ramla into his own hands, and in all probability the rights to the lordship were regarded as remaining in the hands of Baldwin's descendants. Baldwin's son Thomas disappears from the sources after 1187 and evidently died without children of his own.¹ Rights of inheritance would thus have passed to Baldwin's daughters, the elder of whom married Aimery of Lusignan. She bore him several children, but only one son, Hugh later Hugh I of Cyprus (died 1218), and two daughters survived to maturity. As we do not know when the daughters died or when Ramla returned to effective Christian control, we cannot know whether they would have had any claim upon the lordship, but the likelihood is that by the early 1240s the rightful heir to Ramla was Hugh's son, King Henry I. Admittedly there is much here that is speculative; however, if these hypotheses are correct, then Ramla would have been given to John of Jaffa by Henry, not in his capacity as regent as suggested above, but as heritor, alienating the patrimony he derived ultimately from his great-grandfather, Baldwin of Ibelin.²

The double county of Jaffa and Ascalon had come into being in the twelfth century following the capture of Ascalon in 1153. It was created as an apanage for Amaury, the younger brother of the then king, Baldwin III, and he held it until in 1163 he succeeded to the throne. The county was again detached from the royal domain in 1176 when it was given as an apanage to King Baldwin IV's sister, Sibylla, to be held by her and her successive husbands, William of Montferrat (1176–7) and Guy of Lusignan (from 1180). When Guy and Sibylla mounted the throne in 1186, the county would have been absorbed into the royal domain once more.³ But within little more than a year the entire region had been overrun by the Muslims, along with almost the whole kingdom. Then in 1191, during the Third Crusade, the county of Jaffa and Ascalon was promised to Guy of Lusignan's brother Geoffrey.⁴ Jaffa was re-occupied later that year and Geoffrey seems duly to have had seisin, styling himself 'count of Jaffa' in a group of privileges issued late in 1191 and in 1192.⁵ But he chose not to remain in the East and returned to his ancestral lands in France,

1. 'Eracles', pp. 84–85 var. d; 'Les Lignages d'Outremer', *RHC Lois*, ii. 448.

2. For useful genealogical tables, see W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans. The Structure of the Armeno-Cilician Dynasties* (Paris, 1963), tables VII(C), XI(I).

3. L. de Mas Latrie, 'Les comtes de Jaffa et d'Ascalon du XII^e au XIX^e siècle', *Revue des questions historiques*, xxvi (1879), 188–90; H. E. Mayer, 'Studies in the History of Queen Melisende of Jerusalem', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, xxvi (1972), 175–6, 182.

4. Ambroise, *L'Estoire de la guerre sainte*, ed. G. Paris (Paris, 1897), 135; 'Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi', ed. W. Stubbs, *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I* (Rolls Series, 38) (London, 1864), i. 235.

5. *RRH* nos. 698, 701, 702.

probably leaving with the other participants in the crusade in October 1192.¹ Ascalon remained in Muslim hands until the treaty of 1241.

On Geoffrey's departure, Jaffa was taken over by his brother Aimery, the constable of Jerusalem. By this time his other brother, King Guy, was ruling in Cyprus, bitterly resentful of the new ruler in Acre, Henry of Champagne. There are two versions of what happened next. According to the one which is probably the more authoritative,² Henry and Aimery quarrelled over an attempt by the Pisans to seize Tyre on Guy's behalf; Henry arrested Aimery but released him following protests from the Military Orders and the other barons; the upshot was that Aimery relinquished his office of constable and retired to Cyprus where shortly afterwards, following the death of Guy who had given him the county of Jaffa, he was chosen to rule; Henry subsequently gave the office of constable to John of Ibelin, the future lord of Beirut. Several other events are then recorded, and the account goes on to tell how Henry went to Cyprus where Aimery was now king and the two were reconciled; it was agreed that Aimery's three sons would marry Henry's three daughters, their dower to be provided by Aimery in an arrangement whereby one would have the county of Jaffa as her heritable marriage portion. The truce with the Muslims then ended; Aimery sent one of his knights with a small force to take seisin of Jaffa in his name; no sooner had they taken up positions than the Muslims attacked and captured the city. The other version states that on learning of the death of King Guy, Henry sent for Aimery who was then at Jaffa, a possession he held as a gift from Guy and Sibylla, and on his arrival arrested him; in the end Aimery surrendered the office of constable and all his fiefs including Jaffa; peace was then made on the basis that Henry's daughters should marry Aimery's sons, but there is no mention of Jaffa as part of the settlement; Aimery then went to Cyprus where he assumed the reins of government. Various other incidents are described and then we are told that when the Muslims began the siege of Jaffa, Henry sent to Cyprus for aid and Aimery insisted on being reinstated in Jaffa as the price of assistance; Aimery's Cypriot commander took over, but the Muslims sacked the city.³

The chronology is vague, although we know that Guy of Lusignan died apparently in the latter part of 1194 and that Jaffa fell to the

1. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii. 22; S. Painter, 'The Lords of Lusignan in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries', *Speculum*, xxxii (1957), 42.

2. 'Eracles', pp. 202-3, 212-13, 214, 219-20 var. d. At p. 203 col. 1 a sentence has dropped out of the printed text which in the manuscript (MS Lyon, Bib. municipale 828 at fo. 334^v) reads: 'Le rei Guy son frere li dona maintenant (deja *erased*) le conte de Japhe. Le rei Gui (fo. 335) ne vesqui gaires. . . .' For the superiority of this version and the shortcomings of the printed text, see M. R. Morgan, *The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre* (Oxford, 1973), 19, 192-3 *et passim*.

3. 'Eracles', pp. 208-9, 218-19, 221. There is a third, self-evidently garbled version: 'Eracles', pp. 198-9 var. c.g.

Muslims in September 1197¹. The accounts are difficult to assess – the statement that Aimery had received Jaffa from Guy and Sibylla is certainly wrong as Sibylla had died in 1190, even before Geoffrey's tenure – but they are in agreement in what from our point of view is a crucial issue: at the moment Jaffa fell to the Muslims, Aimery had seisin. As will be seen, it does not much matter whether he had seisin in his own right or as guardian of his son's future wife's marriage portion. The children were all young at the time of the settlement, and in the event two of Aimery's sons and one of Henry's daughters died. In 1210 Aimery's one surviving son, King Hugh I of Cyprus, married Henry of Champagne's daughter Alice.² The assertion that Jaffa was to be the dower for one of Henry's daughters finds corroboration in a late source, the earlier of the two recensions of the *Lignages d'Outremer* (compiled in the 1270s), which says of Alice and Hugh that they 'orrent en mariage la conté de Japhe'.³

One other point should be made about the accounts of Aimery's quarrel with Henry of Champagne. The printed edition of the first version states that Henry gave the county (*conté*) to John of Ibelin, whereas in fact the manuscript employed (MS Lyon, Bibliothèque municipale 828 at fo. 335) reads *conestablie*, and this reading is confirmed by another manuscript, now in Florence, excerpts from which including the passage in question were published in the last century by Louis de Mas Latrie.⁴ On the basis of this mis-reading, some scholars have wrongly assumed that John was given the county of Jaffa as well as Aimery's office of constable, a title which he is to be seen employing in the years 1198–1200. In particular, the suggestions made by Mayer on the strength of this misinformation – that in the 1190s the office of constable and the county of Jaffa were linked and that from the 1190s the Ibelin family, by virtue of Henry of Champagne's supposed grant to John, had a claim on Jaffa – are to be rejected.⁵

After their capture of Jaffa in 1197, the Muslims destroyed it. Seven years later, in 1204, the town was restored to Christian rule by the truce of that year.⁶ But so far as is known, the Latins in the East

1. J. Richard, 'L'abbaye cistercienne de Jubin et le prieuré Saint-Blaise de Nicosie', *Epeteris tou Kentrou Epistemonikon Erevnon*, iii (1969/70), 70–71; Prawer, *Histoire*, ii. 114n.

2. The marriage took place shortly before the truce with the Muslims expired. 'Eracles', pp. 308–9.

3. 'Lignages', p. 444. For the date of the recension, see P. W. Edbury, 'The Ibelin counts of Jaffa: a previously unknown passage from the "Lignages d'Outremer"', *English Historical Review*, lxxxix (1974), 604.

4. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii. 596. Cf. 'Eracles', p. 203 var. d.

5. Riley-Smith, *Nobility*, p. 154; Mayer, 'Ibelin versus Ibelin', p. 26. For John as constable, see J. L. La Monte, 'John d'Ibelin, the old Lord of Beirut, 1177–1236', *Byzantion*, xii (1937), 424.

6. Prawer, *Histoire*, ii. 114, 123; R. S. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols* (New York, 1977), 106, 134. Ibn al-Furāt (*Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders. Selections from the Tārīkh al-Duwal wa'l-Mulūk*, ed. and trans. U. and M. C. Lyons with historical

made no attempt to rebuild it, nor are there any indications that they received the agricultural rents from the surrounding area. Destroyed and abandoned – someone writing in 1217 could say of Jaffa, ‘quondam magna fuit, modo desolata’¹ – it evidently formed part of a ‘no-man’s land’ separating Egypt and the Palestinian hinterland from the Christian-occupied area around Acre. When at the time of the Fifth Crusade the Christians decided to strengthen their southern flank, it was at Caesarea and the new castle at Athlit, respectively some thirty-five and fifty miles further to the north, that they concentrated their efforts. It was not until the crusade of Frederick II (1228–9) that the work of refortifying Jaffa was put in hand. The citadel had been rebuilt by February 1229, and the patriarch of Jerusalem was directing the construction of further defence works in 1230.²

Exactly what provision, if any, the emperor Frederick made for the custody of Jaffa after his departure is not known, but by about 1235 it had been acquired by Count Walter of Brienne, a nobleman from Champagne whose uncle, John of Brienne, was a former king of Jerusalem. Who gave it to him and on what authority is not recorded. There is one feature of Walter’s possession of Jaffa which has hitherto passed unnoticed: in his surviving *acta* he never once styles himself ‘count of Jaffa’, always simply ‘count of Brienne’. Indeed, the only writers to call him ‘count of Jaffa’ were those living in the West.³ If formal documents deny Walter the title, then the inference would seem to be that he was never invested with the county as his fief; he might merely have had custody of Jaffa as a commanding officer, but with no feudal title, no seisin. Of course, Walter was a count and Jaffa was a county, and so for people in the West to call him ‘count of Jaffa’ would have been an understandable mistake.

It is reasonably safe to assume that Walter was not Frederick’s appointee. Walter’s uncle, John of Brienne, had led the papal invasion of Frederick’s lands in Italy during his absence on crusade, and he himself was the grandson, through his mother, of Tancred of Lecce, the king of Sicily ousted by Frederick’s father, Henry VI, in the 1190s. It was said that in the 1220s Frederick, fearing that Walter had designs on the kingdom of Sicily and that he was building up a party there,

introduction and notes by J. S. C. Riley-Smith (Cambridge, 1971), ii. 107) records a statement of ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād that Jaffa was returned to the Christians in 1198.

1. Magister Thietmar, cited by G. Beyer, ‘Die Kreuzfahrergebiete Südwestpalästinas’, *Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästinavereins*, lxxviii (1946/51) (= *Beiträge zur Biblischen Landes- und Altertumskunde*), 161.

2. Prawer, *Histoire*, ii. 145–8, 178, 183, 194, 197, 228. For the patriarch’s contribution, see ‘Annales de Terre Sainte’, ed. R. Röhrich and G. Raynaud, *Archives de l’Orient latin*, ii (1884), 438; ‘Les Gestes des Chiprois’, *RHC Documents Arméniens*, ii. 700.

3. ‘Catalogue d’actes des comtes de Brienne’, nos. 169–73. Westerners calling him ‘count of Jaffa’ include Frederick II in Matthew Paris, *Chronica majora*, iv. 301; ‘Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin’, *RHC Historiens occidentaux*, ii. 531, 539, 543–4; Jean de Joinville, ‘Histoire de Saint Louis’ in *Oeuvres*, ed. N. de Wailly (Paris, 1867), 350.

was out to kill him.¹ Apparently in 1235, Walter had married Maria, the elder sister of King Henry I of Cyprus; Jean Richard, believing that the rights to Jaffa had passed from Aimery of Lusignan to Hugh I and thence to Henry, has suggested that Jaffa may have come to Walter as his wife's dowry.² This suggestion may well be correct. Alternatively, Walter could have been entrusted with Jaffa by the Ibelin-dominated regime in Acre, in which case he can have acquired no feudal right in Jaffa as that regime would not have been able to confer any.

Walter was captured in 1244. By June 1247 John of Ibelin had taken the title 'count of Jaffa and lord of Ramla'. In March 1253 Pope Innocent IV stated that the king of Cyprus had conferred the county of Jaffa and Ascalon upon him and that it had been within Henry's power to make that grant.³ The assumption behind Mayer's belief that when Henry gave John the county of Jaffa he did so in his capacity as regent of the kingdom of Jerusalem is that the county was at the time a part of the royal domain. But there is an alternative explanation: that Jaffa, like Ramla, was Henry's own inheritance and that he was giving away what was in fact his own. There is more than one way of arriving at this conclusion. The most plausible is that Henry had inherited Jaffa from his mother, Alice of Champagne, whose marriage portion it had been: in 1197 Aimery of Lusignan, Henry's grandfather, had had seisin as guardian of the marriage portion of his future daughter-in-law; the fact that the Muslims had occupied it from 1197-1204 was irrelevant, and by the terms of Aimery's agreement with her father, Alice would have acquired it in due course, as indeed the *Lignages d'Outremer* asserts did happen; Alice had died in 1246, whereupon Henry would have inherited her rights. The alternative version of the events of 1197, which seems to suggest that in that year Aimery held Jaffa in his own right, would point to the same ultimate outcome: Aimery would have recovered seisin in 1204 and the fact that he was then king-consort of Jerusalem would have made no difference to the county being transmitted to his own heirs, the Cypriot Lusignans. Seisin, presumably of the most nominal kind since the town was then in ruins and the surrounding countryside apparently outside effective Christian control, would have passed to

1. 'Eracles', p. 359. But see K. M. Setton (general ed.), *A History of the Crusades* (Philadelphia/Madison, 1955 → in progress), ii. 472. It is therefore surprising to find Walter making grants to the Teutonic Knights in the 1220s and 1230s. 'Catalogue d'actes des comtes de Brienne', nos. 151, 163, 165, 170.

2. J. Richard, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, trans. J. Shirley (Amsterdam, 1979), 249. The marriage took place in the same year as an expedition to Montferrand (Barīn). 'Eracles', pp. 403, 406. This was in 1236 according to some sources ('Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 439 var. b; 'Gestes', p. 724), but before the death of John the 'Old Lord' of Beirut (early 1236) and about the same time as Philip of Troyes' and Henry of Nazareth's embassy to the pope in 1235-6. See Riley-Smith, *Nobility*, pp. 204-7.

3. 'ad collationem suam'. See Mayer, 'Ibelin versus Ibelin', p. 31.

King Hugh I and from him to King Henry. The point about this discussion of Henry's rights is that whereas a grant of royal domain by a regent could have only limited duration and the grantee's title would be extremely vulnerable the moment the grantor ceased to be regent, a grant by a regent of his own feudal property would confer a title which would be far more secure. Admittedly the grant would still require royal ratification, but the possibility that a future king would take the lordship into his own hands on the grounds that it was a part of the royal domain improperly alienated would not arise.

Henry's ability to give John the county of Jaffa, however, might seem to have been complicated by Walter of Brienne's custody of it. If Walter held Jaffa as the appointee of the Ibelin, anti-Hohenstaufen junta in Acre, his position can only have been temporary and neither he nor his heirs would have been able to claim any rights there after his departure from the scene in 1244. If on the other hand we accept Richard's view that Jaffa was his wife's dower, the situation would not have been so simple. Maria would have kept her dower until her own death and then the children of her marriage would have been entitled to inherit. But Richard's theory does not present an insurmountable obstacle to Henry being able to dispose of Jaffa within three years of Walter's capture. Any idea that Henry would have disregarded his sister's rights while she was still alive is out of the question: family loyalty and public opinion would have ruled that out. But Maria may well have died before the grant was made to John of Jaffa; she was certainly dead by 1250, and the indications are that she had died several years earlier.¹ Walter's sons by Maria were still young in the mid-1240s. Perhaps any claim they might have had to Jaffa was bought off elsewhere; in 1247 Henry gave the elder son, John of Brienne, his entire maternal inheritance in Champagne; and although admittedly the formal document recording this gift does not say so, the grant could have been made in exchange for John's rights to Jaffa.² Positive evidence that the Briennes tried to claim Jaffa back after 1247 is non-existent; quite likely any such claim would have lacked legal support.

Ascalon was restored to Christian control in 1241 and lost again, this time for good, in 1247. At no time in this period did John of Jaffa have possession, and until at least as late as 1254 he made no mention of Ascalon in his title, simply employing the style 'count of Jaffa and lord of Ramla'.³ But from 1256 he used the title 'count of Jaffa and

1. Edbury, 'Disputed Regency', p. 38. She had died before the marriage of Henry I and Plaisance which took place in that year. 'Eracles', p. 439. Maria's second son, also named Walter, later said that he had been brought up by his aunt, perhaps an indication that his mother had died early in his childhood. Edbury, *op. cit.* p. 31.

2. *Layettes du trésor des chartes*, ed. A. Teulet and J. de Laborde (Paris, 1863-81), iii. no. 3648; *RRH*, no. 1154.

3. *RRH*, nos. 1149, 1156, 1221; Innocent IV, *Registre*, nos. 6455, 6463, 6465. John also used this title in a document of 1261. *RRH*, no. 1297a.

Ascalon and lord of Ramla',¹ although the full form is not employed in every contemporary reference to him; often he is described merely as 'count of Jaffa' – readily understandable since Jaffa was his principal possession, Ascalon never under his control and Ramla apparently lost to the Muslims by 1253.²

So far in this discussion, the argument has turned on the problem of who had the rights to fiefs of which the tenure had been interrupted by periods of Muslim destruction or occupation. In turning to Ascalon, we are also confronted by problems created by the rejection of Hohenstaufen rule in the East. Ascalon's recovery was negotiated by Richard of Cornwall, Frederick II's brother-in-law, and Richard handed it over to one of Frederick's officers in the East, the castellan of Jerusalem. In 1243 the emperor granted Ascalon to the Hospitallers, perhaps the most powerful of his supporters in Latin Syria, and his grant was ratified by Conrad later that year. The formal transfer by the Hohenstaufen representative took place in April 1244.³ But within four years of Frederick's grant of Ascalon to the Hospitallers, the anti-Hohenstaufen Henry of Cyprus had given the county of Jaffa and Ascalon to John of Ibelin. Thus two individuals asserted the right to dispose of Ascalon, and this was to lead to litigation.

The earliest indication that the Hospitallers' rights to Ascalon were being challenged is provided by a papal letter of February 1246: Pope Innocent IV told the archbishop of Nicosia and the bishop of Limassol that the Order was to be compensated for the expenses it had incurred at Ascalon were the town to be handed over to someone else. The papal letter does not specify to whom it was envisaged the Hospitallers might give the town, but in view of the rights which it has been argued the Lusignans had to Jaffa and the fact that the letter was addressed to two senior churchmen in their island kingdom, it may well be that the Order's possession of Ascalon was being disputed by a member of the Cypriot royal family, or someone close to it.⁴ Ascalon fell to the Muslims in 1247 – King Henry used resources from Cyprus in a vain attempt to save it – but hopes that it might be recovered were evidently kept alive for at least another decade. No more is heard for a few years. John of Jaffa, presumably because he had never been seised of Ascalon, forbore to adopt the full title of 'count of Jaffa and Ascalon', but he seems to have pursued a claim against the Hospitallers nevertheless: something certainly

1. RRH, nos. 1245, 1246, 1249b, 1249c.

2. Richard, *Latin Kingdom*, p. 345 and n. 31 (p. 442). But see Ibn al-Furāt, ii. 97–98.

3. *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de St.-Jean de Jérusalem (1100–1310)*, ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx (Paris, 1894–1906), nos. 2301, 2308, 2320, cf. 2319; R. Hiestand, 'Zwei unbekannte Diplome der lateinischen Könige von Jerusalem aus Lucca', *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken*, 1 (1971), 33–56. For the Hospitallers as supporters for Frederick, see also J. S. C. Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c.1050–1310* (London, 1967), 172 ff.

4. *Cartulaire général*, no. 2394; Innocent IV, *Registre*, no. 1784.

goaded the Order into turning both to Pope Innocent, who in February 1252 gave instructions that its rights to Ascalon were not to be interfered with and to Conrad who in March of the same year confirmed his father's grant once more.¹ But by 1252 Hohenstaufen authority in the East had long been no more than a shadow, and with Conrad's death in 1254 the effective power of the legitimate branch of the family came to an end. By 1256 the Hospitallers had stopped trying to insist on their rights to Ascalon – rights which in any case had been purely nominal since 1247 – and had agreed to accept arbitration over the terms by which they would surrender their claims to John of Jaffa.² It is at this juncture that John, who at the beginning of 1256 had apparently allowed Jaffa to be used as a base for a raid into territory beyond Ascalon,³ first appears styling himself 'count of Jaffa and Ascalon'. By the beginning of 1257 agreement had been reached, and in two privileges of January and February 1257 (1256 o.s.) John concluded the dispute by making a substantial grant to the Hospitallers of land in the vicinity of Ascalon to be held by them when and if the town was reoccupied.⁴

It is possible to formulate a hypothesis as to why this dispute over Ascalon had arisen. The point at issue may well have been, had the county of Jaffa and Ascalon in the twelfth century been regarded as one lordship or two? If it had been one unitary lordship, then whoever had seisin of Jaffa as count at the time Ascalon was recovered in 1241 might quite properly have expected to acquire the remainder of the county; so Henry of Cyprus, his mother or his sister and her husband should have had it. But if Ascalon was regarded as a separate lordship, distinct and separable from Jaffa, the position was different: at the time it fell to the Muslims in 1187 it had formed a part of the royal domain, and so after 1241 it would have been for the crown to dispose of as it saw fit. Hence Frederick's grant to the Hospitallers. Indeed, there are indications that when in the mid-twelfth century the double county was first created for the future King Amaury, he acquired the two halves at different dates: his apanage may well have been thought of as consisting of two separate units.⁵

From the foregoing discussion it would appear that Henry I of Cyprus gave John of Jaffa the rights to the county of Jaffa and Ascalon and also the lordship of Ramla which he himself had inherited. The grant probably coincided with Henry's acquisition of

1. *Cartulaire général*, nos. 2587, 2590.

2. *Cartulaire général*, nos. 2810, 2816, 2817.

3. 'Rothelin', p. 630.

4. *Cartulaire général*, nos. 2845, 2853. The ascription of these documents to 1257, first proposed by Delaville Le Roulx, avoids the awkward chronological problems which have led Mayer ('Ibelin *versus* Ibelin', pp. 45–46) to devise ingenious theories about the course of this dispute.

5. John of Ibelin, pp. 417, 419, 422; Mayer, 'Melisende', pp. 175–6, 182.

the regency of Jerusalem in 1246 and may have formed a *douceur* to ensure John's support at that time. John would have acquired his lordship in the south of the Latin Kingdom at the same time Henry gave Tyre – not his, but a part of the royal domain – to Philip of Montfort as well as other royal lands to Balian of Ibelin, lord of Beirut.¹ John's title would have been far stronger than Philip's, since Henry was giving him what was his own. He evidently took seisin of Jaffa and Ramla, but not Ascalon which was held by the Hospitallers; eventually, in 1257, the Order gave up its own claims and recognized John's rights. There are no substantiated grounds for supposing that John's tenure of Jaffa was challenged, and although Ascalon was lost in 1247 and Ramla seemingly by 1253, John held Jaffa until his death in 1266. In 1268 Jaffa too was captured by the Muslims. Nevertheless John's descendants continued to employ their title until well into the fourteenth century.²

If there was no challenge to John's title to Jaffa, then it may be wondered why he should have felt the need to get the pope to confirm it. Almost certainly the papal confirmation is to be seen as a ploy used by John in his efforts to vindicate his rights to Ascalon. In March 1252 the Hospitallers had obtained a further confirmation from Conrad; now in March 1253 John obtained his confirmation from Conrad's greatest adversary, Pope Innocent IV, who thus would seem to have made a *volte face* from his position of just over a year earlier. A papal confirmation of lands in feudal tenure would have made little impression in the High Court of Jerusalem where no doubt it would have been argued that the pope had been acting *ultra vires* in granting it, but it ought to have weighed with the Hospitallers, themselves an exempt Order of the Church, and John is likely to have been trying to gather the support of ecclesiastical opinion in an attempt to persuade the Order to surrender its claims. From Innocent's point of view, John was a man who merited all the support he could offer: he and his family were violently anti-Hohenstaufen; he himself was responsible for the defence of the southern portion of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, and he had benefited from the aid of St Louis who in 1252–3 was active in strengthening the fortifications at Jaffa. At the same time as he issued his confirmation, the pope also gave John a number of other privileges;³ it is perhaps significant that the only other laymen in the Latin East to receive comparable privileges during Innocent's pontificate, Henry I of Cyprus and

1. Riley-Smith, *Nobility*, p. 215.

2. For example, a document of 1338 mentions 'dominus Huo de Ybelino comes Joppensis et Ascalone, dominus Ramarum et senescalcus regni Jerosolimitani'. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii. 178. See Edbury, 'Ibelin counts', pp. 606–9; W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Ibelin aux XIII^e et XIV^e siècles', *Epeteris tou Kentron Epistemonikon Erevnon*, ix (1977/9), 202–22.

3. Innocent IV, *Registre*, nos. 6455–8, 6463. See Riley-Smith, *Nobility*, p. 214; Mayer, 'Ibelin versus Ibelin', p. 41.

Balian of Ibelin lord of Beirut,¹ were also leading opponents of the Hohenstaufen. The fact that Innocent's confirmation of John's tenure of Jaffa and Ascalon came so soon after Henry's death would appear to be purely coincidental. Mayer's idea of a mid-winter voyage to Italy the moment Henry's demise was announced and a successful petition to the pope crammed into the staggeringly short period of 18 January–26 March 1253 can be jettisoned in favour of a more sedate approach set in train as soon as Conrad's confirmation of March 1252 became known; indeed, news of Henry's death may not even have reached the papal court by the time the confirmation was issued: he is not described as 'rex quondam'.

In the early 1250s John of Jaffa was evidently in good standing at the papal court. One possibility aired by Mayer, that John used his connections there to have a Latin bishopric of Jaffa created, however needs to be knocked very firmly on the head.² To be fair to Mayer, he is careful to say that the matter cannot be decided for certain, but even the evidence in favour of there being a bishopric of Jaffa for a short period in the 1250s that Mayer advances turns out to be a chimera. The chief grounds for supposing that there was such a bishopric is contained in the statement in the French vernacular compilation, the *Estoire de Eracles*, that in 1253 there occurred the death of 'l'evesque de Jaffe, Gui de Nimars'. The printed text is based on just one manuscript (MS Paris, Bib. Nat. fonds français 9082), but at least two other manuscripts of this work read 'Baffe' or 'Baphe' (*i.e.* Paphos, the seat of a Latin bishop since the 1190s) for 'Jaffe' and 'Mimars' for 'Nimars'.³ The idea that we are dealing with a Guy of Mimars, bishop of Paphos, finds added support in two further sources, both of which record Guy's death, the thirteenth-century *Annales de Terre Sainte* and the late Italian compilation, the *Chronique d'Amadi*, although it is also true that a Catalan version of the *Annales* would make Guy bishop of Jaffa.⁴ Another source mentioning Guy in a different context, the *Lignages d'Outremer*, states simply that 'Gui [youngest son of Hugh of Mimars] fu evesque de Baphe'.⁵ The case against his being bishop of

1. Innocent IV, *Registre*, nos. 2441, 2524, 2884, 3067, 5893, *cf.* 3149–51; Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii. 640–1.

2. Mayer, 'Ibelin versus Ibelin', pp. 39–41.

3. 'Eracles', p. 441. The editors provide variant readings from a second manuscript, MS Paris, Bib. Nat. fonds français 2628. See also MS Florence, Bib. Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. LXI, 10 at fo. 337^v, which reads, 'l'evesque de Baphe, Guy de Mimars'. Substituting 'Jaffe' for 'Baffe' seems to have been a foible of the copyist of Bib. Nat. 9082. See 'Eracles', p. 401 n. 40 where it alone reads 'Jaffe' and 'Eracles', p. 464 where the Bib. Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. LXI, 10 fo. 342^v again reads 'Baphe' for 'Jaffe'.

4. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 445: 'Guis de Mimars, evesques de Balfe'; 'Chronique d'Amadi', ed. R. de Mas Latrie in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi* (Paris, 1891–3), i. 202: 'Guido, vescovo di Bapho'; 'Anales de Tierra Santa' ed. A. Sánchez Candeira in 'Las Cruzadas en la Historiografía española de la época. Traducción castellana de una redacción desconocida de los "Anales de Tierra Santa"', *Hispania*, xx (1960), 364–5: 'Gui de Minars, que fue obispo de Jafe'.

5. 'Lignages', p. 471.

Jaffa is overwhelming. Admittedly, there are no formal documents extant which refer to Guy as bishop of Paphos by name, although it is known that in 1246 he was a canon of Nicosia cathedral.¹ Indeed, between Bishop John, recorded in 1246, and Emmanuel Frangipani who was provided to the see in 1254, the sources, other than those cited here, are silent about the identity of the bishops of Paphos, although we do have papal letters from 1248 and 1252 addressed to unnamed bishops.² John, the bishop of 1246, turns up in Jaffa in 1253 as 'episcopus quondam Paphensis',³ and although he seems to have been in John of Jaffa's entourage, there is nothing to suggest the possibility, tentatively envisaged by Mayer, that he had hopes of becoming a bishop of Jaffa.

Where then does this discussion of John of Jaffa's title leave Mayer's arguments about the origins of the split in the Ibelin family? There is no doubt that John lord of Arsur and John count of Jaffa supported different sides in the War of St Sabas and that in 1258 John of Jaffa, by a skilful manipulation of the customs governing the regency, managed to replace John of Arsur's pro-Genoese policy with his own pro-Venetian one.⁴ What is open to doubt is whether before the War the two cousins had long been bitter political opponents. Clearly, if John of Jaffa's title to Jaffa was beyond challenge, relations between the two men could not have been soured on that account. Mayer has three other arguments which suggest that John of Arsur had become estranged from the other members of his family and that this process had begun as early as 1228: he did not share his family's implacable hostility to the Hohenstaufen but was, to use Mayer's expression, a 'centralist'; his lordship of Arsur was of little worth, given him condescendingly by his brothers; and in 1251 he tried to introduce an administrative reform behind the backs of his kinsmen which was contrary to their interests.⁵

For various reasons, none of Mayer's arguments seem convincing. The idea that he was a 'centralist' is based largely upon remarks made by Philip of Novara,⁶ but in each case the construction placed by Mayer on Philip's evidence to suggest that John was set apart from the rest of his family can be queried. The quarrel between John and his brother Balian at the siege of Beirut in 1232 is told by Philip to

1. Innocent IV, *Registre*, no. 2007.

2. For John, see Innocent IV, *Registre*, no. 2057 (in 1245 he had been bishop-elect of Paphos; Innocent IV, *op. cit.* nos. 957, 1066, 1532); For Emmanuel, see Innocent IV, *op. cit.* no. 7577; for unnamed bishops, see Innocent IV, *op. cit.* no. 3698; La Monte, 'Santa Sophia', nos. 75-76. The episcopal list for Paphos is fragmentary for the thirteenth century. See G. Fedalto, *La Chiesa latina in Oriente*, ii (Verona, 1976), 186-7; W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'État et origine du haut clergé de Chypre avant le grand schisme d'après les registres des papes du XIII^e et du XIV^e siècle', *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome*, xci (1979), 270-1.

3. Innocent IV, *Registre*, nos. 6455-6, 6465.

4. Riley-Smith, *Nobility*, pp. 215-17.

5. Mayer, 'Ibelin versus Ibelin', pp. 29, 31-37.

6. 'Gestes', pp. 682, 705, 729.

illustrate Balian's chivalric enthusiasm and the collective prowess of the sons of the 'Old Lord' of Beirut; the emphasis is on Balian's disappointment at not being chosen for a dangerous mission, not on John's expendability. In any case the brothers were co-operating in apparent harmony not long afterwards.¹ Philip's story that in 1228 Frederick had offered John the town of Foggia in Italy is told to show the lengths to which the emperor was prepared to go to split the family. Although the soubriquet 'of Foggia' seems to have stuck to John – it is attested independently as late as 1252² – this in itself need not be taken to mean that Frederick's gambit had any lasting success. The idea that in 1241 John was visiting the Hohenstaufen stronghold of Tyre appears, *pace* Mayer, to be based on a textual error: 'Sur' (Tyre) should read 'Arsur' (Arsur).³ A final point made by Mayer, that in a letter sent to Frederick in 1241 John seems to be divided off from his brothers, may only signify that he himself was responsible for drafting it, and the fact that the Ibelins were there offering concessions tells us nothing about John's own attitude or his relationship with his kinsmen as they were evidently in agreement at this juncture.⁴ Against Mayer's theory and in favour of John being at one with the rest of his family in opposing the Hohenstaufen is the clear indication of Philip of Novara that had he been in Acre in 1241 he would have helped prevent a pro-Hohenstaufen attempt to seize the town, and also the assertion made by John of Jaffa that he had assisted in the capture of Tyre in 1243.⁵

Turning now to the question of John's lordship of Arsur, the belief that his brothers showed a 'condescending attitude' in letting him have it is based on the statement in the *Lignages d'Outremer*: 'Johan, le fis Johan de Ibelin sire de Baruth, fu sire de Sur(*sic*) par sa mere; car les freres li laisserent avoir. . .'.⁶ From other evidence it is known that John, the 'Old Lord' of Beirut, partitioned his fiefs among his sons on his death-bed in 1236.⁷ In law his eldest son would otherwise have inherited them all, but by acting before his death John would ensure that the others were provided for, and it may well be that the

1. 'Gestes', p. 712.

2. *Calendar of the Patent Rolls. Henry III (1247-1258)* (London, 1908), p. 158. John is one of a number of men listed as recipients of a circular letter sent by King Henry III of England to leading figures in the East. In the actual letter he may have been addressed by his correct formal title.

3. The same mistake is made elsewhere. 'Lignages', pp. 448, 449; 'Gestes', p. 705. There are other grounds for supposing John to have been in Arsur at the time. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 440; 'Gestes', p. 728. Cf. Mayer, 'Ibelin *versus* Ibelin', p. 33 n. 54.

4. 'Acte de soumission des barons du royaume de Jérusalem à Frédéric II', ed. R. Röhrich, *Archives de l'Orient latin*, i (1881), 402-3; Mayer, 'Ibelin *versus* Ibelin', p. 33. In support of Mayer's suggestion, however, is the fact that John was engaged at this time in transactions with the pro-Hohenstaufen Hospitallers. *RRH*, no. 1100.

5. 'Gestes', pp. 728-9; 'Documents relatifs à la successibilité au trône et à la régence', *RHC Lois*, ii. 400.

6. 'Lignages', p. 449; cf. Mayer, 'Ibelin *versus* Ibelin', pp. 29, 32.

7. 'Gestes', p. 725.

settlement whereby the younger John was to have Arsur coincided with the partition of his father's inheritance. But irrespective of when he obtained it, Arsur was not his father's to dispose of. John of Beirut had married Melisende, the heiress to Arsur, and on her death Arsur would have passed immediately to the eldest son of the marriage, provided he was of age.¹ We do not know whether she outlived her husband, but assuming that she did not, the lordship would already have passed out of John of Beirut's hands. Alternatively, if she were still alive at the time of his death, she would have continued to possess it, and her husband would not have been able to interfere with the succession. John of Arsur, as the fourth son of the marriage,² would therefore have had to have his brothers' acquiescence before he could obtain his mother's inheritance, and so the statement in the *Lignages* can be taken simply as a statement of fact. What is surprising is that a fourth son should have acquired a whole lordship, however run-down it might have been, and the compiler of the *Lignages* is doing no more than explain how this remarkable situation had come about.³

In 1251 John of Arsur, as lieutenant in Acre of the regent, Henry of Cyprus, convened a joint meeting of the High Court and the *cour des bourgeois* of Acre and tried to persuade both bodies to keep written registers recording the business transacted before them. His nephew, John II lord of Beirut, and his cousin, John of Jaffa, were absent; of the knights who participated on that occasion, the majority, claims Mayer, were later supporters of John of Arsur at the time of the War of St Sabas, and the move would have benefited the crown and harmed the nobility for various reasons, not least because the ability of baronial lawyers to cast doubt on material facts and distort precedent would be constricted if written record replaced memory.⁴ So is this evidence for the estrangement of John of Arsur from the other magnates? The fact that the lord of Beirut and the count of Jaffa were not listed as being present tells us only that they happened to be somewhere else on that particular occasion; there is no need to posit the theory that there had been a conspiracy to push the measure through behind their backs. The knights who did attend were, it

1. For Melisende, see 'Lignages', pp. 448, 451. The custom known in England whereby a husband held his wife's inheritance if she predeceased him until his own death was unknown in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, although it was known in Antioch. *Les Assises d'Antioche*, ed. and trans. L. M. Alishan (Venice, 1876), 36.

2. Rudt de Collenberg ('Les Ibelin', pp. 128-9) has claimed that John was the second son, but he has mistaken him for the future count of Jaffa as a witness to charters. Balian was the eldest; then Baldwin ('Gestes', p. 672); then Hugh ('Eracles', p. 367) and then John. See 'Lignages', pp. 448, 451.

3. Mayer (*Ibelin versus Ibelin*', p. 29) goes on to suggest that the absence of Arsur from the list of fiefs dating from the 1180s which John of Jaffa incorporated into his legal treatise (pp. 422-6) may reflect the bitter hostility between the two. A more likely explanation is that Arsur, which barely appears as a lordship in the twelfth century, was a rear-fief of Caesarea until after 1187.

4. Mayer, 'Ibelin versus Ibelin', pp. 33-37; see 'Abrégé du livre des assises de la cour des bourgeois', *RHC Lois*, ii. 246-9.

would seem, for the most part those resident in Acre who regularly attended the High Court there; it is true that several of them also witnessed a grant made by John of Arsur as regent in 1257 to the commune of Ancona at a particularly sensitive stage in the War of St Sabas,¹ but to regard them as members of John's 'party' may be reading too much into the evidence; in both 1251 and 1257 John of Arsur, as lieutenant of the regent or as regent, was legitimately empowered to convene the High Court and they, as leading vassals, probably regarded it as a duty to attend. Presumably it was the same group who supported the move to block John's administrative reform in 1251 and who accepted the change in the regency in 1258 engineered by John of Jaffa. As for John's proposed reform itself, it was no doubt stymied by the innate conservatism of the baronial lawyers, although whether the vassals feared it would affect them along lines Mayer suggests is debatable. But however John's proposals are viewed, the fact that he proposed a change in the administration of justice which failed to win support is no indication that he was at odds with the other leading vassals on other matters or that henceforth 'the magnates must have had their reservations' about him.

Mayer's theory that there had been a long history of antagonism between John of Arsur and the other members of his family before he and his cousin, John of Jaffa, came into direct conflict over the War of St Sabas is hard to accept. We should instead look at the more immediate circumstances of the war: in particular at the question of the relationship of the two cousins with Henry of Cyprus's widow, Queen Plaisance, and at the necessity for the regime in Acre to be supporting whichever side was winning. But such matters deserve a separate study.

1. *RRH*, no. 1259. See Mayer, 'Ibelin *versus* Ibelin', p. 49.

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VIII

JOHN OF JAFFA AND THE KINGDOM OF CYPRUS

During the century that elapsed between the conquest of Cyprus in 1191 and the fall of the last Frankish cities on the coast of Syria and Palestine to the Muslims in 1291, relations between the western communities in Lusignan-ruled Cyprus and what remained of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem were close. At times the regime in Acre (the present-day Israeli town of Akko) was headed by the Cypriot king or his nominee, and throughout the thirteenth century there were noble houses with interests in both kingdoms. Of these the most celebrated was the Ibelin family. The Ibelins had come to prominence in the Kingdom of Jerusalem during the second quarter of the twelfth century and took their name from their first lordship, the town of Yabne, not far from the modern Tel Aviv. By the middle of the thirteenth century they had become the leading figures among the aristocracy in both Cyprus and Jerusalem, and, out of all the various members of the family alive at that time, the one who has left the most striking memorial is the John of Ibelin who from 1246 or 1247 until his death in 1266 was count of Jaffa and Ascalon.¹

John of Jaffa, as I shall call him to distinguish him from the other Johns of Ibelin who lived at around the same period, is best remembered as the author of a treatise on the law and customs of the High Court of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.² It is by far the longest of the legal treatises to have survived from the kingdoms founded by the crusaders and is perhaps the single most important source for understanding western society and culture in the Latin East in the thirteenth century. John was at work on his *magnum opus* in the mid-1260s.³ He was concerned primarily with legal procedure and the question of how to plead in the High Court, but in the course of his work he provided invaluable insights

1. There is a large literature on the Latin East in the thirteenth century and the place of the Ibelins in it. For dependable accounts, see J. Richard, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, trans. J. Shirley (Amsterdam/New York/Oxford, 1979); J. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (London and Basingstoke, 1973).

2. Edited by Comte Beugnot as 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', *R[ecueil des] H[istoriens des] C[roisades]. Lois*, 1 (Paris, 1841), pp. 1-432.

3. For the date, M. Grandclaude, *Étude critique sur les livres des Assises de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1923), p. 88.

into the nature and substance of the law itself. John wrote in French, and, over and above its intrinsic interest to the historian, his work forms one of the most striking and original literary achievements of any of the Latin settlers in the Holy Land. Moreover, the law and custom he described belong firmly in the mainstream of European customary law, and the sophistication and detailed knowledge and experience he brought to bear in writing his book are sufficient to place him on an equal footing with the most distinguished contemporary English and French writers on legal custom, Bracton and Beaumanoir.

But even if his treatise had not survived, John of Jaffa would have been assured a place in the histories of his age. His distant kinsman by marriage, John of Joinville, who had met him on several occasions during the crusade of Louis IX (1248-54), admired him and praised him for his wisdom, courage and foresight. For a brief period in the mid-1250s John had acted as regent of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, and then in 1258 he went on to play a decisive role in the War of Saint Sabas fought between Venetians and Genoese in and around Acre. On the other hand, in 1261 the pope found it necessary to issue him with a stern rebuke for his adulterous liaison with the widowed queen of Cyprus, Plaisance of Antioch.⁴ But while John's career in the Holy Land as count of Jaffa has frequently attracted attention, the fact that he seems to have lived in Cyprus for most of life, at least until he acquired his county, has tended to be overlooked.

John's parents were Philip of Ibelin and Alice of Montbéliard. Philip was the younger son of Balian of Ibelin (died ca.1193) and Maria Komnena, the Byzantine widow of King of Amaury of Jerusalem. John's father was therefore the uterine half-brother of Queen Isabella I of Jerusalem (died 1205). But besides being closely related to the royal house of Jerusalem, Philip was also a near kinsman of the Lusignans: his cousin had been Eschiva of Ibelin, the wife of King Aimery, the first king of Cyprus, and ancestress of the Lusignan dynasty. John's mother, Alice of Montbéliard, was also linked to the Cypriot Lusignans, in her case through her brother, Walter of Montbéliard, regent of Cyprus during the childhood of King Hugh I (1205-10). Walter of Montbéliard was Hugh's brother-in-law, having married his sister, Burgundia of Lusignan, a few years earlier.⁵ Alice's first husband, Count Berthold of Katzenellenbogen, a

4. John of Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, ed. N. de Wailly (Paris, 1868), caps 34, 83, 100; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 215-17; H.E. Mayer, 'Ibelin versus Ibelin: the Struggle for the Regency of Jerusalem, 1253-1258', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 122 (1978), pp. 43-5, 49-56.

5. For Walter, P.W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 41-6.

German nobleman who had settled in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, is last mentioned alive in a document of 1207, and, as Alice and Philip were already married by 1210, their wedding must have taken place during Walter's time as regent.⁶

Until about 1211 Philip seems to have lived in the Kingdom of Jerusalem where his elder brother, John, was lord of Beirut and regent (1205-10). But then, for reasons that are not entirely clear, he transferred his activities to Cyprus. It is probable, as I have argued elsewhere, that Philip's move to Cyprus was linked in some way to a quarrel between the Ibelin brothers and the new king of Jerusalem, John of Brienne.⁷ By 1217 Philip had acquired the valuable estate of Peristerona near Morphou, and that same year, together with his brother, he was a member of Hugh I's entourage and travelled with him from Cyprus to Acre to confer with the leaders of the Fifth Crusade. As close relatives of the king, John and Philip of Ibelin seem to have been quick to acquire a dominant position among the Cypriot nobility: by 1217 they were taking precedence over all the royal Cypriot vassals when witnessing royal charters.⁸

According to Philip of Novara, Philip and Alice's son John was aged seventeen in 1232,⁹ and so his birth can be dated to 1214 or 1215. Whether the future count of Jaffa was actually born in Cyprus is not known, but there can be no doubt at all that he spent much of his childhood on the island. In 1218 King Hugh died leaving a widow, Alice of Champagne, two small daughters and an infant heir, Henry I (1218-53). Alice of Champagne was the daughter of Queen Isabella, and in 1218 she turned to Philip of Ibelin, her mother's half-brother, and appointed him to act on her behalf as regent for her son. Despite a series of bitter quarrels with Alice and a section of the nobility, Philip held power from 1218 until his death in 1227 or 1228.¹⁰ The story of what happened in the years that followed his death has been recounted on many occasions, and so there is no need here to go into detail. Philip's brother, John of Beirut, now took charge in Cyprus, and it was he who led the opposition to the Emperor Frederick II of

6. *R[egesta] R[egni] H[ierosolymitani] (1097-1291)*, ed. R. Röhrich (Innsbruck, 1893-1904), no. 841a; 'Les Lignages d'Outremer', *RHC Lois*, 2, pp. 452, 455 n. 3. For Berthold, *RRH*, nos. 776, 802, 812, 818-19, 821.

7. Edbury, *Kingdom of Cyprus*, pp. 47-8.

8. For Peristerona, P.W. Edbury, 'Latin Dioceses and Peristerona: a Contribution to the Topography of Lusignan Cyprus', *Epeteris*, 8 (1975/7), p. 50. For the conference at Acre, 'L'estoire de Eracles empereur', *RHC Historiens Occidentaux*, 2, p. 322. For their precedence as witnesses, *RRH*, no. 900.

9. 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', *RHC Documents arméniens*, 2, p. 708.

10. Edbury, *Kingdom of Cyprus*, pp. 48-51.

Hohenstaufen and his lieutenants in East until 1236 when he in his turn died.¹¹ Frederick had arrived at Limassol later in 1228 en route for the Holy Land. His high-handed actions and his support for those men who had opposed Ibelin rule led directly to the outbreak of civil war in Cyprus shortly after his return to the West in 1229. It was in the opening stages of this conflict that we first hear of the young John of Jaffa: together with his sister and some others he fled from Cyprus to take refuge in Tortosa and so escaped falling into the clutches of Frederick's officer, Count Stephen.¹²

It was only in the later stages of the war that John of Jaffa emerged as an active participant. There could have been no question that in due course he would join his uncle, John of Beirut, and his cousins in their struggle against the emperor, and, as John himself later recorded in his legal treatise, at one point during the conflict Frederick had given instructions that his fiefs in Acre should be sequestered along with those of his Ibelin kinsmen.¹³ In 1232 he was in the thick of the fighting at Casal Imbert (a village to the north of Acre), but, although Philip of Novara spoke highly of his prowess on that occasion, another author implies that he may have been at fault for allowing the imperial troops to launch a surprise attack on the Ibelin positions. Directly after this episode, in the scramble to raise money to get the Ibelin forces back to Cyprus and so prevent the emperor's partisans from taking complete control in the island, John was among those who sold property in and around Acre to the military orders. Later in 1232 he was present at the decisive engagement, the battle of Agridi (Aghirda, near the southern end of the pass through the mountains linking Nicosia and Kyrenia), after which, in his first recorded independent action, he was entrusted with rounding up survivors from his opponents' army.¹⁴

John was an only son, and accordingly he inherited his father's property in both the Kingdom of Jerusalem and Cyprus. But after the alienations he had made in 1232 there are no more allusions to his inheritance on the mainland, nor is there any evidence until the early 1240s that he was involved in affairs there.¹⁵

11. For the events of 1228-33, G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1940-52), 2, pp. 94-129; Edbury, *Kingdom of Cyprus*, pp. 55-69.

12. 'Gestes', pp. 682-3.

13. 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', p. 325.

14. 'Eracles', pp. 397, 398; 'Gestes', pp. 708-9, 711-12, 715, 718-19. For the sales to the orders, *Cartulaire général de l'Ordre des Hospitaliers de St-Jean de Jérusalem*, ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx (Paris, 1894-1906), nos. 2015-16; M. Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 164.

15. He was, however, a witness to an arbitration delivered near Acre in October 1232 concerning tithes payable to the bishops in Cyprus. L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852-61), 3, pp. 633-6.

Instead it would seem that he remained for the most part in Cyprus. His only sister became a nun, and John, or rather their mother, founded and endowed the Cistercian nunnery of Saint Theodore at Nicosia for her benefit. The foundation dates from the mid-1230s, although the Cistercians did not formally accept it as a house of their order until 1242.¹⁶ During the 1230s John himself regularly attended the Cypriot High Court, and he appears as a witness to almost every extant royal charter issued there in those years.¹⁷ In the charters dating from before 1236 he is frequently referred to as 'John of Ibelin junior' to distinguish him from this uncle and namesake, the lord of Beirut, who remained the power behind the throne until his death that year.¹⁸

In the aftermath of the civil war in Cyprus (1229-33) the Ibelins and their circle totally dominated the Cypriot High Court. John of Jaffa and his cousins were all closely related to the royal family. John of Beirut had had five sons, Balian, Baldwin, Hugh, John and Guy. They, together with John of Jaffa and their other cousin, John lord of Caesarea, had all been the second cousins of King Henry I's father, Hugh I, by virtue of their common descent from the founder of the Ibelin clan in the East, Barisan the Elder. They were also first cousins to Alice of Champagne, Henry I's mother, as they and Alice were all grandchildren of Maria Komnena.¹⁹ As the king's closest relatives they would have regarded themselves as his natural counsellors. It is also likely that they were among the wealthiest of the Cypriot vassals, although the evidence is insufficient to prove this assumption. John of Jaffa is known to have owned the major rural centres of Peristerona near Morphou and Episkopi near Limassol as well as a casal called 'Vassa' in the diocese of Paphos and properties in Nicosia.²⁰ John's closeness to

16. J. Richard, 'The Cistercians in Cyprus', in M. Gervers (ed.), *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians* (New York, 1992), pp. 201-2.

17. *RRH*, nos. 1037, 1049, 1054, 1055, 1071, 1078; 'A Register of the Cartulary of the Cathedral of Santa Sophia of Nicosia', ed. J. L. La Monte, *Byzantion*, 5 (1930), nos. 38, 39, 42, 45. The only extant charter which John does not witness is *RRH*, no. 1092 (Dec. 1239).

18. W.H. Rudt de Collenberg ('Les Ibelin aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles', *Epeteris*, 9 (1977/9), p. 140) believed that the John of Ibelin who is mentioned in these charters was John of Jaffa's cousin and namesake, the son of the John of Beirut who was later to become lord of Arsur. However, as John of Arsur was John of Beirut's fourth son and the John of Ibelin who witnesses here consistently appears ahead of John of Arsur's elder brothers, I am convinced that his view is mistaken. John of Beirut's sons invariably witness in order of seniority. Before John of Beirut's death in 1236, John of Jaffa appears before the eldest, Balian, but once Balian had succeeded his father as lord of Beirut the order is reversed, and John of Jaffa signs after Balian but before Balian's brothers. Balian may have been slightly older than John of Jaffa, but until 1236 John was a major fief-holder in his own right whereas Balian had yet to enter his inheritance.

19. For a genealogical table, Edbury, *Kingdom of Cyprus*, p. 41.

20. Mas Latrie, *Histoire de Chypre*, 3, pp. 647-9. For 'Vassa', see Mas Latrie's comment, p. 648 n. 7.

the king was further enhanced by the fact that the two men both married sisters of King Hethoum I of Cilician Armenia (1226-69). Henry probably married Stephanie of Armenia in 1237, but the date of John's marriage to her sister Maria is uncertain. It appears to have taken place before 1241, and W.H. Rudt de Collenberg was probably correct to assume that it was celebrated at about the same time as the king's.²¹

The early 1240s saw the effective end of the attempts by the emperor Frederick II's officers to rule in the Latin East. Since the early 1230s Ibelin-controlled Acre had faced Hohenstaufen-controlled Tyre in an uneasy truce. Both sides were waiting for their opponents' vigilance to falter in the hope of gaining the advantage. In 1241 John of Jaffa had been involved with some of the other leaders in the Ibelin camp in a diplomatic move to break the deadlock by proposing that Frederick appoint his own wife's brother-in-law and John's cousin's cousin, Simon of Montfort earl of Leicester, as his lieutenant in the East, but nothing had come of that proposal.²² The next year John was a participant in the Ibelin-led campaign which ended with the expulsion of Frederick II's men from Tyre. The leaders in this military action were his kinsmen Balian lord of Beirut and Philip of Montfort, and John own role seems to have been comparatively modest.²³ After 1242 he disappears from view. In June 1247, when he next turns up in the surviving sources, he appears with the title of count of Jaffa and lord of Ramla.²⁴

For a man whose career had until this point been centred largely on the kingdom of Cyprus, the acquisition of the county of the Jaffa marked a major change in direction. From now on John devoted much of his energy to defending his county and playing a leading role in the political life of the kingdom of Jerusalem. It should not be assumed that Jaffa was an especially desirable acquisition. In 1244 the Christians had suffered a crushing defeat near Gaza at

21. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Ibelin', pp. 205-6. For the marriage of Henry and Stephanie, 'Eracles', p. 408. The earliest evidence for it comes in a papal letter of Nov. 1237 addressed jointly to the king and queen of Cyprus. Gregory IX, *Registres*, ed. L. Auvray (Paris, 1890-1955), no. 3950.

22. P. Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule in Syria', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 59 (1986), p. 22 and note 11.

23. For the date (1242 and not 1243 as used to be believed), Jackson, 'End of Hohenstaufen Rule', pp. 23-6; D. Jacoby, 'The Kingdom of Jerusalem and Collapse of Hohenstaufen power in the Levant', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 40 (1986), 83-8. For John's role, 'Documents relatifs à la successibilité au trône et à la régence', *RHC Lois*, 2, pp. 400-1; 'Gestes', pp. 734-5; 'Chronique d'Amadi', in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. R. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1891-3), 1, pp. 195-6.

24. Mas Latrie, *Histoire de Chypre*, 3, p. 647.

the hands of the Egyptians and their Khwarizmian allies, and in the same year the Muslims retook Jerusalem. As the port for Jerusalem, Jaffa must have suffered the economic consequences of its loss, and to make matters worse the surrounding countryside now lay wide open to marauders. Apart from Ascalon, which was to fall to the Egyptians in 1247, Jaffa was the most southerly Christian-held stronghold in the kingdom and so increasingly liable to come under pressure from Muslim troops operating from Egypt or Kerak.

Back in the 1190s it had been assigned as dower for whichever of Henry of Champagne's daughters should marry the eldest son of King Aimery of Cyprus.²⁵ It was in Muslim hands for several years after 1197, and, despite its recovery by the Christians, the town appears to have remained largely in ruins until the late 1220s. It is unfortunate that our sources say very little about Jaffa's status in law and in particular about who was entitled to possess it. In the 1980s Professor Hans Mayer and I debated these and related matters.²⁶ I now believe that Jaffa continued to be regarded as Alice of Champagne's dower until her death, and that at some point in the late 1230s it was she who entrusted its custody to her son-in-law, Count Walter of Brienne. Walter had married Maria, Alice's daughter and King Henry I's sister, in 1235.²⁷ At that time Maria was next in line of succession to the crown, and as Henry's marriage to Stephanie of Armenia was childless, Maria would have continued to be regarded as heiress-presumptive until her death which occurred at some point during the 1240s.²⁸ There was thus a real possibility that Walter might have become king-consort of Cyprus. So Jaffa was important enough to be entrusted to the care of one of the highest ranking nobles in the Latin East. It should, however, be pointed out that as it was her dower property Alice could not alienate it permanently, since on her death it would have to pass to her heir. Accordingly any title to Jaffa that Walter may have acquired must have been of a strictly temporary nature. Some contemporaries and many modern writers have taken to describing him as the 'count of Jaffa', but it is my view that this title, with its connotations of full and

25. *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)*, ed. M.R. Morgan (Paris, 1982), p. 177; 'Les Lignages d'Outremer', p. 444.

26. Mayer, 'Ibelin versus Ibelin' (as note 4), pp. 25-57; P.W. Edbury, 'John of Ibelin's Title to the County of Jaffa and Ascalon', *English Historical Review*, 98 (1983), pp. 115-33; H.E. Mayer, 'The Double County of Jaffa: One Fief or Two?', in P.W. Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement* (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 181-90; H.E. Mayer, 'John of Jaffa, his Opponents and his Fiefs', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 128 (1984), pp. 134-63. I shall return to these questions in my forthcoming study, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Woodbridge, 1997).

27. 'Eracles', p. 403.

28. Edbury, 'John of Ibelin's Title', p. 125 note 1.

heritable possession, was never his. Jaffa was a county and Walter was a count: maybe the confusion over his status arose from these facts.²⁹ In 1244 Walter was captured in battle by the Egyptians, and he died some time later a prisoner in Cairo. Then in 1246 Alice of Champagne died,³⁰ and Jaffa came into the possession of her son, King Henry I.

We know from a papal letter dated March 1252 that it was Henry who gave John the county of Jaffa and that in so doing he was giving away what was his.³¹ Henry would thus have made the grant between his mother's death and June 1247, the earliest documented appearance of John as count. But the circumstances that had prompted this grant are not made clear. Perhaps, as Jonathan Riley-Smith has suggested, it was part of a series of alienations to leading nobles in Latin Palestine designed to buy their acquiescence for Henry's accession to the regency of the kingdom in 1246.³² (The regency was well worth bargaining for since it conferred control of Acre, the wealthiest city anywhere in the Latin East, on its occupant.) But the situation may have been more complex. John was, as we have seen, a powerful noble in Cyprus, but, although his relatives were leading figures in the mainland kingdom, he himself seems not to have been prominent there, and so maybe it was not so necessary for Henry to secure his support. On the other hand, Jaffa was of vital strategic importance, and Henry needed someone of comparable stature to Walter of Brienne to take charge there. As his close kinsman and leading vassal, John would have seemed the ideal choice. But the seriousness of the task in hand may have meant that John would not agree simply to holding Jaffa at Henry's pleasure as a sort of glorified castellan. If Henry wanted John to take responsibility for its defence, he would have to confer it on him and his heirs as a permanent possession. Henry also had to revive for their benefit the long dormant title of count of Jaffa and Ascalon, a title which in the twelfth century had normally been held by the heir to the throne of Jerusalem. As John himself was to point out in his treatise, the county of Jaffa and Ascalon was considered to be the premier barony of the kingdom.³³

John would have been in his early thirties when in 1246 or 1247 he became count of Jaffa, a position he was to hold for the remaining twenty years of his life.

29. For a fuller discussion of this point, see my forthcoming study cited above at note 26.

30. 'Gestes', p. 741.

31. Mas Latrie, *Histoire de Chypre*, 3, pp. 649-50.

32. Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 214-15.

33. 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', pp. 417-18, cf. pp. 419, 422.

However, in 1268, less than two years after his death, his county fell to the Muslims. Thereafter John's descendants lived in Cyprus where for about another century they continued to employ their comital title.³⁴ It was during his final years that John wrote his great legal treatise. Into it he poured a life-time's experience of law and court procedure acquired, as he himself explained, in the High Courts of both Jerusalem and Cyprus.³⁵ During his career he had doubtless engaged in law suits on his own account, but it seems clear from his writings that he had frequently been chosen to represent other litigants. After 1246 he would have presided over his own seigneurial court at Jaffa, and, as regent of Jerusalem from 1254 until 1256, he would have been responsible for conducting business in the High Court in Acre. But in the light of the preceding discussion, it is probably not too fanciful to suggest that many - perhaps most - of his court appearances before 1246 had been in the High Court of Cyprus.

During the next three centuries John's treatise was clearly valued on the island. Of the five surviving medieval manuscripts, three contain definite indications that they were being kept there in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries.³⁶ Although two of the five were copied in Acre shortly before it fell to the Mamluks in 1291, it is possible that two of the others, both evidently of fourteenth-century date, were produced in Cyprus.³⁷ In 1369, in the aftermath of the murder of King Peter I, it was decided that a revised version of John's treatise should be prepared for use as a work of reference in the Cypriot High Court, and as late as 1531 the Venetian authorities in Cyprus were arranging for the treatise - though interestingly enough not the 1369 text - to be translated into Italian.³⁸

There is thus a certain irony in the fact that when he came to write his treatise, John chose to concentrate on the legal institutions of Latin Palestine. As

34. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les Ibelin', pp. 206-21.

35. 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', p. 325.

36. Venice: Marciana MS fr. app. 20 (=265); Oxford: Bodleian MS Selden Supra 69 (= Selden no. 3457); Rome: Vatican MS Cod. Vat. lat. 4789. See M. Grandclaude, 'Classement sommaire des manuscrits des principaux livres des assises de Jérusalem', *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, ser. 4, 5 (1926), pp. 457, 461, 462; J. Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans: Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIVe et XVe siècles)* (Paris, 1962), pp. 123-4. The other two medieval MSS (Paris: BN MS fr. 19025 and MS fr. 19026) could well have been kept in Cyprus too.

37. The two 14th-cent. MSS possibly copied in Cyprus are the Bodleian MS Selden Supra 69 and the Paris: BN MS fr. 19026. For the Acre MSS (Marciana MS fr. app. 20 and Paris: BN MS fr. 19025), P.W. Edbury and J. Folda, 'Two Thirteenth-Century Manuscripts of Crusader Legal Texts from Saint-Jean d'Acre', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 57 (1994), pp. 243-54. The Vatican Cod. Vat. lat. 4789 is a luxury product of the 15th century. Whether it was copied in the West or by western craftsmen who had come to Cyprus is unknown.

38. Grandclaude, *Étude critique*, pp. 81-4.

he explained in the rubric to the prologue to its earliest recension, the book concerned the 'assises et des usages et des plais de la Haute Cort dou reiaume de Jerusalem'.³⁹ But later on he makes it clear that it was writing for the benefit of those intending to plead the High Courts of either Jerusalem or Cyprus.⁴⁰ But these references to Cyprus give the appearance of being something of an afterthought, and the sparsity of allusions to Cyprus in the rest of the treatise reinforces this impression. The Cypriot High Court and the law as administered there are mentioned in passing on a handful of occasions, and almost invariably John was informing his readers that things were the same there as in Jerusalem.⁴¹ Only once, in chapter 155, did he indicate a contrast between the law and custom of the two kingdoms: in Cyprus grants of fiefs are normally to the recipient and heirs descended from him and his espoused wife, whereas in Jerusalem some fiefs have been granted to the recipient and any heir.⁴²

The fact that John decided to focus on the High Court of Jerusalem is probably in itself a reflection of the extent to which he had concentrated his own political and legal activities in Syria and Palestine in the last two decades his life. Even so, in view of his continuing links with Cyprus his decision to do so might at first sight seem strange. He may, however, have had a particular reason. In the prologue to his treatise he described the legal system in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and he drew his remarks to a close by explaining that it was important for the barons and other *riches homes* with rights of *cour et coins et justise* to know the laws and usages of the kingdom.⁴³ A lord with *cour et coins et justise* had a complete legal franchise within his lordship: he had a seigneurial court for his own men in which he could validate his own acts; he could exercise rights of high justice over them and over all the other residents in his lordship, and he also

39. 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', p. 21 note 4. For the earliest recension, as represented by the Paris BN MS fr. 19025 (=Beugnot's MS C) and by the Oxford: Selden Supra 69, see Grandclaude, 'Classement sommaire', pp. 441-8. No two MSS of John's text contain an identical text. For the various recensions, see Grandclaude, 'Classement sommaire', pp. 440-53; P.W. Edbury, 'The *Livre des Assises* by John of Jaffa: the Development and Transmission of the Text' in J. France (ed.), *The Crusades and their Sources* (forthcoming).

40. 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', pp. 46, 51. See also the unpublished chapter belonging to the earliest recension: BN MS fr. 19025, fo. 208v; Oxford: Selden Supra 69, fo. 291r.

41. 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', pp. 56, 68-9, 183, 245, 308, 396. The references to Cyprus at pp. 362, 383, 430 are in passages that were not part of John's original treatise but were added later.

42. 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', pp. 233-5. Note the additional references to Cyprus in some MSS as indicated in the apparatus. The chapter is adapted from chapter 29 of the treatise by Philip of Novara: 'Le livre de forme de plait', *RHC Lois*, 1, pp. 503-6.

43. 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', p. 27, cf. p. 31. In the origin version of the treatise the chapters numbered 1-5 in the printed edition were grouped as a single prologue.

controlled the burgess courts. What John was saying was that these lords needed to know the law and the procedures of the High Court as they should be applying them in their own seigneurial courts. One of his purposes in writing his treatise was thus to educate his fellow lords and thereby promote a measure of uniformity between their courts. In Cyprus, however, there were no lords with the franchise of *court et coins et justise*. Indeed, no lord held a castle or fortified town, and so there were no lordships of the type familiar in the kingdom of Jerusalem or, for that matter, the principality of Achaëa. Individual vassals owned rural estates, but in no case was public justice delegated to them. The Lusignan kings had retained a monopoly over the administration of justice, and in this and other respects they had succeeded in inheriting much of the substance and concept of Byzantine public authority.⁴⁴ So John's objective of promoting good practice in the seigneurial courts was irrelevant so far as Cyprus was concerned.

So why was John's treatise owned and read in Cyprus? One reason might have been the prestige of its author and the continuing presence of his descendants on the island. Another may have lain in the comprehensive and magisterial treatment of its subject matter. There is no doubt that people then, as now, did find the treatise impressive: not only did it continue to be read in Cyprus, but in the fourteenth-century sections from it were adapted in Frankish Greece for inclusion with the so-called *Assises de Romanie*.⁴⁵ The reputation of the John's treatise was such that later generations sought to fill in gaps in his discussion by interpolating passages from other works, notably the treatise by Philip of Novara who described the law as administered in the High Court of Cyprus.⁴⁶ But probably the chief reason, and also the most obvious, for the continued appeal of John of Jaffa's *magnum opus* on the island was that it was accepted that the law and customs and legal procedures of Jerusalem applied equally in the High Court of Cyprus, and so much of what he had had to say applied there with equal force. John's contemporary, Geoffrey Le Tor, had made this point explicitly in the introduction to his own short treatise when he wrote of matters being determined 'par les assises et par les bons usages et les bones costumes dou reyaume de Jerusalem, les queles l'on doit tenir ou reyaume de Chypre'. Another contemporary, Philip of Novara, had said the same: 'l'om est tenu en Chypre de tenir les us et les assises dou royaume de Jerusalem'.⁴⁷ This

44. For further discussion, Edbury, *Kingdom of Cyprus*, pp. 21, 185.

45. D. Jacoby, *La féodalité en Grèce médiévale: les "Assises de Romanie": sources, application et diffusion* (Paris and The Hague, 1971), pp. 43-4, 51-2, 70, 87, 90, 104-7.

46. See P.W. Edbury, 'Philip of Novara and the Livre de forme de plait' forthcoming in the proceedings of the Third International Congress of Cypriot Studies (held in Nicosia in April 1996).

47. Geoffrey Le Tor, 'Livre', *RHC Lois*, 1, p. 444; Philip of Novara, p. 478, cf. p. 523. See also, 'Document relatif au service militaire', *RHC Lois*, 2, p. 428.

meant that precedents from the High Court of Jerusalem could be cited in the Cypriot High Court, although, as Philip of Novara was careful to explain, only with the court's express permission.⁴⁸ There is also at least one example of a litigant using a Cypriot precedent in the High Court of Jerusalem.⁴⁹ So although John of Jaffa wrote primarily with the Kingdom of Jerusalem in mind, his treatise was indeed of value to practitioners in the High Court of Cyprus. The fact that it was adopted as an official work of reference in 1369 and translated into Italian at the behest of the Venetian authorities in the 1530s testifies to its abiding importance.

48. Philip of Novara, p. 524.

49. P.W. Edbury (ed.), 'The Disputed Regency of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1264/6 and 1268', *Camden Miscellany*, 27 (= Camden 4th series, vol. 22), pp. 24-5, 27-8.

IX

Law and Custom in the Latin East: *Les Letres dou Sepulcre*

Both John of Ibelin count of Jaffa and Philip of Novara include accounts of the 'Letters of the Sepulchre' in their treatises on Latin Syrian legal institutions and the workings of the High Court. In his version of the story, Philip of Novara began by explaining that there was a lot of uncertainty about the enacted law, or *assises*, in the Kingdom of Jerusalem; he then continues:

Things could be done much better and settled far more satisfactorily in the Kingdom of Jerusalem before the land was lost. For all the *assises* and good usages and good customs, that is to say any usage of great authority, were written down and kept in the Holy Sepulchre, and people called them the 'Letters of the Sepulchre' because each *assise* and usage and custom was written out separately on a large and splendid piece of parchment (*en un grant parchement franchois*). And also there were the usages and *assises* relating to the *cour des bourgeois* along with those of the High Court. And each piece of parchment bore the seal and sign manual of the king and the patriarch and also of the viscount of Jerusalem. And they were all written out in large ornate letters, and the initial letters were illuminated in gold and all the rubrics were in red. The usages and the customs which were put into writing came into being after much discussion, deliberation, enquiry and thought. For after the first *assises* were made at the conquest of the land, it often happened that when a large number of wise men arrived on pilgrimage the king and the patriarch together with the leading pilgrims and the vassals of the kingdom made new *assises*, usages, and customs, and in

some cases, if it was thought beneficial, they abrogated some of the earlier ones. And if any *assise* was made with good intent but some people out of malicious subtlety devised a trick whereby it could be circumvented, the trick would be countered and an amendment brought in to stop it. There were many cases which touched on the jurisdiction of the Church, and so the Church of Jerusalem made an agreement that, if certain cases came before it, it would not invoke the *decretum*, decretals, or laws but would judge according to the usages and *assises* of the land. And the king and his men were bound to the Church in many matters, much to their common advantage. And whenever it happened that there was an argument in the court concerning an *assise* or usage, so that it was necessary to see the documents, the chest wherein they were kept could be opened by the hands (*a mains*) of nine people: the king or one of his leading men acting on his behalf; two of his liege men; the patriarch or the prior of Sepulchre in his stead; two of his canons; and the viscount of Jerusalem and two *jurés* of the *cour des bourgeois*. And all this I have heard recounted by many who had seen it before the 'Letters' were lost, and from many others who knew all about it, some of whom were those who had had charge of the 'Letters' at some time. And all was lost when Saladin took Jerusalem, and never again was an *assise*, usage, or custom written down. . . .¹

The point of the story is that after 1187 people in the East had no way of establishing precisely what royal legislation had decreed and so were incapable of telling which elements in law and court procedure had come into being as the result of a deliberate expression of royal will as enshrined in an *assise*, and which were simply a matter of custom and precedent; in any case, the distinction between enacted law and customary law had always been blurred.

It has to be remembered that Philip of Novara and John of Ibelin were writing in the 1250s or 1260s, 70 years after Saladin's conquests. Furthermore, the tale they tell and the wording of their versions of the story are close, and it is my belief that John had adapted the material he found in Philip's work for his own use. In other words, the two accounts are not independent of each other. Indeed, in the original version of his

1. Philip of Novara, 'Livre de Philippe de Navarre', *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades* (hereafter *RHC*), *Lois*, Vol. I, pp. 521-2, cf. p. 536; John of Ibelin, 'Livre de Jean d'Ibelin', in *RHC*, *Lois*, Vol. I, pp. 25-6.

treatise, John had made no mention of the 'Letters' at all; the story only appears in a later revision he made when he incorporated a number of passages from Philip's work into his own.² But the account of the 'Letters of the Sepulchre' that these two authors give has in the main been accepted by modern historians. Among those to have given it credence was the father of modern research into Latin Syrian legal literature, Maurice Grandclaude, and he has been followed by, among others, John La Monte, Jean Richard, Joshua Prawer, and Jonathan Riley-Smith.³ So far as I am aware, in recent years only Hans Mayer has expressed doubts about its authenticity.⁴ As I shall now explain, my own view is that the 'Letters of the Sepulchre' never existed and that Philip of Novara's story was a piece of legal fiction concocted in the mid-thirteenth century in response to a particular problem then facing the ruling clique in the Latin kingdom.

My chief objection to the story of the 'Letters' is simply that it does not make sense. The documents were supposedly being kept in a public place — indeed in a place of the utmost significance in the life of the kingdom — and yet, as described by Philip of Novara and John of Ibelin, they were not a public archive. The fact that they were kept heavily under lock and key meant that it was not a question of having the laws of the kingdom available for consultation so that litigants could examine the actual texts of the *assises* when preparing their cases. The chest in which the 'Letters' were kept would be opened when and if the court deemed it necessary after litigation had begun,

2. The passage concerned is not found in the two manuscripts which represent the earliest recension: Oxford: Bodleian Library: Ms Selden Supra 69, fol. 3r, col. 1; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Ms fr. 19025, fol. 3v, col. 2 (= var. 'C': see John of Ibelin, p. 25, n. 42). The printed edition in effect gives the revised version. See M. Grandclaude, 'Classement sommaire des manuscrits des principaux livres des assises de Jérusalem', *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, ser. 4, 5 (1926), 440-50, 455-62.
3. M. Grandclaude, 'Liste d'assises remontant au premier royaume de Jérusalem (1099-1187)', *Mélanges Paul Fournier* (Paris, 1929), pp. 329-30; J.L. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100 to 1291* (Cambridge, MA, 1932), p. 166; id., 'Three Questions concerning the Assises de Jerusalem', *Byzantina-Metabyzantina*, 1 (1945), 204-8; J. Prawer, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: European Colonialism in the Middle Ages* (London, 1972), p. 122; id., *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford, 1980), pp. 10, 354, 359; J. Richard, *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, trans. J. Shirley (Amsterdam-New York-Oxford, 1979), pp. 67-8, 252, 409; J. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (London, 1973), p. 133.
4. H.E. Mayer, *The Crusades*, trans. J. Gillingham, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1988), p. 161. For earlier sceptics, see La Monte, 'Three questions', 205.

and the opening of the chest had to be in the presence of nine specified individuals. But if the archive could only be consulted under the auspices of the court, then why was it not kept in the court itself? Furthermore, why go to all the trouble of assembling the nine representatives and adjourning to the Holy Sepulchre to carry out an inspection of the texts of laws which themselves had originally been promulgated in the High Court or at assemblies at which the members of the High Court were joined by clergy, visiting pilgrims, and other notables? We may wonder why, if the 'Letters' had proved so useful in the decades before Saladin's conquests, new legislation after 1187 was not officially preserved, and also why there was no serious attempt at a reconstruction of what had been lost. King Aimery (1197-1205) is said to have tried to get Ralph of Tiberias to record what he knew of the laws and customs, but Ralph had demurred,⁵ and it would seem that the matter was thereupon allowed to drop. We may also wonder what actually happened to the 'Letters'. Jerusalem was not sacked in 1187; if the 'Letters' were really as important as all that, why were they not salvaged at the time of the surrender or retrieved subsequently?

Would the twelfth-century kings of Jerusalem have kept a record of their legislation in the way Philip of Novara described? In the West Frederick Barbarossa and Roger II of Sicily and his heirs did preserve legislative codes, but their counterparts in France and England seem not have done so. What we know of the surviving texts of legislation from the Kingdom of Jerusalem is not very helpful in this respect. In January 1120 an assembly consisting of King Baldwin II, the patriarch of Jerusalem, and the leading clergy and laity met at Nablus and issued a series of 25 decrees. Most, though not all, were concerned directly with moral or ecclesiastical questions. The Nablus decrees were certainly important. William of Tyre informs us that in his day (1170s – early 1180s) they were readily available in the archives of many churches, and indeed the surviving text is derived from the copy made for use in the church at Sidon. In this instance, therefore, it would seem that the overwhelmingly ecclesiastical nature of the decrees meant that the bishops acquired copies for their own use; whether there was an 'official' copy lodged in a chest in the Holy Sepulchre is not stated anywhere.⁶ William himself preserves the text of the taxation decree of

5. Philip of Novara, p. 523. Cf. John of Ibelin, p. 430.

6. *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, ed. G. Mansi, Vol. 21, new edn. (Paris, 1767), pp. 261-6; William of Tyre, *Chronicon*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Turnhout, 1986), pp. 563-4. See H.E. Mayer, 'The Concordat of Nablus', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 33 (1982), 531-43.

1183, agreed in an assembly comprising the nobles, clergy, and people, but here again there is no allusion to any official copy being preserved for posterity. As chancellor of the kingdom William probably had played a part in its drafting, and in any case, as one of the collectors, he would have had his own copy.⁷ It may be worth noting in passing that, although in his history William made considerable use of records from his archiepiscopal archive, he gives no indication that, although he held the office of chancellor, he had access to any collection of royal records.

There are other grounds for suggesting that in matters of secular law, the leaders of lay society preferred to rely on memory rather than on written record. In 1251 the leading figures in the East were still arguing as to whether the High Court should keep records of its day-to-day judicial business; in England, by comparison, plea rolls are extant from as early as 1194. However, as Michael Clanchy has explained, it was only in the thirteenth century, with its much greater emphasis on written title and written authority, that in England reliance on the collective memory of custom and practice began to count for less.⁸ Perhaps significantly nothing came of the 1251 discussions: justice for litigants in the High Court remained dependent on what those vassals who took the trouble to attend could recollect from previous hearings.⁹

Philip of Novara's account, however, does provide circumstantial evidence which might be thought to argue for the authenticity of the 'Letters'. On closer inspection, however, many details in his story raise problems of their own. For example, would kings of Jerusalem have allowed the patriarchs and the viscounts to join in affixing their seals to the texts of the laws in what seems to have been in effect royal letters-patent? In any case the description of the documents accords ill with twelfth-century chancery practice; they are made to sound far more like folios from the illuminated manuscripts being produced in Acre in the later thirteenth century.¹⁰ The idea that the Courts Christian would have been prepared to suspend the operation of canon law in favour of the secular law of Jerusalem in certain circumstances sounds also unlikely. Philip goes on to assert that he knew about the 'Letters' from people

7. William of Tyre, pp. 1044-6.

8. M.T. Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1306* (London, 1979).

9. 'Abrégé du Livre des Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois', *RHC, Lois*, Vol. II, pp. 246-50; Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 133-4.

10. For Acre manuscripts, see J. Folda, *Crusader Manuscript Illumination at Saint-Jean d'Acre, 1275-1291* (Princeton, 1976), pp. 21 *passim*.

whose memories stretched back to before 1187 and who had seen them. Here we are up against a different problem: much of what Philip wrote about himself in his history of the war with the Hohenstaufen would seem to have been exaggerated and fanciful;¹¹ are we to take this claim too with a pinch of salt? I should be more confident about accepting what Philip has to say about his informants if there was evidence for the existence of the 'Letters' from nearer 1187. The provision for inspecting the contents of the chest is another element in the story that invites scepticism. Unfortunately Philip's wording leaves it uncertain as to whether the chest had nine locks to which each of the listed individuals had a key or simply whether all nine had to be present when it was opened. Nine locks does seem rather excessive. On the other hand, the keeping of valuables or muniments in chests with more than one lock was common in the Middle Ages. For example, Ernoul tells us that in the mid-1180s the royal regalia kept at the Holy Sepulchre was in a chest with at least two keys with separate key-holders; maybe it was a memory of this arrangement that helped provide the inspiration for the story of the 'Letters'.¹²

Twelfth-century kings of Jerusalem certainly legislated on a wide range of topics.¹³ But did they preserve their enactments in a locked chest in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in the manner described? If I am right, and the 'Letters of the Sepulchre' were no more than a myth, the question must then be faced as to why Philip of Novara, and, after him, John of Ibelin should have felt the need to perpetrate it. Partly, I suspect, the answer lies in the same change of atmosphere that Clanchy has described with reference to England: custom and precedent were no longer held to be sufficient; what was wanted was documented authority, and if there was no documented authority then its absence had to be explained. But it is possible to offer a hypothesis which would furnish a much more specific context for the emergence of this myth.

11. P.W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 48-9, 54, 56-7, 70. Cf. P. Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule in Syria', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 59 (1986), 22-3.
12. M.R. Morgan (ed.), *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)* (Paris, 1982), pp. 32-3. Cf. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy*, pp. 181-2. For instructions that chests with three locks be placed in churches to receive money for crusading purposes, see S. Schein, *Fidelis Crucis: The Papacy, the West and the Recovery of the Holy Land, 1274-1314* (Oxford, 1991), p. 39.
13. Grandclaude, 'Liste d'assises', *passim*; Richard, *Latin Kingdom*, pp. 68-71, 298, n. 20.

In the second quarter of the thirteenth century the leaders of Latin Syrian society had had to close ranks to defend their interests against the emperor Frederick II. As is well known, the Ibelins led the anti-imperial party, and Philip of Novara was one of those who came to prominence at this period under their patronage. In their struggle against the Hohenstaufen the Frankish nobles sought to justify their actions, notably by means of a tendentious re-interpretation of a twelfth-century law, the *Assise sur la ligece*, and they also persistently manipulated the principles governing the regency of the kingdom to suit their own interests.¹⁴ They based their position on an appeal to legal custom and precedent, and some of their number, notably Philip of Novara and John of Ibelin, were recognized as experts in this subject. But their expertise and the bases on which their party's behaviour in the political arena had been set came to be challenged from an entirely different direction. A steady influx of immigrant nobles and knights from France had always served to augment the ranks of the local aristocracy. For example, early in the thirteenth century the Montbéliard and Brienne families had made their mark. Philip of Montfort, already a close kinsman of the Ibelins, had arrived with the crusading army led by Thibaut of Champagne in 1239, and at around the same time lesser but significant figures such as Peter of Avallon and James Vidal gained an entrée into the Latin Syrian nobility.¹⁵ This French element was reinforced during the sojourn of King Louis IX and his crusaders in the East between 1248 and 1254. Several of his entourage remained after his departure. Thus John of Valenciennes was already lord of Haifa by 1257 and played a major role in the politics of the Latin East until the mid-1260s.¹⁶ Geoffrey of Sergines, another of Louis's intimates during his crusade, stayed in the East until his death in 1269 as the commander of the permanent garrison the king had founded in Acre, and he rose to become seneschal of the kingdom and *bailli*. Two other veterans of Louis's crusade, Oliver of Termes, who succeeded Geoffrey as commander of the

14. Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, Ch. 7-8 *passim*.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 37, and n. 103 (p. 247). For Peter of Avallon, see also John of Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, ed. N. de Wailly (Paris, 1874), Chs. 41, 84.

16. Joinville, Chs. 91, 92, 112; *Regesta Regni Hierosolomytani* (hereafter *RRH*), compiled by R. Röhrich (Innsbruck, 1893-1904), Nos. 1259, 1269, 1271, 1297a, 1338 and n. 2.

French garrison, and Erard of Valery, also made names for themselves in the East in the 1260s.¹⁷

It is not at all clear whether the Ibelins perceived this French element in Latin Syria as a threat to their own political ascendancy. But the presence of these people did stimulate a challenge to the interpretation of the customary laws as administered in the High Court. In the *bailliage* disputes of the mid-1260s, Hugh of Brienne argued that since those who had established the usages of the kingdom in the aftermath of the First Crusade were French, the custom of the Kingdom of Jerusalem ought to conform with that of France and, where Jerusalemite custom differed from French custom, French custom should prevail.¹⁸ Similar sentiments were expressed a few years later by James of Ibelin in a speech denying the liability of Cypriot knights to answer feudal summons to service in Palestine.¹⁹ It was a clever argument, and one which could be brought into play whenever a litigant believed that French custom might bolster his chances of winning his case and which could be quietly forgotten if not. Although it failed to carry the day in either of the two instances in which we know that it was employed, the argument could well have unsettled the Latin Syrian jurists; there were enough people of French birth who were members of the High Court of Jerusalem and who would have been familiar with the contrasting customs of their homeland.

So how was the conflict of laws to be explained? People in the thirteenth century had little appreciation of the ways in which custom was continually evolving with the constant establishment of fresh precedents, but they did know that conscious acts of legislation had the effect of superseding existing practices. As already noted, the problem was that they could not always distinguish those elements in the law that had come into being as the result of an *assise* and those that were simply a matter of usage. John of Ibelin and Philip of Novara both had to admit that ignorance of the *assises* meant that in practice no


17. Joinville, Chs. 2, 37, 59, 60, 62, 72, 74, 86, 111, 112, 123; *RRH*, Nos. 1221, 1269, 1291a, 1297a, 1298, 1317c, 1318, 1322, 1324-5, 1332a, 1338-9, 1343-4, 1347-8, 1350, 1352, 1364; J. Riley-Smith, *What Were the Crusades?* (London, 1977), pp. 65-70; Richard, *Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*, pp. 377-9; C.J. Marshall, 'The French Regiment in the Latin East, 1254-91', *Journal of Medieval History*, 15 (1989), 302-4.

18. P.W. Edbury, 'The Disputed Regency of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1264/6 and 1268', *Camden Miscellany*, 27 (= Camden Society, 4th ser., Vol. 22, 1979), 25, 31, 37, 40-41, cf. 28, 34, 38.

19. 'Document relatif au service militaire', *RHC, Lois*, Vol. II, p. 431.

distinction could be made between the two categories.²⁰ The rejoinder to an appeal to French custom was that the rulers of Jerusalem had issued their own laws. But where were these laws? Why could the Latin Syrian jurists not produce them? The answer was to insist that a whole corpus of legislation had indeed existed and moreover that it had been hallowed by being kept within the sacred precincts of the Holy Sepulchre; since 1187, however, it had been lost for ever.

20. Philip of Novara, p. 521; John of Ibelin, pp. 182-3.



THE "LIVRE" OF GEOFFREY LE TOR AND THE "ASSISES" OF JERUSALEM

It is convenient, if somewhat misleading, to refer collectively to the medieval treatises on feudal custom which survive from the Latin East as "the *Assises* of Jerusalem". These treatises are an assemblage of unofficial writings on the legal institutions and procedures of the High Courts of Jerusalem and Cyprus, written in French by men who were living in the East and who had firsthand experiences of their workings. For the most part the treatises date from the mid-thirteenth century. The longest and most famous, those by John count of Jaffa (died 1266) and his contemporary, Philip of Novara, discuss in detail the amalgam of customary and enacted law which was applied in both kingdoms, concentrating on those aspects which relate to the tenure of fiefs and the obligations arising from such tenures. These authors were recording something of their own legal knowledge and dispensing advice on how to plead, but at the same time they were setting forth views on the relationship between the kings and their vassals and hence were expressing an interpretation of the constitutional position of the monarchy.¹

1. The treatises were collected and edited by Comte A. BEUGNOT in *R[ecueil des] H[istoriens des] C[roisades]. Lois*, I (Paris 1841). They have been widely discussed,

Less well known much briefer are the texts attributed to Geoffrey Le Tor. Although published by Comte Beugnot in 1841 and discussed by the distinguished French historian, Maurice Grandclaude, in the 1920s,² they have not attracted much attention, and their affinity with the other legal treatises warrants some attention. Two separate texts by Geoffrey survive. A manuscript now in Venice, the basis of Beugnot's ms. 'A', contains 32 chapters 'd'usages et d'assises de la haute court dou reiaume de Jerusalem, que Mesire Jofrei le Tor, qui esteit tenu à moult bon plaideor et ancien chevalier, mist en un sien livre...'.³ A Paris manuscript, Beugnot's ms. 'B' contains 19 chapters of which chapters 7 and 8 are identical to chapters 9, 10 and 11 in 'A'. These are the only chapters in common.⁴ The 'B' text begins with a formal introductory chapter and then continues with a discussion of the nature and implications of homage, but it is difficult to see any plan to the 'A' text. Thus for example, the laws governing the *bailliage* are discussed in the first chapter and again in chapter 18.⁵ Grandclaude suggested that the 'A' text comprised extracts from a larger work,⁶ but it is more likely to be simply a collection of notes. Neither text makes any pretence to offer a comprehensive summary of feudal customs.

Chapters 6 and 7 of the 'A' text are evidently related to two chapters appended to one of the surviving manuscripts of Philip of Novara's legal treatise. These were edited by Beugnot as chapters 54 and 55 of Philip's work; chapter 54 is particularly close to Geoffrey's chapter 6, although Geoffrey's version is longer, containing a number of phrases absent from the other. Philip's chapter 55 is less close to Geoffrey's chapter 7, and

notably by M. GRANDCLAUDE (see note 2 below). For the treatises as statements of constitutional theory, see J. RILEY-SMITH, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (London, 1973). For treatises on burgess law from the Latin East, published in *RHC Lois*, II, see J. PRAWER, *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford, 1980).

2. Geoffrey's treatises are edited as "Livre de Geoffroy Le Tort", *RHC Lois*, I, 433-50. See M. GRANDCLAUDE, *Étude critique sur les livres des Assises de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1923); *idem*, "Classement sommaire des manuscrits des principaux livres des Assises de Jérusalem", *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, sér. 4, v (1926).

3. Geoffrey LE TOR, p. 435. See GRANDCLAUDE, "Classement sommaire", pp. 460-62, 474.

4. Geoffrey LE TOR, pp. 437-8, 446. See GRANDCLAUDE, "Classement sommaire", pp. 459-60.

5. Geoffrey LE TOR, pp. 435, 440.

6. GRANDCLAUDE, "Classement sommaire", p. 460.

towards the end it diverges from it completely.⁷ It must surely be more than just coincidence that two chapters with totally unrelated subject-matter should be juxtaposed in two different works. Whereas it is possible that the redactor of the chapters added to the end of the one copy of Philip's treatise may have drawn on Geoffrey's work, leaving out those phrases he judged unnecessary, it is extremely unlikely that Geoffrey had taken his version and expanded it. More probably, both writers drew on a common original.

On the other hand it does seem certain that Geoffrey derived the final eleven chapters of his 'A' text from Philip of Novara.⁸ Here Geoffrey's phrasing is more concise than Philip's, and his dependence on Philip can be convincingly demonstrated by comparing his own chapters 30 and 31 with Philip's 52 and 53.⁹ On the other hand, Philip is scarcely likely to have allowed his own discussion to take its looser form if he had been deriving his material from Geoffrey's writings. In chapters 52 and 53 Philip was summarizing his own previous discussion of the advantages accruing to the vassals from the *Assise sur la ligece*.¹⁰ But in these later chapters he missed an important application of the *Assise* –action by peers when a vassal is imprisoned without *esgart*– although he had discussed this point earlier.¹¹ In chapter 30 Geoffrey listed six instances in which the *Assise* could be applied, including the application missed by Philip; in all the other cases his wording was similar to Philip's, and the instances followed in the same order.¹² In chapter 31 Geoffrey described how the *Assise* was to be applied, and again the wording is close.¹³ In this chapter Geoffrey, by adding the phrase 'ou c'il ne peut venir', had allowed for the possibility of the vassal being prevented from conjuring his peers in person, as would have been the case had he been in prison, and so that aspect of the *Assise*

7. Geoffrey LE TOR, pp. 436-7; Philip of NOVARA, "Livre de forme de plait", *RHC Lois*, I, 529-30. See GRANDCLAUDE, "Classement sommaire", pp. 431-2 (although his comments here are misleading).

8. Geoffrey caps. 21-2 = Philip cap. 2; Geoffrey caps. 23-6 = Philip cap. 10; Geoffrey cap. 27 = Philip cap. 12; Geoffrey cap. 29 = Philip cap. 18; Geoffrey caps. 30-1 = Philip caps. 52-3; Geoffrey cap. 32 = Philip cap. 28.

9. Geoffrey LE TOR, pp. 442-3; Philip of NOVARA, pp. 527-9.

10. Philip of NOVARA, pp. 510, 516-18.

11. Philip of NOVARA, p. 517, see pp. 531-2.

12. Clause 1 = Philip of Novara, cap. 52, p. 527 lines 1-4; clause 2 = cap. 52, p. 527 line 4 - p. 528 line 1; clause 3 = cap. 52, p. 528 line 9; clause 4 = cap. 52, p. 528 lines 10-14; clause 6 = cap. 53, p. 528 lines 1-3.

13. Philip of NOVARA, cap. 52, p. 528 lines 1-8.

which Philip had omitted was taken into account. Of Geoffrey's six instances, five were described by Philip earlier in his treatise,¹⁴ and the fact that these five follow in the same sequence both earlier and in chapters 52 and 53 is further evidence that Geoffrey had a version of Philip's work before him and was improving upon it.

But Geoffrey's 'A' text contains material which is not in Philip's treatise, and so it cannot be seen as totally derivative. In particular Geoffrey noted that the *bailliage* was not heritable and described the penalties for failure to perform homage.¹⁵ So he would appear to have obtained a copy of Philip's work and to have précised or rephrased those chapters in it which for some reason caught his fancy. It has further been suggested that the opening chapters of the 'A' text were written up as a commentary on the regency disputes in the kingdom of Jerusalem which had arisen in the mid-1260s.¹⁶ He was therefore writing later than Philip of Novara, and, more specifically, probably after about 1265. On the other hand, Geoffrey's 'A' text most likely pre-dated the additional chapters found in one manuscript of Philip's work. These cannot be dated with any precision, although a possible *terminus a quo* is provided by the fact other additions at the end of the same manuscript refer to events in the 1270s.¹⁷ It is perhaps also significant that there is no direct evidence for Geoffrey knowing John of Jaffa's legal treatise, apparently composed in 1265-6.¹⁸

Although better organized, Geoffrey's 'B' text would appear to pre-date the 'A' text. In addition to the chapters common to both, there are six others in the 'B' text which deal with subjects also covered in 'A'. But Geoffrey's treatment of his subject-matter in 'B' is less comprehensive and so probably earlier. This can best be seen by comparing 'B' chapter 19 with 'A' chapter 22; had Geoffrey already written chapter 22, it is unlikely that he would have later dealt with the same subject so inadequately.¹⁹ A

14. Clauses 1-2 = Philip of NOVARA, cap. 39, p. 516; clause 4 = cap. 40, p. 517; clause 5 = cap. 41, p. 517; clause 6 = cap. 42, p. 518.

15. Geoffrey LE TOR, pp. 436-8.

16. RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 123, 219. For this dispute, see P.W. EDBURY, "The Disputed Regency of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1264/6 and 1268", *Camden Miscellany*, XXVII (1979) (= Camden Fourth Series, 22), 1-47.

17. Philip of NOVARA, pp. 530-1.

18. GRANDCLAUDE, *Étude critique*, p. 88.

19. Geoffrey LE TOR, pp. 440-1, 450; compare also 'B' caps. 6, 11, 12 (pp. 446,

terminus ante quem for the 'B' text is provided by the fact that five chapters appear to have been used by James of Ibelin in his treatise which can be securely dated to 1276.²⁰

* * *

Geoffrey Le Tor was a member of a knightly family which had been settled in the kingdom of Jerusalem since the twelfth century. The earliest known member of his family, another Geoffrey, appears as a witness to charters issued by King Baldwin II in 1125 and 1128.²¹ A second Geoffrey Le Tor, who was married to a woman named Flandrina, flourished between the late 1150s and the 1180s. His principal fief was at a place named 'Manueth' (al-Manawāt), a few kilometers to the north of Acre. He was clearly a man of some standing, although in 1183 'to pay his debts and enable him to retain the rest of his fief' he sold a group of other estates to Count Joscelin of Edessa.²²

Geoffrey II had a son, also named Geoffrey, and the two men served King Guy of Lusignan at the time of the siege of Acre (1189-91).²³ In the early thirteenth century a John Le Tor came to prominence. It is not clear whether he was a grandson or a younger son of Geoffrey II and Flandrina, but he evidently inherited 'Manueth' which in 1212 he sold to the Hospitallers. In 1212 John held the office of viscount of Acre, and in 1215 he was sent to Rome by the king of Jerusalem, John of Brienne, to act as his lay representative at the Fourth Lateran Council.²⁴

Geoffrey, the author of the legal writings, was John's son. He is first found in 1222 as a witness to a diploma issued by John of Brienne.²⁵ Then in 1229, shortly after the return of the emperor

447-8) with 'A' cap. 20 (p. 442); 'B' cap. 13 (p. 448) with 'A' cap. 12 (pp. 438-9), and 'B' cap. 17 (p. 449) with 'A' cap. 5 (p. 436).

20. Geoffrey LE TOR, pp. 448-50 ('B' caps. 14, 16-19); James of IBELIN, "Livre", *RHC Lois*, I, 463-5, 467 (caps. 47-50, 68). For the date of James' treatise, see RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 127.

21. *R[egesta] R[egni] H[ierosolymitani 1097-1291]*, compiled by R. RÖHRICHT (Innsbruck, 1893; *Additamentum*, 1904), nos. 105, 121.

22. *Tabulae ordinis Theutonici*, ed. E. STREHLKE (Berlin, 1869), no. 16; *RRH*, nos. 468, 624, cf. nos. 339, 366, 465, 467, 504, 601, 614, 653, 684; John of IBELIN, p. 422.

23. *RRH*, nos. 683-4, 690, 693, 696-7, 702, cf. no. 624.

24. *RRH*, nos. 857, 858a, cf. nos. 777, 829; "L'estoire de Eracles empereur et la conquete de la Terre d'Outremer", *RHC Historiens occidentaux*, II, 319. For John and his descendants, see "Les Lignages d'Outremer", *RHC Lois*, II, 464-5.

25. *RRH*, no. 953.

Frederick II to the West, he was sent to the emperor to tell him of Alice of Champagne's claim to the regency of Jerusalem and to request that Conrad come to the East.²⁶ In the civil war between the imperial supporters in the East and the Ibelins he emerged clearly as a partisan of the latter,²⁷ and in 1236 he was again sent to the West on a diplomatic mission, this time at the behest of the Ibelin-dominated Commune of Acre. At that time he was said to be living in Cyprus since, although he had been born in the kingdom of Jerusalem, King Henry I had given him a large fief there; the chronicler adds that later he became chamberlain of Cyprus.²⁸ Exactly when he became chamberlain is not known, although he was in office by 1247.²⁹ In 1257 he was named as a member of a three-man arbitration tribunal to settle differences between the Master of the Hospitallers and Prince Bohemond VI of Antioch.³⁰ He does not appear in the surviving documents from the Latin East after that date, although the internal evidence of his legal writings strongly suggests that he lived for about another decade.

From the rather sketchy evidence at our disposal, it would seem that Geoffrey was an able man who was entrusted with important and responsible public duties and who turned his hand to writing about legal matters towards the end of his life. His espousal of the Ibelin cause in the civil war of 1229-33 would have brought him into close contact with both Philip of Novara whose treatise he utilized and the other great legal writer of the mid-thirteenth century, John count of Jaffa. Geoffrey married twice: a son by his first marriage is said to have died at Mansourah, presumably in 1249 at the time of St Louis' crusade to Egypt; by his second marriage he had a son named John who in his turn was to enjoy a certain prominence in public affairs in the kingdom of Cyprus.³¹

The younger John Le Tor was attending the High Court of

26. "Eracles", p. 380. For this episode, see RILEY-SMITH, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 174-5.

27. *RRH*, no. 1049; "Eracles", p. 394.

28. "Eracles", pp. 406-7.

29. *RRH*, no. 1154.

30. "Inventaire des pièces de Terre Sainte de l'ordre de l'Hôpital", ed. J. DELAVILLE LE ROULX, *Revue de l'Orient latin*, III (1895), no. 305.

31. For Geoffrey's marriages and genealogy, see Codex Vaticanus latinus 4789, fo. cclxxxix col. 2 (correcting the printed version in "Lignages", p. 464).

Cyprus by the late 1280s.³² In the political crisis of 1306-10 he evidently began by supporting the usurper, Amaury of Tyre,³³ but in 1310 he was able to assume the role of an elder statesman and was active in negotiating a settlement after Amaury's murder.³⁴ Thereafter, until his death at some point between 1319 and 1326, he was high in the counsels of King Henry II. He was a witness to the marriage contract of the king's sister, Maria of Lusignan, and King James II of Aragon agreed in 1314, and to the marriage contract of the king's cousin, Isabella of Ibelin, and Ferrand of Majorca the following year.³⁵ He is last known in 1318-19 when he was an ambassador to the pope.³⁶

The Le Tors were therefore a middle-ranking family of feudatories who in the course of two centuries had regularly held high office and played an active part in public affairs. Their origins are unknown, and, from the spellings employed in the formal documents, it would seem that there was uncertainty as to whether their surname meant 'the Bull' (*taurus: le tor*) or 'the Crooked' (*tortus: le tort*). During the second quarter of the fourteenth century the family disappears from view, probably having failed in the male line. But to have survived for so long and to have produced ambassadors to the West in three successive generations, not to mention a viscount of Acre (and hence president of the burgess court) and a chamberlain of Cyprus, required ability in legal affairs. It was therefore only natural that they should have interested themselves in the law, and, in an environment in which other prominent figures were recording their understanding for the benefit of their peers, not surprising that one member of the family should have made an attempt at writing about it.

32. *RRH*, nos. 1461, 1518; A. de CAPMANY y de MONTPALAU, *Memorias históricas sobre la marina, comercio y artes de la antigua ciudad de Barcelona* (Madrid, 1779-92), II, 57.

33. "Documents chypriotes du début du XIV^e siècle", ed. C. KOHLER, *Revue de l'Orient latin*, xi (1907-8), 442; "Chronique d'Amadi", ed. R. de MAS LATRIE in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi* (Paris, 1891-3), I, 250, 305.

34. "Amadi", p. 369 ('prodo homo et vechio cavalier').

35. J. Ernesto MARTINEZ FERRANDO, *Jaime II de Aragón. Su vida familiar* (Barcelona, 1948), II, no. 153; L. de MAS LATRIE, "Nouvelles preuves de l'histoire de Chypre", *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes*, xxxiv (1873), 63.

36. Pope John XXII, *Lettres communes*, ed. G. MOLLAT (Paris, 1904-47), nos. 7966-7, 7974, 8532, 9947. Cf. *ibid.*, no. 24525 for evidence that he was dead by 1326. John Le Tor had a son named Geoffrey who is known only from the "Lignages" (p. 464). GRANDCLAUDE (*Étude critique*, p. 148) supposed that it was this man rather than his grandfather and namesake who was the author, but for chronological reasons this belief would seem unlikely.


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THE LUSIGNAN KINGDOM OF CYPRUS AND ITS MUSLIM NEIGHBOURS

I. The Mamluk invasion of 1426

On 7 July 1426 an invading army from Egypt inflicted a crushing defeat on the Cypriot forces at Khirokitia. Casualties were heavy. The king of Cyprus, King Janus (1398-1432), fell captive and was taken away to Cairo. The Egyptian troops had already sacked the town of Limassol, and they went on to occupy and pillage Nicosia and many other places besides. At Cairo Janus had to suffer public humiliation, but in due course he was ransomed, and for a few years he was able to resume his rule. Henceforth the Mamluk sultans of Egypt kept Cyprus under tribute and obliged Janus's successors to acknowledge their suzerainty. This tribute was to have a long history. There were numerous attempts at renegotiation, and the Egyptian rulers eventually agreed to fix it at 8,000 ducats per annum. After the demise of the Lusignan royal family later in the fifteenth century, the Venetian authorities in the island continued to pay up, and when, early in the sixteenth century, Egypt came under Ottoman rule, the Venetians had to send the money to Istanbul instead.

But Egyptian suzerainty was more than simply a matter of exacting money. The invasion had left the Lusignan regime permanently impoverished. Henceforth people in Cyprus looked anxiously in the direction of Cairo, fearing an adverse reaction, every time any political change occurred in the island. In 1440 and again in 1443, the Cypriots even had to allow the Mamluk fleets that were being sent against the Knights of St. John in Rhodes to requisition provisions and fresh water.



From P. W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374*.

The invasion of 1426 came as the culmination of a series of attacks launched against Cyprus by the Sultan Barsbay. In 1424 his forces had raided the south coast and overran Limassol, though apparently they failed to take the castle. In 1425 a larger expedition followed a similar pattern, raiding the coast between Famagusta and Limassol, routing the Cypriot forces sent against them, and again attacking Limassol. In 1426 the Muslim forces were larger still. Although at least one Muslim writer claimed that Barsbay was seeking revenge for Peter I's sack of Alexandria which had taken place as long ago as 1365,¹ there can be little doubt that the immediate cause of these punitive attacks was the persistent use of Cyprus by Christian pirates. These pirates, many of them from Catalonia, had been pillaging the coastlands of Egypt and Syria and preying on Egyptian merchant shipping in the eastern waters of the Mediterranean.

The events of the 1420s and the later history of relations between Cyprus and Cairo are topics that deservedly hold considerable interest. But what I find striking is not that the Mamluk sultanate should inflict this heavy blow when it did, but that something similar had not happened much earlier. Why up until the 1420s had Cyprus been largely free from Muslim attack? Why had no Muslim ruler ever launched a similar invasion during the previous 230 years of rule by the Lusignan dynasty or indeed at any time since the Emperor Nicephoros Phocas had reasserted Byzantine imperial authority as far back as 965? It is on the question of how this freedom from Muslim attack during the two and a half centuries before 1426 is to be explained that I shall focus attention in this paper.

II. The importance of naval power

Between 965 and the usurpation of Isaac Ducas Komnenos in the

1. M. M. Ziada and J. L. La Monte, «Bedr ed-Din al-Aini's account of the conquest of Cyprus», *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves* 7 (1939-44), 242-3. For the events of the 1420s making full use of the Arabic sources, A. Darrag, *L'Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay 825-841/1422-1438* (Damascus 1961), chapter 7.

mid-1180s, Byzantine rule in Cyprus had been sustained by a strong naval presence, reinforced by control, at least for most of this period, of the southern coast of Anatolia. What mattered was Byzantine maritime supremacy. As the Arab geographer, Muqaddasī, writing in 985, put it, «The island is in the power of whichever nation is overlord in these seas».² However, from about the year 1180 the Byzantine navy went into a marked decline. As recently as 1169 an imperial fleet of 200 warships had been able to attack Egypt, and in 1177 Byzantine envoys were taking the initiative in proposing another assault in conjunction with the king of Jerusalem. But a few years later the authorities in Constantinople found they could take no effective action against Isaac Ducas Komnenos after his seizure of power—a Byzantine fleet sent against him was defeated by the Sicilian naval commander Margaritone in 1187—and, after the Latin take-over in 1191 and the establishment of Lusignan rule in 1192, the Byzantine emperors proved incapable of intervening.³ More seriously, the continued decay of the imperial navy meant that in 1203 the Greeks could not prevent the Venetian fleet bearing the army of the Fourth Crusade from advancing on Constantinople itself.

The end of Byzantine rule in Cyprus therefore followed close on the heels of the loss of Byzantine naval hegemony in the waters around the island. But Muqaddasī's dictum, that «the island is in the power of whichever nation is overlord in these seas», was no longer applicable. Henceforth naval dominance ceased to be the preserve of any one state. Rather, it was shared among the merchant communities of the various Italian cities and the other western trading nations, and, as is well known, their commercial rivalries frequently gave rise to bitter conflict. The kings of the Lusignan dynasty valued the presence of these western merchants in Cyprus and were prepared to give them exemptions from tolls and other concessions, but, at least until their war with the Genoese in the 1370s, the monarchs were able to retain their freedom of action

2. C. D. Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria* (Cambridge 1908), 5.

3. C. M. Brand, *Byzantium confronts the West 1180-1204* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 5, 172. For 1177, William of Tyre, *Willelmi Tyrensis Archiepiscopi Chronicon*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Turnhout 1986), 981-5.

and avoid allowing any of these maritime powers to dominate them. Unfortunately our information is rather sketchy, but it would seem that the Lusignans, like the kings of Jerusalem before them,⁴ did not themselves maintain warships on a permanent footing. When they did need to deploy a naval arm, they would seem to have leased the vessels required and their crews from western shipowners. For example, we know that they employed naval commanders of undoubted Italian extraction such as Lanzarotto in the 1290s, or Angelo of Arezzo, the captain of King Hugh IV's Smyrna galleys, in the 1350s.⁵ A Cypriot galley in the 1290s had a mixed crew of Syrians, Pisans and Venetians, and Leontios Machairas records Genoese and Pisans among the crews serving in Peter I's fleet in the 1360s.⁶

But although no single power ruled the seas around Cyprus, it is nevertheless true that it was western European shipping that continued to be in the ascendant. It was this ascendancy that had made possible the flow of supplies and reinforcements that sustained the crusaders in the Holy Land and along the Levantine littoral for most of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and in the process the merchants of Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Marseilles and elsewhere prospered. This ascendancy also had the effect of constricting Greek and Muslim merchant shipping by making large-scale ventures neither safe nor profitable. Indeed, on occasion Muslims and Greeks had their merchandise transported in western ships. That way it was less likely to fall into the hands of the corsairs who infested the eastern Mediterranean and, more espe-

4. J. H. Pryor, *Geography, technology, and war: Studies in the maritime history of the Mediterranean, 649-1571* (Cambridge 1988), 122-4.

5. «Nouvelles preuves de l'histoire de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan», ed. L. de Mas Latrie, *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes* 34 (1873), 44; Pope Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes et curiales* ed. P. Gasnault *et al.* (Paris 1959-), nos. 2019, 2087.

6. «Les Gestes des Chiprois», *R[ecueil des] H[istoriens des] C[roisades]. Documents arméniens*, ii, p. 830; Leontios Makhairas, *Recital concerning the sweet land of Cyprus entitled «Chronicle»*, ed. R. M. Dawkins (Oxford 1932), §§ 145-6. There were, however, ship-building facilities at Famagusta. J. Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans. Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIVe et XVe siècles)* (Paris 1962), 38-49.

cially, the Aegean.⁷ However, from the late twelfth century onwards, as more of the lands bordering the Mediterranean came under Muslim control, so the threat to the security of Cyprus increased. Essentially, this threat could take one of two forms. On the one hand, there was the fear that a Muslim ruler might launch a sea-borne invasion, such as indeed happened in the 1420s; on the other, there was the danger that corsairs would prey on the coasts of Cyprus or on ships in Cypriot waters or in the shipping lanes linking Cyprus to the West and so deter western merchants from taking the risk of trading there. Any major disruption to the main arteries of trade could easily result in merchants ceasing to come on a regular basis. If that were to happen, the island's prosperity would suffer; the crown would lose the revenue that might otherwise be spent on defence, and Cyprus would become ever more vulnerable to direct attack.

III. The Turkish threat to Cyprus and the routes from the West

Safeguarding the trade routes to Europe and keeping corsairs at bay was without doubt a matter of major concern for the Lusignan kings. Western dominance of east-west trade in the Mediterranean from the twelfth to the fifteenth century was facilitated by Christian control of the lands along the way. The prevailing winds and currents mean that for ships sailing between Europe and the Holy Land it is easier to take the more northerly route—calling at the ports of southern Greece, Crete, Rhodes and Cyprus and passing thence to Beirut or Tripoli—than a southerly course parallel to the shores of north Africa. Christian domination of the coasts along this northerly route had the effect of making it difficult for Muslim corsairs to operate at any point along its length. However, the collapse of Byzantine authority in southern Anatolia following the fall of Constantinople to the Franks in 1204 enabled the Seljuk Turks of Konya to expand southwards and occupy Antalya (or «Satalia») as it was known to western writers in the middle ages)

7. Pryor, *op. cit.*, 159-60.

in 1207 and Alaya a few years later.⁸ Potentially therefore the Turks could threaten Christian shipping plying between western Europe or the Aegean on the one hand and Cyprus and the Holy Land on the other. It therefore comes as no surprise to find that in the turmoil which engulfed the whole region with the break-up of the Byzantine empire after the Fourth Crusade the regent of Cyprus, Gautier of Montbéliard, sought to safeguard the approaches to Cyprus by seizing control of Antalya and also, according to one source, the island of Rhodes. He was unsuccessful. But in the years that followed the Seljuks, who were kept fully occupied by their land-based neighbours and who suffered a crippling blow at the hands of the Mongols in the early 1240s, seem to have been more interested in using their ports for legitimate trade than as bases for a sea-borne extension of the *jihad* against Christendom. In the second decade of the thirteenth century they concluded a commercial treaty with King Hugh I of Cyprus, and it is not until 1292 that a Cyprus-based attack on the Turkish port of Alaya provides evidence of renewed hostility.⁹ Even so, in the years around 1300, a steady if limited amount of trade between Cyprus and Antalya and Alaya continued to be transacted.¹⁰

In the fourteenth century the depredations of Turkish shipping operating from the ports on the southern and western coasts of Anatolia constituted a much graver threat than previously. By then the Seljuk sultanate had given way to the more militant *ghazi* emirates, and by the 1320s the Turks were inflicting major damage on Christian shipping in the Aegean and in the seas between Cyprus and Rhodes. King Hugh IV (1324-59) and his son Peter I (1359-

8. *Ibid.*, 6-7, 20-2, 37-8, 54-7, 70-1, 95.

9. A.G.C. Savvides, *Byzantium in the Near East: its relations with the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum in Asia Minor, the Armenians of Cilicia and the Mongols, AD. c. 1192-1237* (Thessaloniki 1981), 78-9, 139-45; Pryor, *op. cit.*, 165-7; P. W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge 1991), 42-3, 102.

10. *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto*, ed. M. Balard (C[ollana] S[torica di] F[onti e] S[tudi], 39; Genoa 1983), nos. 69, 70, 72; ed. V. Polonio (CSFS, 31; Genoa 1982), no. 125; ed. R. Pavoni (CSFS, 32; Genoa 1982), nos. 112, 132, 145, 153, 169, 173, 187; ed. R. Pavoni (CSFS, 49; Genoa 1987), 4, 96, 187; ed. M. Balard (CSFS, 43; Genoa 1984), nos. 36 (p. 56), 84 (p. 153).

69) took steps to counter this Turkish challenge. Unfortunately the Cypriot chronicles give few details of events during Hugh's reign, and so our knowledge of his activities is limited, but in 1337 the pope was congratulating him on what would seem to have been an important victory over the Turks, and a few years later a German visitor to Cyprus, Ludolf of Sudheim, noted that Alaya, Anamur, Siq and Antalya—in other words a substantial section of the Turkish-held coastlands of southern Asia Minor—paid the Cypriots tribute. Hugh also participated in succession of naval leagues involving the Papacy, the Knights of St. John in Rhodes and the Venetians which for thirty years, from the early 1330s onwards, tried to curb Turkish depredations in the Aegean, and which in 1344 succeeded in wresting Smyrna from Turkish control.¹¹

In the 1360s Peter I furthered his father's policy. In August 1361, not content simply with taking tribute, he seized the town of Antalya by assault. He then installed a garrison, which later in 1361, in 1362 and in 1370 successfully resisted Turkish counter-attacks, and he also raided the coast between Myra and Siq and re-imposed the tribute on the local emirs. In the previous year, 1360, he had responded to a plea from the Christian Armenian inhabitants of Korykos (Gorhigos) to take over responsibilities for the defence of their city. By capturing Antalya Peter had occupied what was probably the most important trading centre on the southern coast of Anatolia and a useful port of call for ships sailing between Cyprus and the West. By taking control there, he was not just preventing its use as a base for Turkish corsairs but was strengthening his life-line to Europe.¹² However, this positive, forward policy could not be sustained. In 1373, faced by imminent Genoese invasion, Peter's namesake and successor, Peter II, relinquished control of Antalya to the Turks. Then, in 1375, the last vestiges of the Cilician kingdom of Armenia succumbed to Muslim pressure. Although the Cypriots continued to hold on to Korykos

11. Benedict XII, *Lettres closes et patentes intéressant les pays autres que la France*, ed. J.-M. Vidal and G. Mollat (Paris 1913-50), no. 1673; L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris 1852-61), ii, 216; Edbury, *op. cit.*, 157-60.

12. Edbury, *op. cit.*, 163-4.

until 1448, from the 1370s the Turks were the undisputed masters of the Anatolian coast. Cyprus, weakened by the calamitous war with Genoa of 1373-4, was accordingly far more vulnerable to attacks from the north, such as the raids around the coast from bases in the emirate of Karamania reported as occurring in 1450 and 1451.¹³ Nevertheless, the seriousness of the Turkish threat to the island's security is difficult to gauge. Largely this is a result of the unevenness and intractability of our sources. Leontios Machairas records action taken against Turkish pirates in Cypriot waters in the 1360s, but the surviving narratives for medieval Cypriot history are rarely as detailed as they are for that decade, and we are left uncertain as to whether their silence at other periods reflects an absence of Muslim piratical activity or its perennial presence. Earlier our sources are more voluble on the subject of Christian piracy, with tales of spectacular raids on settlements near the Cypriot coast in 1196, 1302 and 1312.¹⁴ However, although potentially the Turkish occupation of southern Anatolia constituted a threat to the security of Cyprus itself and of shipping in the approaches to the island, and although in 1383 there was even talk of an offensive alliance between the Genoese and the emir of Karamania specifically directed at Cyprus,¹⁵ there was never at any time any real prospect of a full-scale Turkish assault on the island.

IV. The threat from Egypt

But though the Turks of Anatolia could and did threaten the trade routes between Cyprus and the West, and though Cypriot kings

13. Leontios Machairas, §§ 366-9; J. Darrouzès, «Notes pour servir à l'histoire de Chypre (quatrième article)», *Κυπριακαὶ Σπουδαὶ* 23 (1959), 43-4.

14. *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)*, ed. M. R. Morgan (Paris 1982), 162-5; «Chronique d'Amadi», ed. R. de Mas Latrie in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi* (Paris 1891-3), i, 238, 393-4, cf. p. 398 (1316).

15. R. Cessi, «Venezia e i Regni di Napoli e Sicilia nell'ultimo trentennio del secolo XIV», *Archivio Storico per la Sicilia Orientale* 7 (1911), 328 (cited by E. A. Zachariadou, «The early years of Ibrahim I Karamanoglu» forthcoming — I thank Professor Zachariadou for her kindness in sending me a copy of the typescript of her paper); S. Mangiante, «Un consiglio di guerra dei Genovesi a Cipro nel 1383», *Atti della Società Ligure di storia patria* 77 (1963), 255-62.

could on occasion take vigorous action to curb Turkish depredations, there can be no doubt that it was successive rulers of Egypt who were in the position to pose a far greater threat to Cypriot security. In 1171 a young military commander of Kurdish extraction named Saladin overthrew the ailing shi'ite regime of the Fatimid caliphs. He then proceeded to unite Egypt and Syria under his rule, and he almost, but not quite, crushed the crusader kingdom of Jerusalem at the battle of Hattin in 1187. In 1193 he died, and his family, known to posterity as the Ayyubids, divided his lands among them. His successors in Egypt remained powerful until in 1250 they fell victim to a *coup d'état* staged by members of their own high command. Then, from 1250 until 1517, the military regime that we call the Mamluk sultanate held sway. Theirs was a system of government in which army commanders succeeded one another as sultans —each change frequently accompanied by a good deal of blood-letting— and in which hereditary succession could only assert itself fitfully. In 1260 the sultan of Egypt was able to take charge in Syria, and for the next two and a half centuries his successors ruled an empire that extended northwards to the Euphrates and encompassed Egypt, Syria and Palestine and included suzerainty over the Islamic Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina. The sultanate was wealthy and powerful: in the later thirteenth century it was to stem the tide of Mongol advance and put an end to the crusader states of the Levantine littoral, and it maintained its hegemony until in 1516-17 it collapsed in the face of superior Ottoman military technology. By comparison with the might at the disposal of the Ayyubids or the Mamluks, Cyprus under the Lusignans was tiny and vulnerable.

What was more, successive rulers of Egypt had good reason to want to take punitive measures against the Lusignan kingdom. In the thirteenth century Cyprus became both a base for crusading expeditions directed against Egypt and a source of supply and reinforcement for the crusaders in the Holy Land. In 1248-9 King Louis IX of France over-wintered in the island where he assembled men and supplies before launching his ill-fated assault on Egypt, and on numerous other occasions during the thirteenth century Cypriot troops participated in campaigns against Muslim forces in Syria and Palestine. Nobles in the kingdom of Jerusalem such as

the lords of Beirut or the counts of Jaffa had estates in Cyprus and used their Cypriot resources to help defend their mainland possessions. So too did the great military Orders, the Templars and the Knights of St. John. From 1269 the king of Cyprus was also titular king of Jerusalem; earlier in the century Lusignans had frequently acted as regent in Acre (Akko), the capital of the kingdom now that Jerusalem itself was in Muslim hands. In 1291 Acre and the other remaining Christian-held cities of Syria and Palestine fell to the Mamluks. Cyprus provided a place of refuge. Also, as the most easterly outpost of western Christendom, it was viewed as a springboard for any future recovery of the Holy Land. Around 1300 the Cypriots and the Mongol Ilkhans of Persia were threatening joint action against the Mamluks in Syria and, from their headquarters in Cyprus, the Templars attempted to hold a bridgehead on the Syrian coast by occupying the off-shore island of Ruad near Tortosa (the modern Tartus). At the same time the king of Cyprus, in conjunction with the pope, was calling for an economic blockade of the Mamluk ports in the hope of undermining the Egyptian economy and so making a reconquest of the Holy Land feasible. More dramatically, in 1365 King Peter led a crusade which sacked Alexandria, and in the war that followed he sent his fleet against the ports of Syria. Peace was not made until 1370. In 1403 Marshal Boucicault again used Cyprus as a base for an assault on the Mamluk coast.¹⁶

With so much provocative activity and so much hostile intent being generated in Cyprus, it might be supposed that the Ayyubids and Mamluks would have taken reprisals. In fact, before 1400 there are only two known instances of Egyptian fleets being sent against the island. In 1220, during the Fifth Crusade, a fleet of twenty Muslim galleys burnt a number of pilgrim ships at Limassol with the loss, so we are told, of 13,000 lives.¹⁷ In 1271 the Sultan Baybars

16. For details of these episodes (with the exception of the Boucicault expedition), Edbury, *op. cit.*, 74-107, 161-79 *et passim*.

17. «L'estoire de Eracles empercur et la conquete de la Terre d'Outremer», *RHC. Historiens occidentaux*, ii, 345-6 variants; *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris 1871), 429-30. This is presumably the incident alluded to, though without mention of Cyprus, in Oliver of Paderborn, «Historia Damiatina», ed. H. Hoogeweg, *Die Schriften des Kölner*

sent a fleet of eleven ships to attack Cyprus, apparently as a diversionary tactic against King Hugh III who had taken his forces to Acre. Fortunately for the people of Cyprus, they all ran aground on reefs near Limassol, and troops and crew numbering 1,800 men were taken captive.¹⁸ But after that there is nothing. Following the fall of Acre in 1291 there were a series of scares: the Christian chroniclers report that in the early 1290s the sultan al-Ashraf Khalil was planning an invasion; in 1306 one of the charges against King Henry II was that he had not done anything to prepare defences despite warnings of a threatened Mamluk assault; in 1308 the then ruler of Cyprus, Amaury of Tyre, told the pope that the sultan was building an invasion fleet of eighty galleys, and we know from other evidence that it was precisely at this period that Famagusta was being fortified; then in 1322 reprisals were threatened against Cyprus for the assistance given the Armenians when the port of Ayas fell to the Mamluks.¹⁹ For their part, the Cypriots had good reason to be apprehensive. During this period ships based in Cyprus had raided the Mamluk coasts and preyed on Muslim merchantmen; the rulers had promoted calls for a crusade to win back the Holy Land and had tried to enforce a commercial boycott of Mamluk ports; they had attempted, ineffectually it is true, to make common cause with the Ilkhans of Persia, and also, on a number of occasions, they had sent aid to the kingdom of Cilician Armenia which was suffering repeated hammer blows from the Mamluk armies.²⁰ But for all that, not one of the threatened

Domscholasters, späteren Bischofs von Paderborn und Kardinal Bischofs von S. Saniba, Oliverus (Tübingen 1894), 253; Roger of Wendover, *Flores historiarum*, ed. H. G. Hewlett (Rolls Series: London 1886-9), II, 261.

18. P. Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the thirteenth century* (London 1992), 207, 218.

19. 1290s: «Gestes des Chiprois», 820-1; «Amadi», 229-30. 1306: «Gestes des Chiprois», 859. 1308: *Vitae Paparum Avenionensium*, ed. S. Blauze, new edn. by G. Mollat (Paris 1914-27), III, 84-6. Famagusta: *Regesti Clementis Papae V*, ed. cura et studio monachorum Ordinis S. Benedicti (Rome 1885-92), no. 2736; «Amadi», 291, cf. pp. 326-7. 1322: Pope John XXII, *Lettres secrètes et curiales relatives à la France*, ed. A. Coulon and S. Clémencet (Paris 1906-72), nos. 1571-3, 1683, 1685, cf. nos. 1562, 1687.

20. Edbury, *op. cit.*, chap. 6 *passim*.

Muslim assaults on Cyprus materialised.²¹

When we move on to the 1360s and the reign of Peter I, we find that much the same thing happened. In 1365 Peter led a crusading fleet which captured and destroyed Alexandria. Without doubt this expedition was the most damaging assault on the Mamluk sultanate staged by a Christian army at any time in its history. During the next five years the Cypriots launched a series of attacks on Syria. The Mamluks reacted to the 1365 crusade by planning a counterattack on Cyprus. They set about building a huge fleet but then abandoned the whole operation. At Beirut, where they had had a well-defended shipyard specially constructed, the half-built ships were left to rot. Once again a threatened Muslim assault on Cyprus had failed to take place.²² But why?

V. The Pryor thesis

In 1988 Professor John Pryor put forward a convincing argument that goes a long way towards explaining the reason for Cyprus's near immunity from attack before 1291. Reduced to its essentials it is very simple: so long as the Christians held the coast of Palestine and Syria and so could deny the Muslims port-facilities, Cyprus was to all intents and purposes out of reach of a galley fleet based in Egypt. A study of climatic conditions together with an estimate of the amount of food and water that oared galleys could carry provides some idea of the extent of their operational range. Sailing in a straight line north from Egypt to Cyprus was not a practicable proposition. In view of the prevailing winds and currents the easiest and, in navigational terms, the most logical route was to claw up the coast of Palestine and turn west at some point between Beirut and Tripoli. The amount of space in the hold that could be allocated to water-storage and the time that

21. I ought to point out, however, that to the best of my knowledge there is no corroborative evidence from the Muslim sources for this period for plans to invade Cyprus.

22. D. Ayalon, «The Mamluks and naval power — a phase of the struggle between Islam and Christian Europe», *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities* 1 (1965), 6.

could elapse before putrefication rendered water undrinkable were the essential limiting factors. Progress would be slowed by the need to keep the galleys together, quite apart from any problems caused by adverse weather. At most a fleet could make a round trip from Egypt to about as far north as Beirut. In consequence, Christian shipping off the coast of Cyprus or sailing between Cyprus and Tripoli was extremely unlikely to encounter hostile Egypt-based warships.²³ The galleys that entered Cypriot waters in 1220 and 1271 must have been at the full limit of their range.

Pryor was not primarily concerned with Cyprus, but with the larger question of explaining Christian maritime supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. He points out that western merchantmen putting into Cypriot ports rarely sailed in a direct line to Acre or Jaffa through waters that might be exposed to Muslim naval patrols, but normally kept approximately due east, making landfall somewhere near Tripoli, and then followed the coast southwards within reach of land and a safe haven should hostile shipping threaten. The Third Crusade in 1191-2 followed by a mopping-up operation in 1197 re-established Christian control over virtually the entire coast northwards from Jaffa, thereby restoring Christian naval dominance after Saladin's conquests of 1187-8. It was not until the 1260s, when the Mamluks reconquered the Palestinian littoral south of the Templar castle at Athlit near Haifa, that the situation began to change. But even then, any advantage that the Muslims had won was offset by their scorched-earth policy which rendered the ports on that part of coast useless. It was only in 1291 with the final expulsion of the crusaders from Syria that the Mamluks acquired usable naval bases. For a whole century after the Latin conquest of Cyprus, from 1191 until 1291, Christian naval dominance of the eastern Mediterranean and Christian control of the mainland littoral combined to keep Cyprus almost totally free from attacks from Egypt.

But as Pryor readily admits, the logistical considerations he highlights do not provide a complete answer. Military necessity often meant that for both the Ayyubids and the Mamluks land-based warfare had to take priority. In any case Egypt lacked

23. Pryor, *op. cit.*, 9, 54-5, 71, 75-86, 95-6, 99, 113, 115-34 *passim*.

timber suitable for ship building, and the traditions of craftsmanship and indeed the navigational and other nautical skills needed if they were to possess navies that would be a match for those of Venice or Genoa could not be acquired easily. Though some Egyptian rulers, notably Saladin in the late 1170s and 1180s and Baybars in the 1260s and 1270s,²⁴ did have fleets, the ships themselves had a very short life-span, and there seems not to have been the continuous programme of refitting and replacement that was needed if the navy was to be kept up. It was also the case that throughout the history of the Mamluk sultanate, naval commanders and sea captains never acquired the same status as their land-based counterparts.²⁵

VI. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries

Once the Mamluks had gained possession of the entire Syrian coastline and so had acquired bases barely seventy miles away, the absence of war fleets with which they might threaten the island of Cyprus can no longer be explained in terms of the need for fresh water and similar logistical considerations. For an answer we have to look instead to the social and political structure of the Mamluk sultanate itself. The élite in the military establishment comprised cavalry regiments who scorned any individual or any group outside their own exclusive class. This Mamluk élite was based firmly in Cairo; it was there that power and promotion were to be gained, and men of ambition and ability did their best to avoid permanent posting to garrison duties elsewhere. So although their control of Syria lasted for two and a half centuries—they were thus far more successful than any of the ancient Pharaonic dynasties or any earlier Muslim regime in sustaining their rule there—military initiatives still had to emanate from distant Egypt. Accordingly, apathy towards the idea of deploying a navy, together with the lack of prestige accorded naval commanders, the absence of a nautical

24. A. S. Ehrenkreutz, «The place of Saladin in the naval history of the Mediterranean Sea in the middle ages», *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 75 (1955); Thorau, *op. cit.*, 99, 101, 203, 207-8.

25. Ayalon, *op. cit.*, 5-7. Cf. Ehrenkreutz, *op. cit.*, 116.

tradition, preoccupation with other theatres of war and the shortage of raw materials all have a part to play in our understanding of the failure of the Mamluks to maintain a permanent fleet during the fourteenth century. On top of all these considerations is the fact that at times the sultanate was hamstrung by political crises, and, indeed, it may well be that more than anything else it is the political instability of the period that explains the failure of the Mamluks to respond to the sack of Alexandria in 1365. What was more, during the conquest of Syria the Mamluks had deliberately and systematically applied a scorched-earth policy along the coast, with the result that only Beirut and Tripoli retained their former importance. Far from thinking in terms of using a navy to defend their own shore-line, they were destroying it, thus rendering it untenable and not worth attacking. In other words, they had turned their backs on the sea.²⁶

The other consideration that helps explain the Mamluk's reluctance to maintain a fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and take reprisals against Cyprus or other Christian possessions was the fact that their regime was able to share in the wealth generated by international commerce with the West.²⁷ Though there were attempts to impose a commercial boycott on the Mamluk ports following the fall of Acre, the measures employed were never effective, and, as the fourteenth century wore on, the curbs on western merchants trading in Egypt or Syria were relaxed. Trade with the West brought profit to the sultans, and so, while they were prepared to take draconian measures to extort money from the western merchants, they had no desire to bring that trade to a stand-still through waging a naval war against them or damaging their interests by attacking Cyprus. On the other hand, if as in 1365 the Christians did attack the lands of the sultanate, the sultan could order reprisals on those merchants who happened to be within his territory at the time even if he could not launch a counter-strike against the Christian bases whether in Cyprus or elsewhere. What happened in the 1360s was that Venice and Genoa in particular put Peter I under enormous pressure to make peace so that

26. Ayalon, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

27. E. Ashtor, *Levant trade in the later ages* (Princeton 1983).

they could secure the release of their people and resume their trade.²⁸

So what had changed so that in the 1420s the Sultan Barsbay could launch his invasion of Cyprus? On the one hand Cyprus was in a much weaker position than previously and lacked effective allies. The commercial prosperity of the fourteenth century had gone — the effect of changing trade routes and the economic depression triggered by the Black Death. The end of prosperity had been aggravated by the demands of the Genoese who had pillaged the island in the 1370s and extorted tribute since the 1380s.²⁹ The kings had less money to spend on defence, and, as a result of the Black Death and subsequent epidemics, a much reduced population from which to recruit their army. Nor could they expect any help from the western mercantile republics. The Genoese, who had occupied Famagusta since 1373, had no love for the Lusignans and in any case were not present in sufficient strength to intervene effectively. The Venetians were too deeply involved in trade with the sultanate to be able to afford to come to the aid of the Cypriots even if they had wanted to. By the 1420s they had emerged as the foremost trading nation in the eastern Mediterranean; their trade with Alexandria and Beirut far outdistanced any business they did in Cyprus, and they stood to lose too much if they attempted to thwart Barsbay's expeditions. In 1425 the Genoese and Venetian consuls in Alexandria were told that their merchants could continue to enjoy freedom to trade in the Mamluk sultanate provided they gave Cyprus no assistance.³⁰ No one else was in a position to take action to prevent the island's natural defence, the sea, from being breached.

On the other hand, it is more difficult to see what had changed

28. Edbury, *op. cit.*, 150-3, 168-71.

29. The amount of tribute paid the Genoese is to be the subject of a forthcoming article by Mlle. Catherine Otten. Meanwhile, see C. Otten, «Les institutions génoises et les affaires de Chypre», in M. Balard (ed.), *État et colonisation au moyen âge* (Lyon 1989), 167-78. By the 1400s the quality of the Cypriot coinage had deteriorated and the mint output had fallen noticeably. D. M. Metcalf, «The currency of Lusignan Cyprus in the years around 1400 in the light of a coin hoard excavated at Polis», *Report of the Cyprus Department of Antiquities* (Nicosia 1990), 241-84, esp. 241, 253.

30. Ashtor, *op. cit.*, 245-69 *passim*, 286-9.

in the Mamluk world to overcome the «hydrophobia» that had hitherto prevailed. Barsbay himself was a forceful ruler who would seem to have had a firmer political grip than any sultan for some considerable time, and it may have been his personal determination that was decisive. Nor should we underestimate the extent to which the Catalan depredations may have goaded the Mamluks into action.³¹ Cyprus-based piratical raids on the Mamluk coasts and on shipping frequenting Mamluk ports had been in progress since at least the beginning of the century, and, though in 1414 the Cypriots undertook to put a stop to them, nothing much seems to have been done.³² It is certainly true that in the fifteenth century the Mamluk sultanate made far more effective use of its naval resources than earlier. In addition to the assaults on Cyprus of the 1420s there were retaliatory raids launched against Rhodes in the 1440s, and in 1460 James the Bastard was given Egyptian ships and troops in his bid for the throne. James's gamble paid off: he was able to use the Mamluks to oust his half-sister and take power *and* he was then able to get the Egyptians off Cypriot soil with the result that they could not capitalize on this his episode to tighten their suzerainty over the island. Then, in the 1470s and '80s, as Cyprus was drawn into the web of Venetian policy in the eastern Mediterranean, the Mamluks started to become increasingly apprehensive about the growing power of the Ottomans. But that is another story.

31. Ashtor, *op. cit.*, 286-9, 294-6.

32. Leontios Machairas, §§ 46-7; «Amadi», 502; G. Hill, *A history of Cyprus* (Cambridge 1940-52), ii, 469. Hill's belief that Leontios's statement (§ 645) denotes Mamluk punitive expeditions against Cyprus in the years before 1414 is unlikely. It probably anticipates the events of the 1420s.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- 965 Nicephoros Phocas restores Byzantine rule in Cyprus
- 1171 Saladin inaugurates the Ayyubid regime in Egypt
- 1184 Isaac Ducas Komnenos usurps power in Cyprus
- 1187 Saladin defeats the crusaders at Hattin in Galilee and captures Jerusalem
- 1189-92 The Third Crusade
- 1191 Richard I of England conquers Cyprus; the Crusaders recover Akko (Acre)
- 1192 Beginning of Lusignan rule in Cyprus
- 1204 Fall of Constantinople to the army of the Fourth Crusade
- 1207 The Seljuk Turks occupy Antalya (Satalia)
- 1220 Muslim fleet attacks Christian ships at Limassol
- 1248-9 Louis IX of France in Cyprus preparing for his assault on Egypt
- 1250 The Mamluks topple the Ayyubids in Egypt
- 1260 Mamluk sultanate extends its authority to include Syria
- 1260-77 Reign of the Mamluk sultan Baybars
- 1271 Muslim fleet wrecked near Limassol
- 1291 Fall of Akko (Acre) and end of the crusader states in Syria
- 1337 Pope congratulates Hugh IV on his victory over the Turks
- 1344 Christian league (including Cyprus) captures Smyrna
- 1361 Peter I of Cyprus takes Antalya (Satalia)
- 1365 Peter I destroys Alexandria
- 1370 Peace restored between Cyprus and the Mamluks
- 1373-4 War between Cyprus and Genoa; the Genoese seize Famagusta; the Cypriots relinquish Antalya
- 1375 End of the kingdom of Cilician Armenia
- 1403 Marshal Boucicault raids Syria

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- 1424-6 Sultan Barsbay sends his fleet against Cyprus
- 1426 Battle of Khirokitia
- 1440, 1443 Mamluk fleet attacks Rhodes
- 1460 James II takes power in Cyprus with Mamluk aid
- 1489 The Cypriot monarchy ends; beginning of Venetian rule
- 1516-17 Fall of the Mamluk sultanate to the Ottomans

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The Crusading policy of King Peter I of Cyprus, 1359-1369

In October 1365 a fleet under the command of King Peter I of Cyprus sailed into Alexandria harbour and taking the authorities completely by surprise captured the city. A few days later, on the approach of an army from Cairo, it withdrew to Cyprus laden with booty.

This feat of arms marked the dramatic climax of Peter's military activities and was perhaps the most notable blow struck at the Mamluk empire by a Christian army at any time in its history. The ten years during which Peter occupied the throne of Cyprus saw an unprecedented burst of aggression from his base in what since 1291 had been the principal outpost of western Christendom in the eastern Mediterranean: Turkish shipping had been cleared from the seas; in 1361 the port of Satalia (Antalya) had been conquered, and then in 1362-1365 Peter himself was in the West to recruit the army with which he was to attack Egypt. The closing years of his reign witnessed a series of negotiations between Cyprus and the Mamluks, interspersed with raids along the coasts of Syria and Egypt from Ayas to Alexandria, and a second royal visit to the West. In January 1369 Peter was murdered by a group of his vassals, and peace was concluded in 1370.

Historians have generally taken the view that in 1365 Peter intended to win back the kingdom of Jerusalem of which he was titular king, either by conquest or by exchanging it for Alexandria and other acquisitions in Egypt. According to the commonly held opinion, Peter was 'dominated by one ruling passion, the prosecution of war against the infidel';¹ his expedition was 'a serious crusade to reconquer the Holy Land',² although 'it was the spirit of chivalry, rather than political thinking, which animated the expedition'.³ In retrospect we can see that if Peter believed he could restore the kingdom of Jerusalem, he was grossly mistaken in his understanding of military realities and his crusade was indeed an anachronism. Part of the difficulty with Peter's reign - a difficulty which has not received the consideration it demands - is that the sources on which these views are based are not sober, impartial works of scholarship, but blatant propaganda - *excitatoriae* for his or for later crusades or *apologiae* for his actions. In

particular, we may regard with suspicion the attempts by Philip of Mézières to ascribe to Peter the same motives and ambitions as he himself had, and we must remember that William of Machaut and his audience were as much interested in idealised chivalry as in historical truth. Given these shortcomings, it is now necessary to try to look behind the sources and ask, what was Peter trying to achieve? was he really the crusading enthusiast, bent on refounding the Latin kingdom, or did he have some other, more modest and more practical aim? The reign can conveniently be divided into three: the anti-Turkish measures of the years 1359-1362, the visit to the West and the Alexandria campaign, 1362-1365, and the raids and negotiations of 1366-1369. Peter's policies in each of these periods will be examined in turn in an attempt to answer these questions.

Peter's first major achievement was the capture of Satalia - probably then the most important port on the southern coast of Asia Minor - in August 1361. In the following years the local Turkish rulers were placed under tribute, Turkish coastal strongholds raided, and Turkish shipping driven off the seas. Repeated attempts to recapture Satalia were repulsed, and the Cypriots continued to hold it until in 1373 they handed it back to its former ruler rather than let it fall into the hands of the Genoese.⁴ There was nothing novel in Peter's programme: there had been a Cypriot attempt to capture Satalia in the first decade of the thirteenth century,⁵ and some evidence survives for the Turkish rulers paying tribute to Peter's father, Hugh IV, who himself had won what was evidently a major naval victory over them in about 1337.⁶ The expedition of 1361 can best be understood in the light of Leontios Makhairas's statement⁷ that it followed a Turkish attack on Cyprus: Turkish naval power was growing and decisive action was needed to counter it; Peter therefore re-asserted Christian mastery of the seas and so not only saved Cyprus from raids, but protected the all-important shipping lanes; in addition he seized the key Turkish port, thus providing a potentially useful Christian-controlled staging post for shipping bound for Cyprus and obtaining one of the most important outlets for the trade of central Asia Minor. Peter's policy is therefore evidence of an awareness that for both military and commercial reasons the Turks and in particular Turkish naval power had to be kept in check. This awareness had led to the Cypriot involvement in the various leagues which from the early 1330s were directed against Turkish positions in the Aegean. In 1334, following the preaching of a crusade in 1333, a force consisting of Papal, Venetian, French, Byzantine, Hospitaller and Cypriot ships defeated a Turkish navy, and there is some evidence that the Hospitallers, Byzantines and Cypriots went on to attack the Turkish-held port of Smyrna (Izmir).⁸ Ten years later, in 1344, in response to a crusade preached in 1343, a combined Papal, Venetian, Hospitaller and Cypriot fleet succeeded in capturing Smyrna, and it appears that from then until Peter's reign, Cyprus more or less continuously supported its defence.⁹ Both Venice and the Knights of St. John had good reason to curb Turkish expansion in the Aegean: in both cases their lands were threatened, and the Venetian route to

Constantinople and the Black Sea was jeopardised. Cypriot interests were less directly affected by changes in the Aegean, but Hugh IV's membership of these leagues was doubtless motivated as much by the desire to protect the sea-link to the West, as by the desire to remain on good terms with the other participants. Although the capture of Satalia was not the work of an international league,¹⁰ Peter I's behaviour should be seen as the natural continuation and extension of these earlier policies.

If Peter's capture of Satalia in 1361 was in accord with past policies, his journey to the West in 1362 was a break with tradition. Never before had a crowned king of Cyprus visited Europe. As to the reasons for his journey, Leontios Makhairas, who gives only a passing reference to the suggestion that Peter hoped to recover Jerusalem, conveys the impression that he was going in answer to a papal summons to defend himself against his nephew's claim to the throne of Cyprus.¹¹ Hugh, the son of Peter's elder brother, was living in the West and had asserted his rights in 1360 when a Cypriot embassy arrived at the court of Pope Innocent VI to announce Peter's accession.¹² Whatever the legal merits of Hugh's claim, the Cypriots seem not to have wavered in their support for Peter. In 1361 a second Cypriot embassy arranged a composition by which Hugh was to receive a generous apanage in Cyprus in return for the recognition of his uncle as king.¹³ From papal letters of November 1362, it would appear that the new pope, Urban V, had accepted the principle of a composition, though there was still disagreement over the precise terms.¹⁴ But contrary to Leontios's statements, the papal letters surviving from these years give no indication that Peter had been summoned to appear in person,¹⁵ and it is likely that the dispute could have been handled by his procurators. If Peter was not under papal summons, we can only assume that his main intention in going to the West was the organisation of a crusade. He arrived at Avignon at the end of March 1363, and at once (31 March) the pope ordered the preaching of the cross for an expedition to begin in March 1365. Evidently preliminary arrangements were well under way: King John of France was immediately named captain-general,¹⁶ and in this connection it is doubtless significant that Peter's embassy of 1361 had made contact with him.¹⁷ It is nevertheless possible that Peter's crusading initiative and his capture of Satalia were partly intended to ingratiate himself with the papacy and so gain papal support in his conflict with his nephew,¹⁸ but the fact that he persisted with his crusade after the dispute had been settled proves that this explanation by itself is insufficient to account for his visit to Europe.

Although no king of Cyprus had ever before visited the West, Cypriot ambassadors had frequently gone there to discuss projected crusades and, on occasion, may have provided the impetus for renewed crusading activity. There is evidence that Lambertino, the bishop of Limassol who was in the West in 1341, was the prime mover of the negotiations which prepared the way for the Smyrna crusade of 1344;¹⁹ though Cyprus seems to have been slow to join the crusading league of 1333-1334, it may be relevant to note that Cypriot ambassadors were at the papal court immediately before the crusade-

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encyclicals of 1333 were issued.²⁰ More to the point, Peter unquestionably recognised the limitations of Cypriot military power and the consequent need for help from the West if a major expedition was to be launched. This premise had lain behind Henry II's memorandum on the subject of the crusade to the Council of Vienne in 1311 and the advice submitted to the papacy by Cypriot ambassadors in 1323.²¹ It is likely that the same consideration may have influenced Hugh IV's decision to marry his eldest son to a daughter of Louis, duke of Bourbon, who throughout the period from the Council of Vienne to the outbreak of war with England in the mid-1330s had been the most consistent enthusiast for crusading proposals among the French nobility.²²

Peter's opportunities for recruitment in the West seemed good. The truce of Brétigny in 1360 followed by the treaty of Calais of the same year marked the formal cessation of hostilities between England and France. Peter could therefore hope for support from noblemen who had acquired a taste for warfare, and from unemployed soldiers of fortune and their bands. For his part, Pope Urban saw in the crusade a chance to rid France of the free companies.²³ But the adherence of the French king may well have been of doubtful value. His participation may have encouraged others to take the cross, but the instability of peace in France following the truce of Brétigny and the exhaustion of the financial resources of the crown cannot have been auspicious. Indeed, it may be asked whether King John was not merely hoping to use the clerical taxes raised for the crusade to pay off his ransom.²⁴ In the event, his death early in 1364 put an end to the participation of French royalty in the campaign, and though it may have led to the withdrawal of some of his subjects from the expedition, the danger that the crusade might fail to take place because of the king's commitments at home, or that it might founder because of some disagreement with the king of Cyprus, no longer existed. Although Peter spent over two years in the West recruiting and organising his expedition, it is probable that, as Philip of Mézières was to record, he was disappointed by the response.²⁵ His forces eventually set sail from Venice in June 1365 and made a rendezvous at Rhodes with a fleet bringing the contingent from Cyprus. We cannot be certain of the relative sizes of the two armies, but it is perhaps significant that all the sources are agreed that the Cypriot fleet contained substantially more ships.²⁶ It is possible therefore that, for all Peter's efforts, the force which sacked Alexandria in October 1365 consisted in the main of his own Cypriot vassals and retainers.

For Peter's crusading fleet anchored at Rhodes in 1365 there were several potential goals. We have ample cause to believe that its destination was kept secret until after it had departed for the final stage of its voyage, but when the decision to go to Alexandria was taken is a matter for conjecture; probably it had been Peter's intention throughout.²⁷ A campaign in the Aegean was ruled out as seems clear from the tenor of a papal letter of April 1365 to the Emperor John V Palaeologus, and there is also evidence that Peter's allies, the Hospitallers, were anxious not to re-open

hostilities with the local Turkish *amirs*.²⁸ Peter had gone to considerable trouble and expense in preparing his crusade, and despite the precedents of the expeditions of 1334 and 1344 he had probably always intended it to be directed to an area where Cypriot interests would be more immediately affected. The choice of targets was still wide. First there was southern Asia Minor. Peter could have followed up his success of 1361, but his brother, John, prince of Antioch, who had acted as regent during his absence, had completed the work of destroying Turkish shipping and forcing the Turks to pay tribute.²⁹ Another possibility was Cilician Armenia. Here Peter who had already taken over the defence of Gorhigos,³⁰ perhaps the only Armenian port of any consequence not then in Mamluk hands, could have combined with the Armenians in a joint effort to push the Mamluks out of Cilicia and advance into northern Syria. The idea of an invasion of Syria via Armenia had been discussed by various crusade-propagandists in the early fourteenth century and, for a number of military, economic or religious reasons, almost universally rejected.³¹ But it is also likely that in 1365 the existing Armenian regime would not co-operate: an anti-Latin faction was in power, and Peter was probably committed to installing his illegitimate kinsman, the pro-Latin Leo of Lusignan, as king.³² The remaining alternative was a direct assault on the Mamluks either in Syria or in Egypt.

The origins of the idea that 'Jerusalem could be won on the banks of the Nile' are traceable to the twelfth century.³³ In the thirteenth there had been two major expeditions to Egypt, the Fifth Crusade and St. Louis's first crusade, in the course of both of which the possibility of exchanging the Muslim-held parts of the kingdom of Jerusalem for the Christian conquests was discussed.³⁴ King Henry II's memorandum of 1311 had also advocated an attack on Egypt. This document is important as the only direct evidence for the opinion of the Cypriot royal family between the fall of Acre and Peter's accession as to how the recovery of the Holy Land might be achieved. Henry recommended a surprise attack on Egypt using Cyprus as a base; even if the Egyptians learnt of the preparations, they would not know where the expedition would strike, and so would have to be ready to defend the whole coast of both Egypt and Syria; furthermore, fear of Mongol incursions would make the Mamluks hesitate to withdraw troops from Syria once the landing had been made; with Egypt secured, the Christians could advance into Syria.³⁵ Whether Peter knew the contents of his great-uncle's memorandum of half a century earlier is unknown, but both Henry and Peter saw the need for help from the West and both Henry and Peter recognised the advisability of a surprise attack on Egypt. The tradition of thought which regarded this as the best way to win back the kingdom of Jerusalem was thus well established.

We come now to the central problem of Peter's reign: did he, in 1365, expect to be able to restore the Latin kingdom? Peter 'from his youth had desired the liberation of his paternal inheritance, the kingdom of Jerusalem', Philip of Mézières assured his readers.³⁶ As early as 1362 the king had written to the commune

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of Florence about his intentions to recover the Holy Land,³⁷ and Pope Urban repeatedly asserted that the expedition of 1365 was to be 'pro recuperatione Terre Sancte'.³⁸ (By contrast, Clement VI had consistently described the crusade proclaimed in 1343 as being 'contra Turcos'.)³⁹ Faced with the testimony of these sources and the circumstantial evidence of the tradition that Egypt was the key to the recovery of Jerusalem, a view allegedly urged by the legate, Peter Thomas, at Alexandria when opposing those who wished to abandon the city,⁴⁰ we might incline to agree that Peter genuinely believed he could win back Jerusalem. But it is hard to accept that he really thought he could defeat the Mamluks in Egypt and lead his victorious army into the lands of the former kingdom, or that, having received Palestine in exchange for Alexandria, he could have garrisoned and defended it. Such scepticism finds support when we look more closely at these sources. Philip of Mézières, though an eyewitness, was a crusade-publicist who was obsessed with the idea that Jerusalem should and could be recovered. It was probably he who, as chancellor of Cyprus, had penned the letter to the Florentines. The other principal authorities for the reign, William of Machaut and Leontios Makhairas, refer to Peter's ambition to recover Jerusalem without giving it prominence and without depicting the expedition of 1365 as having that goal.⁴¹ No doubt Peter was prepared to let the pope and Philip of Mézières use the recovery of Jerusalem for propaganda purposes and something of this came to be reflected in the other sources, but it does not necessarily follow that he himself believed his own propagandists.

If the recapture of Jerusalem was not part of Peter's programme in 1365, the question arises of what in fact his policy was. It is clear from the scale of his preparations that he had been planning a major invasion of some part of the Muslim world; he had been absent from Cyprus for nearly three years and during his absence had visited most of the kingdoms of western Europe; he had financed his travels by allowing the Cypriots to buy exemptions for the poll-tax,⁴² and when trouble from the Genoese was threatened appears to have conceded all their demands rather than allow them to hinder his schemes.⁴³ It is also clear that once he had captured Alexandria, he intended to hold on to it.⁴⁴ This much is certain. What follows is hypothesis. We have seen that considerations of commerce and security had played a large part in Peter's activities before his visit to the West, and we shall see that the same considerations were to be prominent in the negotiations of the final years of his reign. Let us suggest that Peter's preoccupation in 1362-1365 was similarly not Jerusalem but the interrelated questions of Cypriot trade and defence. Peter knew that if ever the Mamluks or Turks gained control of the sea, Cyprus would be at their mercy. As it was, the most potent naval force in the eastern Mediterranean lay in the hands of the Italian and Catalan merchants. Provided they had a sufficient vested interest in the commercial well-being of Cyprus, the political future seemed assured, for not only would

they give aid if the island were threatened, but the revenues from trade in the form of customs and market-dues which accrued to the Cypriot crown would help substantially towards paying for the island's defence. On the other hand, if the merchants stopped trading in Cyprus, not only would the commercial wealth no longer be at the disposal of the authorities, but there would be no assistance should the Muslims mount an invasion.

One of the problems of the 1360s seems to have been that the island's commercial prosperity was threatened and that in consequence the merchants might cease to come in such numbers: Famagusta, the principal port, was handling a declining share of the oriental trade. In the first half of the fourteenth century it had enjoyed immense prosperity based largely upon its role as the chief entrepôt for the spice trade: eastern goods were brought in from northern Syria and Armenia by local middlemen and there sold to western traders. By the end of the century, however, the city was in serious decay, and though the Genoese invasion of the 1370s had aggravated this process, it is almost certain that its chief cause lay in economic factors over which the kings of Cyprus had no control. One of these was the recession which is to be linked with the demographic effects of the Black Death; another was changing trade routes which tended to take the oriental trade with Europe further north through the Black Sea or further south up the Red Sea and through Egypt. Leontios Makhairas rightly saw that among the reasons merchants traded in Famagusta in preference to Syria or Egypt during the period of its greatest commercial prosperity was the papal prohibition on direct trade between Catholics and Muslims;⁴⁵ this prohibition had never been totally effective, but there can be no doubt that it had acted as a restraint. From the mid-1340s the papacy was granting increasing numbers of licences to circumvent its own ban on trading in Muslim territories; indeed, in August 1365, while Peter's crusading fleet was waiting at Rhodes, Urban V was issuing yet more licences to the Venetians to trade in Alexandria.⁴⁶ There are no statistics to illustrate the extent to which the economic decay of Famagusta had advanced by Peter's reign, but it is not hard to imagine that to contemporary observers Famagusta was in decline because commerce which previously would have been transacted there was now being transacted in Egypt or Syria. If we take the example of the Venetian state-owned galleys which were sent to the East regularly from 1332, such a view would seem to have some degree of validity. From the registers of the Venetian Senate it appears that of the years 1332-1345 in which the republic organised state-galley voyages to the eastern Mediterranean, the usual number equipped was seven or eight and the terminus, after 1334, was invariably Cyprus. In the two decades after 1346, when these galleys first started going to Alexandria, the annual total that sailed for the East remained at around seven or eight, but of these only half were bound for Cyprus; the others were for Egypt. In the years 1357-1359, the eve of Peter's accession, a total of fourteen galleys were equipped for Alexandria and only nine for Cyprus.⁴⁷ It must be stressed

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that we have no way of knowing how far other types of venture or how far other merchant republics followed this change in trading patterns, but, if it was in any way symptomatic of a general trend, the idea that Alexandria was taking trade from Famagusta would be perfectly understandable.

The hypothesis that is proposed is therefore that Peter's war on the Mamluks was aimed at reversing the decline in the share of trade transacted in ports under his control. When he launched his expedition against Alexandria he hoped to achieve one of two things: to capture and hold the city so that in future he and his kingdom would derive profit from its commerce, or if, as indeed it turned out, permanent occupation was not feasible, to destroy Alexandria in the naive expectation that its commercial wealth would revert to Famagusta. It has already been mentioned that Peter intended to hold on to Alexandria, and there is evidence too that it was not until after the decision to withdraw had been reached that a start was made on the systematic destruction of the fortifications.⁴⁸ Had Peter been able to keep Alexandria, it would have formed, with Satalia and Gornigos, one of a series of Levantine ports in Cypriot hands. He would have realised that the capture of Alexandria required a larger force than that with which he had occupied Satalia in 1361; hence the elaborate preparations. Perhaps we might even go so far as to suggest that with Cypriot control of the major ports, Peter might have expected to have such a stranglehold on Egyptian economic life that the long term aim of recovering Jerusalem would not have been quite so unrealistic.

The closing years of Peter's reign were characterised by a complicated series of negotiations. Besides Cyprus and the Mamluk sultanate, Catalan and Italian trading interests were directly involved. The merchants, whose interests had received a major setback by the sack of Alexandria, wanted peace in order to resume their commercial relations with the Muslims, and it was of little importance to them whether or not the settlement favoured the Cypriots. The papacy vacillated: in 1366 Urban was supporting Peter by issuing further crusade indulgences, attempting to prevent negotiations between the Mamluks and the Venetians, banning all trade with the Muslims and calling for the end of a Venetian prohibition on the export of arms to Cyprus;⁴⁹ but from 1367 the pope was more willing to follow the demands of the Italians: in 1367 the trading ban was lifted, and, when Peter arrived in Rome the following year, Urban was not prepared to support his request for military help and pressed him to allow the Venetians and Genoese to negotiate a peace on his behalf.⁵⁰

Peter's policy towards the Mamluks after the sack of Alexandria continued to be aggressive. In 1366 he was planning to attack Beirut, the most important port on the coast of Syria, but desisted partly because of Italian pressure and partly, it would seem, because his resources were inadequate.⁵¹ The Venetians had defused Peter's crusade-propaganda in the West by claiming that peace had been made and so dissuaded many of the adventurers who, hearing of Peter's exploits at Alexandria, were preparing to come to the East.⁵² If

we accept the theory that Peter was fighting a mercantile war, then an attack on Beirut would have been a logical next step after Alexandria, although as the Mamluks were planning a counter-attack⁵³ Peter could have been thinking more in terms of a pre-emptive assault. At the same time negotiations had opened; according to a document preserved by Philip of Mézières, Peter was demanding the ceding of Jerusalem as the price of peace, but there is reason to suppose that he had no true desire for a settlement and was merely playing for time.⁵⁴ Towards the end of 1366 a Cypriot ambassador was imprisoned by the Mamluks; when in January 1367 a large Cypriot fleet belatedly put to sea, it was scattered in a storm, and, though a few ships reached Tripoli where they were reported to have done considerable damage, the expedition as a whole was a failure.⁵⁵ It was only after this that serious negotiations for peace were begun, and a settlement would have been reached had not the sultan refused his final ratification.⁵⁶ Peter, who had been fully occupied while these negotiations were in progress by a Turkish attack on Gorhigos and a mutiny in the garrison at Satalia,⁵⁷ reacted by sending his fleet to raid Tripoli and the ports of northern Syria as far as Ayas.⁵⁸ At the close of 1367 Peter set out on his second visit to the West with the expressed intention of raising a further army.⁵⁹ No help was forthcoming, and, as has been mentioned, the pope induced Peter to send Venetian and Genoese ambassadors to the Mamluks to sue for peace on his behalf; the embassy reached Cairo in the summer of 1368, but failed to make any progress.⁶⁰

Some idea of what Peter was hoping to achieve in the closing years of his reign can be gained from what is known of the peace negotiations of those years. The text of the treaty of 1367 which, though accepted by the Mamluk emissaries, was not ratified by the sultan has been preserved. Out of the twenty-one clauses the first thirteen are all concerned with commercial franchises for Cypriots and reciprocal trading arrangements. Peter was seeking the same sort of commercial franchises in the Mamluk lands that the Italians had in Cyprus; in particular full rights of jurisdiction over Cypriot merchants and over disputes involving Cypriots and Muslims, and a halving of the customs dues. Other clauses stipulated that the Muslims should not harbour Turks who were making war on Cyprus or pirates, that reprisals were not to be taken on Cypriots for the misdeeds of Christians from the West, and that the king's family and retainers were to have free access to the Holy Places. Two clauses were intended to prevent further conflict by allowing for arbitration and delay in the event of a quarrel, and a final clause indicated that the peace was to include Peter's allies, the Knights of St. John.⁶¹ In the treaty of 1367 there was no reference to the kingdom of Jerusalem, demanded in the negotiations of 1366, but two other demands of that year, customs exemption and the handing over of enemies, reappeared though not necessarily in the same form.⁶² In May 1368 Peter agreed to allow the Venetian and Genoese envoys to negotiate on his behalf on the basis of the 1367 treaty. In their instructions they were told to renew the demands for commercial franchises, the customs reductions being given special

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prominence: if the Mamluks would not agree to a reduction by a half, a third or at least a quarter was to be sought. In addition there was a request for a particular *funduq* in Alexandria for the use of Cypriot merchants. There was also to be a mutual exchange of prisoners and the annual provision for up to fifty members of the royal household to visit the Holy Palaces. The king began his instructions with a clause which stated that any agreement reached was not to be to the prejudice of his rights in Jerusalem, but it is doubtful whether this should be understood as meaning any more than that Peter was not prepared to surrender his titular kingship.⁶³ The keynote of the negotiations of 1367 and 1368 was thus commerce. Peter was using aggression and the threat of aggression, not to make territorial gains in areas once under Christian rule, but to derive trading advantages at the expense of the Mamluks and, by implication, at the expense of the Cypriots' competitors in the Muslim ports, the merchants from the West.

The remaining history of the war can be briefly told. Between the failure of the 1368 negotiations and Peter's murder in January 1369 no further moves seem to have been made. There were more raids on the Mamluk coast later in 1369 and negotiations were reopened, this time successfully, in 1370. The terms of the settlement are not known, though, if we accept the view that they were similar to those of an agreement of 1403, they were clearly less advantageous to the Cypriots than those of 1367 would have been.⁶⁴ Peter was unquestionably a vigorous ruler whose campaigns impressed his contemporaries, but warfare and royal tours of Europe were expensive. He resorted to the expedients of allowing individuals to buy exemption from the poll-tax⁶⁵ and of alienating parts of the royal domain to foreign adventurers in his service⁶⁶ in his attempts to remain solvent. According to Leontios Makhairas, he had spent all the wealth accumulated by Hugh IV on the expeditions against the Turks before 1362, and by 1366 the king's counsellors were showing concern at the cost to the crown of the military activities.⁶⁷ Some indication of the strain caused by the war can be seen in the *remède* issued at the time of Peter's murder: among other complaints, the vassals referred to excessive military service, to financial impositions being extended beyond their agreed terminal dates, to the alienation of the royal salt monopoly and to new fiscal burdens imposed against their wishes.⁶⁸ There are symptoms too of the increasing difficulties in which Peter found himself in the development of the negotiations of 1367-1368, and there is little doubt that the new regime in 1369 lacked the resources and energy to maintain the former level of pressure on the Mamluks.

Our view of Peter's achievement is clouded by the events of 1373-1374 when the Genoese invaded Cyprus, captured Famagusta and left the kingdom greatly weakened. What he achieved must be considered in the light of what he set out to do. If he had intended to win back Jerusalem, he was a failure; he was also unrealistic. If, as is more likely, he went to war to derive commercial benefits for Cyprus, he may have come nearer his goal, though, being unable to press home his advantage, here too his policy was not crowned

with success. Two points should have emerged from this study. Peter's activities were in certain respects a development of earlier policies; his burst of military enterprise should not be seen as an isolated phenomenon but as the continuation of ideas which can be dimly perceived in the quieter and less well-documented reigns of his father and great-uncle. More importantly, the usual view of Peter as the old-fashioned crusader who would win back Jerusalem has been called in question. In its place an assessment of Peter as a political realist with a crude and inadequate understanding of economic forces has been proposed. Thus the capture of Satalia was for reasons of security and trade; the destruction of Alexandria once it was clear that it could not be held could have been an attempt to destroy a rival port to Famagusta; the negotiations of 1367 and 1368 showed commercial franchises as the main Cypriot concern; all the talk of crusade and the recovery of Jerusalem could have been no more than an attempt to supplement Cypriot resources with men and money from the West. This interpretation rests on numerous assumptions, but faced with a choice between Peter, the crusader with delusions of former glories, and Peter, the king who devoted his energies to the struggle for a secure Cyprus protected by its commercial hegemony, the latter has much to recommend it.

1. G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, Cambridge, 1940-52, II, 368.
2. H. E. Mayer, *The Crusades*, Oxford, 1972, 238.
3. J. Praver, *The World of the Crusaders*, London, 1972, 148.
4. See in particular, Leontios Makhairas, *Recital concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus entitled 'Chronicle'* (ed. and trs. R. M. Dawkins), Oxford, 1932, I, paras.116-28, 132-5, 137-44, 150-52, 180, 208, 317-18, 366-9. See also Philip of Mézières, *The Life of Saint Peter Thomas* (ed. J. Smet), Rome, 1954, 96-7; William of Machaut, *La prise d'Alexandrie ou chronique du roi Pierre I^{er} de Lusignan* (ed. L. de Mas Latrie), Geneva, 1877, 20-21. For the return of Satalia, see Gregory XI, *Lettres secrètes et curiales intéressent les pays autres que la France* (ed. G. Mollat), Paris, 1962-5, no.2198.
5. See Hill, II, 74-5.
6. L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le regne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, Paris, 1852-61, II, 216; Benedict XII, *Lettres closes et patentes intéressent les pays autres que la France* (ed. J-M. Vidal and G. Mollat), Paris, 1913-50, no.1673.

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7. Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.116-17.
8. P. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident*, Paris, 1957, 90-100.
9. Lemerle, 181-3, 189-92. For Cypriot contributions to the defence of Smyrna, see *Codice diplomatico del sacro militare ordine gerosolimitano oggi di Malta* (ed. S. Pauli), Lucca, 1733-7, II, 93-4; Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 217-19, 221-2; *Annales ecclesiastici* (ed. C. Baronius and O. Raynaldus, new ed. A. Thiener), Bar-le-Duc/Paris, 1864-83, 1356, para.36; *I libri commemoriali della repubblica di Venezia regesti (1293-1778)* (ed. R. Predelli and P. Bosmin), Venice, 1876-1914, II, p.264 no.241; Clement VI, *Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se rapportant à la France* (ed. E. Déprez, J. Glénisson and G. Mollat), Paris, 1901-61, nos.2580, 2591, 2749, 2957, 4130, 4661, 5056; Clement VI, *Lettres closes, patentes et curiales intéressant les pays autres que la France* (ed. E. Déprez and G. Mollat), Paris, 1960-61, nos.1079, 2377; Innocent VI, *Lettres secrètes et curiales* (ed. P. Gasnault and M-H. Laurent), Paris, 1959- , nos.618, 642, 645, 689, 693, 1630-31, 1788, 1791; Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.114, 119.
10. The Cypriots, however, had Genoese, Hospitaller and Papal assistance. Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.117-19.
11. Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.129, 131, see para.107.
12. *Annales ecclesiastici*, 1360, paras.13-16; Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.102, 105-8. Leontios's dates for this and the embassy of 1361 are impossible. See N. Iorga, *Philippe de Mézières (1327-1405) et la croisade au XIV^e siècle*, Paris, 1896, 117 n.4. For the dispute, see Hill, II, 309-10.
13. Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.108-9. See also Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 233, III, 741.
14. Urban V, *Lettres secrètes et curiales se rapportant à la France* (ed. P. Lecacheux and G. Mollat), Paris, 1902-55, nos.119-20. See Leontios Makhairas, I, para.129.
15. Leontios's statement (para.107) that the pope summoned Peter to Avignon in 1360 is directly contradicted by a papal letter of that year. *Annales ecclesiastici*, 1360, para.16. Urban's letters of Nov.1362, though written after Peter had set out, contain no suggestion that he was under summons.
16. *Annales ecclesiastici*, 1363, paras.15-19. See Urban V, *Lettres secrètes*, nos.476-89.

17. Peter's emissary, John of Morf, sent to the West in 1361, had been with King John in Jan. 1362 (1361 o.s.). Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, III, 741.
18. As suggested by A. S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, London, 1938, 322-3.
19. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 180-81. See Lemerle, 181.
20. Hugh IV's ambassadors, Peter Le Jaune, Philip L'Aleman and the bishop of Beirut, were at Avignon June-July 1333. John XXII, *Lettres communes* (ed. G. Mollat), Paris, 1904-47, nos. 60648-9; see nos. 60643-7, 60651, 60653, 60655, 60657, 60660-61, 60777-81. The crusade was formally initiated on 26 July. *Op. cit.*, nos. 61202-57.
21. Mas Latrie, *Histoire* II, 118-25 (see paras. 9-11); John XXII, *Lettres secrètes et curiales relatives à la France* (ed. A. Coulon and S. Clémencet), Paris, 1900- , no. 1690.
22. See G. Tabacco, *La casa di Francia nell'azione politica di Papa Giovanni XXII*, Rome, 1953, 63-5, 220-21, 231-2, 235, 303. For the marriage, see Hill, II, 294.
23. Urban V, *Lettres secrètes*, no. 487.
24. See M. Prou, *Étude sur les relations politiques du pape Urbain V avec les rois de France Jean II et Charles V*, Paris, 1888, 27; C. Samaran and G. Mollat, *La Fiscalité pontificale en France au XIV^e siècle*, Paris, 1905, 19.
25. Philip of Mézières, *Saint Peter Thomas*, 120-21.
26. For varying estimates, see Philip of Mézières, *Saint Peter Thomas*, 127 see p. 125; Leontios Makhairas, I, paras. 162, 167; 'Chronique d'Amadi', ed. R. de Mas Latrie in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, Paris, 1891-3, I, 414.
27. See Hill, II, 329-31. William of Machaut's assertion (pp. 60-63) that Peter was only persuaded to go to Alexandria by Percival of Cologne after he had reached Rhodes seems to have been purely a literary device to flatter Percival.
28. Urban V, *Lettres secrètes*, no. 1703; Leontios Makhairas, I, para. 166.
29. Leontios Makhairas, I, paras. 132-5, 137-44, 150-52.
30. Leontios Makhairas, I, paras. 112-14.
31. Atiya, *Crusade*, 55, 59, 63-4, 80, 105-6, 122, 185.

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32. The internal history of Armenia in this period is obscure; the regime seems later to have offered suzerainty to Peter himself. See H. F. Tournebize, *Histoire politique et religieuse de l'Arménie depuis les origines des Arméniens jusqu'à la mort de leur dernier roi (l'an 1393)*, Paris, 1910, 701; Hill, II, 358; W. H. Rüdert-Collenberg, *The Rupenides, Hethumides and Lusignans: The Structure of the Armeno-Cilician Dynasties*, Paris, 1963, p.76 no.196.
33. See R. C. Smail, *Crusading warfare (1097-1193)*, Cambridge, 1956, 22.
34. S. Runciman, *A history of the Crusades*, Cambridge, 1951-4, III, 160-62, 263.
35. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 118-25. It is not clear whether the Cypriots who presented the memorandum of 1323 (above p.93) held to Henry's views or were prepared to accept Louis of Bourbon's idea of a direct assault on the coast of Syria. See A. B [oislisle], 'Projet de croisade du premier duc de Bourbon', *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire de France*, IX, 1872, 248-50.
36. Philip of Mézières, *Saint Peter Thomas*, 102.
37. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 236-7.
38. See for example the bulls cited above n.16.
39. Clement VI, *Lettres closes ... France*, nos.332, 360, 433-4.
40. Philip of Mézières, *Saint Peter Thomas*, 134.
41. William of Machaut, 3, 10; Leontios Makhairas, I, para.131.
42. Leontios Makhairas, I, para.157.
43. For the dispute, see Hill, II, 312-14. For the text of the settlement agreed in April 1365, shortly before Peter's expedition was ready, see Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 254-66. Though Peter was said to have objected to one of the articles in the agreement, he later complied with it. Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.154-5, 173, 174, 209.
44. Philip of Mézières, *Saint Peter Thomas*, 133-4; William of Machaut, 100-109; Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.172-3.
45. Leontios Makhairas, I, para.91.
46. *I libri commemoriali*, III, p.42 no.227; see p.28 no.140, p.43 no.234, p.47 no.267. See W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce*

du Levant au moyen-âge, Leipzig, 1885-6, II, 45-8.

47. F. Thiriet, *Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Roumanie*, Paris/The Hague, 1958-61, nos.12, 43, 76, 91, 105, 140, 154, 170, 178, 192, 202, 206, 239, 272, 292, 311, 328, 343, 365, 418, 424, 433, 486, 498. See A. Tenenti and C. Vivanti, 'Le film d'un grand système de navigation: les galères marchandes vénitiennes XIV^e-XVI^e siècles', *Annales*, XVI, 1961, 83-6.
48. See Atiya, *Crusade*, 367.
49. *Annales ecclesiastici*, 1366, para.16; *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum sive acta et diplomata res Venetas, Graecas atque Levantis illustrantia* (ed. G. M. Thomas and R. Predelli), Venice, 1880-99, II, 110-11, 113-17; *I libri commemoriali*, III, p.51 no.296; Urban V, *Lettres secrètes*, nos.2370, 2416-18.
50. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 303, 308; *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levantinum*, II, 123-6; William of Machaut, 219-21. Urban was also critical of Peter's behaviour towards his wife and towards Florimond of Lesparre and declined to give him the Golden Rose. *Annales ecclesiastici*, 1367, para.13; Urban V, *Lettres secrètes*, no.2567; Iorga, 374.
51. William of Machaut, 114-22; Leontios Makhairas, I, paras. 177-80.
52. See Hill, II, 335-6, 341.
53. See Hill, II, 337.
54. See Iorga, 321-2; Hill, II, 339-40.
55. Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.185, 189-92.
56. See Hill, II, 344-7.
57. See Hill, II, 348-9.
58. William of Machaut, 204-17; Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.209-12, see para.213. See also *Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois* (ed. S. Luce), Paris, 1862, 185-91. For evidence that this raid was in retaliation for breaking off negotiations, see Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 292, 304.
59. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 292; William of Machaut, 219; Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.216-17.
60. See Hill, II, 356-7, 359-60.

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61. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 293-302.
62. See Iorga, 321-2.
63. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 302-8.
64. See Hill, II, 372-6.
65. Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.157, 215.
66. For example see Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 358-9; *Chypre sous les Lusignans. Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIV^e et XV^e siècles)* (ed. J. Richard), Paris, 1962, 80, 84, 91.
67. Leontios Makhairas, I, paras.157, 182.
68. 'Bans et Ordonnances des rois de Chypre, 1286-1362', *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Lois*, II, 378-9. See J. Richard, 'La révolution de 1369 dans le royaume de Chypre', *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, cx, 1952, 110-15.

The murder of King Peter I of Cyprus (1359– 1369)

This examination of the murder of King Peter I of Cyprus concentrates on trying to understand the grievances which led a group of his vassals to kill him. An attempt is made to bring the Cypriot narrative accounts of the event under critical control, in the course of which the murder is redated and the guilt of the king's brothers established. The careers of the other knights involved are then analysed, and this analysis – together with a survey of an ordonnance issued in the immediate aftermath of the murder – help place the deed in the context of the effects that Peter's warfare against the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt was having on Cypriot noble society. A suggestion is then offered as to why the vassals resorted to murder rather than relying on constitutional restraints to achieve their aims.

In the early hours of a January morning in 1369 a group of Cypriot noblemen pushed their way into the room in the royal palace at Nicosia where the king, Peter I, had been asleep, and stabbed him to death. It was a sensational ending to the career of a man who in his brief, ten-year reign had won renown throughout Europe and the Mediterranean world. News of the murder was

widely reported and evidently much discussed: half a generation later Chaucer could make his worldly and therefore tedious Monk include a few lines on Peter's death in his catalogue of hackneyed *exempla* illustrating the mutability of fortune (Robinson 1957:194):

O worthy Petro, kyng of Cipre, also,
That Alisandre wan by heigh maistrie,
Ful many a hethen wroghtestow ful wo,
Of which thyne owene liges hadde envie,
And for no thyng but for thy chivalrie
They in thy bed han slayn thee by the morwe.
Thus kan Fortune hir wheel governe and gye,
And out of joye brynge men to sorwe

Peter had succeeded to the throne of Cyprus in 1359 as the eldest surviving son of his father, King Hugh IV. Even before his accession he had shown himself adventurous and headstrong: in 1349, together with his brother John, he had slipped away secretly from Cyprus to explore western Europe; King Hugh had to enlist international help to find his sons and on their return threw them into prison in Kyrenia castle (Hill 1948:302ff.). There is evidence, too, that Peter was given to extravagant displays of piety: in 1353 we find Pope Innocent VI absolving him from vows to visit the tomb of Saint James of Compostela in far-off Galicia, to consume nothing but bread and water on Saturdays, and to abstain from eating meat (Rüdt de Collenberg 1975–7:211–12).

After his accession Peter concentrated his energies and enthusiasms on waging war against the Moslem powers whose lands bordered the eastern end of the Mediterranean sea. He first turned his attention to the south coast of Asia Minor. In 1360, at the request of its Armenian inhabitants, he sent a garrison to occupy Gorhigos (Korgos).

The following year a Cypriot expedition captured Adalia (Antalya) from the Turks and at the same time the Turkish emirates of that region were placed under tribute, and the sea was cleared of Turkish corsairs. His appetite whetted, Peter then began to prepare a more ambitious exploit. In 1362 he travelled to the West where, with the support of Pope Urban V, he toured the courts of Europe, recruiting men for a new campaign. It was not until 1365 that his expedition, which by then had acquired all the characteristics of a crusade, was ready. Its destination was the Egyptian port of Alexandria. The crusaders, joined at Rhodes by Peter's forces from Cyprus, took the city by storm. There was much destruction and pillage, and although Peter himself had hoped to retain his capture, the army was obliged to withdraw on news that Moslem troops were approaching from Cairo. The crusade had been but a limited success, and Peter was now committed to a full-scale war with the greatest power in the East. His policy was to keep up the pressure on the Mamluk sultan of Egypt until he would agree to submit to a peace formula from which Cyprus would gain some manifest and tangible advantage. To this end Cypriot forces raided Egyptian possessions on the coasts of Syria and Palestine: Ayas (Yumurtalik), Tripoli and Beirut, to mention only a few of the more important. These raids, interspersed with negotiations, occupied much of the years 1366 and 1367. But the Cypriots, together with those westerners who had remained in the East after 1365, or had come out when news of the spectacular events at Alexandria became known, were unable to press the war to a successful conclusion. Peter resolved on another trip

to the West to raise support; he set off late in 1367, but this time response to his efforts was muted. His achievements may have caught popular imagination – Chaucer was later to make his Knight serve on the campaigns to Adalia (1362), Alexandria (1365) and Ayas (1367) (Robinson 1957: 17) – but an expedition on the scale undertaken in 1365 was not feasible, and the Italian mercantile republics were anxious for peace to be restored so that they could resume their trade. Peter also found that he no longer had the warm support of the papacy. He returned to Cyprus in 1368 with little if anything to show for his trouble. A few months later he was dead.¹

After a glorious beginning, the last three years of Peter's reign had been an anticlimax. Frustration, a sense of failure, and the loss of momentum in the military endeavours must have been obvious to all. A reading of the narrative sources for these years leaves little doubt that the effect on the king had been to induce a growing mental instability (Richard 1952:109 and n.1). There are a number of incidents which seem to illustrate this point. They range from the well-attested quarrel between Peter and two western knights in his service, Florimond de Lesparre and the lord de Rochefort, in the course of which the king accepted challenges from each to come to Europe and there fight duels with them in person (Hill 1948:349ff., 354ff.), to an obscure episode in which, the day before the murder, Peter had imprisoned and threatened to execute John Gorap, the steward of his household, for failing to provide oil for the asparagus (Dawkins 1932a: §279).

Before his accession Peter had married



Figure 1. Silver *gros* of Peter I of Cyprus.

Eleanor, the daughter of a younger son of King James II of Aragon (Iorga 1896: 107 n.2). Eleanor bore him two children: a son, also named Peter, who succeeded him as King Peter II (1369–82), and a daughter. Leontios Makhairas has a story, to which he alludes no less than three times, that whenever Peter was away from home he would have his servant put one of Eleanor's shifts by his bed, "... and when the king lay down to sleep, he would take the said shift in his arms (because of the love which he had for the queen) and thus he would sleep" (Dawkins 1932a: §130; see §§216, 242). But for all this display of affection, Peter took mistresses. His unfaithfulness to his wife became so notorious that towards the end of 1367 the pope issued a stern admonition on the subject – apparently to no effect (Theiner 1872:146–7). Two women are named in our sources, both members of the lesser nobility: Joanna L'Aleman and Eschiva of Scandelion. Leontios Makhairas comments "... if anyone says, 'seeing that he had such love for (Eleanor), how is it

that he had two mistresses?' this he did on account of his great sensuality, because he was a young man" (Dawkins 1932a: §242). Be that as it may, matters began to come to a head while Peter was in the West on his second visit (1367–8). Rumours started to circulate that the queen in her turn had taken a lover, a distinguished Cypriot aristocrat named John of Morphou, count of Edessa. It is difficult now to decide whether there was any truth in these rumours, although it may be noted that there is nothing to suggest that the pair had any association after Peter's death, when presumably there would have been less cause for discretion. The controller of the royal household during Peter's absence was a knight named John Viscount. The rumours placed him in an invidious position. He feared that if he were to report the affair to the king, the king possibly and the queen certainly would turn against him; on the other hand, if he pretended not to know anything and Peter came to hear about it by some other means – quite likely, since

the matter was common gossip – he would be blamed for not informing him earlier. In the event, John wrote to the king while he was still in the West, telling him of the rumours and adding that he himself did not believe there was any truth in them. But even this was sufficient to direct the king's wrath against him, and on his return Peter was determined to find out the facts. He met a wall of silence. The High Court was summoned and the knights and nobles there gathered were told to declare the truth of the matter. Frightened by possible repercussions if they testified that John Viscount's story of the rumours was well founded, they preferred to perjure themselves and told the king that the allegations were false. John was left to the king's mercy; he was put in prison where he died. There can be no doubt that the nobility were ashamed of their craven behaviour, and it is also clear that the king had a shrewd idea of what in fact had been going on. He adopted a truculent attitude towards his vassals and is said to have gone out of his way to insult their womenfolk. The normally good relations between crown and nobility gave way to fear, suspicion, and hatred.²

The stage was set for the final drama. King Peter's son, the future Peter II, coveted a pair of greyhounds belonging to James of Jubail (or Gibelet), the son of a knight named Henry of Jubail. The younger Peter, who would have been aged about twelve at the time, was enraged when James refused to give them to him. When the king came to hear of it, he made overtures to buy the dogs, but the Jubails refused to sell. Then the king in his anger stripped Henry of his office – he was viscount of Nicosia – and had both him and his son thrown into

prison; at the same time he made preparations to marry Henry's daughter to an artisan, and had her tortured when she tried to hide. The other members of the nobility learned of these developments with consternation. Not only had the king set about destroying an old and distinguished family on the most trivial of pretexts, he had acted illegally by imprisoning a liegeman without the judgement of his peers, and by disparaging his daughter in attempting to force her to marry below her station. If he were allowed to get away with it this time, there was no knowing whom he would turn on next. The nobles approached the king's brothers – John, titular prince of Antioch, and James, who as James I (1382–98) was later to mount the throne – and asked them to make representations. But when they came before the king, he was angry and insulting and clearly in no mood to make amends. The brothers then conferred with the nobles, and they decided to go in a body and demand that the king renew the oaths concerning good government and the maintenance of law which he had sworn at the time of his accession. But some members of the nobility, knowing the sort of man the king was, did not think this would solve their problems and resolved to kill him. And so, in the early hours of the next morning, the party set off, stopping to release the Jubails and also John Gorap, the steward of the household, from prison. They gained admission to the king's private apartments; three of their number, Philip of Ibelin, titular lord of Arsur, Henry of Jubail and John of Gaurrelle, attacked the king with daggers drawn; John Gorap then struck the head from the now lifeless body, and other knights who had shared in the

plot to slay their lord mutilated the corpse further with their swords. Last of all, James of Nores, who had not been a party to the conspiracy but who now wanted to identify himself with the conspirators, with the words, "It was this which cost you your life", cut off the king's penis (Dawkins 1932a: §281).

This at least is the tale as told by the Cypriot chroniclers. The murder is portrayed as the outcome of a quarrel arising from a petty dispute in the course of which the king, whose recent behaviour had already cost him the trust and goodwill of many of his vassals, had victimized a noble family. It is a story of passion, fear, court intrigue and violence. But to understand the incident more fully, it is necessary to consider the nature and value of these Cypriot narrative accounts in the light of other evidence. Various questions are posed: who were the men responsible for the deed? what sort of people were they? what other grievances did they have? and why should their grievances have driven them to the extreme of killing the king?

There are four Cypriot accounts of the murder. That by Leontios Makhairas (Dawkins 1932a: §§261–81), who was writing in Greek in the early part of the fifteenth century, is the fullest and earliest. The others are all in Italian. That by Diomedes Strambaldi (Mas Latrie 1893:102–14) is essentially a translation of Leontios; while for his account of the murder, as for much else concerning the fourteenth century, the sixteenth-century writer, Florio Bustron (Mas Latrie 1886:272–6), appears to be dependant on the anonymous history known as the *Chronique d'Amadi* (Mas Latrie 1891·

422–6). Although their precise relationship still awaits elucidation, Leontios Makhairas and the *Chronique d'Amadi* evidently have much material in common. In short, these Cypriot narratives are all comparatively late and exhibit an unmistakable textual inter-relationship which points to a common original. In consequence, their account of the murder perhaps deserves less credence than normally ascribed to it. Some elements in their story, for example the history of John Viscount, the fate of the Jubail family and the identity of the murderers, find a fair measure of confirmation elsewhere (Mas Latrie 1877:247–69; Moranvillé 1893:303–4), but in two details – one trivial in itself but clearly illustrative of the fact that the unanimity of these sources should not be counted on, the other significant for what actually happened – their version of events requires re-appraisal.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Louis de Mas Latrie (1852:344–5) finally settled the confusion surrounding the year of the murder – 1369 – and, on the basis of the narrative accounts of Diomedes Strambaldi, the *Chronique d'Amadi*, and Florio Bustron, proposed Wednesday 17 January, the feast of St Anthony, as the day. In his dating he has been followed by almost all subsequent scholars.³ The three sources he used, together with Leontios Makhairas's history which was then unknown, do point to 17 January as the date. Leontios, for example, clearly states that the day before the murder was Tuesday 16 January, the eve of St Anthony (Dawkins 1932a: §279), and that the murder took place early on Wednesday 17 January (§280) – dates which concur with the calendar for that year. But against the testimony of these sources may be

placed three statements to the effect that the king died a day earlier than supposed – on Tuesday 16 January. This date is provided by the prologue to the 1369 recension of John of Ibelin's legal treatise (Beugnot: 1841:3–6), a note in a Greek collection of homilies and legends concerning the Virgin Mary from Cyprus (Darrouzès 1950:185; Darrouzès 1958:40) and by Guillaume de Machaut in his *Prise d'Alexandrie* (Mas Latrie 1877:247, 265–8).⁴ But, as has been stated, the four narrative accounts of Cypriot provenance which agree in giving the date as 17 January are textually interrelated; in consequence their unanimity on any particular point demonstrates nothing other than that they are drawing, perhaps at several removes, on material in a common original. But if these narratives speak with one voice because in effect they are one voice, the sources which give 16 January as the day of the murder are unquestionably independent of one another. Their combined evidence would therefore seem preferable, and Peter's death should therefore be redated to 16 January.

To redate the murder to one day earlier than previously supposed is of little intrinsic significance. To suggest in the face of the Cypriot sources that the king's brothers were a party to the decision to kill the king, however, alters our perspective of events considerably. Leontios Makhairas and the other Cypriot sources are careful to disassociate the king's brothers from the plan to murder King Peter: allegedly they had agreed to get the king to renew his oaths and went with the murderers thinking that that was what they were going to do; it would appear that it was only thanks to their presence that the murderers were

able to gain admittance to the royal apartments, and that the murderers rushed at the king and stabbed him to death before the two princes of the blood-royal realized what was happening; although at the scene of the crime, the king's brothers were innocent of his blood. But to writers in the West there was no doubt that they were guilty men: they were either in the conspiracy, urging the murderers on, or, according to some accounts, actually struck the fatal blows themselves. Guillaume de Machaut, whose *Prise d'Alexandrie* is a full-length biography of King Peter, Philippe de Mézières, the crusade propagandist, chancellor of Cyprus and visionary, Froissart, Christine de Pisan, the anonymous author of the *Chronographia regum Francorum* – to mention only a few of the better known writers and sources – are all agreed on their complicity.⁵ In the past, historians have rejected these assertions, preferring the unanimity of the much fuller accounts of Cypriot origin (Mas Latrie 1852:342–4; Dawkins 1932b:137–8; Hill 1948:366–7). But, as has been claimed, their unanimity counts for nothing, and the historical tradition enshrined in these sources is flawed in at least one other respect. Confronted by the array of counter-assertions, it must be admitted that the complicity of the king's brothers seems probable. When we take into consideration circumstantial evidence provided by the Cypriot sources themselves and pointing to the same conclusions – the brothers' presence at the scene of the murder, the fact that they made no attempt to punish the actual murderers subsequently (see below), and the fact that the king's widow held Prince John personally responsible for the deed (Dawkins 1932a: §553–4) – their complicity seems certain.

Indeed, it is possible that the sources on which these Cypriot narratives drew for their account of the murder reflected either an "official" account, put out by the regime, headed by the prince of Antioch, which came to power directly after Peter's death, or took shape at the court of James I (1382–98) or his son Janus (1398–1432), in which case it would have been imprudent to record that the then king or his father was guilty of regicide and fratricide.

But it is one thing to accuse Peter's younger brothers of complicity in his murder, even if it is admitted that they did not strike the blows themselves, quite another to understand why. Evidence for long-standing personal animosity between King Peter and his brothers is lacking. John, prince of Antioch, had a fine record of service, both as a military commander and as regent while Peter twice visited the West as king; it is no exaggeration to see him as his brother's right-hand man (Mas Latrie 1852:250, 252, 308; Mas Latrie 1877:136, 137–8, 146, 148, 162, 170–2; Dawkins 1932a: §§101, 119, 121, 132–52, 160–3, 167, 190, 194–6, 200, 204, 209, 214, 223–4; Smet 1954:93). James appears to have been still in his teens during the 1360s, and accordingly had not played any significant part in the events before 1369; he had, however, been present at Alexandria in 1365 where he had been knighted and given the office of seneschal of Cyprus.⁶ Before the murder there is no indication of any ill-will between the king and his brothers, unless we believe a story recounted by Leontios Makhairas that Peter had intended to lock them in the Margarita prison together with those knights he knew hated him, but had been thwarted (Dawkins 1932a: §260). But

Leontios' tale is told with something of the air of a piece of literary fantasy, and in any case it presents chronological difficulties which make it impossible to accept it as it stands (Richard 1952:108 n.1). On the eve of the murder there occurred an angry scene between the king and his brothers when they tried to remonstrate on behalf of the Jubail family (Dawkins 1932a: §§269–72), and it may be that it was only after that that the knights persuaded them that Peter meant to do them harm. But the suspicion must remain that personal ambition or private animosity are insufficient explanations of John and James' involvement.

Before turning to consider those wider problems facing Cypriot noble society which may have added to the dissatisfaction, and helped create the situation leading up to the murder, it will be useful to examine the careers and backgrounds of the other men known to have been implicated. Apart from John and James, six men are mentioned by name in our sources as being directly concerned with the king's death: the three murderers, Philip of Ibelin, lord of Arsur, Henry of Jubail and John of Gaurelle (Mas Latrie 1877:268–9; Dawkins 1932a: §280);⁷ John Gorap and James of Nores, who mutilated the body, and Raymond Babin, in whose house the murderers are said to have planned their fell deed (Iorga 1896: 389 n.2). Philip of Ibelin stands out pre-eminent as a member of the *haute noblesse*. His direct ancestors had been fief holders in the Latin East since early in the twelfth century; from the 1170s they had been related by marriage to the ruling house in the kingdom of Jerusalem; the Jerusalemite lordship of Arsur they had held since the beginning of the thirteenth century, and,

although Arsur had been lost to the Moslems in the 1260s, the family continued to use the title (Mas Latrie 1894:590-6). Philip himself married twice; on each occasion his consort was a member of the Cypriot royal family.⁸ Fairly early in Peter's reign, for reasons which remain obscure, Philip and Peter quarrelled. Philip went into exile. He had Pope Urban V intercede with the king on his behalf, and by late 1366 was once again in Peter's service.⁹ Outwardly at least the two men were reconciled, for the next year Philip was a member of the party which accompanied the king to the West (Mas Latrie 1852:291; Dawkins 1932a: §194). Henry of Jubail, the knight whose treatment at the hands of King Peter occasioned the murder, was a member of one or other of the two families in Cyprus with that surname. Early in the twelfth century the Genoese Hugh Embriaco had obtained the lordship of Jubail in the county of Tripoli, and his descendants had moved to Cyprus when ousted by the Mamluks at the close of the thirteenth century. A second family, apparently unrelated to the Embriaci, also took their name from Jubail and in their case settled in Cyprus in the 1190s (Rey 1895: 398-422). Unfortunately Henry's immediate antecedents are not known and so it is not possible to ascertain to which of these houses he belonged. Henry himself had served King Peter on at least some of his military expeditions, had been given a diplomatic mission on one occasion, and had held the important judicial post of viscount of Nicosia (Dawkins 1932a: §§119, 161, 165, 167, 261, 265). The third murderer, John of Gaurrelle, appears to have been a descendant of a Poitevin follower of Guy of Lusignan, the founder of the Cypriot royal dynasty

(1192-4) (Rey and du Cange 1869:607). His family, though of knightly status, perhaps lacked the distinction of the Ibelins or Jubails, and little is known about John's career before 1369, except that he had gone to the West with King Peter in 1362 (Mas Latrie 1877:254; Dawkins 1932a: §129; Rüdts de Collenberg 1975-7:231). James of Nores similarly could trace his ancestry in the East through several generations. The Nores family first appears in Cypriot sources of the early thirteenth century, and its members are best thought of as substantial knights rather than as magnates. In many respects James of Nores attained greater distinction than his forbears. He had a long record of service, first being mentioned as far back as 1338 (Mas Latrie 1852:179). By 1344 King Hugh IV had made him Turcopolier (Rüdts de Collenberg 1977:74), and in 1347 he sent him to the papal curia (Rüdts de Collenberg 1975-7:221). Under Peter I, James had an outstanding military career and led the important embassy of 1367 to the Egyptian Sultan (Mas Latrie 1852:291, 292, 302, 308; Mas Latrie 1877:138, 177-201; Dawkins 1932a: §§119, 123, 126-7, 147, 162, 190, 193, 202-5, 214). After Peter's death he is said to have entertained ambitions to marry his daughter to the young Peter II (Dawkins 1932a: §349). Raymond Babin's career and family background closely parallels that of James of Nores. The Babins had settled in Jerusalem in the twelfth century and had moved to Cyprus by the early years of the thirteenth. Raymond himself had served King Hugh as captain of the royal galleys (Rüdts de Collenberg 1975-7:227) and had been made Butler of Cyprus on the accession of King Peter (Dawkins 1932a: §100). Early in Peter's reign he had

been an ambassador to Pope Innocent VI (Theiner 1872:53; Dawkins 1932a: §102; Rüd̄t de Collenberg 1975-7:222, 232, 236, 241, 243) and he subsequently participated in several of the king's military expeditions (Dawkins 1932a: §§119, 163, 190). Of the six, only John Gorap came from a family of no great antiquity. The earliest reference to it dates to 1350 (Rüd̄t de Collenberg 1975-7: 229), and it has been suggested that it was of Syrian rather than western European origin (Dawkins 1932b:138). He himself had made his career in the royal household, incurring, as has been mentioned, the king's wrath the day before the murder.

The knights who killed the king or who are known to have been implicated in his death were, for the most part, men of long-established noble families who themselves had distinguished records of service, in some cases reaching back to the time of Hugh IV. Henry of Jubail, John Gorap, and perhaps Philip of Ibelin had private scores to settle, but there is no evidence that this was true of the others. The nobility as a whole may have felt itself threatened by the king's recent actions, and, almost certainly with the encouragement and connivance of the king's own brothers, a group from within the nobility went to extremes. But although the narrative sources interpret the murder primarily in terms of personalities and the breakdown of normal personal relationships, there can be no doubt that in the background lay legal and other, more general, complaints. Leon-tios Makharras devotes a certain amount of attention to the legal aspects of the Jubail affair, pointing out the extent to which the king had breached feudal conventions (Dawkins 1932a: §§268-71, 277). But, as Professor Jean Richard has ably demonstrated

(1952:108-23), of far greater importance for the historian is a piece of immediately contemporary evidence, an *ordonnance* issued the same day as the murder. Later on 16 January the High Court was convened to make provision for the regency necessitated by the minority of the heir to the throne, and it would seem that this *ordonnance* was approved at this meeting. The document consists of thirteen clauses, most of which were obviously designed to remedy abuses which had found expression during Peter's reign, and it thus provides an invaluable guide to the specific grievances entertained by the nobility at that time.¹⁰ Without mentioning any members of the Jubail family by name, several of the clauses deal with the legal implications of the indignities inflicted upon them. Clause five asserted the necessity for a judgement in the High Court before the king could lay his hands on the person or the fief of a vassal, and clause seven summarized the rights that a feudal lord had over the marriage of heiresses or widows holding feudal property, stressing the requirement for the woman to be married to a man of comparable social standing.¹¹ A further clause (clause 13) asserted the right of the vassals to swear to support one another in defence of their feudal privileges in the face of illegal infringements by their lord — they had done just this on the eve of the murder (Dawkins 1932a: §272). Other clauses touched on the position of the vassals in such a way as to remind the king of the limitations on his power: vassals were to have their rights and fiefs and not be made to perform services other than were due (clause 4); the High Court was to meet regularly, at least once a month (clause 6), and, so that there should be no doubt as to the customs to

be employed there, a copy of the legal treatise by the thirteenth-century baronial lawyer, John of Ibelin count of Jaffa, was to be deposited in safe keeping for use as a work of reference (clause 8).¹²

The remaining clauses serve to illustrate other grievances. With one minor exception,¹³ they can all be linked in some way to the war, or the effects of the war, on the kingdom. Financial impositions for military purposes had been extended beyond the terminal dates agreed, and the revenues had been put to other uses (clauses 2 and 3); the king had alienated royal rights over the *salines* without the High Court's permission (clause 9); financial demands had been imposed by the *office des enquestes*, again without the Court's permission (clause one). In short, Peter had abused the aids agreed by the vassals, had been alienating the royal domain, and had resorted to new financial exactions without consultation; in clause one of the *ordonnance*, the vassals set about dismantling the administrative machinery which enabled him to do all this by decreeing the abolition of the *office des enquestes* (Richard 1952:113ff). In each case these clauses in the *ordonnance* are pointers to the extent to which the wars, and also Peter's costly diplomatic perambulations in western Europe, had strained the resources of his island kingdom. Allegedly the wealth accumulated by King Hugh IV had been used up on the expeditions against the Turks in the early years of the reign; and before each of the king's western visits, revenue had been raised by allowing individuals to purchase immunity from the poll tax (Dawkins 1932a: §§157, 215). As early as 1366 the king's counsellors had shown concern at the cost to the crown of the military expeditions (Dawkins 1932a:

§182), and other evidence shows that, at the time of his death, Peter was heavily in debt (Mollat 1962-5: nos. 13, 20, 128, 134, 291, 718). To fight his wars the king had to live beyond his means and dissipate the assets of the crown. Royal insolvency and unsanctioned exactions boded ill for the future of Cyprus, besides placing added burdens on individual Cypriots. Under such circumstances it comes as no surprise that relations between the king and his leading subjects were deteriorating.

Two other clauses in the *ordonnance* are concerned directly with the conduct of military operations. Clause ten states that the king is not to declare war, nor make peace, nor recruit more than a hundred men-at-arms without the vassals' agreement. It may be that this was simply a provision intended to last for the duration of the minority of the new king, but it is equally likely that it was intended for all time, and in any case it is an assertion of a claim to control royal policy. Perhaps the clause implies insufficient consultation in the past; its presence certainly indicates dissatisfaction with the current military situation. Cyprus was committed to the war. Despite the economic difficulties the only conceivable course was to force the Egyptians to accept terms, and the only way of achieving this end was to keep up the pressure on them. These same considerations would seem to lie behind the other clause dealing specifically with the conduct of the war, clause eleven, which placed restrictions on the right of mercenaries to discharge themselves from royal service. A lull in the war, clause eleven, which placed restrictions inability of the government to pay wages, could have led to numbers of foreign mercenaries discharging themselves at will,

thereby making an advantageous peace formula yet more difficult to achieve. Both crown and vassals were in a dilemma: the cost of the war was too great for the island's resources, yet expenditure on mercenaries and the other pre-requisites of warfare had to be maintained. Paradoxically, there is no indication that the vassals had tired of campaigning; indeed, most of the knights directly associated with the murder were distinguished veterans. What they objected to was the effects the war was having on their social class in terms of both financial cost and access to the royal council chamber; warfare was expensive and the king was not to be trusted.

Writing about twenty years after the murder, Philippe de Mézières gave the Cypriots' jealousy of foreigners in Peter's service as a reason for the conspiracy against him (Iorga 1896:386 n.5). Philippe's suggestion is perfectly compatible with the idea that the vassals felt that they had not been adequately consulted; and it finds further support from what is known of the fate of Peter's favourites, both foreign and Cypriot, during the period which followed the murder. Foreign knights such as Brémont of La Voulte, who had served on Peter's campaigns, had received fiefs in the island and had then left, had their fiefs confiscated.¹⁴ John Lascaris Calopheros, a Greek from Constantinople, who had married a widowed noblewoman and had apparently tried to deprive her children by her first marriage of their inheritance, was dispossessed and imprisoned without trial (Jacoby 1968:190-5). John Moustry, a Cypriot high in Peter's favour whose family, it would seem, had until recently been numbered among the bourgeoisie, was hounded into

exile by Philip of Ibelin who had a private score to settle.¹⁵ Another person who lost the estate given her by King Peter was his mistress, Eschiva of Scandelion (Robert 1906:40). By contrast, all the knights who, together with the prince and his brother James, are known to have been implicated in the murder are found continuing to enjoy positions of honour and responsibility during the years of Peter II's minority and the prince of Antioch's regency (Beugnot 1841:3, 4, 6; Mas Latrie 1874:106; Mas Latrie 1891:450-1; Dawkins 1932a: §§290, 325, 349, 412-13; Mollat 1962-5:718). Treason had prospered: the murder of the king by members of the old aristocracy had been followed by a reaction against many of the 'new' men who had been high in his favour.

Never before had a king of Cyprus died in violent circumstances, nor had political assassination been a common feature of public life in the island. In the past, despite occasional upsets, relations between crown and nobility had generally been good, but in 1369 the nobility had many causes for complaint: besides the tales of the king's short-tempered behaviour, his treatment of the Jubail family, and the prevailing atmosphere of distrust and unease recounted by the main narratives, there were the financial effects on king, kingdom, and nobility alike of a war with no easy end in sight; and although the older nobility were never systematically excluded from the royal council, they were jealous of royal favourites. But for all this, it is difficult to see why the nobles should have found it necessary to kill their lord. These nobles were a politically mature and sophisticated group of men who could well have been expected to devise a means of curbing,

by some form of constitutional check, a king who in his vindictiveness had resolved to dispense with the normal processes of law and justice. In the thirteenth century John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa, whose legal treatise was adopted as a work of reference in the High Court of Cyprus directly after King Peter's murder, had envisaged—unrealistically—a form of legalised resistance to a king who behaved unlawfully, based on applying the sanction of refusing to perform feudal services (Beugnot 1841:313–35). In 1306 the sick and incompetent King Henry II had been sent into retirement and his younger brother installed as regent—an experiment which began well but ended disastrously (Hill 1948:216–60). A third expedient was suggested in 1369—that the king should be forced to renew his coronation oaths. The murderers are said to have rejected this proposal on the grounds that he would no more abide by his oaths in the future than he had in the past. They no doubt feared that if they attempted to impose restraints of this type, Peter would strike back at them later. But it may be that there was a further reason why constitutional restraints would not serve. For them to work, the king would have to be isolated. But in 1369, however united in their opposition the Cypriot nobility might be, Peter could look elsewhere—in particular to the foreign knights he had brought into the island—for assistance and support, and there is evidence, too, that the kings of Cyprus had developed governmental instruments during the fourteenth century which would have relieved them of the necessity to work in concert with their vassals (Richard 1952:122). Indeed, the vassals constituted only one element in the structure of power and influence in Cyprus,

and to ensure that their action could have lasting effect they had to pre-empt the possibility of a royal *révanche*. They had therefore to act decisively, and that meant acting violently.

Subsequent events cloud our perception of the long-term effects of the murder on the dynasty and its dealings with its vassals. The war with the Mamluks was brought to an end in 1370 with a treaty which probably fell far short of earlier Cypriot hopes (Iorga 1896:402). In 1372 fresh hostilities broke out, this time between Cyprus and Genoa. In 1373 the Genoese sent a large invasion fleet; Famagusta, the most important Cypriot port, was captured, not to be relinquished until 1464; the island was pillaged and placed under tribute; many knights, including the late king's brother James and the two sons of the prince of Antioch, were taken prisoner to Genoa. The invasion and its crippling effects on Cyprus distort our perspective on the murder. To contemporaries it could be seen as retribution (for example Collijn 1924–31:430–1). To modern eyes, the connection between the events of 1369 and 1372–3 are more tenuous. The origins of the Genoese war are a separate subject in their own right, but among the pretexts that the Genoese advanced to justify making war on Cyprus—and it was only a pretext—was the claim that they were avenging Peter's death (Dawkins 1932a: §§345–6, 459; Coopland 1969:296). By way of giving colour to this assertion, in the course of the invasion they captured and executed the three knights, Philip of Ibelin, Henry of Jubail, and John of Gaurrelle (Dawkins 1932a: §423; Balbi 1975: 167). After the war, Peter II and his mother, Eleanor, promoted a reaction against the murderers, their families and associates.

A number of knights were exiled and their estates confiscated, and in an incident of high drama, graphically recorded by Leontios Makhairas, the queen-mother engineered the assassination of the prince of Antioch (Dawkins 1932a: §§542, 551–4). Later when James became king in 1382, the pendulum was to swing the other way once more, and restitution was decreed (Dawkins 1932a: §620), but by then conditions in the island had changed considerably.

Notes

¹ For accounts of Peter's campaign, see Iorga 1896: chapters 6–11 *passim*; Atiya 1938:319–78; Hill 1948: 320–60; Setton 1976:237–82. For a recent attempt to reinterpret Peter's policy and aims, see Edbury 1977a: 90–105.

² Leontios Makhairas (Dawkins 1932 §§234–59) has a detailed account of these events, marred by chronological impossibilities. See Richard 1952:108 n.1. Guillaume de Machaut (Mas Latrie 1877:248–54) gives a similar account of the story of John Viscount but with various different nuances.

³ Scholars following Mas Latrie: Iorga 1896:385, 391; Hill 1948: 365; Richard 1952:108. Dawkins (1932b:136) thought that the murder took place on 16 January, but apparently supposed that day to be the feast of St Anthony.

⁴ Two further pieces of evidence add some support to 16 January as the date: the *ordonnance* of 16 January 1369 appears to be alluded to in the 1369 prologue to John of Ibelin's treatise as having been issued the day of the murder (see n. 10 below, and the text it refers to), and the day of the week – Tuesday – though not the day of the month, which is given wrongly, is repeated in a note on Peter's death in another Greek manuscript (Darrouzes 1956:57–8).

⁵ For references, see Iorga 1896:394 n.5, to which should be added Moranvillé 1893:303–4.

⁶ For James' career before 1369, see Mas Latrie 1877:138; Dawkins 1932a: §§149–50, 172. The fact that he was knighted in 1365 suggests that he would have been born about 1350. Peter had been born in 1329 (Mas Latrie 1877:5), and John may not have been much younger; certainly he had custody of his estates as early as 1353 (La Monte 1930:486–7).

⁷ According to the *Chronographia regum Francorum*

(Moranvillé 1893:304) an otherwise unknown fourth knight named Peter of Mimars shared responsibility for the king's death.

⁸ Philip's wives were respectively a niece and a grand daughter of Hugh IV. Rüdts de Collenberg 1977: 72, 78, 90 n.43, 91 n. 58.

⁹ For the quarrel and Philip's return to Peter's service, see Iorga 1896:340 n.4, 390 n.5; Mollat and Lecacheux 1902–55: nos. 1968–9; Dawkins 1932a: § 190; Rüdts de Collenberg 1977: 91 n.58. On the basis of an apparently corrupt passage in Leontios Makhairas, it has been suggested that at the beginning of his reign Peter made Philip seneschal of Cyprus (Iorga 1896:103 n.1). This idea has been questioned by Richard (1952:116 n.3), but if correct would mean that Peter subsequently deprived Philip of the office, since he gave it to his brother, James of Lusignan, in 1365 (Dawkins 1932a §172).

¹⁰ Beugnot (1843:378–9) printed the *ordonnance*, but with an erroneous date. Richard (1952:110–11) redated it to 1369 on the basis of internal evidence, and in fact the best MS. (Vatican Library MS. lat. 4789, f.cclxix^v) confirms his date. For an account of the meeting of the High Court with allusions to this *ordonnance*, see Beugnot 1841:3–6.

¹¹ For seigneurial control of marriages, *servise de mariage*, see Edbury 1977b:345–7, 349.

¹² For measures to implement clause eight, see Beugnot 1841:4–6. For manuscripts of the version of the treatise adopted in 1369 see Grandclaude 1926: 450–3, 462–3, 471–4. It is not known for how long this 'official' version of John of Ibelin's treatise was preserved. When in 1531 the Venetian authorities ordered an Italian translation to be made, they made use of other recensions – an indication that the 1369 recension was no longer available.

¹³ Clause twelve is concerned with the complaint that by improving his own property a man has detracted from the value of his neighbours. For an example of this type of dispute, as it involves James of Nores, see Richard 1947:125.

¹⁴ Robert 1906:39–40. For Brémond, see Mas Latrie 1877: 72–5, 111–4, 144–5, 158, 162, 168, 207, 228; Dawkins 1932a: §§187, 190, 200; Richard 1962: 80. For his fiefs after 1369, see Dawkins 1932a: §620; Mirot 1935 – 57:225; Mollat 1962 – 5:265. For other non-residents who were dispossessed or who feared dispossession, see Mas Latrie 1852:358–9; Mollat 1962–5:352, 802–3, 897–8, 1004–5, 1540.

¹⁵ Dawkins 1932a: §283. For his earlier career, see Mas Latrie 1852:302, 308; Dawkins 1932a: §§190, 194, 199, 200, 206, 208, 214, 248, 273–6. For the family's burgess origins, see Chamberlayne 1894:25–6.

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Figure 1 (Edbury). Silver *gros* of Peter I of Cyprus. Photographs by courtesy of the Heberden Coin Room, Ashmolean Museum, Oxford.

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XIV

CYPRUS AND GENOA: THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF 1373–1374

The war with the Genoese of 1373–1374 is often seen as a watershed in the history of Cyprus under the Lusignans. The loss of Famagusta, the attendant destruction, the financial burdens and the collapse of the island's commercial prosperity in the aftermath of the war contrast sadly with the stability and purpose that had gone before. It may well be that in economic terms the war did no more than aggravate existing trends and that the commercial importance of Cyprus was already waning, but from a purely political point of view the war was a catastrophe and marked a significant stage in the process which was to lead ultimately to the Venetian acquisition of the island in the late fifteenth century.

Relations between the protagonists had been strained for a century or more before the 1370s. The Genoese authorities seem to have encouraged their nationals to attack Cyprus in the early 1310s,¹ and were preparing hostilities in 1305–1306, 1319–1320, 1343–1344,² and 1364–1365,³ and so the war, when it came, can be seen as the fulfilment of a threat which had been used on several occasions already. Indeed, the crisis of 1364–1365 closely foreshadowed the events leading to the war of 1373, and on that occasion conflict was only averted by a combination of diplomatic pressure on the part of the papacy and a capitulation by the Cypriots to Genoese demands. But quite apart from these threatened hostilities, there had been a host of lesser disputes and violent incidents involving Genoese citizens in Cyprus itself or in Cypriot waters stretching back to the 1290s if not before.⁴ To give just two illustrations: in 1302 Genoese pirates had carried off Guy of Ibelin, titular count of Jaffa, from his estate at Episkopi; by 1317 hostility between Cyprus and Genoa had reached such a pitch that senior clergy of Genoese origin beneficed in Cyprus found it necessary to live away from the island.⁵ It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that, but for this long-term anta-

1. Pope Clement V, *Regestum*, ed. cura et studio monachorum ordinis s. Benedicti (Roma, 1885–92), nos 9256–7.

2. Clement V, no. 752; *Annales ecclesiastici*, ed. C. Baronius & O. Raynaldus, new edition by A. Theiner (Bar-le-Duc/Paris, 1864–83), 1320 para. 47; Pope Clement VI, *Lettres closes, patents et curiales se rapportant à la France*, ed. E. Déprez, J. Glénisson & G. Mollat (Paris, 1901–61), nos 360, 575, 833.

3. For references see N. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières, 1327–1405, et la croisade au XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1896), 255–65; G. F. Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1940–52), ii, 312–16.

4. See Hill, ii, 183, 205–12, 278–81, 287–90 *et passim*.

5. For Guy, see 'Chronique d'Amadi', ed. R. de Mas Latrie in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi* (Paris, 1891–3), i, 238; for Genoese clergy, Pope John XXII, *Lettres communes*, ed. G.

gonism, the quarrel which began in 1372 at the coronation of King Peter II when some Genoese merchants were killed in a riot could have been resolved. The immediate pretexts for the war — the desire of the Genoese to exact reparations from an obdurate Cypriot government and their alleged concern to avenge the murder of the previous king, Peter I — can only be understood in the light of this history of bad relations. It is with the underlying reasons for this history rather than with the immediate causes of the war that this paper is concerned.

Relations between Cyprus and Genoa had not always been unhappy. In 1218 the regent of Cyprus, Alice of Champagne, had given the Genoese generous commercial privileges, and these were renewed and extended by Henry I in 1232.⁶ The circumstances of Alice's grant are obscure: it could be that she was seeking Genoese support in the face of the political challenges she was facing at the outset of her regency;⁷ alternatively, she may simply have been encouraging Genoese merchants to come to Cyprus and so stimulate the island's trade. The 1232 privilege was awarded at a critical juncture in the civil war of 1229–1233 between the supporters of the Emperor Frederick II and his opponents led by the Ibelin family and King Henry I. The Genoese, strongly Guelph in their sympathies, made common cause with the groups in the East opposed to Frederick, and they provided the Ibelins with the necessary transport to bring their forces from Syria to Cyprus in the campaign which led to the defeat of the imperialists at Aghirda in June 1232, the same month as their privileges were renewed.⁸ In December of the same year the Cypriots and Genoese entered into an alliance for five years, presumably as part of the arrangements whereby Genoese ships helped blockade Kyrenia, the imperialists' last stronghold in the island.⁹ Friendly relations between the Genoese and the anti-imperialist, Ibelin-dominated regime of King Henry I seem to have persisted for several years: thus in 1243 we find the Ge-

Mollat (Paris, 1904–47), nos 2735–6.

6. L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852–61), ii, 39, 51–6. Cf. 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Documents Arméniens*, ii, 711, 713.

7. See Hill, ii, 84.

8. 'Gestes', 711–15, cf. 707–8.

9. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 56–8; 'Gestes', 719. The treaty has normally been ascribed to December 1233. The dating clause in fact reads: '*Actum in Nicossia, in palatio regis, millesimo ducentesimo tricesimo tercio, indictione sexta, die secunda Decembris post terciam*'. The sixth indiction, however, ran from 24 Sept. 1232 — 23 Sept. 1233, and in consequence either the indiction or the year of grace is erroneous. I prefer to accept the indiction as correct, since in December 1232 the king of Cyprus was still besieging Kyrenia whereas a year later the island was at peace, and because the form of the document suggests that the king of Cyprus did not at that time control the whole of his kingdom: instead of the king concluding a treaty witnessed by a few members of the High Court, the king and about fifty knights and magnates entered into the agreement with the Genoese representatives as individuals — an indication that at the time the king was in a weak position, not in total control.

noese assisting the Ibelins expel Frederick II's officers from Tyre.¹⁰

The earliest hint of any trouble between the authorities in Cyprus and a Genoese subject dates to 1252. In that year Pope Innocent IV, himself a Genoese, intervened on behalf of a relative of his, a Genoese knight, who had been deprived of his fief in the island by the king.¹¹ Far more serious was the breach which followed in 1258. From 1256 the Genoese and Venetians had been engaged in the war known as the War of St. Sabas. Much of the fighting had taken place in Acre, the principal port in Latin Syria, with the contestants attempting to oust each other from their quarters there. At first the government in Acre had favoured the Genoese, but in 1258 a shrewdly contrived legal ploy had ushered in a change of regent, and henceforth the government supported the Venetians. At the centre of this manoeuvre were the regent of Cyprus, Plaisance of Antioch, her infant son, King Hugh II, and John of Ibelin count of Jaffa who, besides being a leading member of the Latin Syrian nobility and legal expert, was a major land-holder in Cyprus and, as it happened, Plaisance's lover. This change in governmental policy was followed by Venetian victories and the expulsion of the Genoese from Acre.¹² Forced to choose between the warring republics, the rulers of Cyprus and Acre had opted for the Venetians. Precisely why they should have done so is not clear, but it may be that it was simply a matter of expediency: support the side which looks as if it is going to win. Apart from this one intervention in 1258, the Cypriot government seems to have kept out of the conflict, and there is no evidence for the Genoese retaliating by attacking Cypriot interests. There is evidence however that their ally, Michael VIII Palaeologos, whose recovery of Constantinople in 1261 did much to damage Venetian commerce, intended invading Cyprus with Genoese assistance in the early 1260s.¹³ But no such expedition materialised.

If the War of St. Sabas marks the beginning of strained relations between Cyprus and Genoa, it also marks the beginning of a tendency which lasted throughout the next century for successive rulers of Cyprus to show favour to Genoa's rivals. The Genoese would not have viewed the commercial privileges granted Barcelona and Pisa in 1291 with much pleasure,¹⁴ especially as the grant to Pisa followed closely on the crushing defeat inflicted by the Genoese at Meloria in

10. See J. Richard, *Le royaume latin de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1953), 256-9.

11. Pope Innocent IV, *Registre*, ed. E. Berger (Paris, 1881-1921), no. 5560.

12. J. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (London, 1973), 215-17; H. E. Mayer, 'Ibelin versus Ibelin: the struggle for the regency of Jerusalem, 1253-1258', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, cxxii (1978), 48ff.

13. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii, 653-5.

14. *Memorias históricas sobre la marina, comercio y artes de la antigua ciudad de Barcelona*, ed. A. de Capmany y de Montpalau (Madrid, 1779-92), ii, 56-7; *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll'Oriente cristiano e coi Turchi fino all'anno 1531*, ed. G. Müller (Firenze, 1879), 108-9.

1284 and because at about the same period, as we shall see, the Cypriots were attempting to negotiate a treaty with Genoa which was to the detriment of Genoese interests. But it is when we compare relations between Cyprus and Genoa with relations between Cyprus and Genoa's arch-rival, Venice, that this point is fully brought home. Outwardly at least, the rulers of Cyprus tried to adopt an even-handed stance in dealing with the two republics.¹⁵ Cyprus refused to be drawn into the actual fighting in the War of St. Sabas (1256–1270), the War of Curzola (1294–1299) or the so-called 'Straits War' of 1350–1355. But as in the case of the War of St. Sabas, Cypriot actions during the wars of 1294–1299 and 1350–1355 leave little doubt as to where sympathies lay.

The *Gestes des Chiprois* tells how in 1294 a Venetian fleet arrived at Limassol and destroyed the Genoese tower and *loggia* there. The Venetian commander then had an interview with the king during which the king, far from being outraged by this incident, is reported to have told the Venetians to watch out that the Genoese did not take up arms and go after them ("... se gardassent que Jenevès nen armassent après yaus..."). The Venetians then sailed to Famagusta. At Famagusta the royal castellan told the Genoese community that he was obliged by the terms of their privilege to defend them, but could only recommend flight inland to Nicosia. So although the Cypriots acknowledged their obligations to the Genoese, they did nothing for them and the Venetians seem to have had their

15. It may be that earlier in the thirteenth century Cyprus had favoured Genoa at Venice's expense. From a Venetian document of 1302 it is clear that the Lusignans issued no privilege for Venice before 1306. It would appear that during the minority of Henry I (1218–32) and the minority of Hugh II (1253–67) Venetian ambassadors had been promised privileges which were then withheld on the pretext that the king was a minor. 'Nouvelles preuves de l'histoire de Chypre', ed. L. de Mas Latrie, *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes*, xxxiv (1873), 54–5: "... et adhuc esse publica vox et fama, et de hoc quod ita sit rei veritas esse probabile argumentum, quod tempore quo nobiles viri Petrus Dandulus et Lucas Barbani fuerunt ambaxiatores pro commune Veneciarum ad dominum Henricum, tunc regem Cipri, fuit eis per ipsum de jurisdictionibus et franchisiis communis et hominum Veneciarum in insula Cipri facta satis large oblacio, sed quia ipse dominus rex non habebat posse in suis manibus, ipse obtulit ipsis ambaxiatoribus non modicam quantitatem pecunie de sua camera regali. Et hec oblacio facta fuit nobili viro Marco Barbo, ambaxatori postmodum ad illustrem dominam reginam Placenciam, que tenebat pro filio sua bajulatum Cipri. Et istud idem oblatum fuit eidem Marco per bone memorie dominum Ugonem, patrem presentis regis Henrici'. There exists an inventory of Venetian properties in Cyprus which from internal evidence would appear to date to the period 1236–47 (G. M. Thomas, 'Einen Bericht über die ältesten Besitzungen der Venezianer auf Cypern', *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen und historischen Classe der k.b. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München* (1878), 148–57; for the date see p. 157 where is mention of 'Balianus dominus Beriti', i.e. Balian of Ibelin, lord of Beirut (1236–47) and so is approximately contemporary with the famous inventories from Latin Syria compiled by Marsilio Giorgio. This inventory states that Venetians have customs concessions and rights of jurisdiction over their nationals, presumably either by virtue of the Byzantine grant of John Comnenus or because they managed to get the rights they already enjoyed in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem accepted in Cyprus. But the inventory also makes it clear that many properties had been lost in one way or another by the Venetians and that some were forcibly withheld.

tacit approval. A little later we read of a Cypriot galley manned by Syrians, Pisans and Venetians, “gens hainos as Jenevès”; not surprisingly the Genoese rebuffed an offer to accompany them in an attempt at mediation.¹⁶ Two other incidents would also seem to point to Cypriot partiality towards the Venetians. In 1297 a Venetian seized a Genoese ship from under the castle at Famagusta and set it on fire with impunity in full view of both the Cypriots and the Genoese, and in 1298 we find Cypriot officials warning Venetian shipping of a Genoese privateer.¹⁷ In the late 1290s and early 1300s there were Genoese demands for compensation from the Cypriot government for damage done to their people in Cyprus and at the same time there were various acts of Genoese aggression against Cypriot interests.¹⁸ How far this state of affairs arose directly from Cyprus’s support for the Venetians is hard to say, but there is no reason to doubt that the Genoese in Cyprus were all the more self-assertive as a result of their victory over the Venetians in the war of 1294–1299.¹⁹ When in 1306 King Henry II was deposed by his brother, Amaury lord of Tyre, the principal accusation against him was that he had done nothing to avert the Genoese threat.²⁰ One of Amaury’s first actions as governor of Cyprus was to award the Venetians extensive trading privileges in Cyprus — a concession which hitherto the Lusignan dynasty had avoided making.²¹

We are less well informed about Cypriot attitudes during the war of 1350–1355 between Venice and Genoa largely because of the paucity of the Cypriot chronicles for this period, but circumstantial evidence again points firmly in the direction of Cyprus being sympathetic to the Venetians. Thus for example, in 1353, at the height of the war, the marriage contract was drawn up for the heir-presumptive to Cyprus, the future Peter I, to marry into the royal house of Aragon, Venice’s ally in the war.²² Since the 1330s the papacy with the Venetians and the Knights of St. John in Rhodes had been organizing leagues to combat Turkish expansion in the Aegean. In 1334 Cyprus joined the alliance and Cypriot ships were sent to the Aegean where the combined Christian fleet had some

16. ‘Gestes’, 829–31; cf. Hill, ii, 208–9.

17. Andrea Dandolo, ‘Chronicon Venetum ad ann. 1339’, in L. A. Muratori (ed.), *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, xii, col. 407 (for 1297); ‘Nouvelles preuves’ (1873), 50–54 (for 1298 — the document is translated into English in R. S. Lopez & I. W. Raymond, *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World* (New York, 1955), 318–21).

18. Hill, ii, 209–12.

19. ‘Chronique d’Amadi’, 255.

20. ‘Gestes’, 860–61 and see also the document printed in the notes at p. 859 col. 1; ‘Chronique d’Amadi’, 249.

21. *Diplomatarium Veneto-Levanticum sive acta et diplomata res Venetas, Graecas atque Levantis illustrantia, a. 1300–1454*, ed. G. M. Thomas & R. Predelli (Venice, 1880–99), i, 42–5; ‘Gestes’, 862. Cf. ‘Nouvelles preuves’ (1873), 54–6 and see above note 15.

22. W. H. Rudt de Collenberg, ‘Les Lusignan de Chypre’, *Ἐπετηρίς τοῦ Κέντρου Ἐπιστημονικῶν Ἐρευνῶν*, x (1979–80), 129 and n. 268.

limited success. In 1344 a combined papal, Venetian, Hospitaller and Cypriot fleet succeeded in capturing Smyrna (Izmir) from the Turks, and in 1350 Cyprus joined Venice, the papacy and Rhodes in a renewal of the league only to find its effectiveness nullified by the outbreak of the war between Venice and Genoa. But despite the war, the participants in this league were still assisting in the defence and supply of Smyrna in the early 1350s, and in 1357, with the war over, the league was revived once more to counter Turkish aggression.²³ Although it is true that the parties to these alliances needed considerable encouragement from the papacy before they would fulfil all their obligations, the history of these activities show Venice and Cyprus co-operating in military action over an extended period, while Genoa remained to one side.

There is no doubt that from the 1290s until the 1360s Cyprus enjoyed far better relations with Venice than with Genoa. We do not read of Venetian piratical attacks on Cyprus and evidence for periods of ill-feeling is rare. There were evidently problems in the mid-1320s at the beginning of Hugh IV's reign, and in 1349 there was an anti-Venetian riot in Famagusta in which the local inhabitants and royal officers were involved. It may be significant that on this occasion the Venetian Senate recognised that the king had dealt sufficiently firmly with the offenders that no embassy to press for reparations was thought necessary.²⁴ In the fourteenth century there was a steady stream of Cypriot notables being given Venetian citizenship.²⁵ The 1360s witnessed King Peter I being fêted at Venice at the end of 1362 and then giving the Venetians support in their efforts to crush the rebellion in Crete in 1363-1364.²⁶ But in 1365 the long-standing friendship and co-operation was shattered by Peter I's destruction of Alexandria. Venice had not been informed of the object of the expedition, Venetian interests were damaged in the sack and the ensuing war impeded Venetian trade with Egypt and Syria. The Venetians retaliated by doing their utmost to undermine Peter's war effort.²⁷ Although something of a *rapprochement* was achieved and the fighting with the Muslims ended in 1370 with the Venetians and Genoese negotiating on behalf of a war-weary Cyprus, when the conflict between Cyprus and Genoa broke out in 1372 the Venetians did nothing. In 1373 a Cypriot ambassador was told that the Venetians had sent a mediator to Genoa — nothing further is heard

23. P. Lemerle, *L'Émirat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident* (Paris, 1957), 94-100, 181-92, 230-33; K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. i (Philadelphia, 1976), 229-31 *et passim*.

24. Hill, ii, 285-6, 290.

25. *I libri commemoriali della republica di Venesia registi (1293-1778)*, ed. R. Predelli & P. Bosmin (Venice, 1876-1914), i, 111, ii, 26, 44, 54, 57, 281, 312, iii, 41, 42, 92, 106.

26. Jorga, *Philippe de Mézières*, 147-50 (where the year should be 1362 and not 1361); Hill, ii, 327 n. 3.

27. Hill, ii, 335-47; J. Richard, 'Chypre du protectorat à la domination vénitienne' in his collected papers edited as *Les relations entre l'Orient et l'Occident au Moyen Age* (Variorum Reprints, London, 1977), 661-2; Setton, *Papacy and Levant*, i, 274ff.

of this — but that they were too pre-occupied with their own wars to be of any military assistance.²⁸ Although to the very last the Genoese accused the Cypriots of favouring the Venetians,²⁹ it may be that, in the aftermath of Peter I's wars, fought perhaps with the intention of disrupting the pattern of trade in the East so as to divert a larger share of the Levantine commerce through Famagusta,³⁰ the Venetians saw little point in supporting the Lusignans.

* * *

In the late thirteenth century and for much of the fourteenth Cyprus, in particular the port of Famagusta, enjoyed considerable prosperity. The surviving architectural monuments in Famagusta coupled with the portrait of opulence given by Ludolf of Sudheim in the mid-fourteenth century or the picture of bustling commercial activity provided by the registers of the notary Lamberto di Sambuceto at the beginning of the century are evidence enough.³¹ Some of the wealth accrued from the exchange of local products, but much seems to have accumulated in consequence of Cyprus's position on the international trade routes linking western Europe and Asia. In a famous passage, the fifteenth-century Cypriot author, Leontios Makhairas, explains the riches of Famagusta thus:

And there was great wealth there: all rich lords such as were Sir Francis Lakha the Nestorian and his brother Sir Nicholas Lakha the Nestorian. And the riches which they had are beyond my power to describe, for the merchant ships of the Christians which came from the West did not venture to do their business anywhere else but in Cyprus; and all the trade of Syria was done in Cyprus. For thus were the commands and prohibitions of the most holy pope on pain of excommunication, that the profit might go to the poor Cypriots, because they dwell upon a rock in the sea, and upon one side are the Saracens, the enemies of God, and on the other the Turks. And because Syria is near Famagusta, men used to send their ships and convey their wares to Famagusta, and they had agents there for the sale of their goods, Francis Lakha the Nestorian and his brother. And when the ships of Venice, of Genoa, of Florence, of Pisa, of Catalonia and of all the West arrived, they found the spices there and loaded their

28. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 359-60.

29. Leontios Makhairas, *Recital concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed. & trans. R. M. Dawkins (Oxford, 1932), para. 336.

30. See P. W. Edbury, 'The Crusading policy of King Peter I of Cyprus, 1359-1369' in P. M. Holt (ed.) *The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades* (Warminster, 1977), 95-100.

31. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 213-14; 'Actes passés à Famagouste de 1299 à 1301 par devant le notaire génois Lamberto di Sambuceto', ed. C. Desimoni, *Archives de l'Orient latin*, ii (1884), continued in *Revue de l'Orient latin*, i (1893). For a general description of trade in Cyprus, see W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen âge*, trans. F. Raynaud (Leipzig, 1885-6), ii, 3-23.

*ships with whatever they needed and went on their way to the West. And therefore the people of Famagusta were rich and so was the whole island, and the land began to be an object of envy.*³²

This description gives an idealised picture of the role of Cyprus in East–West trade, but nevertheless contains some important statements. With the fall of Acre in 1291 the popes banned Christian trade with Muslim ports. But the policy of weakening the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt by a trade embargo failed, principally because too many western merchants were prepared to flout the papal decrees. Licit trade with Asia could pass through the Armenian port of Ayas, but the importance of this outlet dwindled after 1322 when the town was sacked by the Egyptians. The last Venetian state galleys bound for Ayas sailed in 1334 and the town was finally lost to the Muslims in 1337.³³ So what we find is local merchants based in Famagusta, many of them Syrians or, as in the case of the Lakha family, Nestorians,³⁴ trading between Famagusta and Ayas or the small ports of Muslim Syria such as Tortosa or Lattakieh. Thus from Lamberto di Sambuceto's register for 1300 we find a certain "Jacobus Safsaf de Beruto, habitator Famaguste" trading in Syria.³⁵ The non–Latin merchant community in Famagusta, who as non–Latin would have had no qualms about breaking the papal injunctions, were bringing Asiatic spices and other commodities to Cyprus and selling them there to western merchants. Nor was it only the non–Latin merchants who were involved in trade with Syria: in 1301 the automatic sentence of excommunication imposed for infringing the papal ban was lifted from a burgess of Famagusta of Latin Syrian origin named Vivian de Ginnebaldo de Accon.³⁶ In all probability these local merchants traded with the acquiescence of the authorities. At least, in 1323 and again in 1324 the pope found it necessary to remind King Henry II to enforce the embargo, and it would seem that the king and his officers had incurred excommu-

32. Leontios Makhairas, para. 91 (following Dawkins's translation).

33. For the Venetian states galleys to the Levant, see F. Thiriet, *Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie*, (Paris/The Hague, 1958–61), nos 12, 43, 76, 91, 105, 140, 154, 170, 178, 192, 202, 206, 239, 272, 292, 311, 328, 343, 365, 418, 424, 433, 486, 498 etc. . . For Ayas see J. Richard, 'The Eastern Mediterranean and its Relations with its Hinterland (11th–15th Centuries)', in *Les Relations* (see above n. 27), 18; A. T. Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers' Interventions in Cilician Armenia: 1291–1375', in T.S.R. Boase (ed.), *The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia* (Edinburgh & London, 1978), 128, cf. 133–44. (Luttrell corrects the date for the loss of Ayas.)

34. See J. Richard, 'Le peuplement latin et syrien en Chypre au XIII^e siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, vii (1979), 166–71.

35. Lamberto di Sambuceto, no. 83, cf. no. 158.

36. J. Richard, 'Isol le Pisan: un aventurier franc gouverneur d'une province mongole?' in his collected papers edited as *Orient et Occident au Moyen Age: contacts et relations (XII^e–XV^e s.)* (Variorum Reprints, London, 1976), 188, 192–4. For Italians engaged in what was presumably illicit trade between Syria and Famagusta in 1300–1301, see Lamberto di Sambuceto, nos 109, 255, 391, 442, 470, 474, 479, 485–7.

nication for not doing so.³⁷

But so far as the non-Cypriot merchants were concerned, it was much to Cyprus's advantage to insist on the papal ban. Starving Egypt and Syria of supplies of war materials was important for reasons of security, but if western merchants were denied access to Muslim ports and so could only obtain eastern goods in Famagusta, then Famagusta would become a key *entrepôt* through which all the East-West trade in the East Mediterranean flowed. Professor Jean Richard has suggested that Henry II may have established Famagusta as a staple in Cyprus for international trade, compelling merchants to do business there and not elsewhere in the island.³⁸ It may well be that the Cypriots had ambitions far beyond this, to compel merchants, so far as was possible, to trade in Famagusta and not elsewhere in the Levant. (True there was also Ayas, and, as long as it was functioning as a port of entry to Asia, Famagusta's monopoly could never be complete; maybe commercial rivalry was partly responsible for the poor relations between Cyprus and the kingdom of Armenia in the early fourteenth century). The task facing the Cypriots was to prevent western merchants trading in Syria, and this meant using naval patrols to police the seas. Such patrols were well-established by about 1310, and there is a possible reference to one as early as 1294; significantly the first reference to an admiral of Cyprus also dates from the 1290s, from 1298.³⁹

To police the seas, even with the backing of papal decrees, inevitably led to conflict. Prominent among the western European trading communities flouting the trade embargo was Genoa, and there is good reason to suppose that Cypriot patrols had been intercepting Genoese ships trading with Syrian ports for some time before 1306. Such actions inevitably led on the one hand to protestations of innocence and demands for restitution and compensation, and on the other to retaliatory raids on Cyprus itself or on Cypriot shipping. In all probability Cypriot attempts at enforcing the papal injunctions were an important reason for the Genoese hostility of the early years of the fourteenth century.⁴⁰ In 1311 Henry II

37. John XXII, *Lettres communes*, nos 18100, 18119, 20386, *cf.* no. 14103. Admittedly it is not clear whether the pope had in mind Cypriots or western merchants using Cypriot ports, but, as he had been working hard to secure peace between Cyprus and Genoa and attempts to enforce the ban on Genoese shipping was a major source of friction between them, it is likely that he was chiefly concerned to get Henry to discipline his own subjects.

38. J. Richard, 'La situation juridique de Famagouste dans le royaume des Lusignans' in *Orient et Occident* (above n. 36), 226, 228. The idea of Famagusta as staple is supported by the failure of Pegolotti (writing in the 1330s) to mention any other port in the island in the course of his detailed account. Francesco Pegolotti, *La pratica della mercatura*, ed. A. Evans (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 77-102. See also Leontios Makhairas para. 154 clause 11 where the idea of compelling ships to put into Famagusta is alluded to.

39. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 121; 'Nouvelles preuves' (1873), 52; 'Gestes', 830.

40. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 156-7, 172-3; Clement V, no. 752 *cf.* no. 753. (The pope raises the issue of the Genoese quarrel with Cyprus and illicit trading in the same letter). See Hill, ii, 209-12, 278-81.

sent a memorandum to the Council of Vienne on the subject of the recovery of the Holy Land. In it he told a story of the tribulations that could befall those attempting to apply the papal ban. The previous winter the Knights of St. John in Rhodes had seized a Genoese galley coming from Alexandria. A Genoese embassy had requested its return, and the Master had refused on the grounds that he had been acting on papal instructions and suggested that the Genoese make representations to the pope. The ambassadors departed and then, without any further warning, two Genoese galleys raided the island of Rhodes, carrying off boats and men including a ship bringing some brothers of the Order with twenty-five horses and other goods from the West. They then sailed to Turkey and sold a great part of their spoils to the Muslims.⁴¹ Henry's memorandum here shows considerable subtlety in describing an incident which concerned Rhodes rather than Cyprus, but no doubt there were parallel instances and Henry evidently wrote with feeling.

Henry's memorandum set great store by an effective economic blockade of Egypt and Syria. In particular he wanted patrols to stop those "evil and false Christians" who were selling Mamluk slaves and war materials in Egypt — a direct challenge to the Genoese who were doing well out of the slave trade between their ports in the Black Sea and Alexandria.⁴² Henry's views on the blockade were shared by many crusade theoreticians of his time. What is striking are the claims he makes for the effectiveness of his measures to enforce the ban. He had armed galleys constantly on patrol and had done more damage to the Muslims than all other Christians put together. He had taken many ships belonging to "evil Christians" going to those parts with the result that they dare not now go near his kingdom. His patrols had captured Muslim vessels and the previous summer had seized a Genoese galley loaded with timber bound for the lands of the Mamluk sultan from Turkey.⁴³ Henry is of course extolling his own virtue and is quite likely to have been exaggerating the vigour and scope of his achievements, but there is no question that his ships were operating against illicit trade and continued to do so until at least the early years of the reign of Hugh IV.⁴⁴

In the early 1320s we see the beginnings of a shift in papal policy. For various reasons the papacy began to grant licences allowing merchants to circum-

41. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 119–20. See J. Delaville Le Roulx, *Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes jusqu'à la mort de Philibert de Naillac (1310–1421)* (Paris, 1913), 10–11.

42. M. Balard, *La Romanie génoise (XII^e – début du XV^e siècle)* (Genova, 1978), 289–310, *passim*. Henry's complaint about evil Christians selling Mamluk slaves was repeated in another memorandum to the Pope on the subject of the crusade in 1323. Pope John XXII, *Lettres secrètes et curiales relatives à la France*, ed. A. Coulon & S. Clémencet (Paris, 1906 – in progress), no. 1690.

43. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 119–22.

44. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 156–7.

vent its own ban on trade with Muslims. In 1318 the Cypriot patrols had relieved a Genoese merchant operating from Chios of a cargo of mastic presumably destined for Egypt, but in 1320 and again in 1322 and 1325 the Genoese lords of Chios obtained papal licences specifically permitting the export of mastic to Alexandria.⁴⁵ Thereafter the papal embargo was steadily slackened as more licences were issued. In 1329 the new patriarch of Jerusalem, about to set out for Cyprus, was empowered to absolve forty persons from excommunication for illicit trading. From the mid-1340s the Venetians, armed with papal licences, made Alexandria a regular destination for their state galleys. Cypriots too obtained licences to trade in Muslim lands, the earliest dating from the 1330s.⁴⁶ As licences became commoner, so the possibility of enforcing the papal ban on those trading without licences would have receded and it would seem that the Cypriot government gave up trying. By Pegolotti's time (late 1330s) it was evidently accepted by the authorities in Cyprus that Venetian and Genoese merchants would be trading between Famagusta and the Mamluk ports.⁴⁷ Maybe the demise of Famagusta's rival, the Armenian port of Ayas, compensated for the increased freedom to trade in Syria and Egypt so far as Cyprus was concerned, but not for long. What was happening was that the Asiatic trade routes were changing. Instead of coming overland to Syria and Cilicia, the merchandise was being shipped via the Red Sea and thence to Alexandria with the result that Cyprus no longer lay athwart the principal shipping lane. This change of trade routes, coupled with the economic effects of the Black Death, may well have meant that Famagusta was already showing signs of decline by the time of Peter I. It has been argued that the crusades of Peter I in the 1360s were intended to restore the position of Cyprus as the hub of East Mediterranean commerce either by destroying the principal Muslim ports and their markets and so forcing the traffic back to Cyprus or by bringing the Muslim ports under Cypriot control.⁴⁸ In the negotiations at the end of his reign it is clear that Peter was out to get commercial privileges in the Mamluk sultanate for Cypriot merchants; maybe he was hoping that his subjects would be able to buy up merchandise in Egypt and Syria and resell it to western merchants in Famagusta on sufficiently advantageous terms that the westerners would no longer find it worth their while to trade direct.

45. John XXII, *Lettres communes*, nos 11081, 15644, 21494; Delaville le Roulx, *Hospitaliers*, 367-8, cf. 9-10; Balard, *Romanie génoise*, 745.

46. John XXII, *Lettres communes*, no. 45955. For Venice, see above n. 33 and also A. Tenenti & C. Vivanti, 'Le film d'un grand système de navigation: les galères marchandes vénitiennes XIV^e-XVI^e siècles', *Annales*, xvi (1961), 83-6 and chart. For Cyprus, see W.-H. Rudt de Colenberg, 'Les grâces papales, autres que les dispenses matrimoniales, accordées à Chypre de 1305 à 1378', *Ἐπετηρὶς τοῦ Κέντρου Ἐπιστημονικῶν Ἐρευνῶν*, viii (1975-7), 202-5, 238-43. See also Richard, 'The Eastern Mediterranean' (above n. 33), 19.

47. Pegolotti, *La pratica*, 85.

48. For an elaboration of this view, see Edbury, 'Crusading policy of King Peter I' (above n. 30), 90-105, esp. 95-99.

It is thus possible to detect a consistent commercial policy spanning the entire period from the fall of Latin Syria in 1291 until the Genoese War of 1373–1374 of making Famagusta the principal emporium in the east Mediterranean for trade between Europe and the Levant. At first the Cypriots could exploit the papal embargo in the attempt to prevent merchants trading elsewhere, and then, when the embargo was in effect abandoned, try to restore Famagusta's primacy by fighting a commercial war under the guise of a crusade. It goes without saying that the merchants from the West objected to Cyprus policing the seas and seizing their ships and to Cyprus damaging their trade by waging war on the Mamluks. The Genoese suffered as much as any from these policies. But in any case, even for those merchants who were prepared to keep within the law, their interests and the interests of successive kings of Cyprus were in many respects incompatible. The Cypriot government wanted a share in the profits of trade in the form of taxes and customs dues and could appreciate the advantages of having a wealthy merchant class of its own. The Genoese and other westerners wanted to maximize their own profits and that meant cutting out middle-men such as the Cypriot Lakha family and avoiding the additional overheads that Asiatic goods shipped via Cyprus would incur.

* * *

In one important sense however the interests of the Cypriot government and western merchants co-incided. The Cypriot government depended on western merchants coming to the island on a regular basis if Cyprus was to have a position of any importance on the Mediterranean trade routes at all. If for any reason the merchants did not come, Cyprus would lose the commercial revenues vital for defence, and if for any reason Cyprus ceased to be attractive to merchants from the West, then western Europe would no longer have a stake in defending it against Muslim invasion. Indeed, when disputes arose, one of the most serious steps that a mercantile republic could take was to order its merchants to leave Cyprus and forbid future trade. The Genoese did this or threatened to do so on at least three occasions before the 1370s.⁴⁹ So the Lusignans had to provide incentives for the merchants to come, and this they did by granting commercial privileges which reduced tariffs and gave judicial immunity, thereby holding out the prospect of added financial profit and the opportunity to trade in a favoured environment. But when trade flourished and the need for special incentives to attract merchants to Cyprus disappeared, the government would be tempted to try to curtail these privileges, so as to make the foreign merchants more accountable and perhaps increase its own revenues. The interpretation and application of the privileges could in any case provide scope for disagreement. Disputes arising from the commercial and judicial franchises enjoyed by the Genoese in Cyprus

49. Hill, ii, 209–10 (1299), 280, *cf.* 279 (c. 1311), 313 (1364).

constitute a further source for the persistent friction.

According to the Genoese annalist, in 1288 Benedetto Zaccaria negotiated a treaty with Henry II of Cyprus which the government in Genoa then repudiated on the grounds that it was counter to Genoese interests; in consequence the king subsequently held the Genoese in less esteem: “. . . *ex hoc dictus rex postea Ianuenses male tenuit et minus honoravit*”. In 1292 the king formally cancelled the agreement.⁵⁰ Unfortunately for the historian the 1288 treaty does not survive, but the message is clear: the king of Cyprus was attempting to drive a hard bargain with Genoese, and it may be that the effect would have been to restrict their franchises in the island in some way. In the fourteenth-century disputes the Genoese frequently appealed to the terms of King Henry I's privileges granted in 1232 which came to be seen as the classic statement of their rights in Cyprus.⁵¹ The 1232 grant gave four things: jurisdiction over Genoese nationals to be exercised by officials from Genoa, freedom to trade and freedom from commercial imposts, ownership of certain properties in the island and the obligation of the kings to defend Genoese subjects and their possessions on land and sea. On each of these four counts there were to be disputes.

Except in cases of theft, rape and homicide, the Genoese *podestà* in Cyprus had full civil and criminal jurisdiction over Genoese subjects. Even in the case of these exceptions, his court decided whether the accused was guilty and if so only then handed him over to the royal officers for sentence and punishment. But from a dispute which arose in the 1340s it would appear that the Cypriots had prevented the Genoese from having their own prison in the island, and so presumably their ability to exercise criminal jurisdiction was in practice impeded. In 1365, when the Cypriots were obliged to make further concessions, the Genoese right to have their own prisons was carefully stipulated along with the right of the *podestà* to have his own “sergeants”.⁵² More important and more contentious was the question of who exactly were under Genoese jurisdiction and how Genoese nationality was to be determined. In 1365 it was agreed that the *podestà*'s court was to decide whether or not a man was a Genoese subject, and if the royal officers disagreed they could only object by appealing to the doge of Genoa. The problem was that some men had been falsely claiming to be Genoese in order to benefit from Genoese trading concessions. Obviously this was no new problem in the 1360s, but how it had been solved in the past is not clear.⁵³ Then there was the problem of Genoese citizens who became the liegemen of the king and obtained

50. *Annali Genovesi di Caffaro e de'suoi continuatori dal MXCIX al MCCXCIII*, ed. L. T. Belgrano & C. Imperiale di Sant'Angelo (Roma, 1890-1929), v, 91. For the royal cancellation, *Liber iurium reipublicae Genuensis (Historiae patriae monumenta*, vols. 7, 9), ii, cols. 275-6.

51. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 51-6, 151-2, 168, 248-9, 255; Clement VI, *Lettres closes . . . France*, no. 833. Cf. Leontios Makhairas, para. 154.

52. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 259; Clement VI, *op. cit.*, no. 833.

53. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 257-8.

fiefs or who were employed by the crown. Despite the conflicts, appreciable numbers seem to have been involved. The crown would argue that the Genoese officers no longer had any jurisdiction over such men; the Genoese saw it differently. In 1344 it would appear that the republic was prepared to concede this point, but in 1365 the *podestà's* jurisdiction was extended specifically to include royal vassals who were Genoese nationals so that the king could only proceed against them in his own court in actions relating to their fiefs, and to include Genoese in royal service so that the king could not take action against them even for failure to perform their duties adequately.⁵⁴ But who were Genoese? Inhabitants of Genoa and the neighbouring area of the Ligurian coast under Genoese rule, but also the inhabitants of the Genoese colonies in Romania and the descendants of inhabitants of the Genoese colonies and quarters of Frankish Syria — these latter groups being designated “White Genoese”. Here again was ample cause for dispute. The 1218 privilege had defined Genoese as being residents of Genoa and the surrounding area, but in 1365 the definition included the descendants of the refugees from Jubail, which until the end of the thirteenth century had been a fief in the country of Tripoli held by the Genoese Embriaci family. This meant that quite apart from the Genoese merchant community in Cyprus, the Genoese officers claimed jurisdiction over a section of the Syrian population resident in the island, most of whom had only the most nominal connection with Genoa. Numbered among the “White Genoese” were some prominent burgess families; their exemption from royal jurisdiction must have rankled with the Cypriot authorities and the rest of the population, and disputes arising from their exemption must have contributed to the friction.⁵⁵

The commercial clauses of the privileges proclaimed freedom from tariffs and freedom to trade. So far as freedom from tariffs is concerned, there seems to have been little dispute, although from 1344 there is evidence that the Genoese had been objecting to a tax on those who traded with them (“ . . . *gabella per illos qui contrahunt cum eisdem . . .*”). It is not clear whether this was a special impost levied on non-Genoese who did business with the Genoese or an allusion to the obligation of the non-Genoese party to a transaction to pay sales tax. In either case it would appear to have been imposed in breach of the 1232 grant.⁵⁶ Goods

54. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 259–60; Clement VI, *op. cit.*, no. 833.

55. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 39, 257; Leontios Makhairas, para. 375. See D. Jacoby, ‘Citoyens, sujets et protégés de Venise et de Gênes en Chypre du XIII^e au XV^e siècle’, *Byzantinische Forschungen*, v(1977), 161–3, 168, 178–9. Cf. Richard, ‘Le peuplement latin’ (above n. 34), 168–71. For ‘Cosmas filius quondam Ioseph de Zibelleto ianuensis de Famagusta’ — clearly a member of a White Genoese family originating from Jubail (Gibelet), see *Nicola de Boateriis, notaio in Famagosta e Venezia (1355–1365)*, ed. A. Lombardo (Venice, 1973), no. 48.

56. Clement VI, *op. cit.*, no. 833. Cf. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 53 at end of clause 2. For the obligation of non-privileged merchants to pay sales tax in Latin Syria, see J. Riley-Smith, ‘Government in Latin Syria and the Commercial Privileges of Foreign Merchants’, in D. Baker (ed.), *Relations between East and West in the Middle Ages* (Edinburgh, 1973), 118.

owned by non-Genoese imported on Genoese ships were subject to import duties and so presumably the royal officials claimed the right to inspect Genoese ships arriving in Cypriot ports, and it would seem that until 1365 the royal officials had the right to control Genoese recruitment of seamen in Cyprus and that this too gave them rights of inspection on board ship.⁵⁷ It is also apparent that the Cypriots insisted on issuing licences before ships could enter or leave port and that the Genoese regarded this as being in contravention of their privileges. In 1344 the right of entry to Cypriot ports without licences from royal officials was a major cause of dispute, and the point was among those conceded in 1365. The Cypriots may have had problems with overcrowding in their harbours and in any case would have wanted to control the numbers of mariners coming ashore at any one time. As for licences to leave port, the Cypriots were worried about the export of food-stuffs in time of scarcity and the export of prohibited war-materials to the Mamluk sultanate, but in 1365 they surrendered their rights to inspect ships about to leave and had to content themselves with an *affidavit* from the *podestà*.⁵⁸ A further source of dispute which the Genoese saw as impeding trading arrangements was the fact that Cypriot courts retained the right to refuse to accept notarial instruments (at least in cases of will, dower, sale of slaves and shipping) as evidence in legal disputes unless they had been drawn up before the royal judicial officers. This at least is clear from the Genoese complaints answered in 1338 and from Pegolotti who was writing his *La Pratica della mercatura* at about the same time. What is not clear is whether this rule applied generally or was only in force at that period, but it is likely that the rule was a device by which the Cypriot government was trying to enlarge the competence of its own courts at the expense of the foreign merchants and their notaries.⁵⁹ The overall impression that these examples give is that the Cypriot government tried, at least until the capitulation to Genoese demands in 1365, to keep Genoese trading in Cyprus under the scrutiny of its officers, while the Genoese, arguing on the basis of their privileges, strove to escape from governmental supervision.

The Genoese privileges, with their guarantees of safety for Genoese subjects and their possessions, were always liable to be abrogated by the Cypriot authorities in time of conflict. Thus in 1306 Henry II issued proclamations forcing the Genoese to swear oaths for good behaviour and to move from the coast to Nicosia; later that year he arrested the Genoese merchants and seized their merchandise. In 1313 Henry ordered the Genoese in Famagusta to surrender their arms and move to Nicosia, and in 1316 the Genoese were imprisoned, not to be re-

57. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 261-2; Pegolotti, *La Pratica*, 85.

58. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 260-63; Clement VI, *op. cit.*, no. 833. For the question of licences for Hospitaller ships to leave Cypriot ports in 1306, see Clement V, nos 1247-8.

59. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 174-6; Pegolotti, *La Pratica*, 88.

leased until 1320.⁶⁰ For their part, the Genoese could complain of "evil royal officials and their indiscriminate behaviour" and in 1365 insisted on the two senior royal officers whom they regarded as culpable in the affray of 1363, John of Tyre the admiral and John of Soissons the *bailli* of Famagusta, going into exile.⁶¹ Evidently at some point in the early fourteenth century the Cypriots seized Genoese properties in the island. By the treaty of 1329 it was agreed that they were to be restored, and at the same time it was stipulated that the king should undertake repairs or improvements to their bath-house in Nicosia. In 1344 the Genoese were claiming the right to have their own bakery as provided for in the 1232 privilege; presumably the royal officials had denied them this facility. In 1365 one of the points at issue was the right of the Genoese to build a larger official residence for their *podestà*.⁶² If the Genoese were not always able to occupy their properties, neither were they always able to exact repayment of debts contracted by individual Genoese to the rulers of Cyprus or their subjects as the treaties of 1329 and 1338 make clear.⁶³

By the terms of the 1218 privilege, the Cypriot government bound itself to safeguard as far as possible the persons and properties of Genoese suffering shipwreck. In 1232 this provision was expanded into an obligation to defend the Genoese and their possessions on land or on the seas around Cyprus. As has been mentioned, in 1294 the castellan of Famagusta recognized his duty to defend the Genoese community there when a hostile Venetian fleet appeared, and in 1298 Henry II came to an agreement with the Genoese indemnifying them for their losses. A further dispute over compensation arose after 1310. Early that year, while Henry II was being held in Armenia, there was an affray in Famagusta in which some Genoese were killed. The then ruler of Cyprus, Amaury of Tyre, promised compensation but had not paid it at the time of his death. The Genoese approached Henry with the request to honour Amaury's promises, but he refused whereupon they resorted to violent retaliation.⁶⁴ In 1329 the Genoese were demanding compensation for a cog burnt at some point during Henry II's reign and in 1338 compensation for damage done in a riot in Famagusta in 1331. From the agreement of 1338 there is also evidence which shows the royal officers defending Genoese shipping from pirates and restoring goods taken by pirates, although the Genoese merchant concerned still apparently thought that he was entitled to com-

60. 'Bans et Ordonnances des rois de Chypre', *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Lois*, ii, 368; 'Chronique d'Amadi', 255-6, 395, 398, 400.

61. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 263-4; Clement VI, *op. cit.*, no. 833; Leontios Makhairas, paras 155, 173-4, 209.

62. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 156, 263; Clement VI, *op. cit.*, no. 833. Cf. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 55.

63. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 152-5, 172.

64. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 39, 55. For 1294 see 'Gestes', 829. For 1298 see Hill, ii, 209. For 1310 see Clement V, nos 9256-7. Cf. 'Chronique d'Amadi', p. 393.

pensation from the Cypriot government, and there is evidence too for the obligation of the Cypriots to safeguard Genoese property salvaged from shipwreck, although here again there had been a dispute.⁶⁵

* * *

This investigation of relations between Cyprus and Genoa in the century or so before the war of 1373-1374 has perforce approached the subject largely from a Cypriot stand-point. How political upheavals in Genoa — and Genoa's history in these years is of violent instability — or the fortunes of Genoese interests elsewhere in the east Mediterranean or the Aegean and Black Sea area affected Genoese attitudes to Cyprus has largely been left alone. So too has the effect on Genoa and her merchants of the Black Death and the consequent contraction and re-adjustment in commercial activities this entailed.

What this discussion does I think show is that if relations between Cyprus and Genoa were bad, this was definitely not simply the result of an aggressive, unscrupulous maritime power preying on and exploiting a passive and largely defenceless island. That there were acts of piracy⁶⁶ and provocative behaviour by individual Genoese cannot be denied, but against such acts must be set the willingness of successive kings of Cyprus to take individual Genoese into their service and on occasion to reward them with high office: Peter I's appointment of Peter Malocello as chamberlain of Cyprus may serve as a prime example. The reasons behind the hostility went deeper, and the Cypriots must share the responsibility for engendering it. It is a moot point whether the Cypriot predilection for the Venetians since the War of St. Sabas was the cause or effect of strained relations with Genoa, but this predilection certainly meant that relations would remain strained. The Genoese came to Cyprus because they wanted to make money, and what they found was a regime which had a commercial strategy of its own — to channel as much trade as possible through its own principle port. This policy, however imperfect its realisation, struck at Genoese interests because it inhibited Genoese trade and so prevented the merchants from profiting as much as they might have hoped. Furthermore, when the Genoese came to Cyprus they found a regime which in various ways — often petty in themselves — was trying to control the Genoese merchant community and win back some of the extremely generous concessions that the rulers of Cyprus had given in a moment of friendship (or was it weakness?) as far back as 1232.

In 1365 King Peter I conceded Genoa's demands at a time when he was anxious to have his hands free to launch his crusade; the Genoese must have felt that henceforth the irksome behaviour of the royal officers was at an end. Immediately afterwards King Peter embarked on a war which seriously interrupted

65. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 155, 168-72, 176-7.

66. See for example the Cypriot complaints in 1338. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 177.

trade in the Levant and so angered Venice, Genoa and the other trading nations alike. From 1369 until 1372 there was an extended political crisis in Cyprus and then another anti-Genoese riot. There had been such riots before, in 1310, 1331, 1363 and perhaps at other times as well, but on these occasions the two states had stopped short of all out war. But now the Genoese exasperation with a kingdom which had done so much to thwart its interests over the years and which was weakened by the effects of a costly war, from which it had little to show, and by its own internal political wrangles, came to a head. The aftermath of the riot of 1372 was for Cyprus a disaster.

XV

The Aftermath of Defeat:

Lusignan Cyprus and the Genoese, 1374-1382

King Peter II of Cyprus came to the throne after the murder of his father, King Peter I, in January 1369.¹ A troublesome minority ended in 1372 with a riot at his coronation as king of Jerusalem in Famagusta in the course of which a number of Genoese merchants were killed. Genoa demanded reparations. The Cypriots refused. The Genoese thereupon assembled an invasion force. Their war-fleet arrived in 1373, and the Genoese troops were able to seize Famagusta, do an immense amount of damage there and elsewhere in the island and occupy Nicosia. They were checked only by the spirited defence of Kyrenia. In 1374 peace was agreed, and the Genoese withdrew taking with them around seventy knights as prisoners of war. Famagusta, however, was to remain in their hands until 1464. Peter II survived the conflict and reigned until his death in 1382, and it is the history of these later, somewhat neglected years of his life, from 1374 until 1382, that forms the subject of this paper.

The legacy of the war of 1373-74 was two-fold. On the one hand Cyprus was reeling under the impact of what was undoubtedly a calamitous defeat. The island had been exposed to several months of the horrors of foreign invasion. It can never be known how many Cypriots had been killed and how widespread the destruction and looting, but the principal Cypriot narrator of these events, Leontios Makhairas, indicates that Famagusta, Nicosia, Paphos and Limassol had all suffered severely. The Genoese had brought in several thousand troops, many of whom we can assume were hardened mercenaries with long experience of European warfare. The Cypriots too had employed soldiers from outside the island - there are frequent references to a force of Bulgars in Cypriot service - and these men similarly are unlikely to have had much regard for the property or sensibilities of the local population.² In the course of the invasion

1 A revised and re-set version of a paper first published in *Les Lusignans et L'Outre Mer* (Poitiers: Programme com'Science/Conseil regional Poitou-Charentes, 1995), 132-40.

2 For Peter's minority and the Genoese, G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1940-52), ii, 370-413; P.W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge, 1991), 197-209. For the Bulgars, Leontios Makhairas, *Recital Concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed. R.M. Dawkins (Oxford, 1932), §§434, 446, 456, 460, 466, 468-9, 471, 483, 503-4, 552.

Genoese depredations had destroyed the personal wealth of nobles and merchants alike. Famagusta in particular seems to have been thoroughly ransacked, and it is probable that many of the local merchants lost their working capital and so were permanently forced out of business. There can be no doubt that the invasion aggravated Famagusta's economic decline which was already in train as a result both of the Black Death and subsequent epidemics and of the changing trade routes in the eastern Mediterranean.³ The Genoese occupation then had the effect of deterring merchants from elsewhere in the West from trading there, and, writing in the 1390s, the pilgrim, Nicolo da Martoni, was able to leave a vivid description of the town in ruinous decay.⁴

A second legacy of the war was the continuing factionalism at court. Peter I had been murdered by a group of his own vassals acting with the connivance of his two younger brothers, John, prince of Antioch, and James, the future King James I. Throughout Peter II's minority, the prince of Antioch maintained his position as the dominant figure on the island. The murderers went unpunished, and the prince's regime evidently enjoyed strong support among the older noble families. But Peter's widow, the queen mother Eleanor of Aragon, remained bitterly opposed to the prince. During the minority her efforts to avenge her husband's death and undermine her brother-in-law's authority seem to have made no headway, but she did succeed in embarrassing him by getting messages to the pope and to her relatives in Spain. Relations between the queen and the prince evidently deteriorated after Peter II's majority as the two struggled to control the king's exercise of patronage. (Leontios Makhairas later accused her of encouraging the Genoese to invade. It is hard to know whether there is any truth in this allegations, but a contemporary Genoese document did describe the war as being against 'the prince of Antioch and his followers'.) During the war the Genoese attempted to capitalize on these divisions by putting it about that they were avenging Peter I's murder, and, by way of adding substance to this claim, they executed the three nobles who had struck the fatal blows. But Eleanor was not prepared to accept the Genoese in their self-appointed role as her champions, and

Apparently they had been recruited by the Genoese and had deserted. §427, cf. §§377-8. The prince of Antioch is also said to have had mainland Greeks and Tartars in his service. §508, cf. §377 where the Genoese are reported to have troops of these nationalities.

3 Edbury, pp.151-3. For the destruction of personal wealth, Leontios Makhairas, §§96, 349, 422, 451-3.

4 E. Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1983), 115, 120. 'Relatio du pèlerinage à Jérusalem de Nicolas de Martoni, notaire italien', ed. L. Le Grand, *Revue de l'Orient latin*, iii (1895), 628-32.

the war ended with Eleanor and her other brother-in-law, James of Lusignan, leading the Cypriot resistance at the siege of Kyrenia.⁵

In the spring of 1374 the Genoese imposed their terms on the Cypriots. The final version of the treaty, dated 21 October 1374, survives. Cyprus was to be placed under a perpetual tribute to Genoa of 40,000 florins annually and had to pay the *maona*, the joint stock enterprise that had funded the invasion force, a total of just over two million florins spread over twelve years. In addition, 90,000 florins were to be paid towards the cost of the Genoese galleys, and all those Genoese who had suffered at the hands of the Cypriots between the day of Peter's coronation as king of Jerusalem and the Genoese capture of Famagusta were to be compensated. The Genoese were to hold Famagusta in pledge until the payments were complete; also as security for these payments they were to hold hostage James of Lusignan, the two sons of John prince of Antioch, and the Cypriot knights they had captured during the war.⁶ There can be little doubt that the financial demands went far beyond the island's resources, and there is no evidence to suggest that during what remained of Peter's reign the Cypriot government made any serious attempt to comply with them.⁷

Cyprus was thus crippled by a catastrophic war and saddled with a peace treaty, the terms of which could never be fulfilled. There was a very real danger that if they did not pay up the Genoese would attack again.⁸ The difficulties facing the king must have seems insuperable. For advice and support he could turn to his mother and the prince of Antioch, his uncle. But here too the auspices were not good. On top of the resentments that Eleanor already had towards John for the murder of Peter I, there were now mutual recriminations over the responsibility for the war itself. If it were possible to accuse Eleanor of encouraging the Genoese attack, it was undoubtedly true that it was John who had been in charge during the events that had led to the outbreak of hostilities, and he would have had to bear much of the obloquy for the defeat. What was

5 Edbury, pp.198-9, 201-2, 206-7.

6 *Liber Iurium Reipublicae Genuensis* (Historia Patriae Monumenta, ix: Turin 1857), ii, 806-15. The delay in finalizing the treaty probably resulted from the need to refer it to Genoa for approval.

7 In 1383 a new treaty with Genoa indicated that the Cypriots had paid something but did not specify when and how much. C. Sperone, *Real Grandezza della Serenissima Repubblica di Genova* (Genoa, 1669), 116-37 at p.117. See C. Otten-Froux, 'Le relations politico-financière de Gênes avec le Royaume des Lusignan (1374-1460)', in M. Balard and A. Ducellier (eds), *Coloniser au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1995), 61-75.

8 G. Mollat (ed.), *Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Grégoire XI (1370-1378) intéressant les pays autres que la France* (Paris, 1962-5), no. 3012; Leontios Makhairas, §558.

more, the Genoese had largely destroyed the prince's political base. His brother James, whose achievements in the defence of Kyrenia would seem to have made him the hero of the hour, and many of the knights who had supported his regime during Peter II's minority were now in prison in Genoa or Chios. He was left isolated and discredited.

The king and his advisers evidently began by taking the view that their best hope of extricating themselves from the problems that confronted them lay in getting international support to persuade the Genoese to renegotiate the terms of the treaty. Their expectations may have been raised by the generally supportive attitude adopted by the papacy. Already in August 1374 Pope Gregory XI had been encouraging the Genoese to finalize peace and had been expressing his fears for the Cypriot prisoners in Genoa.⁹ In the autumn of 1374 King Peter sent a diplomatic embassy to the West headed by a knight named Thibaut Belfarag. Thibaut was clearly an ambitious man of genuine ability. His surname suggests that he was of Syrian descent, and according to Leontios Makhairas he was originally a burgess who had converted from Greek to Latin Christianity and had been ennobled. He had already acquired some prominence. In 1367-68 he had accompanied Peter I on his journey to western Europe, and in 1370 he had been granted Venetian citizenship.¹⁰ Thibaut now made his way to the papal court from where at the end of November 1374 the pope wrote to the doge of Genoa telling him suspend the preparation of the new fleet that was intended for Cyprus as the king was sending Thibaut to make peace.¹¹ The embassy, now consisting of Thibaut, Abbot Peter of Stavrovouni and John Lascaris Calopheros, who was appointed papal nuncio, set off from the papal court for Genoa in early January,¹² but within a fortnight Thibaut had the pope recall John Lascaris on the grounds that he had a better chance of success without him.¹³

It is difficult to know for certain what lay behind John's recall. Immediately afterwards the pope sent a cardinal in his place to share in the negotiations,¹⁴ and so it would appear that the problem was not that

9 Mollat, nos. 2800-1, 2805, cf nos. 2915-17.

10 L. de Mas Latrie, 'Nouvelles preuves de l'histoire de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan', *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, xxxiv (1873), 77-8; Leontios Makhairas, §§214, 568, 579, 403-4. Cf. Mollat, no. 2073.

11 Mollat, no. 3012.

12 L. Mirot *et al.*, *Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Grégoire XI (1370-1377) relatives à la France*, (Paris, 1935-57), nos. 3570, 3573; Mollat, nos. 3063-7, 3077; W.H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Les grâces papales autres que les dispenses matrimoniales, accordées à Chypre de 1305 à 1378', *Epeteris tou Kentrou Epistimonikon Ereunon*, viii (1975-77), 197, 236, 237.

13 Mollat, no. 3080, cf. no. 3092.

14 Mollat, no. 3094.

Thibaut did not want a papal representative with him on his embassy, but that he had explicitly objected to John. John Lascaris Calopheros was, like Thibaut, a convert from Greek Orthodoxy to Catholicism. In the 1360s he had come to Cyprus from Constantinople and had risen in the service of Peter I only to suffer in the backlash against the king's foreign favourites in the aftermath of his murder. In 1373 Eleanor had sent him to the pope in the course of her own diplomatic manoeuvres, and at the papal curia he had laid charges against his Cypriot opponents. As a well-placed convert, he had attracted papal support, and the pope's tribunal found in his favour. It would seem that he then entered papal service and was still at Avignon when Thibaut arrived late in 1374.¹⁵ So as well as being the papal representative on Thibaut's embassy, John was also marked out as someone close to the queen, and it may be that it was for that reason that Thibaut did not want him. As the pope made clear in letters written at the time, Thibaut's purpose was to obtain confirmation of the peace, the release of the nobles in prison and an end to the 'innumerable evils said to have been committed in the island of Cyprus'.¹⁶ John Lascaris, however, had suffered at the hands of some of the very people the embassy was seeking to free, and, had the nobles been able to return to Cyprus, the prince of Antioch's position would have been strengthened and that of the queen correspondingly diminished.

At Genoa Thibaut's embassy seems to have had no success. At about the same time the Venetian, Frederico Cornaro, whose family had acquired the valuable estate of Episkopi in the south of Cyprus from Peter I, may also have tried to mediate, but there is nothing to suggest that he made any progress either.¹⁷ Thibaut, however, had a further task to perform in the West: the recruitment of mercenaries. According to Leontios Makhairas, he did so largely at his own expense. His men, said to number eight hundred, sailed from Venice later in 1375, and, beating off a Genoese attempt to intercept them, arrived at Paphos just in time to prevent the Genoese, who had been demanding payment of the indemnity, from launching an attack on Nicosia.¹⁸ During Thibaut's absence in the West the situation on Cyprus had changed dramatically. At some point, probably early in 1375 or at the end of 1374, Queen Eleanor had had John

15 D. Jacoby, 'Jean Lascaris Calophéros, Chypre et la Morée', *Revue des Etudes byzantines*, xxvi (1968), 190-7 (repr. D. Jacoby, *Société et démographie à Byzance et en Romanie latine* (London, 1975), IX).

16 Mollat, nos. 3109-10.

17 Mollat, nos. 3056, 3060, 3075.

18 Leontios Makhairas, §§556-62. Leontios knows nothing of Thibaut's diplomatic activities and gives the impression that the recruitment of mercenaries was his sole purpose in visiting the West.

of Antioch murdered. Leontios Makhairas, in an account which must surely contain a number of fictitious elements, describes how the queen tricked John into killing his troop of Bulgar mercenaries at his castle of Saint Hilarion and then induced him to join the king and herself in Nicosia. There she confronted him with the same blood-stained shirt her husband had been wearing when he was killed and had him struck down in the very room in which Peter I had been slain six years earlier.¹⁹

John's murder meant that Eleanor had now finally gained the upper hand at court. It also meant that the return of the nobles from Genoa including Peter II's other uncle, James of Lusignan, and John's two sons was no longer a priority. Indeed, Eleanor may well have prevented anyone associated with the death of Peter I from returning to the island.²⁰ Instead the Cypriots could now adopt a radically different policy and concentrate on expelling the Genoese from Famagusta by force. Thibaut, now promoted to be *turcopolier* of Cyprus, led his mercenaries in blockading Famagusta.²¹ His timely return to Cyprus and his success in forcing the Genoese on to the defensive raised his standing to new heights, but he now allowed his personal ambitions to get the better of him. King Peter was prepared to reward him with estates on Cyprus, but when Thibaut demanded the Cilician Armenian port of Korykos, a Cypriot possession since the early 1360s, the king refused. Thwarted, Thibaut and a group of henchmen murdered the royal counsellor, a priest named Philip, whom they believed to have been responsible for the king's refusal, and they also killed the viscount of Nicosia who happened to be with Philip at the time. The king had little choice but to bring them to trial, and in April 1376 Thibaut and his associates were sentenced and executed. Perhaps significantly in the light of the earlier antipathy between Thibaut and John Lascaris Calopheros, it was the queen who insisted that the sentence be carried out.²²

The fall of this royal favourite and mercenary captain did not, however, mark a change of policy towards the Genoese. After the failure of Thibaut's embassy to Genoa the pope had continued to encourage

19 Leontios Makhairas, §§551-4. Cf. 'Chronique d'Amadi', ed. R. de Mas Latrie, *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi* (Paris, 1891-93), i, 478-9. The story that John was murdered in the same room as Peter was already in circulation by 1379. *Acta et Processus Canonizacionis beate Birgitte*, ed. I. Collijn (Upsala, 1924-31), 431, 432. The date of John's death cannot be pin-pointed, but the pope was still addressing letters to him in Jan. 1375, i.e. while Thibaut was on his way from Avignon to Genoa. Mollat, nos. 3077, 3090, 3092.

20 Leontios Makhairas, §542.

21 Leontios Makhairas, §564; 'Amadi', pp.481-2.

22 Leontios Makhairas, §§565-77; 'Amadi', pp.482-4.

diplomatic efforts on Cyprus's behalf. Two Cypriot envoys, James of Saint Michael and Alphonse Ferrand, both of whom are known to have been close associates of the queen, were in the West towards the end of 1375 seeking assistance, and at about that time the pope was entertaining the idea that Philip of Mézières, Peter I's chancellor who had been living in the West since Peter's death, could act as a possible mediator at Genoa.²³ But after 1375 there is no more evidence for papal involvement. Instead Cyprus turned for support to Genoa's two natural enemies in Italy: Milan, the most powerful land-locked city in Lombardy, and Venice, her greatest maritime rival. In April 1376, the same month as Thibaut was executed, King Peter married by proxy Valentina Visconti, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti, the lord of Milan. At the same time Peter's sister was betrothed to Valentina's brother.²⁴ For the Visconti, involved in a long-running struggle with the papacy for control of northern Italy, inter-marriage with royalty - even the distant and defeated Peter II - provided a boost to their standing and self-esteem. On the other hand, these marriage links with a ruler who had been at odds with the papacy since the 1350s and who on two occasions, in 1363 and 1368, had had crusades preached against him,²⁵ may help explain why Pope Gregory stopped trying to help Cyprus at about that time. In November 1377 the Milanese, acting on their own behalf and on that of King Peter, concluded a military alliance with Venice against Genoa. The treaty contained the stipulation that the Venetians would assist the Cypriots recover Famagusta. Peter formally ratified his adherence the following March.²⁶

The Venetians and the Genoese had come into conflict over possession of the Aegean island of Tenedos, ownership of which would give control of the entrance to the Dardanelles and hence access to Constantinople and the Black Sea. In 1376 the Emperor John V Palaiologos had granted the island to the Venetians; the same year John's rebellious son, Andronikos, had conferred it on the Genoese.²⁷ In the war that followed Milan and Cyprus were the obvious allies for Venice, and although there was not much Cyprus could do to help the Venetian war effort directly, it was to

23 Mollat, nos. 3275-6, 3616, 3623, 3625, 3651-3, 3656, 3658-9; Mirot *et al.*, no. 2011. For Alphonse, Edbury, pp.202-3. For James, 'Amadi', p.479.

24 For references, Hill, ii, 422-3. The marriage of Peter's sister and Valentina's brother did not take place.

25 N. Housley, *The Avignon Papacy and the Crusades, 1305-1378* (Oxford, 1986), 77-8, cf. pp.116-17.

26 L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852-61), ii, 370-2.

27 D.M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: a Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations* (Cambridge, 1988), 312-16.

Venice's advantage if the Genoese were expelled from Famagusta. By aiding the Cypriots they may have hoped to cement their alliance with Milan more firmly. In July 1378 the Venetians were ready to fulfil their undertakings as set out in the treaty agreed the previous November. They equipped a fleet to bring Peter's wife, Valentina Visconti, to Cyprus. It arrived at Kyrenia in September, and the king engaged the Venetian forces for thirty days during which they and the Cypriots launched an attack on Famagusta by land and sea. Although the allies managed to force their way into the harbour, their assault on the walls failed, and the Venetians withdrew.²⁸ This campaign against Famagusta marked the high point in Peter's policy of armed confrontation with the Genoese. Never again was he able to call on outside support. The next year, 1379, the war between Genoa and Venice took a dramatic turn. A Genoese fleet sailed up the Adriatic and, seizing the town of Chioggia at the southern end of the Venetian lagoon, blockaded Venice. There then followed a hard fought war of attrition, and it was not until the summer of 1380 that the Genoese forces capitulated. Despite their success in fending off their enemy, the Venetians had suffered serious losses and were in no position to help the Cypriots, and the fact that the Genoese did not retaliate is similarly to be explained by their preoccupation with the larger struggle elsewhere. Indeed, in the Treaty of Turin which marked the formal end to the conflict and which was agreed in August 1381, Cyprus was left in the lurch. It would seem that Peter had failed to send properly accredited representatives to the peace negotiations and so Cyprus and Genoa remained at war. For her part, Venice had to undertake not to do anything which might be regarded as aiding the king. Now that the fighting was over, the danger that Genoa might take reprisals on Cyprus reappeared. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Turin, Count Amadeo of Savoy, who had taken the lead in bringing the warring parties together, and the Venetian Frederico Cornaro, who had estates in Cyprus and who had supported Cypriot interests in the West over a number of years, tried to have Cyprus included in the peace but to no avail.²⁹

Peter continued to oppose the Genoese until his death on 3 October 1382 at the age of about twenty-six. In the closing years of his life he improved the fortifications at Nicosia, and in 1382 he was in contact with his mother's cousin, King Peter IV of Aragon, who was prepared to help find ways of dislodging the Genoese from Famagusta.³⁰ Overshadowed by his father and by the events at the start of his reign and poorly served by the narrative sources for the period, it is easy to dismiss Peter himself as a

28 For a discussion of the chronology and the conflicting accounts, Hill, ii, 427-9.

29 Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 379-81; Hill, ii, 427-9.

30 Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii, 763-4.

man of little account. In fact, however, his rejection of the peace terms dictated by the Genoese in 1374 in favour of resistance and armed confrontation, a policy he followed for the rest of his life, suggests that he was a man of resolute determination. At the outset his policy may well have been decided for him. The idea that Thibaut Belfarag with the backing of the papacy could persuade the Genoese to moderate their terms was naïve in the extreme, while the next line of approach - sacrifice the interests of the hostages in favour of open opposition to Genoa - bears the hallmarks of his mother, Queen Eleanor. But having embarked on that policy, he stuck to it. Gradually he began to restore members of the old noble families to positions of influence. John of Brie, a veteran of Peter I's wars, became *turcopolier* after the fall of Thibaut Belfarag in 1376. Slightly earlier John of Neuville had been restored to office as viscount of Nicosia, and by 1378 John Gorap, a man said to have been involved in the murder of Peter I, had become auditor.³¹ In 1380 he sent his mother back to her Aragonese homeland. Ostensibly her exile followed a quarrel with the new queen, Valentina Visconti, but there can be little doubt that Peter's decision to send her away signalled that he was now at last fully master in his own kingdom.³² But despite his strength of purpose, his goal, the recovery of Famagusta, eluded him.

No children survived from Peter's marriage to Valentina Visconti, and his death gave rise to a succession crisis. In the end the Genoese installed his uncle, James of Lusignan, as king. James reversed his nephew's policy and accepted that Famagusta was to belong to Genoa and that tribute had to be paid.³³ It was a recognition of his own impotence in the face of a power with far greater resources than his own.

31 For John of Brie, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 372; Leontios Makhairas, §§119, 133, 163, 190, 200, 578. For John Neuville, Leontios Makhairas, §§265, 386, 398, 407, 435, 574. For John Gorap, Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 372; Leontios Makhairas, §§280, 563.

32 Hill, ii, 425-6.

33 C. Otten-Froux, 'Le retour manqué de Jacques Ier en Chypre', *Les Lusignans et L'Outre Mer* (Poitiers, 1995), 228-40; *idem*, 'Relations politico-financière' (as note 7).

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XVI

FAMAGUSTA IN 1300

It is well known that for much of the fourteenth century Famagusta enjoyed a spectacular commercial prosperity. Travellers to Cyprus such as Ludolf of Sudheim and chroniclers such as Leontios Makhairas testified to the enormous wealth that was to be found there, while Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, the agent of the Florentine Bardi company, who was working in Famagusta in the 1320s and 1330s detailed the huge variety of goods that the merchants dealt in.¹ The numismatic evidence which has been painstakingly assembled by Michael Metcalf shows that there was plenty of silver finding its way to the mint, and the surviving fourteenth-century churches serve as a poignant, if tangible reminder both of Famagusta's former grandeur and also of conspicuous consumption directed to pious ends.² To an appreciable extent Famagusta had taken on the role of entrepot for east-west trade that had belonged to Acre until its fall to the Muslims in 1291. As Etienne de Lusignan wrote in the sixteenth century, King Henry II 'fortified it and made it like Acre, placing there a market where all the foreigners from the East would come and do business in all kinds of merchandise'.³ David Jacoby and Jean Richard have demonstrated that much of the impetus for the commercial activity seems to have come from the presence of large numbers of Syrian merchants in the town, themselves refugees from Acre and the other former Christian ports on the mainland opposite. Many of them could claim Genoese, Venetian or Pisan nationality.⁴ Europeans too thronged the town, taking advantage of its security and of the opportunities to do business. Often their presence in Famagusta was purely transitory, but it is clear that there was also a substantial community of long-term western residents. Henry II, whose lengthy reign – 1285–1324 – coincided with Famagusta's rise to greatness, did his best to channel international trade through his port. So great was its wealth and prestige and so close its ties with the former inhabitants of Latin Syria, that during the fourteenth-century the Lusignan kings chose it as the setting for their coronation as kings of Jerusalem.⁵

Of the sources for Famagusta's social and economic history in the middle ages, the surviving notarial acts in the Archivio di Stato at Genoa stand out preeminently as a veritable gold mine. A substantial fraction of the registers of a Genoese notary named Lamberto di Sambuceto are preserved there.⁶ Lamberto arrived in Famagusta sometime before October 1294, and he worked there until 1307; over 1,500 of his *acta* survive. Published with his registers are a further 88 documents from another Genoese notary, Giovanni *de Rocha*, who was on the island between 1306 and 1310.⁷ A number of historians, chief among them Michel Balard, have utilized these documents to shed light on the international mercantile community in Famagusta and on the commodities that were traded.⁸ The documents also illustrate to a limited extent

the effect of the papal embargo on trade in Muslim ports – a ban that was flouted, but was certainly not totally disregarded.⁹ My purpose in this paper, however, is to move away from the merchants and their activities and see what these notarial instruments when read in conjunction with other sources can tell us about Famagusta itself and its topography. In this I am following in the footsteps of Camille Enlart, who visited Famagusta in the 1890s and whose study of gothic architecture on the island remains the fundamental starting-point for my enquiry, and of Michel Balard whose own study on Famagusta's topography is, at least in Britain, difficult to find and certainly deserves to be better known.¹⁰

*

I want to start, however, not with Lamberto di Sambuceto but with a passage in the *Chronique d'Amadi*, a historical compilation known from the sixteenth-century owner of the unique manuscript, Francesco Amadi. This work contains among other things a detailed narrative of the period 1306–1310 during which King Henry II's brother, Amaury Lord of Tyre, seized power and ruled as governor of the kingdom. Writing of the events of 1310, the anonymous author records that the lord of Tyre set about improving the defences of Famagusta by enlarging the castle and fortifying the area from the Sea Gate to the Tower of the Arsenal; serfs were drafted in from throughout the island and set to work on the town moat. Amaury also had the streets cleared of the benches and the other obstacles placed in front of the doors or balconies so that horses could now move freely along the main thoroughfares, and he had the square in front of the royal court remodelled and made it straight at the Dominican convent. To pay for it all he levied a tallage on the Jews – something he did three times during his four-year rule – and this brought in 100,000 bezants; and he also taxed the burgesses of the four principal towns in Cyprus to raise a further 300,000 bezants. We know from other evidence that work on the fortifications was already in hand by 1308, and it would seem that the impetus for it had been anxiety about possible Muslim attack, although *Amadi* would have us believe that Amaury had had the work speeded up through fear of the impending crusade from the West.¹¹

It is hard to know that the fortifications at Famagusta were like before that date. There is mention of a *castrum* at the time of Richard of England's conquest in 1191, but twenty years later Wilbrand of Oldenburg spoke of Famagusta as being 'not greatly fortified'.¹² In 1232, during the war between the Ibelins and the Hohenstaufen troops sent to the East by Frederick II, the emperor's men occupied the 'tower of the port' at Famagusta. The Ibelin forces coming from Syria then landed on the rocky islands, that formed the further side of the harbour; from there they were able to ferry themselves across in small boats and storm the town; the defenders thereupon fled, and the garrison in the tower surrendered on terms.¹³ The implication of this narrative is that at that time there were no walls on the harbour frontage, and this would seem to be confirmed by the privilege given the Genoese that same year in which King Henry I made a grant of property in Famagusta bounded on two sides by streets, on the third by an adjacent property and on the fourth by

the sea.¹⁴ I believe that in 1232 the Ibelin forces could not sail directly into the harbour as the tower, on the site of the present castle, controlled the entrance with a chain stretching from it across the harbour's mouth. The earliest specific reference I have found to the chain only dates from 1296, but it is probably safe to assume that it was in place much earlier. However, the tower and chain may not have afforded much protection: in 1297 a Venetian, Frosio Morosini, so we are told, 'took a certain Genoese ship out from below the tower at Famagusta by taking down the chain in defiance of the Genoese and Cypriots and had it burnt before their very eyes'.¹⁵

The *Chronique d'Amadi* indicates that in 1310 the castle was being enlarged and that fortifications were being built on the harbour frontage between the castle and the Arsenal Tower at the south-eastern corner of the town. The present town walls and the outer shell of the castle date from the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Venetian authorities improved the defences by building bastions at key points but otherwise did little more than reface and strengthen the existing fortifications so as to withstand cannonade. The Lusignan-period castle which is encased within the late fifteenth or sixteenth-century masonry is presumably for the most part the fortress as enlarged by Amaury in the early fourteenth century.¹⁶ The *Amadi* account, when read against the background of the story of the 1232 assault, makes it virtually certain that in 1310 fortifications were being constructed on the waterfront for the first time. Maybe the fact that it specifies that walls were being built between the Sea Gate and the Arsenal Tower means that the area from the castle to the Sea Gate remained open, but that may be to read too much into the text. The lack of any direct allusion in the 1310 narrative to the construction of new walls on the landward side of the town could indicate that some defensive structures already existed, and the reference to gangs of serfs conscripted to dig the moat might be taken as meaning that it was then that the solid rock on which the town is built was quarried out so as to form the base of the town walls and thus increase their height – a prominent feature of the existing defences of Famagusta along much of its western side.

The idea that there were no walls fronting the harbour before about 1310 finds some confirmation in Lamberto di Sambuceto's registers. On the one hand, as Michel Balard has pointed out, there are no allusions to town walls or town gates anywhere in these notarial materials,¹⁷ despite the fact that much of the commercial business they record must have been transacted in the general area of the harbour itself. On the other hand, Lamberto's registers occasionally point to there being open access to the harbour. One document from 1299 appears to show a galley moored directly alongside the Genoese *loggia* – quite possibly a building on the site granted in 1232 – while others from 1300 are dated 'before the Hospital near the sea shore' and 'behind the *staciones* of the Genoese commune at the sea shore'.¹⁸ The 'Hospital near the sea shore' could be a reference to the Knights of St John's house in Famagusta – elsewhere Lamberto uses the phrase 'ad hospitale' without further qualification to denote the Hospitallers' premises¹⁹ – but this phrase more likely refers to the Hospital of St Anthony. Lamberto's registers show that this foundation was close

to the fish market,²⁰ and they provide examples of testators who remembered it in their wills.²¹ On the basis of Gibellino's engraving of the 1570–71 siege of Famagusta, Enlart plausibly identified this establishment with ruins by the Sea Gate. He also demonstrated from evidence furnished by Lamberto that it belonged to the Order of St Anthony of Vienne.²²

Another building that we would expect to have been on the harbour side was the customs house or *comerzium*. On a few occasions Lamberto drafted contracts at or near this location,²³ and in two documents from 1300 he reveals that it was adjacent to the Venetian *loggia*, a fact confirmed by Leontios Makhairas who recorded that in 1368 during an outbreak of fighting between the Genoese and the Venetians the Genoese climbed on to the roof of the *comerzium* to throw stones at the Venetians.²⁴ It would therefore seem likely that on the harbour frontage between the castle and the arsenal – a distance of rather more than 500 metres – there was a sequence of buildings among which were the *comerzium*, the Venetian and Genoese *loggias*, other Genoese commercial premises, the Hospital of St Anthony and the fish market. Lamberto never actually refers to the castle, but he does occasionally mention the castellan or his court.²⁵ Nor does he refer to the arsenal, although it is hard to believe there was no depot for naval stores in existence in 1300, and we know from other evidence that certainly by the 1320s there were facilities for ship building and refitting.²⁶ Maybe both the castle and the arsenal, which from later evidence we know was at the southern end of the town, were away from the areas in which the merchants tended to congregate.

Later in the fourteenth century it would seem that the Genoese established a new communal *loggia* on a site in the centre of the town. In 1372 a number of Genoese were killed in a riot in Famagusta on the occasion of the coronation of King Peter II as king of Jerusalem, and from the narrative account of that event we learn that at that time there was a Genoese *loggia* close to the Franciscan convent, which itself was immediately next door to the royal palace. This location finds corroboration in the treatise written in the fifteenth century by Emmanuel Piloti, who speaks of a central square and a road running from it where the *loggias* of the various trading nations were to be found.²⁷ Precisely when the Genoese acquired this property is uncertain. In 1365 it had been agreed that they could rebuild their *loggia*, but from the treaty of that year it is evident that the site envisaged was adjacent to the town walls, and it is probable that what was then under consideration was a rebuilding of their original premises by the harbour.²⁸

If, as seems likely, in the 1360s the Venetian and Genoese communities both retained the same sites they had held in 1300, it follows that the construction of the harbour walls in 1310 had not entailed the destruction of their *loggias* or, presumably for that matter, the other buildings facing the sea. It has to be assumed that the walls were built on the foreshore between the existing properties and the sea, but if so they must have cramped their space and ruined their outlook. At the time of Enlart's visit to Famagusta in 1896 the sea still washed the base of the walls near the

Hospital of St Anthony, and he noted that the existing ruins of its church, which he dated to the second half of the fourteenth century or later, are located on a narrow site between the town walls and the street and that because the site is so constricted the church is orientated north-south rather than east-west.²⁹ The unfavourable aspect of their location once the town walls had been built presumably also helps explain why in due course the Genoese established their communal headquarters at a prime site in the town centre.

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Next to the fortifications, the feature of the old city of Famagusta that most commonly excites comment is the large number of medieval churches which survive in varying stages of decay. Catholic, Orthodox, Armenian and Nestorian churches can all be identified, most of them dating from the fourteenth century. But how many of them were in existence by 1300? Lamberto di Sambuceto and Giovanni *de Rocha* between them mention several that were, but it is also possible to identify several others that were definitely founded later. Lamberto's registers include some forty-six wills and Giovanni adds one more to this total. In almost every case the testator began by selecting the church or cemetery in which he or she wished to be buried. Only four locations are given; in order of popularity: Saint Michael's, which was the dedication of the chapel at the public cemetery outside the town (19),³⁰ the cathedral church of St Nicholas (13),³¹ the Franciscans (7),³² and lastly the Dominicans (5).³³ There is a large enough selection of these wills for us to be reasonably certain that these were the only four Latin ecclesiastical foundations with burial rights at that time.

When we turn to the surviving register of a Venetian notary, Nicola de Boateriis who was working in Famagusta in the early 1360s, we find a very different profile: each of the five testators whose wills are preserved there chose to be buried in a different place: the Dominican church, the cathedral cemetery, the church of St George, the Augustinian friary, and the 'monasterium Sancti Antonii ordinis Heremitorum'.³⁴ I am not sure whether this last-named establishment is the Hospital of St Anthony discussed already: if it is, then it perhaps only acquired burial rights in the intervening years. The imposing ruins of St George's church are near the castle. Enlart was of the opinion that it was built late in the thirteenth century or early in the fourteenth, but, although it is dangerous to argue *e nihilo*, the total absence of any references to it in Lamberto's registers may perhaps suggest that its foundation postdated his sojourn in Famagusta.³⁵ The earliest evidence for the presence of Augustinian friars in Cyprus only dates from 1299, and again Lamberto gives no hint that they had a convent in Famagusta at the time he was working.³⁶ So despite the small size of the sample, Nicola de Boateriis's register provides good evidence for the growth of new ecclesiastical foundations during the first half of the fourteenth century. Among other religious foundations known to have been built in the decades immediately after the start of the fourteenth century are the Carmelite friary, the establishment of which was authorised in 1311,³⁷ the Armenian church of Saint Mary *Viridis*, which

was said to have been newly built in 1311 and which enjoyed the support of both Pope Clement V and Pope John XXII,³⁸ and the Hospital of the Holy Trinity and Saint Stephen founded in 1328 for the care of pilgrims and the poor by a Genoese named Stefano Draperio (or the Draper). Maybe Stefano, who is described as the lay rector of his foundation in a papal letter of 1332, is the 'Stephanus Draperius', a Genoese inhabitant of Famagusta (formerly of Ayas) whose names crops up on several occasions in Lamberto's registers from 1301.³⁹

So what of the churches and convents already in existence by 1300? Of the four with burial rights, the suburban church of Saint Michael served as the cemetery chapel at what was clearly Famagusta's principal public cemetery. It pertained to the bishop and chapter of Famagusta, and, as Michel Balard has pointed out, the testators who chose to be buried there seem on the whole to have been the poorer members of society.⁴⁰

The cathedral of St Nicholas stands at the centre of the town. The present structure was begun during the episcopate of Bishop Guy (1298–1308) and continued by Bishop Baldwin (ca. 1310–28). Though small by comparison with the great cathedrals of the West, it is without doubt one of the most magnificent churches built by the Latins anywhere in the Levant. The *Chronique d'Amadi* records that Guy's short-lived successor, Anthony Saurano, embezzled the funds Guy had left, and an inscription put up by Bishop Baldwin in 1311 indicates that at that date most of the nave still remained to be built. Construction was still in progress in 1318.⁴¹ There was an earlier church also dedicated to St Nicholas, but almost nothing is known about it. Presumably it stood on the same site; according to the sixteenth-century historian, Florio Bustron, it was built in the time of Archbishop Eustorge of Nicosia (1217–50).⁴² It was, however, in this earlier church that the testators whose wills were drafted by Lamberto di Sambuceto expected to be buried. Exactly when work started on the new cathedral is not recorded, but it may well be significant that not one of Lamberto's testators chose St Nicholas as the place of burial after the middle of 1301. Presumably the existing church had to be dismantled and no one wanted to be buried in the middle of a construction-site. In 1300 a lady named Isabella of Antioch had made a small bequest to the *laborarium* of the church of St Nicholas, and it may well be that she meant this as a contribution towards the building fund for the new cathedral.⁴³

We do not know when the Franciscans established themselves in Famagusta. Their house was situated immediately to the north of the royal palace to which it was connected by a private entrance.⁴⁴ They enjoyed considerable support from King Henry II, and it seems that their convent of Famagusta comprised a substantial complex of buildings.⁴⁵ The existing church could well be of late thirteenth-century construction, but the earliest documentary evidence for the convent's existence only dates from 1296 and is in fact provided by Lamberto di Sambuceto.⁴⁶

The Dominican convent in Famagusta appears to have been founded in the last

quarter of the thirteenth century. Dr Nicholas Coureas has drawn my attention to the fact that whereas Bernard Guil's 1277 list of Dominican houses mentioned only Nicosia in Cyprus, a list dating from 1303 recorded establishments at Nicosia, Famagusta and Limassol.⁴⁷ Enlart, on the basis of Gibellino's engraving of the Turkish siege of Famagusta of 1570–1, located it in the north of the town and concluded that no substantial remains survive.⁴⁸ However, Gibellino may have misled later scholars. As we have seen, the *Chronique d'Amadi* described Amaury of Tyre remodelling the square in front of the palace in 1310 and 'making it straight at the Dominicans'. Quite what this last phrase means is not altogether clear, but it must imply that the Dominican house was close to the palace.⁴⁹ An incident recorded by Leontios Makhairas confirms this interpretation. During the Genoese war of 1373–4 King Peter II, imprisoned in his palace in Famagusta, secretly passed a letter through the latrine to the queen's secretary, Dimitrios Daniel, who, so Leontios informs us, had been told to rendezvous at the side of the palace by St Dominic's.⁵⁰ Most historians, following Enlart,⁵¹ have assumed that Leontios had made a slip and really meant St Francis. But *Amadi's* testimony encourages the belief that Leontios was right, and that the Dominican convent was indeed adjacent to the palace. So where was it? It may be that the Dominican church is actually the building identified on no very good grounds as the church of St Peter and St Paul, situated just to the south of the palace on the far side from St Francis.⁵² If this hypothesis – and it is only a hypothesis – is right, then what Amaury of Tyre had done was to enlarge the square by demolishing buildings to the south of the palace and so opening up the area to the east of this church.

So was it the church of the Dominican order? The present structure appears to date from the fourteenth century but incorporates some earlier carved stone-work. It is a large building – one of the largest churches in Famagusta – and its architecture would seem to proclaim it as a church of the Latin rite. Enlart noted that the wooden gallery at the west end was apparently accessible from the palace by a bridge across the street. As in the case of the Franciscan church there was thus a private entrance from the palace. The Dominicans had enjoyed royal patronage since the middle of the thirteenth century, and so it would not be surprising if their convent in Famagusta included a substantial church and was close to the royal palace. As for St Peter and St Paul, Enlart freely admits that is not marked in quite the right place on Gibellino's plan. In the sixteenth century it was believed that the church of that name had been built in the time of Peter I (1359–69) by a merchant who had spent just a third of the profits he had made from a single voyage on the project.⁵³ In fact a priest of St Peter and St Paul named Dimitrios appears in a couple of documents of 1301 from Lamberto's registers.⁵⁴ The foundation was therefore much earlier than the sixteenth-century tradition would have it, and the priest's name strongly suggests that the church was either Orthodox or belonged to one of the eastern confessions.

The list of religious foundations in Famagusta that were in receipt of legacies is not long. As already mentioned, the testators whose wills were prepared by Lam-

berto di Sambuceto remembered to make bequests to the cathedral, the cemetery church of St Michael, the Franciscans, the Dominicans and the Hospital of St Anthony. In addition we find three who mentioned the nuns of *Carpitane*,⁵⁵ two who mentioned the church of St Mary of Cava,⁵⁶ and two or possibly three who mentioned the lepers of St Lazarus,⁵⁷ while the poor and infirm of the Hospitallers,⁵⁸ St Mary *de Conflaria*,⁵⁹ St George of the Greeks,⁶⁰ the Genoese church of St Lawrence, should it be built,⁶¹ and the chapel of St George in the Genoese *loggia*⁶² each received a single legacy.⁶³ The *Carpitane* was the Benedictine nunnery of the Holy Cross of Antioch which had been refounded in Nicosia where it had come to be known as Our Lady of Tortosa; the fact that almost alone of foundations elsewhere on Cyprus it received legacies from testators in Famagusta leads me to suspect that it may have had a cell there as well.⁶⁴ St Mary of Cava is the cave-church of Chrysospiliotissa outside Famagusta at Kato Varosha. According to James of Verona who visited Cyprus in 1335, seafarers customarily went there to render thanks for a safe voyage.⁶⁵ St Mary *de Conflaria* should almost certainly be read as St Mary *de Confraria* – St Mary of the Confraternity – in which case it was the church of a voluntary charitable association, perhaps similar to the famous Confraternity of St Andrew in Acre. Besides the bequest, which dates from 1307, there are two references to the house of the confraternity of St Mary in Giovanni *de Rocha's* registers from 1309.⁶⁶ The fact that it is only mentioned in documents that come late in the available sequence may suggest that in 1307 the confraternity was of recent foundation. St George of Greeks was the Orthodox cathedral, rebuilt later in the fourteenth century in a thoroughly western, gothic style. Presumably it was the church of that name mentioned in an earlier will, drawn up at Ayas in 1279.⁶⁷ Finally the reference to a project to build a church for the Genoese community dedicated to St Lawrence dates from 1301, whereas the sole reference to the Genoese chapel of St George belongs to 1307. It is surprising, given that so many of the testators were themselves Genoese, that there are no other allusions to this chapel; maybe it too was of recent foundation at that time.

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So far I have concentrated attention on two general areas: the harbour frontage, where were to be found the Genoese and Venetian *loggias*, the *comerzium*, the Hospital of St Anthony, the Fish Market and the Arsenal, and the square in the centre of the town. Here was located the cathedral of St Nicholas which stands to this day on its eastern side and facing it on the west the royal palace. Immediately to the right of the palace stood the Franciscan convent while round the corner to the left of the palace were, if my hypothesis is correct, the Dominicans. Lamberto did a certain amount of his business hereabouts. Thus we find him stating that he drew up acts 'in front of the church of St Nicholas', 'in the church of St Nicholas'; 'in the entrance to the Friars Minor', 'at the house of the Friars Minor', and 'at the *loggia* of the lord king'.⁶⁸ Immediately to the north of cathedral stood the bishop's palace, and here too Lamberto occasionally worked.⁶⁹ The bishop had a garden, presumably adjacent to

his palace, and this also abutted the houses of Giovanni Lanfranc and Gui de Bando.⁷⁰ Both were men of some prominence: Giovanni Lanfranc is described on one occasion as a knight, while Gui, who came originally from Acre, was clearly active as a merchant and was sufficiently eminent to be called upon in 1310 to testify in the trial of the Templars.⁷¹

There is only one other location mentioned in Lamberto's registers that can be identified on the map with any semblance of plausibility, and that is the Templar house. Enlart conjectured that the two small churches next to each other on the road leading north from the palace both came to belong to the Hospitallers; according to his theory, the smaller of the two (on the right when viewed from the street) was built by the Order after it had acquired the Templar property, and the rather larger and apparently earlier church (on the left) had belonged to the Templars until their suppression.⁷² It cannot be claimed that this theory is at all convincing. However, Lamberto drew up several documents 'in domo Templi',⁷³ and he also mentioned that the house of an important Genoese merchant and long-term resident in Famagusta, Oddone de Sexto, stood opposite.⁷⁴ In addition, on one occasion he referred to the 'street of the Temple', the only street to be mentioned by name in the whole of his extant registers.⁷⁵ The Templar house at Famagusta seems not to have been of major importance, although from testimony at the Order's trial in 1310 we learn that it was where in about 1302 one brother knight had been received, and two non-Templar witnesses testified to having seen Templars distributing alms to the poor there.⁷⁶

There are no other locations that can be identified on the map, but there are plenty of tantalizing references. For example, somewhere in Famagusta there was a district known as the *contrada* of Tortosa. Maybe, as David Jacoby has suggested, it was an area where many refugees from Tortosa had congregated. But there are other possibilities: maybe the bishop of Tortosa had owned property there; maybe the abbey of St Mary of Tortosa had a cell there. We really do not know.⁷⁷ Of the public buildings in Famagusta, one that was clearly of major importance was the exchange of *cambia*. Lamberto frequently drew up documents at or near this building.⁷⁸ It was here that currency changed hands and the royal coinage put into circulation. Michael Metcalf has argued convincingly that one of the mints at which the new silver *gros* (or *tournois-turonenses argenti*) were struck must have been in Famagusta. Lamberto never mentions a mint as such, but it is likely that the coins were actually minted in the exchange building itself. A mint official at Famagusta, the *comprador per la secha*, features in a Catalan merchant's account book from 1343, and Leontios Makhairas speaks vaguely of a mint, but I know of no other documentary references to the minting of coins there from before the Genoese occupation of 1373.⁷⁹ Another place to which Lamberto refers on a number of occasions is the 'covered road' (*ruda coperta*). It contained the shops of Raymond Elie and William of Tyre, both of whom were drapers, and it may well be that it was there that merchants engaged in that trade were concentrated.⁸⁰

There are plenty of references to private houses. One of the grandest seems to

have belonged to Philip of Ibelin, the king's maternal uncle and seneschal of the kingdom. Lamberto worked on contracts 'ante domum sive curtilio domini seneschalchi' or 'in domo sive fondico domini seneschalchi'.⁸¹ This property seems to have been distinct from the house of the 'Lord Philip *de Bellino*' which was rented by Bernard Faxie, the consul of Narbonne, and which was next door to a house belonging to the king which was similarly rented out to merchants.⁸² The rents themselves could be high: Giuordano de Naulo owed 25 white bezants for two months rent, and Nicola de Camezana, a Genoese merchant, owned 100 white bezants, although it is not clear for what period this covered.⁸³ Lower down the social scale Anthony, a servant of the castellan of Famagusta, paid 8 bezants and 2 solidi as two months rent.⁸⁴

Besides having a *loggia* which was clearly the commercial and administrative centre for their merchant community, Genoa owned a number of other properties in Famagusta.⁸⁵ But there is no reason to suppose that there was a distinct and self-contained Genoese quarter as had existed in Acre before the War of St Sabas. Famagusta was nothing if not cosmopolitan, and people of all western nationalities seemed to have mixed freely. Thus for example, we find that there was a Genoese-owned house adjacent to the Venetian *loggia*.⁸⁶ Moreover, there is no sign of there having been any internal fortifications within the town. Lamberto, though himself a Genoese, frequently worked for merchants from Genoa's western rivals. Occasionally he drew up contracts in the Venetian *loggia*⁸⁷ and on one occasion he did so at the Pisan *loggia*.⁸⁸ No doubt the merchants' lodgings tended to be concentrated within easy reach of the harbour, but how far there was a definable commercial quarter is hard to judge. The fact that the orthodox churches were clustered in the southern part of the town is an indication that it was there that the Greeks tended to live. Lamberto rarely if ever mentions houses belonging to people with Greek names, and there is nothing to suggest that his work brought him to the predominantly Greek part of the town.

Finally, what of Lamberto himself? He had a house in which he sometimes drew up contracts,⁸⁹ but as 'notary and scribe of the commune of Genoa in Famagusta', he normally worked in the Genoese *loggia*.⁹⁰ He then seems to have relinquished his official post, and from June 1300 until some time after the middle of 1304 he based his activities at the shop of a Florentine spice dealer named Bertozzo *Latinus*.⁹¹ By 1307 he had moved to the premises of Pietro *Pelleterius* (or Pietro the skinner), a Genoese.⁹² There are no specific clues as to where Bertozzo and Pietro's establishments were to be found. We are, however, told that another spice dealer's shop was by the Genoese *loggia*,⁹³ and it is reasonable to assume that Lamberto, most of whose business involved sea-borne trade and many of whose clients were Genoese, set up his desk not too far from the harbour and the *loggia*. Almost certainly he was normally to be found in one of the streets between the harbour and the town centre, and my guess is that most of the other locations in Famagusta that he mentions were in this general area as well.

NOTES

1. La de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852–61), II, 213–14; Leontios Makhairas, *Recital Concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed. R.M. Dawkins (Oxford, 1932), §§91–5; Francesco Pegolotti, *La pratica della mercatura*, ed. A. Evans (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), pp. 77–102.

2. For the coinage, D.M. Metcalf, 'The Gros grand and the Gros petit of Henry II of Cyprus', *Numismatic Chronicle*, CXLII (1982), 83–100; CXLIII (1983), 177–201; *idem*, 'The Gros grand and the Gros petit of Hugh IV of Cyprus', *Revue numismatique*, 6th series, XVII (1985), 130–75. The fullest account of the architectural survivals (originally published in French in 1899) remains C. Enlart, *Gothic Art and the Renaissance in Cyprus*, trans. D. Hunt (London, 1987), pp. 210–303.

3. E. de Lusignan, *Description de Toute l'Isle de Cypre* (Paris, 1580), fo. 24^v.

4. D. Jacoby, 'Citoyens, sujets et protégés de Venise et de Gênes en Chypre du XIIIe au XVe siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen* V (1977), 159–88; *idem*, 'The Rise of a New Emporium in the Eastern Mediterranean: Famagusta in the late thirteenth century', *Μελέται και Υπομνήματα*, I (1984), 143–79. J. Richard, 'Le peuplement latin et syrien en Chypre au XIIIe siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen* VII (1979), 157–73.

5. J. Richard, 'La situation juridique de Famagouste dans le royaume des Lusignans' in *Πρακτικά του Πρώτου Διεθνούς Κυπριολογικού Συνεδρίου*, II (Nicosia, 1972), 221–9 (but see Jacoby, 'The Rise of a New Emporium', p. 149).

6. For a survey of the material relating to Cyprus in the Archivio di Stato, see G. Pistarino, 'Fonti documentarie Genovesi per la storia medievale di Cipro', in *Πρακτικά του Δευτέρου Διεθνούς Κυπριολογικού Συνεδρίου*, II (Nicosia, 1986), 85–108 (also in *Civico Istituto Colombiano: Studi et Testi*, VIII (=Saggi e Documenti, VI), 337–75). A substantial number of Lamberto's acts were published in the nineteenth century as 'Actes pasés à Famagouste de 1299 à 1301 par devant le notaire génois Lamberto di Sambuceto', ed. C. Desimoni, *Archives de l'Orient latin*, II (1884), documents pp. 3–120; continued in *Revue de l'Orient latin*, I (1893), 58–139, 275–312, 321–53. More recently the Istituto di Medievistica at the University of Genoa has sponsored a complete edition with the title *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare* in the series Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi (CSFS). The only volume not so far to have appeared will contain documents already edited by Desimoni. Those that have been published are:

Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (11 Ottobre 1296 – 23 Giugno 1299), ed. M. Balard (CSFS 39; 1983)

Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (3 Luglio 1300 – 3 Agosto 1301), ed. V. Polonio (CSFS 31; 1982)

Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (6 Luglio – 27 Ottobre 1301), ed. R. Pavoni (CSFS 32; 1982)

Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (Gennaio – Agosto 1302), ed. R. Pavoni (CSFS 49; 1987)

Atti rogati a Cipro: Lamberto di Sambuceto (31 Marzo 1304 – 19 Luglio 1305, 4 Gennaio – 12 Luglio 1307): Giovanni de Rocha (3 Agosto 1308 – 14 Marzo 1310), ed. M. Balard (CSFS 43; 1984)

In this paper references to these volumes will be by editor with the volume number in brackets where the same editor has been responsible for more than one.

7. Balard (43), pp. 9–10, 279–81. Giovanni was already in Cyprus by November 1306. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 152.

8. D. Abulafia, 'The Merchants of Messina: Levant Trade and Domestic Economy', *Papers of the British School at Rome*, LIV (1986), 196–212; *idem*, 'The Anconitan Privileges in the Kingdom of

Jerusalem and the Levant Trade in Ancona', in G. Airal di and B.Z. Kedar (eds.), *I comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme* (CSFS 48; 1986), 525–70; *idem*, 'Narbonne, the Lands of the Crown of Aragon, and the Levant Trade 1187–1400', in *Montpellier, la couronne d'Aragon et les pays de Langue d'Oc (1204–1349)* (=Mémoires de la société archéologique de Montpellier, XV) (Montpellier, 1987), 189–207; B. Arbel, 'Traffici marittimi e sviluppo urbano a Cipro (secoli XIII–XVI)', in E. Poleggi (ed.), *Città portuali del Mediterraneo: storia e archeologia*, (Genoa, 1989), pp. 89–94; *idem*, 'Slave Trade and Slave Labor in Frankish Cyprus (1191–1571)', *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, XXIV (1993), 149–90; M. Balard, 'La popolazione di Famagosta all'inizio del secolo XIV' *La Storia dei Genovesi*, IV (1984), 27–40; *idem*, 'L'activité commerciale en Chypre dans les années 1300' in P.W. Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement* (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 251–63; *idem*, 'Les vénitiens en Chypre dans les années 1300', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, XII (1987), 589–603; Jacoby (as above, note 4); C. Otten-Froux, 'Les Pisans en Chypre au moyen-âge' in *Πρακτικά του Δεύτερου Διεθνούς Κυπριολογικού Συνεδρίου*, II (Nicosia, 1986), 127–43.

9. J. Richard, 'Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo sur le commerce avec l'Égypte (fin XIIIe–début XIVe siècle)', *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres: comptes rendus* (1984), pp. 120–34; P.W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191–1374* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 102–4, 133–4.

10. For Enlart, see above note 2; M. Balard, 'Famagouste au début du XIVe siècle' in J. Heers (ed.), *Fortifications, portes de villes, places publiques dans le monde méditerranée* (Paris, 1985), pp. 279–99.

11. 'Chronique d'Amadi', ed. R. de Mas Latrie in *Chroniques d'Amani et de Strambaldi* (Paris, 1891–3), I, 326–7, cf p. 291; Pope Clement V, *Regestum*, ed. cura et studio monachorum Ordinis S. Benedicti (Rome, 1885–92; tables 1948–57), no. 2736.

12. 'Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi', ed. W. Stubbs in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I* (Rolls Series, London, 1864–5), I, 199; Wilbrand of Oldenburg, 'Itinerarium Terrae Sanctae', ed. S. de Candoli in *Itinera Hierosolymitana Crucesignatorum* (Jerusalem, 1978–84), III, 230.

13. 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', *R[ecueil des] H[istoriens des] C[roisades]. Documents Arméniens*, II, 710, 712–13. Cf 'L'Estoire de Eracles', *RHC Historiens occidentaux*, II, 399, 400.

14. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 54. A rental of 1249 records that the commune's houses at Famagusta brought in 57 bezants. C. Desimoni, 'Quatre titres des propriétés des Génois à Acre et à Tyr', *Archives de l'Orient latin*, II (1884), documents p. 219.

15. Balard (39), no. 21; Andrea Dandolo, 'Chronicon Venetum ad ann. 1339' in L.A. Muratori (ed.), *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, XII, col. 407.

16. Enlart, pp. 449–54; G. Jeffrey, *A Description of the Historic Monuments of Cyprus* (Nicosia, 1918), 105–16; A.H.S. Megaw, 'The Arts in Cyprus: Military Architecture' in K.M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades* (Philadelphia/Madison, 1955–89), IV, 197–8.

17. Balard, 'Famagouste', pp. 280, 282.

18. Balard (39), no. 142; Desimoni, nos. 138, 143–4. (Enlart's plan reproduced here shows that the walls came close to the water's edge; the space between the walls and the present harbour is the result of modern infilling.)

19. Pavoni (32), no. 6.

20. Pavoni (49), no. 253. See Polonio, no. 309 for another reference to the *piscaria*.

21. Desimoni, no. 187; Polonio, no. 22; Pavoni (32), no. 46; Pavoni (49), no. 185. Cf Desimoni, no. 91.

22. Enlart, pp. 288–9; Polonio, no. 61 For the 'Canonici regolari di Sant'Agostino di Sant'Antonio di Vienne', see *Dizionario degli Istituti di Perfezione*, II (1975), cols. 134–41. According to the

sixteenth-century writer, Florio Bustron ('Chronique de l'île de Chypre', ed. R. de Mas Latrie in *Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire de France: Mélanges historiques V* (Paris, 1886), 170, 246–7), among the Templar properties acquired by the Hospitallers after the suppression of the Order was the 'House and church of St Anthony' at Famagusta. However, Bustron's lists seem to include all Hospitaller properties on Cyprus at the time he was writing and not just the former Templar properties. The Hospitallers did eventually acquire the properties of the Order of St Anthony.

One of the wills drawn up by Lamberto (Balard (39), no. 24) referred to the 'hospitale Famagoste Sancti Anthonii comunis Ianue', but this may be a drafting error: there is no other evidence to suggest a link between the Hospital of St Anthony and the Genoese.

23. Desimoni, nos. 148, 206, 221–2; Polonio, no. 153; Pavoni (32), nos. 33, 235; Pavoni (49), no. 36. For officials of *comerertzium*, see Pavoni (49), nos. 36, 272; Balard (43), no. 143 (p. 211). See G. Grivaud, 'Sur le *Comerc* chypriote de l'Époque latine', in A.A.M. Bryer and G.S. Georghallides (eds.), *The Sweet Land of Cyprus* (Nicosia, 1993), pp. 134–7.

24. Desimoni, nos. 134–5; Leontios Makhairas, §250.

25. Balard (39), no. 155; Desimoni, no. 118; Polonio, no. 165; Pavoni (32), nos. 9, 33, 122; Pavoni (49), no. 278.

26. J. Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans. Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIVe et XVe siècles)* (Paris, 1962), pp. 38–49. Lamberto occasionally refers to *calafati* – caulkers – though they need not necessarily have plied their trade in Famagusta. Balard (39), no. 24; Polonio, no. 274; Pavoni (32), nos. 23, 31; Pavoni (49), nos. 161, 271, 274; Balard (43), nos. 47 (p. 119), 85 (p. 154).

27. Leontios Makhairas, §330; *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti sur le Passage en Terre Sainte (1420)*, ed. P.H. Dopp (Louvain, 1958), p. 126.

28. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 263 §11. Cf Leontios Makhairas, §154.

29. Enlart, pp. 289–90.

30. Balard (39), nos. 13, 25, 121; Desimoni, no. 189; Polonio, nos. 26, 165, 273/5, 344/9, 351, 415; Pavoni (32), nos. 12, 38, 42, 71, 126; Pavoni (49), nos. 32, 33, 85, 185.

31. Balard (39), nos. 24, 29, 96, 116, 126; Desimoni, nos. 198, 244; Polonio, nos. 20, 176, 366, 418; Pavoni (32), nos. 24, 51.

32. Desimoni, no. 187; Polonio, nos. 12, 23; Pavoni (32), nos. 5, 46; Pavoni (49), no. 281; Balard (43), no. 60 (pp. 351–2).

33. Desimoni, no. 224; Polonio, nos. 22, 145; Pavoni (49), no. 61; Balard (43), no. 19 (p. 39).

34. *Nicola de Boateriis, notaio in Famagoste e Venezia (1355–1365)*, ed. A. Lombardo (Venice, 1973), nos. 156 (cf. no. 25), 157, 158, 167, 168.

35. Enlart, pp. 258–62). A house in Famagusta 'apud Sanctum Georgium' is mentioned in a document of 1279, but this could refer to St George of the Greeks. St George of the Greeks received a bequest in a will drawn up by Lamberto in 1307, and the fact that the testator found it necessary to specify that it was the Greek church might be taken as indicating the presence of two churches with that dedication in Famagusta. *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare: Atti rogati a Laiazzo da Federico di Piazzalunga (1274) e Pietro di Bargone (1277, 1279)*, ed. L. Balleto (CSFS 53; 1989), no. 72 (p. 302); Balard (43), no. 82 (p. 152).

36. Pope Boniface VIII, *Registres*, ed. G. Digard *et al.* (Paris, 1884–1939), no. 3061.

37. Clement V, no. 6751.

38. Clement V, no. 7209; Pope John XXII, *Lettres communes*, ed. G. Mollat (Paris, 1904–47), nos. 6022, 6958.

39. John XXII, nos. 40265, 42052, 57128. For Stephano, see Polonio, nos. 185, 262, 401, 404; Pavoni (32), nos. 28, 50, 73, 121–2. See also 'Relation du pèlerinage à Jérusalem de Nicolas de Mar-

toni, notaire italien (1394–1395)', ed. L. Le Grand, *Revue de l'Orient latin*, III, (1895), 630.

40. Pope Urban V, *Lettres Communes*, ed. M-H. Laurent *et al.* (Paris, 1954–86), nos. 9640, 16111; Balard, 'Famagouste', p. 284.

41. 'Amadi', p. 291; John XXII, no. 8686; Enlart, pp. 222–4, 227–8, and figure 173 (p. 236). Cf. Clement V, no. 8998 (the reference to Baldwin's predecessor must be to Guy; Anthony of Saurano's appointment was probably never confirmed).

42. Florio Bustron, p. 56.

43. Desimoni, no. 198. Enlart (p. 222) goes too far in assuming from this bequest that work had already started. For other bequests to St Nicholas from testators who had not chosen to be buried there, Polonio, nos. 22, 145; Pavoni (32), no. 46; Balard (43), nos. 19 (p. 39), 82 (pp. 151–2).

44. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, II, 187.

45. Enlart, p. 267.

46. Balard (39), nos. 5, 11. For other legacies (apart from those in note 32 above), Desimoni, no. 189; Polonio, nos. 145, 165, 176, 351, 415, 418; Pavoni (32), no. 51; Pavoni (49), nos. 33, 185; Balard (43) no. 82 (pp. 151–2).

47. See B. Altaner, *Die Dominikanermissionen des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Habelschwerdt, 1924), p. 21.

48. Enlart, pp. 215–16, and see p. 214.

49. 'Amadi', p. 327. 'Fecce mutar la piazza che era avanti la corte del re et metteria drio a li Predicatori;...'

50. Leontios Makhairas, §427.

51. Enlart, p. 216.

52. See T.S.R. Boase, 'The Arts in Cyprus: Ecclesiastical Art' in K.M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, IV, 177.

53. Enlart, pp. 246–53.

54. Pavoni (32), nos. 71–2.

55. Desimoni, no. 489 (cf. Polonio, no. 176, where for 'mulieribus de Carpiciis Famaguste' the editor reads 'mulieribus de Carytatis Famagoste'); Polonio, no. 418; Pavoni (49), no. 185.

56. Desimoni, no. 189; Polonio, no. 165.

57. Polonio, no. 415; Pavoni (32), no. 51. Polonio, no. 145 would seem to refer to a house of St Lazarus at Nicosia.

58. Desimoni, no. 189.

59. Balard (43), no. 82 (pp. 151–2).

60. *Ibid.*

61. Polonio, no. 349.

62. Balard (43), no. 82 (pp. 151–2).

63. Pavoni (32), no. 51 mentions the church of the Holy Saviour, but the text appears to be corrupt at this point and it may be reference to a church in Nicosia with this dedication. See 'Documents nouveaux servant de preuves à l'histoire de l'île de Chypre', ed. L. de Mas Latrie, *Collection des documents inédits: Mélanges historiques*, IV (Paris, 1882), 351–2; Balard (39), no. 75.

64. J. Richard, 'Les comptes du collecteur de la chambre apostolique dans le royaume de Chypre (1357–1363)', *Επετηρίς τοῦ Κέντρου Ἐπιστημονικῶν Ἐρευνῶν*, XIII/XVI (1984/7), 39 note 68.

65. For references, see Richard, 'Les comptes', p. 47 note 92. In 1328 it was given to the orthodox monks of St Catherine of Mount Sinai. John XXII, no. 41388.

66. Balard (43), nos. 24 (p. 311), 28 (p. 315).
67. Balletto (CSFS 53), no. 72 (p. 302).
68. Balard (39), nos. 31, 34, 129; Desimoni, nos. 114–15; Polonio, no. 245; Pavoni (49), no. 239.
69. Balard (39), nos. 104–5; Pavoni (49), nos. 107, 202, 204; Enlart, pp. 459–62.
70. Polonio, no. 407; Pavoni (32), no. 229. Cf Polonio, nos. 13–14; Pavoni (49), no. 87.
71. For Giovanni: Balard (39), nos. 13, 129; Pavoni (32), nos. 229, 236. For Gui: Polonio, nos. 115, 367a, 368a; Pavoni (32), nos. 50, 128, 128a, 154–5, 218–219a, 223; Pavoni (49), no. 245; K. Schottmüller, *Der Untergang des Templer-Ordens* (Berlin, 1887), II, 392.
72. Enlart, pp. 290–3.
73. Desimoni, nos. 17–22, 74; Polonio, nos. 219, 226–7, 258; Pavoni (49) nos. 104, 150.
74. Desimoni, nos. 41–2, 55, 60, cf nos. 110, 141. For Oddone, see Desimoni, nos. 45, 67, 70–1, 147, 162, 268–70; Polonio, nos. 56, 56a, 134, 139, 238, 250, 378; Pavoni (32), nos. 10, 225–7, 237; Pavoni (49), nos. 36, 114–15, 120, 185, 202.
75. Pavoni (49), no. 60. In 1360–1 Nicola de Boateriis (nos. 4, 117) mentioned a property ‘in ruga Magistra Mercanciarum Famagoste’ on the corner with the ‘via Regia’ and elsewhere a ‘ruga Mercatorum’.
76. Schottmüller, II, 210, 389, 397.
77. Polonio, no. 313; Jacoby, ‘The Rise of a New Emporium’, p. 154 note 47.
78. Desimoni, nos. 43, 47–8, 69, 83, 93–5, 106–7, 113, 119, 133, 139, 260–1; Polonio, nos. 54, 78, 124, 134, 151, 380; Pavoni (49), nos. 34, 41, 190, 209–10, 219–20, 244, 268, 274.
79. See Metcalf above at note 2. J. Plana i Borràs, ‘The Accounts of Joan Banet’s trading venture from Barcelona to Famagusta: 1343’, *Ἐπετηρίς τοῦ Κέντρου Ἐπιστημονικῶν Ἐρευνῶν*, XIX (1992), 145–6; Leontios Makhairas, §90.
80. Desimoni, nos. 76, 147, 162; cf Pavoni (32), no. 42. For Raymond, see Balard (39), no. 152; Polonio, 80–1, 123; Pavoni (49), no. 1a; Balard (43), no. 18 (p. 38). For William, see Polonio, no. 99; Pavoni (49), no. 52. A third shopkeeper there was Richobono Occelli who though not described as a draper is known to have dealt in cloth. Balard (39), no. 144; Polonio, no. 307.
81. Balard (39), nos. 108, 149; Polonio, no. 64.
82. Desimoni, nos. 195–6; Polonio, no. 145; Pavoni (32), no. 18; Pavoni (49), nos. 113, 178.
83. Pavoni (32), nos. 51, 126. Another Genoese owed 4 bezants and 2 solidi for three months rent; could this be an unpaid balance? Pavoni (49), no. 32.
84. Polonio, no. 165.
85. Desimoni, nos. 140, 143–4, 187, 306; Pavoni (49), no. 57; Balard (43), no. 72 (p. 367).
86. Pavoni (49), no. 60. In 1302 the Venetians requested their own *ruga*, but it was denied them in the treaty of 1306. Jacoby, ‘The Rise of a New Emporium’, p. 179.
87. Desimoni, nos. 127, 134–5, 137, 252, 308; Polonio, nos. 69–70, 76–7, 82–4, 89–90, 111, 147, 201; Pavoni (32), nos. 37, 39, 48, 54.
88. Balard (43), no. 143 (p. 211).
89. Balard (39), nos. 14, 119; Desimoni, nos. 49, 66, 82, 100, 125, 146, 204, 230, 258, 286, 295, 298; Polonio, nos. 71, 125, 167, 174, 333, 388a, 423–6; Pavoni (32), nos. 4, 91, 97–8, 120; Pavoni (49), nos. 222–3, 240, 283; Balard (43), nos. 11 (p. 31), 44 (p. 117), 98–9 (pp. 167, 169), 146 (p. 214), 148 (p. 216), 152 (p. 220), 162 (p. 232).
90. Balard (39), nos. 129, 148, cf. no. 90. Balard (*op. cit.* p. IX) believes that he acquired his official position in 1296.

91. For the earliest evidence for his presence there, Desimoni, no. 150. For the last references, see Balard (43), nos. 18 (p. 38), 37-8 (pp. 58-9).

92. Balard (43), nos. 46-173 (pp. 118-243) *passim*. That it was Lamberto who had moved rather than that Pietro had taken over Bertozzo's shop seems to be proved by the fact that Lamberto wrote up an isolated contract at the latter location during 1307. Balard I(43), no. 64 (p. 135).

93. Pavoni (32), no. 46.



Famagusta (after Enlart)

1870



XVII

Famagusta Society ca. 1300 from the Registers of Lamberto di Sambuceto

As a result of recent scholarship Lamberto di Sambuceto is perhaps the best-known notary to have practised in the Latin East at any time during the middle ages. He was a Genoese who worked in the Black Sea port of Caffa before moving on to Famagusta. The precise date of his arrival in Cyprus is not known, although he was there by October 1294, and he was to remain until 1307. He then returned to Genoa where he lived until at least as late as 1325. A number of his registers are preserved in the Genoese Archivio di Stato. Michel Balard has published over 900 of his acts from Caffa dating to 1289 and 1290¹. More than 1500 more survive from Cyprus, and these too are now all available in printed editions². For most of the time he was on the island Lamberto was operating in Famagusta, although for much of the year 1297 he was to be found in Nicosia. The value of his registers has long been recognized, and in recent years they have been utilised by a number of

¹ *Michel Balard*, *Gênes d'Outre-Mer*, vol. 1: Les actes de Caffa du notaire Lamberto di Sambuceto, 1289–90 (Paris, La Haye 1973).

² A substantial number of Lamberto's acts were published in the nineteenth century: *Cornelio Desimoni*, *Actes passés à Famagouste de 1299 à 1301 par devant le notaire génois Lamberto di Sambuceto*, in: *Archives de l'Orient latin* 2 (1884) documents 3–120; continued in: *Revue de l'Orient latin* 1 (1893) 58–139, 275–312, 321–53. More recently the Istituto di Medievistica at the University of Genoa has sponsored a complete edition with the title *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare* in the series *Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi* (hereafter CSFS). The only volume not to have appeared will contain documents already edited by Desimoni. Those that have been published are:

Michel Balard, *Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (11 Ottobre 1296 – 23 Giugno 1299)* (CSFS 39, Genova 1983).

Valeria Polonio, *Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (3 Luglio 1300 – 3 Agosto 1301)* (CSFS 31, Genova 1982).

Romeo Pavoni, *Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (6 Luglio – 27 Ottobre 1301)* (CSFS 32, Genova 1982).

Romeo Pavoni, *Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (Gennaio – Agosto 1302)* (CSFS 49, Genova 1987).

Michel Balard, *Atti rogati a Cipro: Lamberto di Sambuceto (31 Marzo 1304 – 19 Luglio 1305; 4 Gennaio – 12 Luglio 1307): Giovanni de Rocha (3 Agosto 1308 – 14 Marzo 1310)* (CSFS 43, Genova 1984).

In this paper references to these volumes will be by editor with the volume number in brackets where the same editor has been responsible for more than one.

historians, notably Michel Balard, David Jacoby, Jean Richard, Catherine Otten-Froux, Benjamin Arbel and David Abulafia³. Much of Lamberto's business activities involved drawing up commercial contracts of one sort or another, and his registers have much to tell about the merchants who passed through Famagusta and the commodities they dealt in. My concern here in this paper, however, is to see what light these documents can shed on Famagusta's resident population.

It has to be stressed at the outset that the registers provide an incomplete and distorted picture. Lamberto was a Genoese. For part of his time in Famagusta he held an official position as 'notary and scribe' of the Genoese commune, and during that period he transacted a substantial proportion of his business in the Genoese *loggia*. Not surprisingly Genoese were prominent among his clients, although by no means to the exclusion of all others. What is more, as the bulk of Lamberto's business involved commerce, most of the individuals whose activities can be pieced together from his registers were either merchants or people with capital to invest in mercantile activities. But it is not always apparent whether the individuals who appear in his documents were long-term Famagusta residents or merchants or travellers who were only in the town perhaps for a matter of days before voyaging elsewhere.

Other social groups prove far more elusive. Take the nobility for example. Lamberto's registers reveal that prominent figures such as the Seneschal, the lord of Arsur, Philippe d'Ibelin and Bohemond de Brie and his son Jean owned prop-

³ *David Abulafia*, The Merchants of Messina: Levant Trade and Domestic Economy, in: Papers of the British School at Rome 54 (1986) 196–212; *idem*, The Anconitan Privileges in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Levant Trade in Ancona, in: *Gabriella Aivaldi*, *Benjamin Z. Kedar*, I Comuni Italiani nel Regno Crociato di Gerusalemme (= CSFS 48; Genova 1986) 525–70; *idem*, Narbonne, the Lands of the Crown of Aragon, and the Levant Trade 1187–1400, in: Montpellier, la Couronne d'Aragon et les pays de Langue d'Oc (1204–1349) (= Mémoires de la société archéologique de Montpellier 15; Montpellier 1987) 189–207; *Benjamin Arbel*, Traffici marittimi e sviluppo urbano a Cipro (secoli XIII–XVI), in: *Ennio Poletti*, Città portuali del Mediterraneo: Storia e Archeologia (Genova 1989) 89–94; *idem*, Slave Trade and Slave Labor in Frankish Cyprus (1191–1571), in: Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 24 (1993) 149–90; *Michel Balard*, La popolazione di Famagosta all'inizio del secolo XIV, in: La Storia dei Genovesi 4 (1984) 27–40; *idem*, L'activité commerciale en Chypre dans les années 1300, in: *Peter W. Edbury*, Crusade and Settlement (Cardiff 1985) 251–63; *idem*, Famagouste au début du XIVe siècle, in: *J. Heers*, Fortifications, portes de villes, places publiques dans le monde méditerranéen (Paris 1985) 279–99; *idem*, Les vénitiens en Chypre dans les années 1300, in: Byzantinische Forschungen 12 (1987) 589–603; *David Jacoby*, Citoyens, sujets et protégés de Venise et de Gênes en Chypre du XIIIe au XVe siècle, in: Byzantinische Forschungen 5 (1977) 159–88; *idem*, The rise of a New Emporium in the Eastern Mediterranean: Famagusta in the late Thirteenth Century, in: Meletai kai Ipomniamata 1 (Nicosia 1984) 143–79; *Catherine Otten-Froux*, Les Pisans en Chypre au moyen-âge, in: Praktika tou Deuterou Diethnous Kupriologikou Sunedriou 2 (Nicosia 1986) 127–43; *Jean Richard*, La situation juridique de Famagouste dans le royaume des Lusignans, in: Praktika tou Protou Diethnous Kupriologikou Sunedriou 2 (Nicosia 1972) 221–9; *idem*, Le peuplement latin et syrien en Chypre au XIIIe siècle, in: Byzantinische Forschungen 7 (1979) 157–73; *idem*, Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo sur le commerce avec l'Égypte (fin XIIIe – début XIVe siècle), in: Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres: Comptes Rendus (1984) 120–34.

erties in Famagusta, but we only know this because the houses or warehouses concerned were being rented out for use by merchants. So were these nobles resident in the town or simply absentee landlords? Jean de Brie was castellan of Famagusta at the time of the murder of Amaury lord of Tyre in 1310, but there is no clear-cut evidence about the others⁴. Very few knights turn up in person in Lamberto's registers. Guillaume de Mirabel and Thomas de Blanchegarde were royal officers; another source shows that Guillaume too had held office as castellan of Famagusta, in his case in the late 1290s⁵. Other knights such as Gilles Antiaume of Acre, Raymond Isaac and Roger of Jubail appear fleetingly, but there is no way of knowing whether they actually lived in Famagusta. In Jean Lanfranc we have a lone example of a knight who both resided in the town and invested in trade⁶. Nobles do, however, appear more often in the comparatively small number of surviving documents drawn up during Lamberto's sojourn in Nicosia during 1297, thus perhaps confirming Ludolf of Sudheim's statement a generation later that it was there that for the most part the members of the nobility dwelt⁷.

But what of lesser men? From time to time we find mention of minor royal servants: the king's scribe, the king's crier (*cridator* – a man whose job it was to offer crown property for sale), the king's *officiales*. Again the list is sparse, though it may be noted in passing that of the two criers who are mentioned by name, one was a Genoese⁸. More striking are the scattered references to the castellan and the viscount of Famagusta and their respective courts. Lamberto only gives the name of one castellan, Georges Faccori, and of one viscount, a certain Michel. Both men are problematical. Other sources supply the names of several castellans in the period between the mid 1290s and 1310: Philippe de Brie, Guillaume de Mirabel, Jean de Brie and Reynaud de Soissons. As is to be expected since they held a post of considerable importance in the island's defence, they were all members of prominent knightly families. Georges Faccori, however, is otherwise unknown and belonged to a family that is itself otherwise unknown⁹. Then again, it is unfortunate that of the two acts in which the viscount of Famagusta features, one only gives his first name – Michel – and the other has a lacuna at the critical point¹⁰. So

⁴ *Balard*, (39) 149; *Desimoni*, 169, 195–6, 209–10; *Polonio*, 52, 64, 145, 237; *Pavoni*, (32) 18; *Pavoni*, (49) 113, 178; *Balard*, (43) 30 (p. 319).

⁵ *Pavoni*, (32) 163; *Pavoni*, (49) 202, cf. 19, 36; *Louis de Mas Latrie*, *Nouvelles preuves de l'histoire de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, in: *BEC* 34 (1873) 50, 52.

⁶ *Balard*, (39) 13, 129; *Polonio*, 407; *Pavoni*, (32) 229, 236; *Pavoni*, (49) 87.

⁷ *Balard*, (39) 49, 73, 83; *Louis de Mas Latrie*, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris 1852–61) vol. 2, 214–15.

⁸ *Desimoni*, 90; *Polonio*, 87; *Pavoni*, (49) 12, 31, 206, 248; *Balard*, (43) 56 (p. 347).

⁹ *Pavoni*, (32) 9. For Philip of Brie and the others, see *Mas Latrie*, *Nouvelles preuves* 50; *Les Gestes des Chipriotes*, *RHC Arm*, vol. 2, 829, 871; *Chronique d'Amadi*, ed. *René de Mas Latrie*, in: *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, vol. 1 (Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, Paris 1891) 305, 333, 359, 389, 392.

¹⁰ *Balard*, (39) 13; *Desimoni*, 114. For the only other reference to a viscount of Famagusta (again unnamed) at this period, *Gestes des Chipriotes* 866. 'Amadi' (250), writing of the events

who was he? We might assume that, as in the kingdom of Jerusalem, the viscount, who presided at the *cour des bourgeois* and so was the chief law officer in the town, would have been a knight. Curiously, however, the name Michel was employed exceedingly rarely among the members of Cypriot noble houses, and I am inclined to wonder whether he too came from an obscure family. Be that as it may, it is clear from Lamberto's evidence that both the castellan and the viscount had a court, whose competence included the registration of commercial contracts¹¹, and where they were assisted by a team of assessors known as jurats¹².

In a precious handful of documents, Lamberto names some of the jurats of the viscount's court. In a will of 1296 we find mention of Michel the viscount with two jurats, Riccobuono Occelli and Philippe Arise, and also Abraynus, who is described at the viscount's scribe. In 1300 a deposition was made before an unnamed viscount and three jurats 'of the court of the lord king at Famagusta', Pellegrino de Castello, Liacius Imperiale and Abraynus the Banker (*bancherius*). Abraynus, 'jurat of the court of the lord king at Famagusta', also turns up as a witness in 1301, and I suspect, though I cannot prove, that he was same man as the scribe of 1296¹³. With the exception of Abraynus, all these men feature elsewhere in Lamberto's acts, and it is possible to begin to build up a portrait of them and their circle of associates. They themselves seem to have been a close-knit group: thus Pellegrino de Castello appears as an executor in the will of 1296 in which some of the others had a part while Philippe Arise later acted as an executor for the estate of Riccobuono, who had died late in 1299 or at the beginning of 1300; elsewhere Philippe is to be found witnessing a document together with Pellegrino¹⁴.

Lamberto describes Riccobuono Occelli as 'a Genoese resident in Famagusta'. He owned a house, and he also had a brother who appears in the registers on one occasion. We find him manumitting slaves, acting as an executor for another Genoese, dealing in cloth and accepting money in *commenda*. In short he was behaving as a typical Genoese businessman, and his business associates, Bernardo Zotard and Ianuino de Murta, were similarly Genoese merchants living at the time in Famagusta¹⁵. Liacius Imperiale's name betrays him as another Genoese, but the only other snippet of information about him that Lamberto provides is that he had a shop in Famagusta¹⁶. Of the others, Abraynus sounds as if he was of Syrian origin, while Pellegrino de Castello may perhaps have been a member of a family that had previously lived in Acre and had been careful to preserve its links with Venice. David Jacoby has drawn attention to the brothers Giovanni and Filippo

of 1306, refers perhaps anachronistically to the castellan and viscount as the 'capitano et balio'.

¹¹ *Balard*, (39) 46, 155; *Desimoni*, 118; cf *Pavoni*, (49) 278. What determined why some contracts should be registered in one court and some in the other is unclear.

¹² For the jurats of the castellan's court, *Pavoni*, (32) 122.

¹³ *Balard*, 4 (39) 13; *Desimoni*, 114 cf. 115; *Pavoni*, (32) 36.

¹⁴ *Balard*, (39) 13; *Desimoni*, 114–15; *Pavoni*, (32) 89. Philip is probably the Philip 'Aurie' who witnessed alongside Riccobuono in March 1299. *Balard*, (39) 109.

¹⁵ *Balard*, (39) 5, 11, 15, 97, 109, 144, 145, 148, 148a; *Polonio*, 4, 123, 307.

¹⁶ *Polonio*, 101.

de Castello who had survived the fall of Acre in 1291: in the 1300s Giovanni was living in Famagusta and Filippo in Venice itself. But whether Pellegrino was their kinsman is nowhere made clear. The Venetian de Castello family was closely linked by marriage to another Venetian family, the Brizi, who had enjoyed even greater prominence in Acre with a presence there stretching back to the twelfth century; moreover, sometime around 1300 the Brizi succeeded in gaining admittance to the *Maggior Consiglio* at Venice. They too had members residing in Famagusta at this period¹⁷. Like Riccobuono, Pellegrino de Castello engaged in business ventures: we find him investing in a voyage to Syria – was he thus contravening the papal ban on trade with the Mamluk sultanate? – and later selling a part share in a ship¹⁸.

What all this shows is that of the five named Famagusta jurats, men who by definition would have been of good standing in the local community, one and probably two were Genoese, a third was quite possibly a member of a Venetian family that had previously lived in Acre and a fourth was probably a Syrian. All seem to have had a place in the local business community. Abraynus the Banker had to be a man of integrity if his business was to thrive. Two other bankers (*bancherii*) who resided in Famagusta at this time are also of interest. One appears in the registers variously as *Iopus*, *Iupus* or *Aiubus*, in other words, Ayyub or Job; like Abraynus he was presumably a Syrian Christian. He is frequently identified as a resident or burgess of Famagusta. On one occasion Lamberto described him as a money-changer (*campsor*), but it is clear that his business activities extended far beyond this, and that he accepted money on deposit and invested on his own account¹⁹. The other banker was Vivian de Ginembaldo, a man whose name crops up far more frequently in Lamberto's registers and whose career has already attracted scholarly attention²⁰.

Vivian had been imprudent enough to incur excommunication for engaging in prohibited trade with Mamluk Egypt. How long he lay under this sentence is not known, but in September 1300 Pope Boniface VIII issued a bull lifting the excommunication at the request of Isol the Pisan, a man who had recently come to Europe as the ambassador of the Mongol Ilkhan. The following June Lamberto was called upon to draw up a notarised statement recording that the papal directive had been acted upon by the clergy to whom it had been addressed²¹. Vivian had evidently lived in Acre at some point in the past, but by 1301 Lamberto was describing him as a burgess of Famagusta. That same year he married his niece to

¹⁷ David Jacoby, *L'expansion occidentale dans le Levant: les Vénitiens à Acre dans la seconde moitié du treizième siècle*, in: *Journal of Medieval History* 3 (1977) 240–4; *idem*, *New Emporium*, 168.

¹⁸ *Desimoni*, 83; *Balard*, (43) 144 (p. 211).

¹⁹ *Polonio*, 12, 246–7; *Pavoni*, (32) 37, 183; *Pavoni*, (49) 15, 33, 264; *Balard*, (43) 3, 5 (pp. 22–4).

²⁰ Jean Richard, *Isol le Pisan: un aventurier franc gouverneur d'une province mongole?*, in: *Central Asiatic Journal* 14 (1970) 188; *Jacoby*, *New Emporium*, 174–6.

²¹ *Pavoni*, (32) 13.

Giacomo di Groppo, a local Genoese resident who had previously acted as a Genoese consul or rector in Famagusta²². It is difficult to know how far Vivian's excommunication had inhibited his business activities, but it does not seem to have prevented him from entering into contractual obligations or witnessing those of others. Unfortunately Lamberto provides no evidence to illustrate his commercial activities in Egypt, but we can see him investing money in *commenda* with Pisan, Genoese and Venetian merchants who were moving goods between Cyprus and Italy or between Cyprus and the Armenian port of Ayas²³. We first learn of the existence of his bank in 1300, and from then until 1302, the point at which he disappears from the records, there are frequent references to it. It was clearly situated in a house in the heart of the business district; Lamberto gives several instances of deals being struck in or near it, and on one occasion he notes that the place where public auctions were held was directly opposite²⁴. Vivian himself was described as a *cambiator* or *canssor* (money changer)²⁵, but, as in the case of Iopus the banker, it is clear that his activities spread much further.

Vivian was clearly a successful entrepreneur. If his trading ventures with Egypt got him into trouble with the Church, he was able to cultivate influential friends to smooth things over. There is no hint that he ever claimed to be a national of one of the western trading cities, and, although he was linked by marriage to a prominent Genoese, he invested with Venetian and Pisan merchants as well. It would also seem that he knew Arabic: on one occasion Lamberto mentions that he acted as an interpreter in a transaction involving members of the Florentine Peruzzi house and some one who would appear to have been a Syrian resident of Nicosia dealing in camlets²⁶.

Lamberto occasionally refers to the presence of interpreters when deals were being struck between westerners and people who were apparently of Syrian origin. Among those acting in this role were, in addition to Vivian, *Iohannes Castellanus* who may well be the Giovanni de Castello formerly of Acre who has been mentioned already, Robert, the *magister capellanus* of Famagusta cathedral, and a Genoese named Allegro Fateinanti²⁷. Allegro's activities can be traced in some detail from 1296 until 1310 when he appears a few times in the surviving register of another Genoese notary, Giovanni de Rocha. When first found he is described as a notary²⁸, but he would seem to have specialised in testamentary and family rather than commercial affairs. Many of his appearances show him acting as an execu-

²² *Polonio*, 386–7; *Pavoni*, (32) 13, 35–6. Vivian is described as an inhabitant of Famagusta in 1297. *Balard*, (39) 62. For Giacomo as consul, see *Balard*, (39) 95, 99, 101–2, 105, 124.

²³ *Balard*, (39) 8, 95; *Pavoni*, (32) 85, 85a, 97; *Pavoni*, (49) 21.

²⁴ *Desimoni*, 58, 87, 245–6; *Polonio*, 73, 178, 262–3, 307, 351, 373; *Pavoni*, (32) 85.

²⁵ *Desimoni*, 245; *Polonio*, 307; *Pavoni*, (49) 276–8.

²⁶ *Polonio*, 262.

²⁷ *Balard*, (39) 27, 121, 154; *Polonio*, 128, 262.

²⁸ *Balard*, (39) 3, 154.

tor²⁹ or procurator³⁰. Only occasionally can he be seen involving himself in trade on his own account³¹.

There are numerous examples of individuals named by Lamberto as inhabitants (*habitatores*) or burgesses (*burgenses*) of Famagusta, and by both these terms he unquestionably meant long-term residents. It is unfortunate that there is no way of knowing whether the individuals concerned had been born in the town or whether they intended to remain there permanently. Lamberto never described anyone as a citizen (*civis*) of Famagusta, although on a couple of occasions we do encounter citizens of Nicosia in his registers³². As David Jacoby has already noted, the terms *habitor* and *burgensis* can be used interchangeably for the same person; thus for example, Vivian de Ginembaldo was both a *habitor* and a *burgensis* and on at least one occasion was described as both in the same document³³. On the other hand, Allegro Fateinanti, though often identified as a *habitor* of Famagusta, was never once described as a *burgensis*. So was there a distinction being made? Taken by itself, Lamberto's evidence does not support the idea that these terms conveyed any precise legal meaning, but there may on the other hand have been some subtle social gradation at work. The term *burgensis* might well have been reserved for wealthier and more prominent individuals, and so have carried with it something of the same connotations as the word 'bourgeois' in modern English usage. By that token Vivian would have been a much wealthier man than Allegro, which may have been true but does rather beg the question. The issue is complicated by the fact that before about 1300 Lamberto seems not have used the phrase *burgensis Famagoste*, but after that date he employed it with increasing frequency. Maybe this was just an unconscious development in his own vocabulary and is of no wider significance, but there could be more to it. His increasingly frequent use of the word *burgensis* might possibly have something to do with the physical environment in which all these people lived. We know from other sources that in the first decade of the fourteenth century the fortifications around the town were being greatly improved³⁴, and so it could be that Famagusta was becoming far more obviously a *bourg*: hence it would have been increasingly appropriate to describe its residents as *burgenses*³⁵.

²⁹ *Polonio*, 349, 369, 379; *Pavoni*, (32) 40, 51, 71, 72, 106, 118–19; *Pavoni*, (49) 281; *Balard*, (43) 99 (p. 167).

³⁰ *Desimoni*, 291; *Polonio*, 25, 154, 289; *Pavoni*, (32) 158a; *Pavoni*, (49) 65, 176–7; *Balard*, (43) 20 (p. 40), 18, 20 (pp. 304–8).

³¹ *Balard*, (39) 19; *Desimoni*, 161, 292; *Polonio*, 294; *Balard*, (43) 90 (p. 159).

³² *Polonio*, 262, 384.

³³ *Pavoni*, (32) 36. See Jacoby, *Citoyens*, 159–64.

³⁴ Peter W. Edbury, *Famagusta in 1300*, in: *Nicholas Coureas, Jonathan Riley-Smith, Cyprus and the Crusades* (Nicosia 1995) 339–41.

³⁵ In the discussion following the presentation of this paper, David Jacoby suggested that the designation given to particular individuals would be indicative of their own self-perception since they would have instructed the notary what to write. He further suggested that the increasing use of the term *burgensis Famagoste* could reflect the growing sense among the refu-

Lamberto is far from consistent: sometimes he will specify that a particular individual was an inhabitant of Famagusta in one document, but fail to do so in the next. In many instances the person concerned was known to have originated elsewhere, and it may be supposed that in describing him as a *habitor* of Famagusta Lamberto was defining his status: thus Allegro was a man from Genoa but one who was residing in Famagusta. Accordingly it may well be that Lamberto – paradoxically – was more likely to describe foreign nationals as inhabitants of Famagusta than those who had lived there all their lives and had no outside association. There is thus plenty of information in his registers on the evidently substantial community of Famagusta residents who were either from Genoa or who could claim Genoese nationality, but it is far less easy to identify members of the indigenous population of the town. People claiming nationality of cities other than Genoa who were resident in Famagusta – men such as the Pisan Bernardo Barberius, the Venetian *Genecilus Capxiarus*, or Master Hughes the *accimator* from Toulouse – appear far less often³⁶, but given the marked Genoese bias of our source it is not possible to draw any conclusions as to the relative size of the various western communities. More frequently encountered are those residents of Famagusta who were evidently refugees from Latin Syria. Jacopo *Philippus* of Acre could claim Venetian nationality³⁷; Bonaiuncta of Sidon the tailor was a Pisan³⁸; while Tomaso *Coffinus* of Acre had by 1301 become the Pisan consul in Famagusta³⁹. But there are plenty of others who seem to have no link with places in the West: Nicola, Perrozius and Simon of Acre; Jacopo Safsaf and Maceotus of Beirut; Stephen and Dimitrios of Marqab, to mention but a few⁴⁰.

We might be pardoned for imagining that the entire population of Famagusta, or at least that part of it which found mention in Lamberto's registers, comprised immigrants from Genoa, Venice and other places in the West and refugees from Latin Syria who themselves could either claim western nationality or who were members of the indigenous Syrian population. The groups which remain invisible were the Greeks of Famagusta and the Latins whose families had settled there since the early days of the Lusignan regime if not before and who had no claim to any identity other than as Latin townspeople of Famagusta. Maybe such people are to be sought among the local inhabitants who held the more menial occupations: people such as the smiths George and Theodore; Peter the fisherman; Bartholomew and Gerard the tavern-keepers; Elias the Jewish physician; John the crossbowman; the Jewish dyers, Moshe and Farag; Roolinus the candlemaker;

gees from Syria that they would never return to their places of origin and so were becoming reconciled to idea of Famagusta as their home town.

³⁶ *Desimoni*, 67, 176–7, 203, 244, 308; *Polonio*, 396.

³⁷ *Desimoni*, 215, 265, 308; *Polonio*, 77.

³⁸ *Polonio*, 367–9; cf *Desimoni*, 299, 303; *Polonio*, 2, 6, 11, 15–17, 51, 63, 103, 374, 382, 389.

³⁹ *Polonio*, 254, 341; cf *Desimoni*, 71, 87, 302; *Polonio*, 72, 84, 115, 367, 367a, 372–3; *Pavoni*, (32) 166, 200, 202–7, 218a, 219a, 223; *Pavoni*, (49) 22, 135–6, 245.

⁴⁰ *Balard*, (39) 25; *Desimoni*, 7, 10–11, 83, 128, 192, 204.

Simon the barber ...⁴¹ The problem with these people is that they rarely appear more than once, and so it is not possible to categorize them with any confidence. But in any case it is likely that the indigenous townspeople were dwarfed by the recent arrivals. All the indications are that Famagusta experienced a massive influx of refugees with the loss of the Latin possessions in Syria culminating in the events of 1291. At the same time, as David Jacoby has demonstrated, Famagusta came into its own as a major trading entrepôt with the result that seamen, merchants and their agents thronged the port. Lamberto's registers attest to the presence of large numbers of westerners and large numbers of people whose names show them to have come from Syria. Many of the refugees must have arrived destitute and would have found it difficult to make a much of a living. How they were housed, fed and provided with employment is hard to visualise. But almost by definition the poor do not find a place in notarised contracts. However, it is abundantly clear that many of these immigrants were not poor and were able to integrate into Famagusta society, supporting themselves and their families by following their craft or profession. As for the westerners, there is no way of knowing how long someone would have had to have been in Famagusta before he would have had Lamberto describe him as a *habitor* or a *burgensis*. Lamberto himself remained there for about thirteen years; others such as Allegro Fateinanti or Filippo di San Syro lived there for at least as long. But the fact that a Genoese such as Riccobuono Ocelli could hold public office as a jurat shows that the western residents accepted that they had a role beyond the confines of their own communities and also that, despite the frequently strained relations between the mercantile communities and the crown, the Cypriot authorities were happy that they should.

⁴¹ Balard, (39) 14, 77; Desimoni, 167; Polonio, 114, 173, 206, 380, 418; Pavoni, (32) 117.



XVIII

The Genoese Community in Famagusta around the year 1300: a historical vignette

On 18 June 1301 Pellegrino the shoemaker, a Genoese resident of Famagusta, made his will¹. He was clearly in his last illness, and in fact he had died by the middle of July². To render his dying wishes into the customary and correct formulaic Latin he employed another Genoese, the notary Lamberto di Sambuceto. He was of sound mind though sick in body. He chose to be buried in the cemetery of Saint Michael outside Famagusta – the principal burial ground for catholic Christians – but how much should be spent on the funeral he left to the discretion of his wife, who, as we know from other evidence, was named Margherita. There then follows some *pro anima* bequests: to his daughter, Isabellona, and her husband, Lorenzo, a hundred white bezants to be shared equally; a further fifty white bezants for the poor, destitute and infirm to be distributed by his daughter and son-in-law; three white bezants for the harbour works at Genoa; two white bezants each for the Dominicans, Franciscans and lepers. On the day of his death he wanted thirty masses to be sung, paid for out of his goods, and after his death all his workers should be held quit from any debts they owed him. He then went on to list nine individuals who owed him money for shoes that they had bought. Two others owed him the small

¹ V. POLONIO, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (3 luglio 1300-3 agosto 1301)*, Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi, 31, Genova, 1982, doc. 415.

² R. PAVONI, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (6 luglio-27 ottobre 1301)*, Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi, 32, Genova, 1982, doc. 8.

sums he had loaned them. He himself acknowledged that he had 84 silver *gros* that he was holding for someone whose legacy it was. His principal heirs were his wife and daughter equally. Seven men, all of whom are described as being inhabitants of Famagusta, witnessed.

In itself the will is unremarkable. Pellegrino had been living and working in Famagusta since at least as early as 1297³, but the fact that he was careful to have himself described as a Genoese and to remember the civic charity of his home city shows that he had not entirely cut himself off from his roots. On a few occasions he had witnessed documents – receipts, *commendata* contracts – drawn up by Lamberto⁴, but not once can he been seen investing in the business ventures of others. He was presumably a man of modest means, although there are no clues as to how large an estate he left his wife and daughter or how many workmen he employed. But he must have had cash in hand or, at least, readily disposable assets, for within a month of him drawing up his will his widow was able to convey the fifty white bezants he had bequeathed to her son-in-law⁵.

It is precisely because the will is unremarkable that it can serve as a starting point for an investigation into the Genoese community in Famagusta. The notary, Lamberto di Sambuceto, had arrived there at some point in the early 1290, and though parts of his surviving registers were published by Cornelio Desimoni over a hundred years ago, we are much indebted to the Istituto di Medievistica at Genoa for sponsoring the publication of the remainder in the series «Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi» under direction of Professor Geo Pistrino. Between 1296 and 1307 Lamberto drew up forty-six wills in Famagusta that are extant; the Famagusta registers of another Genoese notary, Giovanni de Rocha, adds one more, dating from 1308. The great majority of the testators were Genoese, and of these about fourteen would seem to have been resident in Famagusta rather

³ M. BALARD, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (11 ottobre 1296-23 giugno 1299)*, Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi, 39, Genova, 1983, doc. 28.

⁴ M. BALARD cit., doc. 28; C. DESIMONI, *Actes passés à Famagouste de 1299 à 1301 par devant le notaire génois Lamberto di Sambuceto*, in «Archives de l'Orient latin», II, 1884, and in «Revue de l'Orient latin», I, 1893, doc. CLXVIII; V. POLONIO cit., docs. 128, 217.

⁵ R. PAVONI cit., doc. 8.

than merchants or other temporary visitors. It is striking how few women called on Lamberto to draft their wills. Altogether there are just five female testators. Of these one or possibly two appear to have belonged to the resident Genoese community⁶, while the other three look like refugees from Latin Syria⁷. It is not that women tended not to make wills: indeed, as Steven Epstein has shown using a much larger sample, in Genoa itself between 1150 and 1250 women made almost half the wills that have been preserved⁸. The implication of the apparent gender imbalance must surely be that, like the visiting merchants and other travellers, many of the long-term residents – the people described as *habitatores* or *burgenses* of Famagusta – had either left their wives and children in Genoa or had none.

In electing to be buried in the cemetery of St. Michael without the walls, Pellegrino was following the general fashion of the time. In the whole of Lamberto's registers only four different burial places are named: the cemetery of Saint Michael, the cathedral church of Saint Nicholas, the Franciscans and the Dominicans⁹. Of the 44 testators who expressed a preference, 19 (44%) chose the cemetery of Saint Michael. But of the thirteen Genoese residents of Famagusta whose wills stipulated where they were to be buried, no less than nine (69%) opted for there¹⁰. Whilst it could be objected that the sample is too small for any conclusions to be drawn from these statistics, they do nevertheless open up some interesting possibilities. It

⁶ R. PAVONI cit., docs. 71-2; less certain: M. BALARD cit., doc. 29.

⁷ C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), doc. CXCVIII; R. PAVONI cit., doc. 38; R. PAVONI, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Cipro da Lamberto di Sambuceto (gennaio-agosto 1302)*, Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi, 49, Genova, 1987, doc. 85.

⁸ S. EPSTEIN, *Wills and Wealth in Medieval Genoa, 1150-1250*, Cambridge Mass., 1984, p. 38.

⁹ P. EDBURY, *Famagusta in 1300*, forthcoming in the proceedings of the conference «Cyprus and the Crusades» (Nicosia, Sept. 1994).

¹⁰ Saint Michael: M. BALARD cit., doc. 13; C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), doc. CLXXXIX; V. POLONIO cit., docs. 165, 275, 349, 415; R. PAVONI cit. (1982), docs. 12, 71; R. PAVONI cit. (1987), doc. 185. Saint Nicholas: V. POLONIO cit., docs. 176, 366. Dominicans: M. BALARD, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Cipro: Lamberto di Sambuceto (31 marzo 1304-19 luglio 1305, 4 gennaio-12 luglio 1306); Giovanni de Rocha (3 agosto 1308-14 marzo 1310)*, Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi, 43, Genova, 1987, doc. 19 (p. 39). Franciscans: R. PAVONI cit. (1987), doc. 281. One resident Genoese testator did not specify his place of burial: M. BALARD cit. (1987), doc. 82 (p. 151).

may be that the non-resident testators, perhaps unfamiliar with the local topography, would have been more likely to have selected the church of one or other of the orders of friars or the Latin cathedral than a burial ground which they might never have seen. In any case some of the transitory visitors may have sought burial with friars wherever they had happened to find themselves in mortal illness. There is also some reason to believe that the Franciscan and Dominican houses in Famagusta were of comparatively recent foundation at the beginning of the fourteenth century¹¹, and so for residents whose families had been living in the town for two or three generations already and who wished to be buried with their own kinsfolk, the choice may have been limited.

Only two of the resident Genoese asked to be buried in the cathedral. Michel Balard has suggested that this was the choice of the better off¹², and what we know of these men would seem to support his belief¹³. Bernardo Zotard is first found in Lamberto's registers acting as an executor for another Genoese in 1296. It is not clear how he made his living, although we do know that he owned business premises in Famagusta¹⁴. In his will he disposed of considerably more than Pellegrino: for his funeral and associated expenses he set aside forty-four white bezants not counting the cost of the procession, mass and candles; there was a *pro anima* bequest of 500 white bezants for his wife; 2,000 white bezants for his daughter's dowry; 3,000 white bezants to his son; various items of value were to be distributed between his two children; other *pro anima* bequests totalled just under 500 white bezants, and there was provision too for the eventual manumitting of two domestic slaves¹⁵. Lanfranco de Romea on the other hand was much more niggardly when it came to paying for his own funeral, putting aside just eight white bezants; his wife was to have her dower of 2,000 white bezants; his property

¹¹ P. EDBURY cit. (forthcoming).

¹² M. BALARD, *Famagouste au début du XIV^e siècle*, in «Fortifications, portes de villes, places publiques dans le monde méditerranéen», ed. J. Heers, Paris, 1985, p. 284.

¹³ M. BALARD cit. (1983), docs. 5, 11; cf. C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), doc. CLXXXIX.

¹⁴ V. POLONIO cit., doc. 213.

¹⁵ V. POLONIO cit., doc. 176 (will dated 26 Dec. 1300). He was dead by 3 Feb. 1301: V. POLONIO cit., doc. 213.

was to be divided equally between his five sons and one daughter. Perhaps with so many children he felt he should not diminish his estate by willing too much property away from his immediate kin. Lanfranco's trade or profession is again not known, although in his will he acknowledged that he was holding a sum of 100 white bezants in *commenda*¹⁶. He was probably not as rich as Bernardo, but he was nevertheless a man of some substance. In 1302 Domenico, his eldest son, married a woman whose dowry was 1,000 white bezants, and at the same time Lanfranco's widow made an *inter vivos* gift to him of her house in the street of the Temple¹⁷. Later that same year Domenico accepted a loan in *commenda* for 605 white bezants invested in corn bound for Lesser Armenia from a prominent member of the Genoese community in Famagusta, Ansaldo di Sestri. Five weeks later he was able to pay the Ansaldo's widow 11 1/2 white bezants as her quarter share of the total profit on this venture¹⁸.

But if burial in the cathedral was for the wealthy, burial outside the city at the cemetery of Saint Michael was not necessarily for the poor. In December 1300, the same month as Bernardo Zotard made his will, Ianuino de Murta also called Lamberto to his house to record his last wishes¹⁹. Ianuino, who is described as *Ianuensis, habitator Famagoste et burgensis*, was among those who wanted burial at Saint Michael. The expenses for his funeral were left to the discretion of his executors, but his religious and charitable bequests amounted to 141 white bezants. Ianuino appears not to have had children of his own. He made bequests to his nephews and nieces and a substantial section of his will was given over to sorting out the affairs of his wife's children by an earlier marriage. It appears that his step-sons had been in dispute with their father's executor; the

¹⁶ V. POLONIO cit., doc. 366 (will dated 6 May 1301). He was dead by 3 Feb. 1302: R. PAVONI cit. (1987), doc. 60. For other references: V. POLONIO cit., docs. 153, 250, 275.

¹⁷ R. PAVONI cit. (1987), doc. 60.

¹⁸ R. PAVONI cit. (1987), docs. 138, 185, 200. For other references: R. PAVONI cit. (1987), docs. 61, 66, 129.

¹⁹ V. POLONIO cit., doc. 165. He was dead by June 1302: R. PAVONI cit. (1987), doc. 237.

executor had then died in turn leaving Ianuino as his executor²⁰, and Ianuino decided to put an end to the dispute by ordering that the disputed sum of 400 white bezants be given to his step-sons out his own estate. But what is striking about this will is the provision made for his former domestic slaves: Mariona and her daughter were to have the small house adjacent to Ianuino's own home and fifty white bezants; Anayma was to have another fifty bezants; while another small house was left to the daughter of Cathalina, his former slave, and mother and daughter were to have a bed with its furnishings. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the children born to Mariona and Cathalina were in fact Ianuino's. On the same day as he made his will Ianuino manumitted Cathalina, here described as white and aged about twenty-four years, her brother Giacomino, and her daughter *quam nutrior pro Deo*, and also Anayma (or Nayma) aged eleven²¹. The will is of considerable interest, showing that Ianuino owned a number of houses in Famagusta, some of which he rented out, and it also reveals that at the time he made his will he was engaged in trading in Cypriot wine out of Limassol²².

To come back to Pellegrino the shoemaker. It is unfortunate that Isabellona and Lorenzo, his daughter and son-in-law, cannot be traced further in Lamberto's registers, but we can know more about his customers and the friends and neighbours who witnessed his will. Of the witnesses, two, Enrico, known from other documents as Enrico Pisano²³, and Ugo and were master tailors. Another man, *magister* Enrico of Tyre, is described elsewhere as a merchant (*merzarius*)²⁴, while two other witnesses, Riccobuono and Giovanni, were described respectively as a leather worker (*corvexerius*) and a tanner (*sannerius*). Two, Enrico of Tyre and Giorgio of Acre²⁵, had presu-

²⁰ C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), docs. CXIV, CXV.

²¹ V. POLONIO cit., docs. 168, 170.

²² For his commercial activities, see also C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), docs. CLXX, CLXXI, CCIII. For other references: M. BALARD cit. (1983), docs. 110, 115, 148a; C. DESIMONI cit., docs. LXX, LXXI, XCIX, CLXXXIX.

²³ C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), doc. CCIII; V. POLONIO cit., docs. 17, 27a; R. PAVONI cit. (1982), docs. 8, 9, 34, 42, 61, 69, 74a, 78, 152, 169, 228.

²⁴ C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), doc. LXXXIII; V. POLONIO cit., doc. 413.

²⁵ Perhaps the man who appears in R. PAVONI cit. (1987), doc. 243.

mably come to Famagusta from Syria, while Riccobuono, like Pellegrino himself, was a Genoese²⁶. Finally *magister* Martino de Leone was a skinner (*pelleterius*) who along with Enrico Pisano the tailor also witnessed Lorenzo's receipt for his legacy from his father-in-law²⁷. In all probability these men – craftsmen and artisans – were of similar social class and standing as Pellegrino. Enrico was later named as an executor when Ugo of Toulouse, a barber, made his will, and on that occasion Martino again appeared as a witness²⁸. The customers, on the other hand, were more varied. Two, Michele *Stacius* of Beirut and Bartholino of Tortosa, had presumably come from Syria. Three are designated *magister*: Paolo de Taus, Naso and Giovanni *Sife*, but of these only Paolo is known from other documents and the status and occupations of these men is unclear²⁹. In addition there was a cleric called *Iacetus*, and a man whose name is given as *Baramonus* and who in other documents is described as a Genoese *censarius*³⁰. None of these people left any clear impression elsewhere in Lamberto's registers, but two others, Simone Rubeo and Baliano de Ghisolfi, had a place among the leading members of the Genoese merchant community in Famagusta.

Simone was the son of Giacomo Rubeo, a Genoese burgess of Nicosia. He first appears in Lamberto's registers in 1297, but he only comes to prominence in 1299 when he is found loading sugar on the galleys of Andrea Spinola and Cattaneo Doria, and Aleppan cotton on a coq belonging to Babilano Salvaigo, all of which was bound for Genoa³¹. He himself evidently travelled with his wares, and after this flurry of activity in April and May 1299 he does not reappear in Famagusta until February 1301. Once more the registers show him organising capital and merchandise again including cotton for a voyage to Genoa. Simone was still evidently a young man, for even in 1301 he found it necessary to stress that he was the emancipated son of

²⁶ R. PAVONI cit. (1987), docs. 165b, 201.

²⁷ R. PAVONI cit. (1982), doc. 8. For other references: V. POLONIO cit., doc. 78a; R. PAVONI cit. (1982), docs. 7, 161.

²⁸ R. PAVONI cit. (1982), doc. 42.

²⁹ R. PAVONI cit. (1987), docs. 38, 39.

³⁰ V. POLONIO cit., docs. 23, 56a, 64, 238.

³¹ M. BALARD cit. (1983), docs. 37, 132, 134, 138, 147.

his father and that he was over twenty years old³². But by now he had his own galley³³. Simone's father, Giacomo, occupied a leading position in the Genoese community, being named on one occasion in 1300 as one of two *rectores Ianuensium in Cipro*, an office which was carefully distinguished from that of Genoese rector in Famagusta³⁴.

It is interesting to find Giacomo Rubeo associated on two occasions, in 1296 and 1300, with Baliano de Ghisolfi³⁵. Back in 1279 a merchant with this name had been staying in Ayas in Lesser Armenia dealing in brazil wood³⁶. It is tempting to identify him with the Baliano who crops up in Lamberto's registers from 1296 until 1307. In 1296 he was the Genoese consul in Famagusta in which capacity he can be seen intervening to compel the executors for a deceased Genoese to hand over legacies³⁷. In 1299 we find him acting as a procurator for his kinsman, Federico de Ghisolfi, in receiving payments from Cattaneo Doria a galley-owner who has already been mentioned in another context³⁸. After he had stopped being consul Baliano remained prominent in the Genoese community in Famagusta, and on one occasion Lamberto described him as *civis Ianue*³⁹. But although in 1300 he frequently turns up as a witness to commercial dealings entered into by other members of the Genoese community, he himself seems not to have been very active at that time⁴⁰ (it is interesting to note by contrast that the young Simone

³² V. POLONIO cit., docs. 235, 303. See also docs. 260, 305, 308, 309, 320, 325, 330, 384, 400; R. PAVONI cit. (1982), doc. 183.

³³ R. PAVONI cit. (1982), doc. 19.

³⁴ C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), doc. XLII. For other references: M. BALARD cit. (1983), docs. 21, 73-4, 83, 92; C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), doc. CCII; V. POLONIO cit., doc. 384; R. PAVONI cit. (1982), docs. 10, 183.

³⁵ M. BALARD cit. (1983), doc. 21; C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), doc. XLII.

³⁶ L. BALLETO, *Notai Genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Laiazzo da Federico di Piazzalunga (1274) e Pietro di Bargone (1277, 1279)*, Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi, 53, Genova, 1989, Pietro di Bargone, docs. 86, 89, 90, 95, 104-6, 110-12, 116, 134-5.

³⁷ M. BALARD cit. (1983), docs. 5, 11. See also docs. 1, 3, 21.

³⁸ M. BALARD cit. (1983), docs. 124-5. See also doc. 101.

³⁹ C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), doc. XLII; C. DESIMONI cit. (1893), doc. CCLV.

⁴⁰ C. DESIMONI cit. (1884), docs. LXXXIV, XCVI, CXIV, CXV; C. DESIMONI cit. (1893), docs. CCLV, CCLIX; V. POLONIO cit., docs. 46a, 97, 232, 260. For an exception: C. DESIMONI cit. (1893), doc. CCCIX.

Rubeo not once appears as a witness to any document in Lamberto's registers). In March 1301, however, Baliano entered into partnership with two other Genoese merchants, Lanfranchino de Bulgaro and *Ianotus* Occello, for a trading voyage using his own galley, the *Metamora* or *Miramoria*⁴¹. Later that same year he was taking funds *in commenda* for a voyage in his galley to Constantinople⁴².

In examining what can be known of Pellegrino the shoemaker and his associates and customers, I have tried to present a *vignette* of Genoese colonial society which, though seen from the vantage point of the registers of a Genoese notary, takes us away as far as possible from the world of the commercial partnerships and the wealthy merchants. Famagusta came to into its own at the end of the thirteenth century, swelled by refugees from the Christian possessions in Syria⁴³, and Lamberto's registers provide an almost inexhaustible fount of information⁴⁴. It was a boom town, and, if

⁴¹ V. POLONIO cit., doc. 279.

⁴² R. PAVONI cit. (1982), docs. 73, 110, 111. For later references to Baliano: R. PAVONI cit. (1987), doc. 237; M. BALARD cit. (1984), docs. 33, 98, 102; pp. 53, 166, 171.

⁴³ D. JACOBY, *The Rise of a new emporium in the Eastern Mediterranean: Famagusta in the Late Thirteenth Century*, in «Meletai kai Ipomnimata», I, 1984, pp. 143-79.

⁴⁴ There is a large literature on Lamberto di Sambuceto and Famagusta: D. ABULAFIA, *The Merchants of Messina: Levant Trade and Domestic Economy*, in «Papers of the British School at Rome», LIV, 1986, pp. 196-212; IDEM, *The Anconitan Privileges in the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Levant Trade in Ancona*, in «I Comuni Italiani nel Regno Crociato di Gerusalemme», Collana Storica di Fonti e Studi, 48, Genova, 1986, pp. 525-70; IDEM, *Narbonne, the Lands of the Crown of Aragon, and the Levant Trade 1187-1400*, in «Montpellier, la Couronne d'Aragon et les pays de Langue D'Oc (1204-1349)» (= «Mémoires de la société archéologique de Montpellier», XV), 1987, pp. 189-207; B. ARBEL, *Traffici marittimi e sviluppo urbano a Cipro (secoli XIII-XVI)*, in «Città portuali del Mediterraneo: Storia e Archeologia», ed. E. Poleggi, Genova, 1989, pp. 89-94; IDEM, *Slave Trade and Slave Labor in Frankish Cyprus (1191-1571)*, in «Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History», XXIV, 1993, pp. 149-90; M. BALARD, *La popolazione di Famagosta all'inizio del secolo XIV*, in «La Storia dei Genovesi», IV, 1984, pp. 27-40; IDEM, *Il paesaggio urbano di Famagosta negli anni 1300*, in «La Storia dei Genovesi», V, 1985, pp. 277-91; IDEM, *L'activité commerciale en Chypre dans les années 1300*, in «Crusade and Settlement», ed. P.W.Edbury, Cardiff, 1985, pp. 251-63; IDEM, *Famagouste au début du XIV^e siècle* (cited at n. 12); IDEM, *Les Vénitiens en Chypre dans les années 1300*, in «Byzantinische Forschungen», XII, 1987, pp. 589-603; D. JACOBY, *Citoyens, sujets et protégés de Venise et de Gênes en Chypre du XIII^e au XV^e siècle*, in «Byzantinische Forschungen», V, 1977, pp. 159-88; IDEM, *The Rise of a new emporium* (cited at n. 43); C. OTTEN-FROUX, *Les Pisans en Chypre au moyen-âge*, in

there were merchants with large sums to invest in trade with Armenia, Syria or the West, so too there was plenty of scope for other men such as Ianuino de Murta to invest in property that could be let or for the craftsmen and artisans such as Pellegrino and his circle to provide shoes and clothing and the other services needed by the merchants and seafarers. The lives and activities of these lesser people are not nearly so easy to trace, but we can briefly glimpse individuals even further down the social scale such as Leo the soap-maker who owed Pellegrino one bezant and two solidi, Saliba the water seller who owed Ianuino for a loan of four bezants, or the thief Teri the Pisan (or Teri Gamella) who absconded from Baliano de Ghisolfi's galley with nine white bezants belonging to Ciriaco de Ancona and eleven white bezants belonging to Contessa, the widow of Vassallo the Pisan⁴⁵. But however hard we try, it is to the powerful and wealthy *hommes d'affaires* – men such as Baliano de Ghisolfi or Michele and Giacomo Rubeo – that inevitably we return. On the activities of such men did Genoese greatness rest, and they make a rewarding subject for study. I am sure Geo Pistarino would be the first to agree.

«Praktika tou Deuterou Diethnous Kupriologikou Sunedriou», II, Nicosia, 1986, pp. 127-43; J. RICHARD, *Le peuplement latin et syrien en Chypre au XIII^e siècle*, in «Byzantinische Forschungen», VII, 1979, pp. 157-73; IDEM, *Le royaume de Chypre et l'embargo sur le commerce avec l'Égypte (fin XIII^e - début XIV^e siècle)*, in «Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres: Comptes Rendus», 1984, pp. 120-34; IDEM, *La situation juridique de Famagouste dans le royaume des Lusignans*, in «Praktika tou Deuterou Diethnous Kupriologikou Sunedriou», II, Nicosia, 1986, pp. 221-9.

⁴⁵ V. POLONIO cit., docs. 165, 342, 360, 415.

XIX

The Franco-Cypriot Landowning Class and its Exploitation of the Agrarian Resources of the Island of Cyprus

From 1192 until 1489 a western monarchy ruled over the island of Cyprus.¹ King Richard the Lionheart had ousted the Byzantine ruler in 1191 during the Third Crusade, and he then established the dispossessed king of Jerusalem, Guy of Lusignan, as the new lord. The Lusignans were to remain in control for almost three centuries, and in the wake of the Third Crusade they introduced a new landowning class made up of men who like themselves were from western Europe. Many of them had previously settled in Syria or the Holy Land and had then lost their livelihood as the direct result of the conquests of Saladin. The Lusignans also established a Catholic church hierarchy. The former Byzantine-Greek landowning class disappeared which means that in Cyprus there are no surviving *archontes* such as are found in the Morea after the Fourth Crusade.

A gulf lay between the new, alien landed elite and the indigenous population. Most rural land was held either directly by the king, by the knights and nobles of European descent who possessed their lands as fiefs, or by Latin ecclesiastical corporations. Only Latin Christians could hold fiefs. Although in the course of time the landed class was reinforced by refugees from the Frankish principalities in Syria and by newcomers from the West who by service or marriage were able to acquire estates, it was not generally possible for members of the indigenous population to join this elite. It is only in the late fourteenth century that we begin to find Cypriot Greeks or Syrians becoming knights, and the earliest known examples - Thomas Barech and Thibaut Belfarag - were both converts to Catholicism.² However, in the last century of Lusignan rule acculturation proceeded apace with many members of the ruling class coming to prefer the Greek language and Greek religious observance in their daily lives, while members of the indigenous burgess community - the best known

1 This paper was read at a colloquium entitled 'Etat et colonisation au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance' held at the University of Reims in April 1987. It was originally published in French as 'La classe des propriétaires terriens franco-chypriotes et l'exploitation des ressources rurales de l'île de Chypre' in *Etat et colonisation au Moyen Age*, ed. M. Balard (Lyon, 1989), 145-52.

2 Leontios Makhairas, *Recital Concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed. R.M. Dawkins (Oxford, 1932), §§568, 579, 599.

example, thanks to the work of Professor Jean Richard, being the Audeth family - were obtaining landed estates and Latin ecclesiastical benefices.³

There can be little doubt that most members of the Frankish ruling class derived the bulk of their livelihood from the agricultural resources of the island. Besides the profits from their estates, many had rents assigned on the produce of the royal domain, and in addition the bishops enjoyed tithes levied from the lords' income from land. Estates of course varied in size and value. The tithe account from the diocese of Limassol for 1367 reveals that whereas the tithe payable on the *casal* of Lefkara was put at 2,500 besants, that from the part of Anglisidhes held by Matthew of Villiers amounted to only 10 besants and a small quantity of produce. The large estates might have one or more outlying settlements known as *presteries*, but unfortunately for the historian it is often not possible to say whether the owner of a named locality only had that one place or held an extensive tract of land of which it was the centre.⁴

In administering their lands lords might handle their affairs in person, employ an agent or *bailli* to act on their behalf, or let their estates at farm. The 1367 tithe account reveals that the largest landowners tended to let their estates to a farmer or *apautour*, but a few years earlier an absentee landlord, Walter of Brienne, had employed a *bailli* named Raouche de Monteron whose duties included supervising the running of his estates, collecting his fief-rents, disposing of the produce, paying tithes to the church and distributing gifts to people in positions of influence.⁵ Answerable to the *bailli* or *apautour* were various villagers who had the daily oversight of the economic life of their community. Chief among them was the *catepan*, the village headman, who was responsible for gathering the dues from the peasantry known collectively as *catepanage*. Methods of administration varied. In 1367 the same catepan was responsible to the bishop of Limassol for all three of his estates, while in

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- 3 J. Richard, 'Une famille de «Vénitiens blancs» dans le royaume de Chypre au milieu du XV^eme siècle: les Audeth et la seigneurie du Marethasse', *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi*, i (1981), 89-129 (repr. J. Richard, *Croisés, missionnaires et voyageurs: Les perspectives orientales du monde latin médiéval* (London, 1983), X); W.H. Rudt de Collenberg, 'Le déclin de la société franque de Chypre entre 1350 et 1450', *Kupraikai Spoudai* (1982), 71-83.
- 4 J. Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans. Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIV^e et XV^e siècles)* (Paris, 1962), 80, 85, 89. For a discussion of the *presteries* of Lefkara, see p. 80 note 1. The total tithe from Lefkara was said to be 2,500 besants, but the account then states that 1,400 had been paid and only 700 was outstanding.
- 5 Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans*, pp. 79-81, 85, 86, 102, 103; 'Compte du domaine de Gautier de Brienne au royaume de Chypre', ed. E. Poncelet, *Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire*, xcvi (1934), 14-28 *passim*.

the 1350s Walter of Brienne had separate *catepans* for Omorphita and Knodhara. Earlier in the fourteenth century at Psomolophou the duties of the *catepan* were carried out by the *bailli*.⁶ In addition to the *catepans* there were jurors, scribes and a host of minor officials or servants concerned with the day-to-day running of the estate and whose number and function doubtless varied according to local circumstances.⁷

The land was cultivated by peasants who were either free men (*francomati*) or serfs (*paroikoi*). The serfs were tied to the land and suffered various legal disabilities: they owed their lord a third of the produce of the landholding and other dues besides, as well as having to perform labour services. The *francomati* on the other hand were free to leave their lands and paid a rent which seems normally to have amounted to a third or a quarter of their produce.⁸ In many settlements the land was divided between the peasants' holdings and the lord's demesne, with the *paroikoi* obliged to perform two days' labour service on the latter each week.⁹ In 1367 the bishop of Limassol had demesne land at Amathus and at Phinikaria, where it seems to have accounted for half the total arable, but not, so it would seem, at Akrounda. At Psomolophou the demesne evidently amounted to only a small proportion of the arable, while at its dependency at Tripi it may have formed about half the total; at the other dependent *presteries* there appears to have been no demesne at all.¹⁰ Lords were able to exploit seigneurial monopolies in the countryside and in some places at least could demand additional *corvées* at harvest.¹¹

There is good reason to suppose that during the three centuries of

6 Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans*, pp. 77, 101, 106, 107; 'Compte du domaine', pp. 16, 21, 24, 28; J. Richard, 'Le casal de Psimolofo et la vie rurale en Chypre au XIVe siècle', *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'Ecole française de Rome*, lix (1947), 130, 140 (repr. J. Richard, *Les relations entre l'Orient et l'Occident au Moyen Age: Etudes et documents* (London, 1977), IV).

7 Richard, 'Le casal de Psimolofo', pp. 130-1, 139-53 *passim*. See also 'Compte du domaine', p. 17; J. Richard, 'Un évêque d'Orient latin au XIVe siècle: Guy d'Ibelin, O.P., évêque de Limassol, et l'inventaire de ses biens (1367)', *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, lxxiv (1950), 129-30 (repr. J. Richard, *Les relations entre l'Orient et l'Occident au Moyen Age: Etudes et documents* (London, 1977), V; *idem*, *Chypre sous les Lusignans*, pp. 101, 106, 107.

8 J. Richard, 'Agricultural Conditions in the Crusader States', in K.M. Setton (general ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, v (Madison, 1985), 270-3.

9 *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Lois*, ii, 430; L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852-61), iii, 125, 520. Philip of Mézière's indication that the serfs were liable for three day's service appears to be wrong. *Le Songe du Vieil Pelerin*, ed. G.W. Coopland (Cambridge, 1969), ii, 146.

10 Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans*, pp. 88, 89; 'Le casal de Psimolofo', pp. 140-3.

11 Richard, 'Le casal de Psimolofo', pp. 134-5, 151; 'Les Audeth', pp. 102-3.

Lusignan rule the proportion of the rural population classified as *paroikoi* fell.¹² Although flight, chicanery or the need of the government to raise money through enfranchisement would have provided the means of escape, it is likely that in Cyprus, as in western Europe, the trend away from serfdom should be seen in the context of the economic pressures resulting from the dramatic fall in population brought about by the Black Death and subsequent epidemics. It is more difficult to be certain of the extent to which the status and obligations of the peasantry remained unchanged during the transition from Byzantine to Lusignan rule. There are no grounds for supposing that the Frankish regime introduced elements from Latin Syria or western Europe into the island's agrarian organisation, although the new ruling class regulated itself by means of the legal customs it had brought with it from the kingdom of Jerusalem.¹³ The framework of Cypriot rural society as revealed in fourteenth and fifteenth-century materials has the appearance of being thoroughly Byzantine in origin, and, although it has to be assumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the Latin landlords had simply stepped into the shoes of their Greek predecessors, there is really no way of knowing whether or not the conquest of Cyprus at the time of the Third Crusade made any difference to the legal or economic position of the peasantry. The labour services, though heavy by comparison with what is found elsewhere in the Byzantine world, are unlikely to have been introduced by the Latin settlers from the kingdom of Jerusalem where they were negligible.¹⁴ In any case their introduction would surely have resulted in strong opposition. In sharp contrast to Crete during the first two centuries of Venetian rule after 1204, instances of rebellion or resistance to Lusignan rule in Cyprus are notably infrequent.

In addition to the peasant cultivators, there are also references in our sources to the use of slave labour in the countryside. But not much is known about this aspect of the rural economy. It would seem that slaves were sometimes brought in simply to make up for the dwindling number of *paroikoi*, but on the other hand in the second quarter of the fourteenth century Ludolf of Sudheim recorded a hundred Muslim slaves working in a vineyard near Paphos and there are other hints that there may have been substantial estates largely manned by slaves.¹⁵

12 Richard, 'Agricultural Conditions', pp. 272, 283-4.

13 P.W. Edbury, 'Feudal Obligations in the Latin East', *Byzantion*, xlvii (1977), 328-9 (repr. *supra*, III).

14 For labour services in the kingdom of Jerusalem, see J. Riley-Smith, *The Feudal Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1174-1277* (London, 1973), 45-6.

15 Compare Ludolf's statement (Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, ii, 212) with the four slaves listed together with nine *paroikoi* and their children recorded at *Mauromaria* in

So how and in what sense can this system of agrarian exploitation in Cyprus be regarded as colonial? The Frankish regime does not appear to have tried establishing colonies of western settlers in the countryside. Professor Prawer has described the establishment of agricultural settlements peopled by western immigrants in the kingdom of Jerusalem in the twelfth century, but evidence is lacking for such communities on Cyprus.¹⁶ Nor was the island a colony in the sense that it was controlled by and for the benefit of an outside power. The Lusignans regime was autonomous. In the first half of the thirteenth century the Hohenstaufen emperors were the overlords of the kingdom, but except briefly at the time of Frederick II's crusade their suzerainty was little more than nominal. From 1373 the island was tributary to Genoa and from 1426 to Mamluk Egypt, but neither power interfered in the exploitation of the rural resources. It is only when the Venetians acquired effective control in the mid-1470s - a state of affairs that was formalized in 1489 - that the island's affairs came to be controlled from outside.

On the other hand, there were two features of the agrarian regime that might seem to carry the hallmarks of colonial exploitation: in some instances agrarian wealth was siphoned off for the benefit of individuals or corporations based outside the island, and secondly there were examples of estates in which we find specialized crops - sugar, cotton, grapes - being grown on a commercial basis for export, instead of the mixed husbandry that was seemingly more normal.

The military Orders provide an obvious example of institutions that regularly sent agrarian wealth away from the island. Both the Templars and the Hospitallers had extensive properties, and the income from their estates was explicitly intended for the defence of the Holy Land. Early in the fourteenth century the Hospitallers absorbed the greater part of the former Templar lands and henceforth diverted their revenues to Rhodes.¹⁷ Some lay landlords behaved similarly. In the thirteenth century many of the principal Latin Syrian magnates had estates on Cyprus, and, like John of Ibelin who is recorded as having told the Emperor Frederick II that he had employed his revenues from the island in the defence of his lordship of Beirut,¹⁸ there can be no doubt that they would have used at least some

1452. Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans*, pp. 153-4. For other references, see Richard, 'Guy d'Ibelin', p. 121; 'Agricultural Conditions', p. 273. For a more recent discussion, see now B. Arbel, 'Slave Trade and Slave Labor in Frankish Cyprus (1191-1571)', *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, n.s. xiv (1993), 151-90.

16 J. Prawer, *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford, 1980), 102-42.

17 Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans*, pp. 67-9, cf pp. 111-20.

18 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Documents*

of their income to supplement their resources on the mainland. Some landowners were absentees. In the thirteenth century there were a number of Latin Syrian churches with estates on the island, and throughout the Lusignan period there seems to have been a sizable incidence of non-residence among the senior clergy in the Latin hierarchy. Until the extinction of the line in 1356 the counts of Brienne held Knodhara and Omorphita, yet so far as is known no member of the family had resided in Cyprus since about 1270. In the 1360s Peter I gave estates to a number of western adventurers who entered his service. After his death in 1369 and the cessation of hostilities with the Mamluks soon afterwards many of these men left, but, and this is no doubt indicative of the prevailing attitude among the Cypriot ruling class towards absenteeism, there is good evidence that the new government pursued a rigorous policy of resumption.¹⁹ But with a few exceptions - the Venetian Cornaro family whose ownership of Episkopi dated from the reign of Peter I is the most obvious example²⁰ - we do not find lay landlords based in the West exploiting estates in Cyprus and, in the manner of the colonial planters of later centuries, being able to retire to their places of origin with their profits.

In some places cash-crops were grown. Mention has already been made of the substantial vineyard worked by slave labour shown to Ludolf of Sudheim. Where there was a sufficient supply of water we find large landowners investing in the cultivation of sugar cane. Cotton too was grown, although this is less well documented for the Lusignan period.²¹ There is no doubt that these enterprises were valuable. What is less clear is what sort of proportion of the rural economy was devoted to them and whether or not they became more widespread in the island with the passage of time. Growing crops for export is not of course a 'colonial' activity in itself, and landowners do not seem to have been seeking to exploit their estates by imposing large-scale changes on land use which

Arméniens, ii, 678-9.

19 For the Brienne estates, see 'Compte du domaine'; for Peter I's grants, see P.W. Edbury, 'The Murder of King Peter I of Cyprus (1359-1369)', *Journal of Medieval History*, vi (1980), 229 and note 14 (p. 231) (repr. *supra* XIII).

20 For the Cornaro interests, see G. Luzzatto, 'Capitalismo coloniale nel Trecento' in *Studi di storia economia veneziana* (Padua, 1954), 117-24.

21 See J. Richard, 'Une économie coloniale? Chypre et ses ressources agricoles au moyen-âge', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, v (1977), 338-43, 346-50 (repr. J. Richard, *Croisés, missionnaires et voyageurs: Les perspectives orientales du monde latin médiéval* (London, 1983), VIII). For cotton in the 1360s, apparently grown at Alaminos, *Chypre sous les Lusignans*, p. 91 and note 3. For sugar, see also *Le livre des remembrances de la secrète du royaume de Chypre (1468-1469)*, ed. J. Richard and Th. Papadopoullos (Nicosia, 1983), no. 35 and notes (pp. 156-7).

might have been regarded as militating against the interests of the community as a whole. Professor Richard, who more than anyone has elucidated the subject of medieval Cypriot agriculture and to whose work this brief survey is heavily indebted, has concluded, 'Il nous semble donc que, sous les Lusignans, l'île a connu une économie rurale assez équilibrée'.²² It is difficult not to agree with this view. There is no particular reason to suppose that the peasantry found their Frankish lords harsher masters than their Greek predecessors; wealth from agriculture was drawn out of Cyprus during the Lusignan period, but perhaps no more so than either before or after;²³ the growing of cash-crops for export was far from all-pervasive. The landowning class in Cyprus under the Lusignan dynasty may have been alien, but only to a limited extent and in specific instances can its activities be accounted as example of medieval European colonialism.²⁴

22 Richard, 'Une économie coloniale?', p. 352.

23 For some suggestions about the Cypriot economy under Byzantine rule in the twelfth century, see C. Mango, 'Chypre carrefour du monde byzantin', *Rapports et co-rapports du XVe congrès international d'études byzantines*, v *Chypre dans le monde byzantin*, part 5 (Athens, 1976), 7-11 (repr. C. Mango, *Byzantium and its Image: History and Culture of the Byzantine Empire and its Heritage* (London, 1984), XVII).

24 See Richard, 'Une économie coloniale?', pp. 346, 352; 'Agricultural Conditions', p. 281. See also M.I. Finley, 'Colonies - an Attempt at a Typology', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, series 5, xxvi (1976), 175-6 *et passim*.



The Lusignan Regime in Cyprus and the Indigenous Population

As is well known, Lusignan rule in Cyprus began in 1192 and lasted until the extinction of the dynasty in 1474 and the assumption of control by the Venetians.¹ In 1191, at the time of the Third Crusade, King Richard of England seized the island from a Byzantine usurper named Isaac Ducas Comnenos who had come to power in the mid-1180s. Then the following year, after an interlude of Templar rule, Richard sold it to the dispossessed king of Jerusalem, Guy of Lusignan, and it was Guy and his brother Aimery who established the Frankish kingdom. Their regime was to prove far more durable than the Latin principalities in Syria and the Holy Land established in the wake of the First Crusade, and, with one or two exceptions, far more durable than those founded in Romania after 1204.

The great majority of the population of Cyprus was, and still is, Greek, and I want to consider how the indigenous Greeks fared in the early years of Frankish rule. What difference did the conquest make to their legal status, to their economic opportunities, or to their religious freedoms? But before I try to answer these questions, I need to make an important point. Richard's conquest had been swift and decisive; his campaigns in the island had lasted just one month. The sources tell of two popular outbreaks in the course of 1191-92 - one against Richard's officers, the other against the Templars² - but after that there is virtually no evidence for the local populace engaging in armed insurrection. True we hear of riots in the 1310s and in the early 1360s against Latin attempts to force the Greeks into religious conformity,³ but these entailed no significant loss of control

1 This paper was read at a colloquium entitled 'Méthodes d'expansion et techniques de domination dans le monde méditerranéen (XIème-XVIème siècles)' held in Toulouse in May 1991. It was originally published in French as 'Le régime des Lusignans en Chypre et la population locale' in *Coloniser au Moyen Age*, ed. M. Balard and A. Ducellier (Paris, 1995), 354-58.

2 Roger of Howden, *Gesta Henrici et Ricardi*, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series 49; London 1867), ii, 172-3; *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)*, ed. M.R. Morgan (Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades 14; Paris, 1982), 135, 137; cf. P.W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge, 1991), 7-8.

3 1310s: *Acta Ioannis XXII (1317-1334)*, ed. A.L. Tautu (Pontificia commissio ad redigendum codicem iuris canonici Orientalis. Fontes Ser. 3, 7,2; Città del

by the authorities and seems to have been no more than short-lived spontaneous outbursts of anger over a particular issue. By contrast, it would seem that at the time of the Genoese war of 1373-74, the Cypriot Greeks for the most part took the side of their Frankish masters, supporting them in their struggle against the invaders. It was only with the breakdown of normal governmental control during the Mamluk invasion of 1426 and King Janus's captivity in Egypt that the chroniclers tell of the subject population trying to take power for itself.⁴ In other words, the Lusignan regime was effectively established and was not confronted by the sort of endemic resistance that was to dog the Venetians for long periods after their occupation of Crete early in the thirteenth century. Other evidence supports this view: there is no network of medieval fortifications in Cyprus designed to overawe the indigenous population; we do not hear of Frankish landlords being killed or held to ransom by the islanders; the feudatories had rural residences,⁵ but they did not have to fortify them against their own peasantry. All this implies an acceptance - a reluctant acceptance perhaps, but an acceptance nevertheless - of Frankish rule. I can suggest three possible explanations of why this might be so: the Greeks lacked the sort of people who could lead an opposition movement; the Latins had settled in the island in sufficient numbers to allow them to secure their own position and make their regime viable; and, thirdly, the Lusignans managed to avoid provoking too much hostility.

To return to the contrast with Crete. It is worth asking why the Cypriots should be peaceable when the Cretans were rebellious. The two islands are very similar in size; both have mountainous regions where insurgents might hold out; both fell under outside control at about the same time. Part of the answer may well be that while in Crete there was a strongly entrenched landed class, the *archontes*, from whose ranks the leaders of the native resistance emerged, in Cyprus no equivalent group survived the Lusignan assumption of power. It is true that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries we find Greeks in Cyprus with aristocratic Byzantine names, but there is no evidence that these people were the

Vaticano, 1952), no. 36; 'Chronique d'Amadi' in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ed. R. de Mas Latrie (Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire de France; Paris, 1891-93), i, 395-6. 1360s: Philippe de Mézières, *The Life of St Peter Thomas*, ed. J. Smet (Rome, 1954), 92-3; Leontios Makhairas, *Recital Concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed R.M. Dawkins (Oxford, 1932), §101.

4 1370s: Leontios Makhairas, §§395, 398-9, 433-4, 436, 440-1, 445 *et passim*, but see §§445, 448, 468. 1426: Leontios Makhairas, §§696-7.

5 See for example, 'Les Gestes des Chiprois', *R[ecueil des] H[istoriens des] C[roisades]. Documents Arméniens*, ii, 692.

descendants of pre-conquest *archontes*; it is just as likely that, if indeed they were descended from Byzantine notables at all, they had come to Cyprus at some point after Latin rule had been established. In Crete, and also in the Morea, the western rulers were obliged to admit existing Greek landowners into the feudal hierarchy, although admittedly with inferior status. There is nothing to suggest that this happened in Cyprus. My hunch is that it was the pre-existing social structures, not the circumstances of the conquest, which can explain this difference. It has been argued that in the twelfth century landed wealth in Cyprus under the Byzantines had largely been in the hands of people from Constantinople, not in the hands of local families, and that, as the contemporary monk Saint Neophytos informs us, these Constantinopolitan landholders, already under pressure during the period of Isaac Comnenos's usurpation, fled at the time of the Frankish take-over.⁶ But irrespective of whether they fled or were systematically disinherited by the Lusignans, Greek society in Cyprus henceforth lacked lay leaders of sufficient standing to act at the foci for discontent. Admittedly the Greek community could have rallied around their spiritual leaders, but in practice the Lusignans seem to have been able to neutralize the Orthodox clergy as a political force.

The narrative accounts of the Lusignan settlement of Cyprus make it clear that Guy and Aimery sought to attract as many settlers as possible and were prepared to share the island's wealth widely. There was of course safety in numbers - in 1191 it was the lack of manpower at the disposal of the Templars when faced with rebellion that appears to have led to the Order relinquishing control - and the more people who settled, the more people there were with a vested interest in preserving the new regime. Initially the Lusignans brought their own dependants and other Franks who had lost their livelihood following Saladin's conquests over from Syria. They are said to have enfeoffed 300 knights and 200 mounted sergeants.⁷ Subsequently Frankish settlers came to Cyprus in a steady trickle from the Latin states in Syria and Palestine and also from the West.

6 C. Mango, 'Chypre carrefour du monde byzantin', *Rapports et co-rapports du XVe congrès international d'études byzantines*, v *Chypre dans le monde byzantin*, part 5 (Athens, 1976), 7-9 (repr. C. Mango, *Byzantium and its Image: History and Culture of the Byzantine Empire and its Heritage* (London, 1984), XVII); Neophytos, 'De Calamitatibus Cypri', ed. W. Stubbs in *Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I* (Rolls Series 38; London, 1864-65, i, pp.clxxxv, clxxxvii. For Greeks with aristocratic Byzantine names, J. Richard, 'Culture franque et culture grecque: le royaume de Chypre au XVème siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, xi (1987), 412-14 (repr. J. Richard, *Croisades et Etats latins d'Orient: Points de vue et documents* (Aldershot, 1992), XVIII).

7 *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr*, p.139; Edbury, *Kingdom of Cyprus*, pp.16-19.

Not all arrived with the intention of staying long: western merchants, for instance, or members of the military Orders might only remain for brief periods. But there were clearly many knights and burgesses who made Cyprus their home. Nor did the Lusignans introduce only people of European descent. The late thirteenth century saw the arrival of substantial numbers of Syrian refugees escaping from the Mamluk destruction of their ports along the Levantine coast, and there is good reason to believe that at Famagusta by about 1300 the Franks and Syrians between them outnumbered the Greeks.⁸ The principal towns - Nicosia, Famagusta, Limassol - must have acquired a truly cosmopolitan aspect, and the Greeks, though remaining a substantial section of the population of each, no longer had that degree of overwhelming preponderance which in itself would have threatened the rulers' ability to retain control. On the other hand, in the countryside, which was where the vast majority of the people lived, Greeks continued to form the bulk of the population.

The chief problem in gauging the impact of the conquest and the Frankish settlement lies in the fact that we have little certain information about the island's social fabric from the time of Byzantine rule in the twelfth century. Arguing by analogy with other parts of the Empire offers no sure indication of the conditions in Cyprus, for, as historians are becoming increasingly aware, developments in the structure of rural society and in the legal status of the peasantry varied from region to region.⁹ Such evidence as there is that dates from the thirteenth century indicates that the bulk of the peasantry in Cyprus were serfs - *paroikoi*.¹⁰ But were they *paroikoi* before 1191, or had they been reduced to this status as a direct consequence of the conquest? Elsewhere I have argued that the framework of Cypriot rural society as it emerges from the fourteenth and fifteenth-century materials has the appearance of being thoroughly Byzantine, and, although it may be assumed in the absence of

8 J. Richard, 'Le peuplement latin et syrien en Chypre au XIIIe siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, vii (1979), 168-70 (repr. J. Richard, *Croisés, missionnaires et voyageurs: les perspectives orientales du monde latin médiéval* (London, 1983), VII); D Jacoby, 'The Rise of a New Emporium in the Eastern Mediterranean: Famagusta in the Late Thirteenth Century', *Meletai kai Ipomnimata*, i (1984), 150-4 (repr. D. Jacoby, *Studies on the Crusader States and on Venetian Expansion* (Aldershot, 1989) VIII).

9 A.A.M. Bryer, 'The Estates of the Empire of Trebizond', *Archeion Pontou*, xxxv (1979), 413 (repr. A.A.M. Bryer, *The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos* (London, 1980), VII); A. Harvey, *Economic Expansion in the Byzantine Empire* (Cambridge, 1989), 76-9.

10 For example, *Le Cartulaire du chapitre du Saint-Sépulchre de Jérusalem*, ed. G. Bresc-Bautier (Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades 15; Paris, 1984), no. 178, cf. no. 174; 'Document relatif au servise militaire', *RHC Lois*, ii, 430.

contrary evidence that the Frankish landlords simply stepped into the shoes of their Greek predecessors, there is really no way of knowing whether the conquest made any difference to the position of the peasantry.¹¹ I am inclined to suspect that the peasants were no worse off, legally or economically, under the Franks than they had been under the Byzantines, and, if this was so, one might almost suggest that for many inhabitants in rural areas the change of regime in 1191 would have passed virtually unnoticed.

Not all Greeks were serfs, but there can be no doubt that all Greeks were legally disadvantaged by comparison with the Frankish immigrants. Greeks could not become vassals; they could not witness royal charters; as the mid thirteenth-century Frankish Cypriot jurist, Philip of Novara, made clear, in many instances non-Franks of whatever nationality could not testify against a Frank in the High Court, and, even in those circumstances in which their testimony was admissible, the testimony of a Frank was to be preferred.¹² As in the kingdom of Jerusalem, there was a legal gulf separating the ruling class from the bulk of the population. What was more, the westerners monopolized the judicial offices: not only did they exclude Greeks from membership of the High Court, the viscounts and jurats of the *cour des bourgeois* and also, so it would seem, the *raïs* of the *cour des suriens* all had to be Franks. In other words, Franks presided over the tribunals in which Greeks were likely to seek recompense.¹³ But there may have been mitigating factors. While we have no way of knowing how equitably the Frankish law officers dispensed justice, it would well be that the law as administered remained essentially the customary Byzantine law in operation from long before the conquest, and also that minority groups - Syrians, Armenians, Jews - were entitled to settle their internal wrangles in accordance with their own traditions.¹⁴ Clearly a Greek was in a weak position when he found himself in litigation with a Frank; what is not so clear is whether the Frankish judiciary was any less amenable and any more distant from the lives of the ordinary people than the Byzantine provincial governors and their officials had been before 1191.

11 P.W. Edbury, 'The Franco-Cypriot Landowning Class and its Exploitation of the Agrarian Resources of the Island of Cyprus', *supra*, XIX, 4.

12 Philip of Novara, 'Livre', *RHC Lois*, i, 499, 501, 533; cf. John of Ibelin, 'Livre', *RHC Lois*, i, 114; 'Abrégé du Livre des Assises de la Cour des Bourgeois', *RHC Lois*, ii, 325.

13 'Abrégé', pp.236-7; J. Richard, 'The Institutions of the Kingdom of Cyprus', in K.M. Setton (general ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, vi (Madison, 1989), 160.

14 For a discussion of the situation in the kingdom of Jerusalem, J. Prawer, *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford, 1980), 388-90.

The new rulers would have taken over the former imperial lands and the properties of absentee or dispossessed *archontes* to distribute among their followers. But what of private property in the towns, and what of ecclesiastical property? Information is lacking as regards the fate of Greek-owned urban property, although there is some admittedly tenuous evidence which might suggest a major shake-up to the benefit of the Franks.¹⁵ But we do know that some Greek church properties were secularized. Philip of Novara, for example, refers to former monastic lands being granted as fiefs.¹⁶ Certain monasteries - the most obvious example being Stavrovouni - passed into the hands of Latin monks,¹⁷ and it is fairly clear that Latin clergy occupied other churches and appropriated their endowments.

Contemporaries took the view that the Orthodox community in Cyprus was not schismatic but part of the Universal Church and needed to be brought back into subjection to Rome. But the Lusignans seem to have applied a double standard: what distinguished the privileged Frankish class from the Greeks was the fact that the former were 'de la lei de Rome' but acknowledging papal supremacy while retaining their Orthodox ritual did not make a Greek the equal of a Latin before the law even if it did make them equal in the eyes of God. The Lusignans introduced their own Latin hierarchy - an archbishop of Nicosia and bishops at Paphos, Famagusta and Limassol - and eventually the Greek bishops, reduced in number from fourteen to four, became in an official sense coadjutors to the Latin bishops, with responsibilities for the Greek clergy and congregations within each diocese.¹⁸ It can be assumed that in the course

15 A list of Venetian properties and former properties survives from the 1240s. O. Berggötz, *Der Bericht des Marsilio Zorzi: Codex Querini-Stampalia IV3(1064)* (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), 184-91. The Venetians seem to have lost a lot property, in some cases allegedly by *force majeure* to the Lusignan authorities. It is difficult to know when these losses occurred, but in the case of Monagroulli (*Monachroli*, p.188) it must have been before 1210 since in that year the king gave it to the Hospitallers. *Cartulaire général de l'Ordre des Hospitaliers de St-Jean de Jérusalem*, ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx (Paris, 1894-1906), no.1354. If, as I suspect, the Venetians had lost property acquired before 1191 at the time of the conquest, it would be even more likely that Greek property-owners too had lost out. For further discussion of the Venetian list see Jacoby, 'The rise of a New Emporium', pp. 165-66 *et passim*.

16 Philip of Novara, p. 536.

17 It is not know when the Latins acquired Stavrovouni, although it was before 1254. *Les registres de Innocent IV*, ed. E. Berger (Paris, 1881-1921), no. 8001. The dedication of a house of Cistercian nuns in Nicosia to St Theodore could well indicate that here too the Latins had taken over older Orthodox premises.

18 J. Gill, 'The Tribulations of the Greek Church in Cyprus, 1191-c.1280',

of this process of re-organisation the Latins managed to get their hands on much of the endowments of the former Orthodox bishoprics. Needless to say, the Greeks bitterly resented the subordination that Latin domination entailed, but a *modus vivendi* was reached whereby the Latins in effect left the Greeks to run their own affairs provided they acknowledged their supremacy. The Greeks retained use of most of their parish churches, although in some instances they had to share them with the Latins, and they managed to keep at least some of their monasteries. However, their bishops and other senior clergy remained much poorer than their Latin counterparts.¹⁹ The destruction of the former landowning class meant that the Orthodox had lost their principal benefactors, a point underlined by the comparative dearth of church building and decoration in the two and a half centuries after the Latin conquest.

So if on the one hand the Greek Church was impoverished and subordinate, on the other it seems to have been allowed a considerable measure of autonomy in its day-to-day affairs, and the Lusignans, no doubt mindful of the potentially explosive consequences should Greek ecclesiastical resentments become the focus for social and political protest, came to its rescue on more than one occasion when over-zealous Catholic clergy from Europe tried to bring it into greater conformity with Latin practice. Significantly it was in 1231, at a time when secular control had broken down as a result of civil war, that a friar, probably a Dominican, engineered the martyrdom of thirteen Greek monks for their obduracy in a dispute over eucharistic observance.²⁰ Normally the ruling élite acted as a buffer between the Orthodox community and the Latin clergy. The agreement between the secular rulers and the Latin Church over tithes illustrates a different aspect of the way in which the Latin church was prevented from impinging on the lives of the ordinary Greeks: tithes were payable to the Latin bishops, but they were only levied on the lords' income from the land, not on the total crop; in consequence the episcopal agents did not come into direct contact with the Greek peasantry, only with the seigneurial bailiffs, and so they did not have occasion to foster the perennial resentments found elsewhere.²¹

Byzantinische Forschungen, v (1977), 77, 89-90 (repr. J. Gill, *Church Union: Rome and Byzantium (1204-1453)* (London, 1979), IV).

19 Gill, 'Tribulations', *passim*; Richard, 'Institutions of the Kingdom of Cyprus', pp.168-72.

20 Gill, 'Tribulations', pp.79-80; M. Angold, 'Greeks and Latins after 1204: the Perspectives of Exile', in B. Arbel, B. Hamilton and D. Jacoby (eds), *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London, 1989), 73-74.

21 J. Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans: Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIVe et XVe siècles)* (Bibliothèque archéologique et historique 73: Paris,

One further question before drawing to a close. Did the Greeks have the opportunities for social advancement? The Franks, of course, employed Greeks in their service. For example, we know that the kings used Greeks to staff the *secrète*, the royal finance office, although the head of this department of state, the *bailli*, was a Frank. These officials had considerable responsibilities, and when after the late fourteenth century the evidence becomes more plentiful, it would appear that they were drawn from a distinct group of close-knit families. A career in royal service or in the service of the great men of the kingdom offered one means of advance. In a more general sense, there can be no doubt that sections of the Greek population, especially in the towns, shared in the benefits of the prosperity that Cyprus enjoyed under the Lusignans, particularly in the first half of the fourteenth century. Social change in rural communities, however, would have occurred despite rather than because of anything the Frankish rulers achieved. It was in the lords' interests to preserve the class of *paroikoi*, but in Cyprus, as elsewhere, they had to contend with flight from the land, chicanery and economic forces which combined to encourage the growth of the class of free peasants. Unfortunately the evidence dates from the fourteenth century or later, and I can do no more than suggest that there was probably not much enfranchisement before the plague of 1347-48.²²


This survey has had to be rather more tentative than I would have wished, and I have not the space to discuss one important aspect of my subject, namely the acculturation between Greeks and Latins which was evidently in full flow in the fifteenth century and which, I believe, had important implications at every level.²³ It is easier to ask questions - why were there so few revolts? how did the conquest affect the legal status of the peasantry? how did the conquest affect property-ownership? how did the Lusignans manage to avoid creating a situation in which the Orthodox Church became the focus for political opposition? - than it is to find satisfactory answers and not just hypotheses. The solidity of the Lusignan regime, the island's prosperity, and the apparent absence of internal conflict are indicative of a successful transition to Frankish rule. It would of course be anachronistic to suggest that the Lusignans were enlightened rulers who saw the task of bettering the condition of their subjects as their

1962), 62.

22 J. Richard, 'Agricultural Conditions in the Crusader States' in K.M. Setton (general ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, v (Madison, 1985), 270-73.

23 See J. Richard, 'Culture franque et culture greque'. In a fifteenth-century manuscript of John of Ibelin's legal treatise the words 'ou Grex' are heavily deleted from the list of categories of people who cannot testify in the High Court Vatican Library: Cod. vat. lat. 4789 fo. liii^v. Cf. John of Ibelin, p. 114.

appointed mission, but they would have realised the need for a *modus vivendi*, and no doubt their experiences in Syria and the Holy Land would have helped them find one. It was a matter of self-interest. The kings and their vassals had to live alongside the Greeks; they depended on Greek labour for their livelihood; and they seem to have managed to strike a satisfactory balance between coercive government and sensitivity to their subjects' aspirations.



LATIN DIOCESES AND PERISTERONA: A CONTRIBUTION
TO THE TOPOGRAPHY OF LUSIGNAN CYPRUS

The existence in Cyprus of fourteen Greek dioceses before 1222 and the creation in 1196 of four Latin ones is familiar to all students of the island's history in the middle ages. On the basis of summaries such as that given by the *Chronique d'Amadi*, it is normally said that the Latin dioceses corresponded to groupings of the Greek: thus the new archdiocese of Nicosia engulfed the orthodox dioceses of Nicosia, Soli, Tamassus, Tremetousha, Kiti, Kythrea, Kyrenia and Lapithos; the diocese of Famagusta, thos of Constantia and Carpasia; Limassol, those of Curium and Amathus; and Paphos, those of Paphos and Arsinoe.¹ Exactly where the boundaries of the dioceses ran is not always clear, although the extent of the Latin diocese of Limassol can be established thanks to the discovery and publication of the detailed financial accounts for the years 1367-8.² Perhaps even more important than knowing the actual location of the boundaries is the question of whether the area of the Latin dioceses coincided with that of the older Greek dioceses they incorporated and which in 1222 they were to supersede. An answer to this question might provide evidence for the wider problem of the extent to which the Lusignans were prepared to adopt pre-existing Byzantine institutions in their settlement of the island. It is the intention of the first part of this article to show that the boundaries were in fact superimposed, although with one significant exception.

The essential clue is provided by the bull of Pope Celestine III of December 1196 confirming the privileges of the newly created Latin archbishopric of Nicosia. The passage in which he listed its endowments is worth quoting in full:

"... locum ipsum in quo prefata Nicosiensis ecclesia sita est, cum omni-

1. 'Chronique d'Amadi', ed. R. de Mas Latrie in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi* (*Collection de Documents inédits sur l'histoire de France*, Paris, 1891, 1893), i, 85-6; L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan* (Paris, 1852-61), i, 123; J. Hackett, *A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus* (London, 1901), 470-71; G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, 1940-52), ii, 46-7.

2. J. Richard, *Chypre sous les Lusignans: Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIVe et XVe siècles)* (*Bibliothèque archéologique et historique*, 73, Paris, 1962), 61-110.

bus pertinentiis suis, dotem etiam ejusdem ecclesie, videlicet duo casalia a karissimo in Christo filio Aymerico, illustre rege Cypri, ipsi ecclesie data et assignata, scilicet Ornithia et Ascendia; decimas insuper istarum regionum Cypri que, ex constitutione Sedis Apostolice, ad ipsam Nicosiensem ecclesiam pertinent, Nicosie videlicet, cum pertinentiis suis, la Solie, la Thomasie, la Tremetossie, le Quit, la Quercherie, Cherin, Lapiton, Melyas, Maratha, Syvorie, Cambi, Xindas et feodum, Briem, et Asquia, et Pigui et Prastrove ...”³

In other words, the original endowment consisted of the site of the cathedral, two *casalia* in full possession, and tithes. The *casalia* are readily identifiable as the neighbouring settlements of Aphanias and Ornithi, about twelve miles due east of Nicosia, and, although a dispute over them is briefly glimpsed on a document of 1221,⁴ they present no problem.

Our difficulties begin when we turn our attention to the tithes. Scholars have interpreted the bull of 1196 as meaning that the Latin archbishop received tithes from Nicosia itself and a selection of villages in the archdiocese, and they have assumed that this meant that the Greeks were thus deprived of tithes formerly due to them.⁵ But this assumption is false: the orthodox church had no direct equivalent to the western system of tithes,⁶ and so we are faced with the improbable situation in which the Latins made certain localities liable for this imposition while others escaped. What no one has noticed is that whereas Aphanias and Ornithi are clearly described as villages (*casalia*), the other places are all called regions (*regiones*). Furthermore, the first eight of these *regiones* are the eight seats of the Greek bishoprics swallowed up in the Latin archdiocese. Mas Latrie, the first to discuss this document, rightly saw that ‘la Solie’, ‘la Tremetossie’, ‘le Quit’, ‘la Quercherie’, and ‘Lapiton’ are respectively Soli, Tremetousha, Kiti, Kythrea and Lapithos, but he failed to identify ‘la Thomasie’ (Tamasos) and thought that ‘Cherin’ was Xeri rather than Kyrenia.⁷ The conclusion to be drawn from this coincidence must be that what was meant by *regiones* in these eight instances were in fact the Greek dioceses, and so it follows that the Latin archbishop was to enjoy the tithes from the entire area under

3. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii, 601-2.

4. Honorius III, *Regesta*, ed. P. Pressutti (Rome, 1888, 1895), no. 3688.

5. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, i, 123-5; Hackett, *op. cit.*, 479-80; Hill, *op. cit.*, ii, 46.

6. For the revenues of the orthodox church, see *The Cambridge Medieval History*, iv (new ed. 1966-7), part ii, 118-25.

7. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii, 601. J. L. La Monte (‘A register of the cartulary of the cathedral of Santa Sophia of Nicosia’, *Byzantion*, v, 1930, 445) identified Tamasos correctly and Hill (*op. cit.*, ii, 46 n. 5) added Kyrenia.

his immediate jurisdiction.

But what of the other places listed in the papal bull? Mas Latrie was unable to identify 'Cambî' and 'Briem', but had no difficulty with 'Melyas' (Milea), 'Maratha' (Maratha), 'Syvorie' (Sivouri), 'Xindas' (Sinda), 'Asquia' (Asha) and 'Pigui' (Piyi), all of which lie in the Mesaoria. 'Prastrove' he suggested could be Peristerona near Piyi or the near-by Prastio.⁸ Probably 'Cambî' and 'Briem' were the names of now vanished or perhaps renamed settlements in the same area, or alternatively are names of settlements which have been corrupted out of all recognition in the transmission of the text.⁹ When we examine the actual location of the identifiable places in this part of the list, we find that they are situated along a curved line reaching from Asha in the south-west to Milea in the north-east. The unmistakable inference is that together these places constituted a contiguous block of territory, and it should be added that the phrase 'Xindas et feodum' suggests that in this case tithes were due not just from the settlement itself, but from the outlying dependencies which together with it went to make up the fief of Sinda. —a fief in the mid-thirteenth century held by a certain Walter Le Moine.¹⁰

My hypothesis is as follows. The list of places owing tithes is in fact made up from two separate lists, misleadingly put together. The archbishop was to receive the tithes from all the places situated within the eight Greek dioceses his archdiocese covered and from an additional district not included in the eight. In other words, since under the new Latin establishment the area from which the diocesan bishops drew their tithes would coincide with the area under their jurisdiction, the archdiocese of Nicosia consisted of the territory of the eight Greek dioceses plus a slice of territory from a ninth—clearly that of Constantia. It would not be unreasonable to suppose that the places concerned lay on the Constantia side of the boundary between the Greek dioceses of Constantia and Tremetousha. On the map they would appear as a bulge or salient, intruding into the Latin diocese of Famagusta. Knodhara, about seven miles west-north-west of Milea evidently came within the bishop of Famagusta's jurisdiction,¹¹ and so the boundary must have turned sharply thereabouts.

8. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii, 601-2.

9. La Monte (*op. cit.*, 445) suggested Kambi for 'Cambî' and also Marathassa for 'Maratha'.

10. 'Les Lignages d'Outremer', *Recueil des historiens des croisades. Lois*, ii, 473.

11. In the fourteenth century the tithes of Knodhara were paid to the bishop of Famagusta. 'Compte du domaine de Gautier de Brienne au royaume de Chypre', ed. E. Poncelet, *Académie royale de Belgique. Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire*, xcvi (1934), 18.

Support for this explanation of the list of *regiones* owing tithes to Nicosia comes from evidence that in the early 1220s the bishop of Famagusta, Caesarius de Alagno, was attempting to recover the tithes from at least some of the villages in question from the then archbishop of Nicosia, Eustorgue de Montagu. In January 1222 Pope Honorius III told the patriarch of Jerusalem, the bishop of Bethlehem and the archdeacon of Acre to restore to Caesarius the tithes the archbishop was withholding from Milea, Sivouri and certain other places 'in regionibus Petalas et Constantiae et Crotequi' as granted to the church of Famagusta at the time of its foundation in the reign of King Aimery as shown by the privileges of Celestine III. Milea and Sivouri were both among the places listed as owing tithes to Nicosia and the unspecified places seem to have been in the same general area and could have been the other localities named in 1196.¹² If Celestine issued a bull for Famagusta at the same time as his bull for Nicosia, it has not survived. Perhaps it stated that the bishop was to enjoy the tithes throughout the area of the orthodox bishopric of Constantia, but omitted to add that some places had been detached from it and given to Nicosia. The matter of tithes was just one of several disputes between the two bishops: as early as 1218 Caesarius had been complaining about Eustorgue's pretensions.¹³ From 1221 Caesarius was himself at the papal court on business relating to the general liability of laymen in Cyprus to pay tithes and the question of relations between the Latin and Greek churches.¹⁴ In what was almost certainly part of the dispute over the tithes of Milea and elsewhere, Caesarius had excommunicated men for withholding tithes he believed to be his, and in December 1221, evidently taking advantage of his presence in Italy, he induced the pope to forbid Eustorgue to lift this excommunication. The pope was again involved in 1224 when he wrote allowing Caesarius to use ecclesiastical censure to compel the restitution of goods taken from his church, apparently on Eustorgue's orders, during his absence at Rome.¹⁵ But although something of the bitterness can be observed, it is not certain whether Caesarius succeeded in making the recovery of the area detached

12. Honorius III, no. 3689. 'Petalas' could refer to the Pedhieos river which flows through this area; 'Constantia' is Constantia-Salamis; 'Crotequi' is probably to be identified with Akrotiki, a district referred to be Leontios Makhairas and located by Dawkins in the Karpasia peninsula. Leontios Makhairas, *Recital concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus entitled 'Chronicle'*, ed. and translated by R. M. Dawkins (Oxford, 1932), i, paras. 34, 191, 448, 654; see ii, 65.

13. Honorius III, nos. 1527-8.

14. *Ibid.*, nos. 3663, 4998, 5361.

15. *Ibid.*, nos. 3664, 4687.

from the diocese of Constantia in 1196 permanent. In 1225 he was translated to the archbishopric of Salerno, and his successors seem not to have shared his taste for litigation.¹⁶

But even if the outcome of this dispute is unknown, one point does emerge clearly. Except for this group of villages in the Mesaorea, the boundaries of the diocese of Nicosia and hence those of the other Latin dioceses were coterminous with the boundaries of the Greek dioceses they overlay. To this extent at least the former ecclesiastical boundaries had been preserved and the administrative geography of the Byzantine province had survived the Latin Conquest.

The possible reference to Peristerona in the bull of Celestine III provides the cue for an attempt to distinguish the various places with this name mentioned in the medieval sources. Modern maps of Cyprus show three localities so named: Peristerona in the Mesaorea (about twelve miles northwest of Famagusta), Peristerona in Morphou (about sixteen miles to the west of Nicosia) and Peristerona in Khrysokhou (about five miles southeast of Polis). There is also Peristeronari near Lefka. Medieval writers sometimes record a Peristerona 'of the count of Jaffa' and, in a variety of spellings, 'la montaine de Peristeronn' - the 'Mountain of Peristerona'. All this has given rise to considerable confusion. Louis de Mas Latrie identified the 'Mountain of Peristerona' with Peristeronari,¹⁷ even though a glance at a relief map would argue against the plausibility of this suggestion. René de Mas Latrie accepted this theory and further identified Peristeronari with Peristerona 'of the count of Jaffa'.¹⁸ Dawkins followed René de Mas Latrie's identification and also asserted that Peristerona of the Mesaorea was Peristerona in Morphou.¹⁹ More recently, Professor Jean Richard has suggested that the 'Mountain of Peristerona' was Peristerona in Morphou.²⁰

An examination of the surviving references to these various localities, however, can provide a solution to the difficulties and confusions scholars have encountered. There are in fact five different places to be considered:

(1) *Peristerona of the Mesaorea*. Leontios Makhairas, Diomedes Stram-

16. *Ibid.*, nos. 5654-5. His successors are scarcely known even by name. See G. Fedalto, *La Chiesa Latina in Oriente*, (Verona, 1973-77) ii, 121.

17. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii, 253 n. 7.

18. Diomedes Strambaldi, 'Cronicha del Regno di Cypro', ed. R. de Mas Latrie in *Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi*, ii, 13 n. 9.

19. Leontios Makhairas, ii, 61.

20. Richard, *op. cit.*, 143 n. 3.

baldi and Florio Bustron all refer to a cult of St. Anastasius here, and any doubts are dispelled by the fact that there is still a church there dedicated to this saint.²¹ If the 'Prastrove' of Celestine's bull is indeed a corruption of 'Peristerona', then this is it. From the list of alienations preserved by Florio Bustron it is known that in the 1460s King James II gave this Peristerona to one of his followers.²²

(2) *Peristerona in Morphou*. Makhairas, Strambaldi and Florio Bustron all state that there was a cult of St. Barnabas and St. Hilarion at Peristerona 'of the count of Jaffa',²³ and as it is to these saints that the well-known five-domed church at Peristerona in Morphou is dedicated, there can be no doubt of the identity. The counts of Jaffa with whom it was associated were the Jaffa branch of the Ibelin family. The first member of the family to bear this title, the famous feudal jurist, John of Ibelin (died 1266) is known to have been in possession of it in 1248, and the village had evidently passed to him from his father, Philip of Ibelin, who had acquired it before 1217.²⁴ The Ibelin line apparently died out in the third quarter of the fourteenth century,²⁵ and Peristerona in Morphou ceased to be connected with subsequent holders of the title. It was not numbered among the possessions of James of Flourey, count of Jaffa in the second quarter of the fifteenth century, and in the early sixteenth it was listed as being part of the royal domain.²⁶

(3) *Peristerona in Khrysokhou*. This is almost certainly the Peristerona granted by James II to his mother, Marietta of Patras, in the 1460s; his other gifts to her, Lyso, Pelathousa, and land at Polis, were all close by.²⁷

(4) *Peristeronari*. In a geographical note which leaves no doubt that the present-day Peristeronari is intended, Florio Bustron referred to this place using the same spelling as appears on the modern English-language maps. The same writer also noted that it was granted by James II to one of his supporters.²⁸

21. Leontios Makhairas, i, para. 32; Diomedes Strambaldi, 12-13; Florio Bustron, 'Chronique de l'île de Chypre', ed. R. de Mas Latrie, (*Collection de Documents inédits sur l'histoire de France. Mélanges historiques*, v, Paris, 1886), 33.

22. Florio Bustron, p. 421.

23. Leontios Makhairas, i, para. 32; Diomedes Strambaldi, 13 (the punctuation in this portion of the text is misplaced); Florio Bustron, 34.

24. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii, 608-9, 648-9.

25. P. W. Edbury, 'The Ibelin counts of Jaffa: a previously unknown passage from the "Lignages d'Outremer"', *English Historical Review*, lxxxix (1974), 609.

26. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii, 504. For the possession of James of Flourey, see Richard, *op. cit.*, 124-6.

27. Florio Bustron, 418.

28. *Ibid.*, 28, 421.

(5) *The Mountain of Peristerona*. Four references, all from the fifteenth century, provide ample evidence for the identity of this locality. In 1440 King John II granted James of Floury “la presterie d’Eftericoudy, appartenance de Presterone de la Montaigne”;²⁹ in 1468 we read of a “serf de la montaine de Peristeronn, de la presterie de Alona”, and of another serf of “la mountain de Presteronn et de la presterie de Handria”;³⁰ 1474 saw the grant to George Contarini of a number of places including “Platanistassa, la quale è prastio de la Montagna de Peristerona”.³¹ Phterykoudi, Alona, Khandria and Platanistasa are all hamlets close to each other high on the slopes of Mount Adelphi, about fifteen miles south of Peristerona in Morphou. ‘La montaine de Peristeronn’ was thus the medieval name for Mount Adelphi and perhaps it derived its name from the fact that the streams running down its northern slopes flow through Peristerona. The way in which the phrases quoted here are formed make it possible to suggest that at some period the hamlets (*presterie*) which clustered around the mountain had formed a single administrative unit, but whether such a unit would have had any legal association with Peristerona in Morphou cannot be determined.

Peristerona in Morphou, undoubtedly the most important of the places under discussion, belonged to the counts of Jaffa and took its name from them. The ‘Mountain of Peristerona’ was indeed a mountain. Once these two points are realised, the identification of any fresh references which might turn up to one of the places named Peristerona should be easier.

29. Richard, *op. cit.*, 143.

30. Mas Latrie, *Histoire*, iii, 234, 253 n. 7.

31. ‘Documents nouveaux servant de preuves à l’histoire de l’île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan’, ed. L. de Mas Latrie, (*Collection de Documents inédits sur l’histoire de France. Mélanges historiques*, iv, Paris, 1882), 445. This is an Italian translation of a French original. See p. 443, n. 3.

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

II When John Rowe and I wrote this paper, we were both strongly influenced by the views put forward by the late M.R. Morgan in her monograph, *The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre* (Oxford, 1973), and in particular by her argument that the so-called 'Lyon *Eracles*' is the version of the Old French Continuation of William of Tyre closest to the original writings of Ernoul, the squire of Balian of Ibelin. Morgan subsequently edited this text, thereby facilitating a comparison with the other versions.¹ For reasons explained elsewhere, I now believe that she was mistaken and think that the 'Lyon *Eracles*' is a comparatively late re-working of the material and should not necessarily be considered preferable to the group of texts she referred to as the *abrégé*.² To an extent therefore our analysis of the relationship between the accounts of the events of 1180 is flawed and needs to be read with care. (Incidentally, the mistaken acceptance of the superiority of the Lyon *Eracles* over the other versions also appears in no. I.)

Morgan's belief that the French translation of William of Tyre's Latin history of the crusade from its inception until 1184 can be dated to c. 1220 (see II, p.3) turns out to be unwarranted. The present state of our knowledge does not allow a date more precise than 1204 x 1234.³

III In some ways the approach adopted in this essay now seems rather dated, especially in the light of recent revisionist work by Susan Reynolds⁴ and Ronnie Ellenblum⁵. In particular, the sentence on p.339 beginning 'There can be no doubt ...' makes a totally unwarranted assumption about the nature of military society in the West in the late eleventh century. In a recent paper I have tried to address some of the issues,⁶ but the wider

1 *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* (1184-1197) (Paris, 1982).

2 P.W. Edbury, *The Conquest of the Jerusalem and the Third Crusade* (Aldershot, 1996), 3-7; 'The Lyon *Eracles* and the Old French Continuations of William of Tyre' in B.Z. Kedar, J. Riley-Smith, R. Hiestand (eds), *Montjoie: Studies in Crusade History in Honour of Hans Eberhard Mayer* (Aldershot, 1997), 139-54.

3 J.H. Pryor, 'The *Eracles* and William of Tyre: An Interim Report' in B.Z. Kedar (ed.), *The Horns of Hattin* (Jerusalem and Aldershot, 1992), 288-9.

4 S. Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford, 1994)

5 R. Ellenblum, *Frankish Rural Settlement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Cambridge, 1998)

6 P.W. Edbury, 'Fiefs, vassaux et servise militaire dans le royaume latin de

questions of military obligation, land tenure and social structure still deserve further attention.

IV This paper was originally read at a conference held in Oxford in 1979. Since then the whole subject of crusader numismatics has been transformed by the appearance of D.M. Metcalf, *Coinage of the Crusades and the Latin East in the Ashmolean Museum Oxford*.⁷ The interpretation of the *établissement* of King Baldwin (p.66) was later discussed by Jonathan Riley-Smith.⁸

VI The subject of the *Lignages d'Outremer* has recently been reviewed in an important article by Marie-Adélaïde Nielen-Vandevoorde.⁹ My remarks about the Cistercian abbey of St Theodore at Nicosia (p.608) need to be modified in the light of a paper by Jean Richard.¹⁰

VII The paper was conceived as a response to an article by Professor Hans Mayer published in 1978 (see p.116 note 1). He replied in two articles which appeared in 1984 and 1985.¹¹ I myself did not return to the subject of these exchanges until 1997 and the appearance of my study on John of Ibelin.¹² I now believe that, of the various possibilities, the most likely is that the county of Jaffa had belonged to Alice of Champagne as her dower until her death in 1246 and that Henry I gave it to John shortly after she died. Previously Alice had given Jaffa to her son-in-law, Walter of Brienne, to administer. By 1246 the defence of Jaffa was a heavy responsibility and quite possibly not an attractive proposition; it is by no means certain that the grant to John should be seen as a *douceur* to get him to agree to King Henry of Cyprus taking the regency of Jerusalem (see above, VIII pp.20-21).

Jérusalem' in M. Balard and A. Ducellier (eds), *Le partage du monde: échanges et colonisation dans la Méditerranée médiévale* (Paris, 1998), 141-50.

7 1st edn 1983, 2nd edn (much revised and enlarged) 1995.

8 J. Riley-Smith, 'Further Thoughts on Baldwin II's *établissement* on the Confiscation of Fiefs' in P.W. Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement* (Cardiff, 1985), 176-80

9 M-A. Nielen-Vandevoorde, 'Un livre méconnu des *Assises de Jérusalem*: les *Lignages d'Outremer*', *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, 153 (1995), 105-30.

10 J. Richard, 'The Cistercians in Cyprus' in M. Gervers (ed.), *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians* (New York, 1992), 199-2


11 H.E. Mayer, 'John of Jaffa. His Opponents and his Fiefs', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 128 (1984), 134-63; 'The Double County of Jaffa and Ascalon: One Fief or Two?', in P.W. Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement* (Cardiff, 1985), 181-90.

12 P.W. Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Woodbridge, 1997), chapter 3. See also essay VIII in this volume

Note (p.117) that the Ibelin occupation of Tyre should be 1242 and not 1243 and (p.129) that the Spanish version of the *Annales de Terre Sainte* is in Castilian and not Catalan.

XII I would now want to stress the additional point (see pp.92, 94-5) that Peter in effect inherited the crusade from King John II of France and in the process inherited the French propagandist rhetoric which saw the expedition as being *pro recuperatione Terre Sancte*.

XVIII p.224. Four lines from the end, read 'Simone' for 'Michele'.



INDEX

Abbreviations: abp: archbishop/archbishopric; Ant: Antioch; bp: bishop/bishopric; Byz: Byzantine; C: Cyprus; ct: count; d: daughter; e: emperor; J: Jerusalem; k: king; kdm: kingdom; ld: lord; pat: patriarch; pr: prince; q: queen; w: wife

- Abraynus, *bancherius*: XVII 90, 91
 Abulafia, D.: XVII 88
 Achaea, principality: VIII 25
 Acre: II 22n; III 332, 334, 335; IV 62, 65; V 3, 6, 8-9, 42; VI 606; VII 117, 121, 123, 125, 131-3; VIII 15-18, 20, 22, 23; IX 75, 77; X 4295; XI 231, 234, 236, 238, 241; XII 94; XIV 111, 116; XVI 337, 345, 346; XVII 89-92, 94; archdeacon: XXI 48; bp, see William; Commune: X 4296; Confraternity of St Andrew: XVI 344; *cour des bourgeois*: VII 132; French garrison: III 342; V 10, 41n; viscount: X 4297
 Adriatic: XV 8
 Aegean: XI 228-30; XII 91-33; XIV 113, 125
 Aghirda: XIV 110
 Agnes of Courtenay: I 174, 175, 180-2, 184; II 4-7, 11, 18-19, 23-4
 Agridi (Aghirda): III 341; VIII 18
 Aimery of Lusignan, k. of C. & J.: I 174, 188, II 13, 16n; V 7, 44; VII 120-2, 124; VIII 16, 21; IX 74; XX 1, 3; XXI 46, 48
 Aimery of Lusignan, brother of Henry II: VI 607
 Akrotiki: XXI 48n
 Akrounda: XIX 3
 Alaminos: XIX 6n
 Alaya: XI 229, 230
 Albert of Vercelli, pat. J.: II 6n, 14
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
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
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
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